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The thesis examines the evolution of Russian policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts 
from the start of 1992, when the Russian Federation became an independent state, to the 
Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian conflict in December 1995. 
In Part I, I discuss rival international relations theories in the post-Cold War world and 
apply them to the debate over foreign policy in Russia and Russian perceptions of the 
Yugoslav conflicts. 
Part II examines the evolution of Russian policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts until 
the end of 1993. January to autumn 1992 was the `liberal internationalist' phase of 
Russian policy, when the government promoted co-operation with the West in order to 
achieve a settlement of the Yugoslav conflicts, and a domestic backlash put pressure on 
the government to adjust its approach. A transitional phase followed, from autumn 1992 
to the end of 1993, during which the government developed a more assertive great 
power policy based on relative domestic consensus. 
Part III shows this neo-realist policy in action. Russian policy makers used the Sarajevo 
crisis of February 1994 to demonstrate Russia's great power status. They also sought to 
prevent developments considered to be harmful to Russia's national interests, in 
particular military action by NATO against the Bosnian Serbs. For a period, other 
powers recognised that Russian opinions must be taken into account. But in summer 
1995, Western policy makers ignored Russian objections and Russia played a secondary 
role in achieving a peace settlement. 
Russian policy makers attempted to use the Yugoslav conflict to demonstrate Russia's 
great power status and its independence from the West, but Russia lacked the power and 
influence for the policy to be effective. Russian policy contributed to the failure of the 
`international community' to achieve a just settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
added to the divisions developing between Russia and the West. 
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Introduction 
The outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in 1991 followed swiftly after the dramatic events in 
Central and Eastern Europe of the late 1980s that marked the end of the Cold War: the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the fall of communist 
regimes across the region, the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and German 
re-unification. The wars were partly a result of those changes because the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia lost its legitimacy and unifying role as communist regimes 
collapsed across the region; and because, during the Cold War, the threat of Soviet 
invasion maintained the unity of the country, while neither NATO nor the Soviet Union 
would allow Yugoslavia to collapse since this would create a dangerously unstable 
region in which superpower competition would deepen. 
The Yugoslav Wars became the most severe of a number of ethnic conflicts that 
arose throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following the fall of 
communism and the end of the post-Second World War international system. The wars 
themselves, and the international responses to them, are important indicators as to what 
kind of international system is replacing the Cold War world. Is it one in which a 
number of states will compete for power and influence, or will they instead seek to co- 
operate in order to maintain peace and secure justice? Alternatively, will they turn 
inwards and try to avoid any involvement in conflicts outside their immediate vicinity, 
judging them to have no effect on their national interests and consequently not to merit 
attention? Or are the conflicts themselves a sign of a world in which the system of state 
sovereignty that has prevailed in Europe for 350 years is collapsing in the face of 
separatist tendencies within, and globalisation without? Or do they actually show that 
the desire for nations to have their own state is stronger than ever? 
Special attention must also be paid to the Russian Federation in analysing the new 
world political system. No longer able to claim the title of `superpower', the successor 
to the Soviet Union remains a major power, or at least has the potential to become one. 
What kind of state it becomes, and what kind of policies its leaders pursue, are key 
questions in the development of world politics. Will policy makers attempt to re- 
establish Russia's imperial role, or will they endeavour to transform it into a nation- 
state? Will they pursue a competitive great power strategy, or will they seek to co- 
operate with leaders of other states in regulating relations between them, preventing 
conflicts, and tackling common threats? 
Although the Yugoslav conflicts were not the most pressing concern for the 
Russian government, its responses to the conflicts, and the criticism of policy levelled 
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by the opposition, give an insight into the orientation of official Russian foreign policy 
since 1992 and the alternatives to it. The issues raised were central to a definition of 
what kind of state Russia would be and how it would act in the international arena. For 
example, would it support what was widely perceived in Russia to be its traditional ally, 
Serbia? Would it insist on Russia's traditional strategic and economic interests in the 
Balkans? Would it use the conflicts to promote its own position as a post-Cold War 
great power? Or would it co-operate with Western powers to end the conflict and create 
a just peace? Or would it decide that it could not be involved in conflict resolution in the 
Balkans when it had to deal with conflicts in the Russian Federation and in the former 
Soviet space, and was suffering severe economic troubles? 
By looking at Russian responses to the wars in former Yugoslavia we can 
understand more fully the priorities and approaches of Russian foreign policy, as well as 
the nature of the developing post-Cold War international environment in general. Such 
understanding is necessary in order to devise appropriate responses, and for the pursuit 
of peace in the former Yugoslavia and in Europe as a whole. 
I shall analyse Russian policy from the start of 1992 when the Russian Federation 
became an independent state, to the Dayton Accords at the end of 1995 that ended the 
Bosnian war. I shall not discuss Russian policy after 1995, such as policy towards the 
Kosovo conflict of 1999. This is mainly a matter of space constraints. But it also makes 
sense to analyse the conflicts separately, since the Kosovo conflict created new issues 
and different priorities. It was also in a different period of Russian policy: conveniently, 
the period from 1992 to 1995 is the `Kozyrev era', since, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Andrei Kozyrev had the most significant input into policy; his replacement by Evgenii 
Primakov at the start of January 1996 marked the start of a new era. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part provides a theoretical 
background, creating a framework in which to interpret the development of policy. 
Chapter 1 discusses rival international theories and their applicability to the post-Cold 
War world. The second chapter investigates general Russian foreign policy from 1992 
to 1995 in the context of these theories. Chapter 3 looks at the various potential 
approaches that Russia could adopt/have adopted towards the Yugoslav conflicts. 
In part two, I examine the evolution of Russian policy towards the conflicts from 
1992 to the end of 1993. The focus of attention is primarily the domestic ideological and 
political struggle for control of policy of the newly independent state, and I argue that 
this period witnessed sharp divisions and debate in which the Yugoslav conflicts played 
a key role. Chapter 4 investigates the initial `liberal internationalist' phase of foreign 
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policy dominated by the pro-Western ideological outlook of the Yeltsin `reformers'. 
This phase was symbolised by Russia's vote in the United Nations Security Council to 
impose sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro for their involvement in the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This decision sparked intense debate in Russia and a concerted 
attack on the Foreign Ministry's wider policy and philosophy. The result of this debate 
was a shift to a more assertive policy that enjoyed relatively consensual support. In 
relation to Yugoslavia, it was centred on the idea of Russia's status and rights as a great 
power (chapter 5). 
Part three continues to investigate the domestic determinants of foreign policy, but 
the emphasis is now more on Russia's role on the international stage and its contribution 
to the efforts of the `international community' to end the wars in former Yugoslavia. 
The more assertive Russia demanded to be involved in these efforts, and insisted that its 
interests be taken into account. This was demonstrated starkly by the Sarajevo crisis of 
February 1994 (chapter 6). Following the crisis, the major powers sought to develop a 
common policy; Russia and the United States were now more directly involved in 
devising a peace plan; but the necessity to maintain the concert undermined the 
effectiveness of the peace-making efforts (chapter 7). Finally, in chapter 8I show that 
events in Bosnia and Croatia created both an increased potential and a heightened need 
for a negotiated settlement, but this could only be achieved by strong international 
action. NATO air strikes were resisted by Russia but contributed to the progress towards 
a settlement, and it was American diplomacy in particular that brokered the Dayton 
agreements. 
In the conclusion, I evaluate Russia's policy in terms of Russia's own interests, and 
in terms of the consequences for Yugoslavia. I also discuss the wider implications of its 




International relations after the Cold War 
Four basic questions 
The primary question we are concerned with is: what kind of policy is a state (Russia) 
pursuing? But we should also be prepared to answer the question: what kind of policy 
should that state be pursuing? However, even if we believe normatively that a state 
ought to have a particular set of policy aims, the analysis of existing policy should make 
no assumptions and must start by identifying which approaches actually are dominant. 
Our answer to the second question will depend partly on an answer to two further 
questions: what kind of international system is developing, and what kind of 
international system ought to develop. 
Thus by distinguishing between the system level and the state level, and between 
prescription and description, we have four inter-related questions: 
1. What kind of policy is a particular state (Russia) pursuing? 
2. What kind of policy should that state be pursuing? 
3. What kind of international system is developing? 
4. What kind of international system should be developing? 
Rival international relations theories may provide answers to the last three 
questions; however, attempts to answer the first question through the lens of any one 
large-scale international relations theory may be misleading. Since there are choices for 
policy makers, and individual policy actors have their own answers to the second 
question, we cannot assume a priori that a particular approach is being applied. 
Furthermore, there may be elements of different theories present in the policy of a state, 
and the relative elements may change over time. International relations theories should 
be a guide to understanding policy, not a straitjacket. Similarly, attempts to force policy 
into one dogmatic mould also may have undesirable results. 
I shall begin by analysing the theory that has had the foremost influence among 
both diplomatic and academic circles since the Second World War, and then investigate 
challenges to it. 
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Realism and neo-realism 
Realism was the theoretical tradition begun by E. H. Can and Hans Morgenthau before 
and after the Second World War. ' They argued that since there is no world government 
with the means to control the actions of states and to punish aggressors, the international 
system is characterised by anarchy, and each sovereign state seeks to maximise its 
military power and to build alliances in order to guarantee its security. The policies of a 
state in maximising its power and security are dictated by its geo-political position: by 
its geographical size and position, by its natural resources, by the configuration of 
neighbouring powers. In a region in which a state has interests, it will act to maximise 
its power relative to other states with interests in the region, on a zero-sum model: an 
increase in its own power or influence can be achieved only by reducing another state's 
power or influence. 
Neo-realists, of whom the leading theorist is Kenneth Waltz, agree with their realist 
predecessors that the international system is characterised by states seeking to maximise 
their power in an environment in which there is no overarching authority; but they argue 
that there is a structure to international politics. The form of the international system at 
any particular time is determined by the configuration of `great powers', identified not 
just by their military, but also by their economic strength. Waltz's acknowledgement of 
the impact of nuclear weapons on the calculations of the major powers signifies a 
further departure from traditional realism: whereas the latter saw war as a recurring 
feature of global politics, and perhaps a necessary instrument in the restoration of a 
balance of power, for Waltz, the possession of nuclear weapons without a first strike 
capability on the part of the great powers counteracts the danger of war between them. 2 
The Cold War international system was a bi-polar system in which there were only 
two superpowers, each with its associated allies. Neo-realists are wary of the 
consequences of the collapse of this system. They argue that the bi-polar system will 
give way to a multi-polar system which will be inherently less stable than its 
predecessor because there will be a larger number of major powers to balance each 
other, making the situation more fluid and unpredictable. The implied inevitability of 
these developments is a feature of the neo-realist approach. Currently, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the United States is the only global superpower, its military and 
economic capabilities exceeding those of any other state. Inevitably, this dangerous 
situation will be rectified and a new balance of power will evolve. Waltz predicts the 
Burchill (1996a). 
2 Waltz (1993). 
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rise to great power status on a par with the United States, of Germany (or the European 
Union), Japan, and China. 
Neo-realists, then, begin with the third question, referring to the structure of the 
international system which is defined by the number of great powers. They have little to 
offer in answer to the fourth question, since they believe that even posing such a 
question represents a misunderstanding of the true nature of international relations. 
Attempts to answer it and to devise an improved political world are misguided and 
dangerous, symptomatic of the kind of idealistic approach which realism first reacted 
against in the inter-war period and which it blamed for the Second World War. 
Like realists, neo-realists emphasise that the internal composition of a state is of 
little significance to its behaviour in the international system, since its national interests 
(relating to its military and economic security) are defined by its objective geo-political 
situation. This is therefore a state centric approach, with explanation at the level of 
states, rather than looking within the state. For example, neo-realists point to the 
behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War which, they 
claim, was remarkably similar in both cases despite contrasting ideological declarations 
and differing economic, political, and social systems. 
Descriptively, if this analysis is adhered to as a strict paradigm, then it may limit 
understanding of a state's policy. How, for example, can neo-realists explain changes in 
policy approach? Insisting on the neo-realist paradigm leads to attempts to explain all 
policy in terms of maximising national interest. Hence, policy shifts are interpreted as 
necessary adjustments to changing circumstances. An example of this is Waltz's 
explanation of Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze's `New Political 
Thinking'. He argues that the new course was adopted because of the necessity to re- 
vitalise the Soviet economy in order to maintain the Soviet Union's power. He writes 
that Leonid Brezhnev's successors `realised that the Soviet Union could no longer 
support a first-rate military establishment on the basis of a third-rate economy. 
Economic reorganisation, and the reduction of imperial burdens, became an externally 
imposed necessity, which in turn required internal reforms. '3 
The problem here is that although this was undoubtedly a major element in 
Gorbachev's thinking, another element was the recognition of universal human values, 
and the attempt to increase security through international agreements and by developing 
`inter-dependency' through trade links. New Political Thinking can thus be seen as an 
attack on the traditional Soviet zero-sum military thinking and a recognition that 
national interests went beyond narrow military, or even economic, strength. It was a 
3Ibid., p. 50. 
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rejection of realist dogma that entailed a widening of the definition of `national 
interests'. 
This example shows that it is essential to look within the state. In some cases, it is 
true that shifts in policies may be due to changes in the geo-political environment. But 
in other cases they may be explicable only by reference to internal factors: the policy 
priorities and theoretical/ideological beliefs of individual actors, and the balance of 
interests/power within the state between institutions and individuals. Here we must 
distinguish between two aspects: the overall political, social, and economic system on 
the one hand, and the internal workings of a state - institutional competition, electoral 
politics, and individual policy preferences - on the other. Individuals or institutions may 
adopt different policy approaches, while some theorists argue that the 
economic/political/social structure of a state will also determine what kind of policy is 
pursued. 
I shall now turn to theories which reject the `realistic' framework by looking within 
the state. 
Liberal internationalism 
Liberal internationalists argue that a state's general foreign policy approach is defined 
by its internal structure; specifically, that liberal democratic states are less likely than 
authoritarian or non-capitalist states to fight wars against each other and are more likely 
to co-operate in the international sphere. Consequently, the more states there are with 
this internal system, the less the chance of war. Hence, this theory moves from the 
inside out, rather than from the outside in. 4 It starts with the question: what kind of state 
is X? This provides an anticipated answer to the first question: if the state is liberal 
democratic, it will be peaceful. The answer to the third question is that the world is 
divided between liberal democratic states and other states. At the system level, it is 
argued that the best system is one in which all states are liberal democratic. 
Normatively, these claims are based on two moral principles: firstly, that liberal 
democracy is inherently superior to other political-economic systems and, secondly, that 
it is also superior because it leads to peace. 
In order to evaluate these claims, it is useful to distinguish the two elements of the 
concept: liberalism and democracy. There are thus two possibly independent claims: 
that market liberal economies do not go to war (inter-dependency theory), and that 
democratic states do not go to war with each other (the `Pacific Union' argument). 
4 BUrchill (1996b), p. 30. 
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Pacific Union 
The concept of a `Pacific Union' holds that there are restraining factors operating in 
democratic states which reduce the potential for war between them. Jack Snyder 
identifies four reasons why it is assumed that mature democratic states do not go to war 
with each other: 
1. Median-voter interests: in a democracy, power is held by ordinary citizens who 
will avoid war where possible because they bear the costs and risks. 
2. Checks and balances in domestic political institutional arrangements: the 
difficulty of achieving a consensus among the various branches of government 
limits the possibility of war. 
3. The `free marketplace' of ideas: free speech and the diffusion of information 
allow effective evaluation of policies. 
4. The notion of `democratic norms': domestically, disputes are settled peacefully 
through the political process and this `habit' is transferred to foreign relations. 5 
Hence, there are restraining factors operating in democratic states which do not apply in 
authoritarian states. In the latter, the elite is liable to seek foreign policy diversions to 
keep the population from expressing domestic political demands - although the failure 
of such campaigns is likely to strengthen those demands - with the result that 
authoritarian states often have an explicitly nationalist state ideology. A democratic 
state is less likely to be aggressive, although if its vital interests are threatened - most 
clearly, if it is invaded - then it will obviously fight to defend itself. 
Snyder suggests that the theory may not apply to democratising states such as 
Russia, in contrast to maturely democratic states. Democratising states may be more 
belligerent even than authoritarian states because the four reasons why democratic states 
will be peaceful may not apply or are distorted, in particular because elites are liable to 
manipulate public opinion and arouse nationalist sentiments in order to protect their 
own interests and power. This is certainly a phenomenon observable in former 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, although Snyder stresses that we must not 
over-generalise: Hungary, for example, is relatively peaceful and non-nationalist despite 
the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Rumania, Ukraine, and Vojvodina (although that 
5 Snyder (1996). Some liberal commentators argue that membership of institutions such as the European 
Union and perhaps even NATO changes the calculations of state actors as they are influenced by the 
democratic political culture of those institutions; see, for example, Fierke and Wiener (1999). This 
approach can be termed `constructivism' because it is held that shared belief systems are constructed 
through co-operation; Garrett and Weingast (1993). 
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treatment may be less severe than he implies). Thus he concludes that we must be aware 
that different circumstances lead to different situations. 
These points suggest that other factors shape the effects of democratisation rather 
than the mere fact that the state is democratising. This means that, just as we cannot 
`scientifically' ascertain foreign policy choices from the geo-political position of a state, 
neither can we a priori predict the foreign policy behaviour of a state by reference only 
to its political system, ignoring geo-political factors, the nature of other states, and 
specific internal factors, such as choices of leaders, institutional competition, strength of 
the economy, and electoral politics. Like neo-realism, the Pacific Union argument 
ignores agency. The premise that Russia is a democratising state would appear to be 
unfruitful as a basis for understanding or predicting its foreign policy. This is not to say 
that democratisation has not affected the process of foreign policy making and the 
policies adopted: it has had a profound impact. But we must not make generalised 
assumptions; we should investigate those effects empirically to see what specific impact 
democratisation has had, and we must look at the specific internal political process of 
that state in order to understand the policy outcome. 
Inter-dependency and globalisation 
The other element in traditional liberal internationalism is the belief that the spread of 
market economies across the globe will enhance the prospects of peace. As with the 
political side, there are again two moral claims: that this is inherently the best economic 
system for any state, and that, instrumentally, it is the best system because it creates 
peace between states. The application to our four questions takes a similar form, since 
the categorisation of the state's economic system tells us how a state will behave. We 
are also informed as to what defines the international system (the distinction between 
capitalist and non-capitalist states) and what kind of system is to be favoured (one in 
which the maximum number of states are capitalist). 
The argument concentrates on links between states that serve to pacify them. There 
are two main reasons why the spread of free trade between states is believed to promote 
peace: 
1. States are dependent on each other for their wealth. War would reduce this 
wealth. 
2. Contacts developed through trading enhance co-operative tendencies and reduce 
ignorant xenophobia and extreme ethnic nationalism. 
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These claims do not relate to the internal structure of the state, but to the nature of 
economic relations between states. Hence, in theory they apply to any state that does not 
have trade barriers, even if the state does not have a market economy. It is interesting to 
note that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze invoked the principle of inter-dependency while 
the Soviet Union still had a planned economy: trading with the West would lead to 
increased links and benefits for both sides, thus decreasing tensions. Nevertheless, most 
proponents of the theory promote not only free trade, but also the development of 
market economies in which the government plays a minimal role. This allows them to 
assert that features of the internal economic structure of market economies may 
encourage peace, in a manner similar to the Pacific Union argument. For example, 
peace may be considered to be in the interests of most businesses because war disrupts 
trade and usually leads to much greater state control of the economy. 
The first claim shows that the efficacy of inter-dependency in creating peace 
depends on its success in increasing wealth. The theory is that universal free trade 
works on the same principle as domestic laissez faire: it is the most efficient economic 
system because the market automatically produces an optimum outcome. 
Internationally, this is partly achieved by a division of labour based on a country's 
`comparative advantage', its ability to produce a particular commodity at a cheaper rate 
than other countries because it has the necessary expertise, materials, and on account of 
other geographic factors. However, a country that has already established an advantage 
is in a superior position to a country seeking to develop one. The implication is that 
some countries may be destined to occupy an inferior position in the `global market 
place', supplying raw materials to the developed countries. The only way for it to break 
out of that position is to impose tariffs to protect its developing industries. 6 
When the liberal theory was formulated, it incorporated the belief that the best 
political unit was the democratic nation-state, and the best international system was one 
in which such states traded freely with each other. It could not envisage developments 
in the late twentieth century. The communications and technological revolution has 
allowed the unrestricted global flow of capital and the growth of vast multi-national 
companies in the late twentieth century. In addition, the nature of technological 
production and the easier transit of materials have made traditional `comparative 
advantage' less significant. The primary `comparative advantage' then becomes the 
price of labour: companies invest in countries where labour is cheapest.? The 
6 See Waltz's discussion of the nineteenth century economist Friedrich List; Waltz (1993), pp. 56-57; 
also, Gellner (1983). 
7 For an account of this process, see Gray (1998a), particularly chapter 4. 
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consequence is that the gap between the rich and the poor within countries, as well as 
between countries, is increasing. 
A further effect is that governments now have less control over domestic policy. 
Multi-national companies are outside the domestic legal framework, the free flow of 
capital undermines governments' attempts to control the impact of financial transactions 
on the economy, and foreign companies investing in a country may exert pressure on 
the government to implement certain policies backed by the threat of withdrawing their 
investment. Even if there are aid and trade deals to encourage the development of the 
poorer countries, these too come with strong conditions fixed by international 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund. 
The problems associated with `globalisation' undermine the claims that unfettered 
capitalism is the route to global prosperity. If instead it deepens divisions within and 
between countries, creating poverty, unemployment, and insecurity, then it fails in its 
own terms. It is also highly unlikely to contribute to peace; instead, competition and 
divisions might erupt into violent confrontations on a North-South axis, perhaps through 
terrorist activity. But even if it did promote peace, the other effects challenge the 
primacy accorded to peace-creating. It is not sufficient to consider war, and the 
prevention of it, the sole purpose of international politics; international politics must 
also address these social, economic, and political problems. This is not merely of moral 
importance, but can also be justified in a realist, `national interests' manner: deepening 
divisions will increase the danger of war, as well as creating other effects, such as large 
scale migration. Furthermore, other aspects of globalisation - such as environmental 
degradation and drugs trafficking - can only be tackled on a global level and cannot be 
left for the `free market' to control. 
Where does this analysis leave us in regard to our four questions? The policy of an 
individual state is more likely to be determined by its position in the global economic 
system than by the mere fact that it has a market economy. We start then, like realism, 
with an answer to the third question. If the analysis is correct, how should an individual 
state behave? It has been suggested that the threat of a North-South conflict requires the 
richer countries to withdraw and take steps to defend themselves and their interests 
(through stronger immigration controls, for example). But, apart from this being a 
morally questionable attitude, it is likely to reinforce the trends that I have identified, 
rather than reduce them. Similarly, the loss of democratic control over the economy due 
to globalisation, which is often discussed as if it is an inevitable development of history 
rather than the result of specific decisions and rules, has to be tackled directly. The 
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moral questions are therefore of primary importance, although, again, this does not help 
us to predict the policy actually adopted by a particular state. 
One of the results of globalisation is a loss of sovereignty. Sovereignty is being 
eroded, either voluntarily - as in the case of the European Union - or as a result of 
globalisation. But at the same time, a backlash is occurring. 
Nationalism 
Some commentators have suggested that the nation-state is becoming less significant 
with globalisation, as national economies are becoming more intertwined and under 
reduced domestic control, and as supra-national political units grow in importance. But 
other events, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
show that nationalism - the desire of a `nation' to have its own state - is as strong a 
force as ever. 
Modern analyses of nationalism emphasise the fact that nations are constructed 
entities. 8 They are not pre-existing natural phenomena, nor do they flow down to us 
unbroken through the river of history. In the nineteenth century - the great age of 
nationalism - elites concentrated on creating national consciousness to support their 
political programmes of creating nation-states. Ernest Gellner argues that this process 
corresponded with economic modernisation. The new economic system of 
manufacturing and expanded trade required a language of education and communication 
across a large area, based on what he calls a `high culture'. In other words, nations had 
to be forged, and forged they were, so effectively that the masses - and even the elite 
themselves - believed in their seamless history. 
Gellner's account is a form of sociological determinism, since the process of 
modernisation led inevitably to nationalism. But it does not apply in the late twentieth 
century to areas where modernisation has already occurred. The revival of extreme 
nationalism in the Balkans resulted from the deliberate policies of leaders manipulating 
popular sentiment and creating a nationalist mood. However, there had to be some 
reason for the people to respond, some fertile ground for the planted seed of aggressive 
nationalism to grow in. It was able to grow partly because this was a period of 
uncertainty and instability, of insecurity in the face of globalisation, loss of prestige, and 
economic decline. But why did the reaction take a nationalist form? Walker Connor 
suggests that sociological accounts of nationalism tend to skim over a very obvious 
feature of nationalism: the irrational loyalty to the nation, expressed in terms of blood 
g See especially, Gellner (1983); Hobsbawm (1992); Anderson (1991). 
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descent, in which the nation is viewed as a large family. 9 In Yugoslavia, the Serbs and 
Croats in particular viewed their nation in these terms, 10 while the collapse of 
communism enabled repressed historical memories to be expressed and manipulated. " 
It is common in analyses of nationalism to distinguish between two types of 
nationalism: civic/inclusive and ethnic/exclusive. The first - in which membership of 
the nation is extended to all the inhabitants of a country - is associated with individual 
human rights-based democracy, the latter - in which membership of the nation is 
reserved for a particular ethnic group - is associated with populist democracy or 
authoritarianism in which the will of the nation overrides all else. 12 It is the second 
form, feeding on the irrational ethno-national bond, that has been prevalent in former 
Yugoslavia and has also threatened to become dominant in the former Soviet Union. 
Russia, which is still a multi-national state, is particularly susceptible to extreme ethnic 
nationalism after its imperial collapse; this could have catastrophic consequences for 
ethnic minorities within the Russian Federation, and for the states bordering Russia that 
have large Russian-speaking minorities. I shall discuss in the next chapter what kind of 
state Russia is becoming and whether its policy makers have embraced inclusive civic 
nationalism or exclusive ethnic nationalism, a choice that will have a significant impact 
on its foreign policy. But there is also one way in which this issue connects Russia and 
the former Yugoslavia more directly. 
The `clash of civilisations' 
Samuel Huntington has famously answered our third question by stating that the post- 
Cold War world will be marked most significantly by what he calls the `clash of 
civilisations'. The world will be divided into regions on the basis of a common 
`culture', which refers to language, religion, or political norms. Huntington writes: 
Civilisation identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will 
be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major 
civilisations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic- 
Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilisation. The most important 
conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these 
civilisations from one another. 13 
9 Connor (1993). 
'o It is encapsulated in the Serb myth of the epic battle of Kosovo; see Anzulovic (1999). 
" See Denich (1994). 
12 Hoffmann (1995), p. 164. 
13 Huntington (1993), p. 25. 
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The Balkans is a prime example of such a fault line, where the `Western', the `Islamic', 
and the `Slavic Orthodox' civilisations meet. 
There are numerous problems with Huntington's thesis as a description of the 
nature of the post-Cold War world. 14 It is unclear, first of all, what `culture' refers to 
and, secondly, why it should be the basis of a state's foreign policy. Historically, it is 
true that states sometimes acted on the basis of religion. This was either for ideological 
purposes - because it was believed that a particular religion must be spread or other 
religions resisted - or because it provided a good basis for increasing influence and 
power (i. e. for realist motives). But why should language or religion be so important in 
the modern world? Although Western states will seek to preserve their secular status if 
they are faced with religious fundamentalism, the `battle' against fundamentalism is 
more likely to take place within states (admittedly with outside influence) than between 
states, whether the state be Turkey, India, Israel, or the United States. 
Empirically, the theory falls down in particular because realist and nationalist 
considerations or other ideological factors usually have priority in the foreign policy 
making of a state over vague notions of cultural affinity. Furthermore, nationalist 
feeling is far more capable of motivating masses than the vaguer notion of `civilisation'. 
These problems indicate that the notion of a `clash of civilisations' is unhelpful as 
an analytical tool, and may be counter-productive if accepted by policy makers. Unlike 
realism and inter-dependency theory, it takes into account ideology and cultural 
outlook, but at the expense of over-estimating their influence while under-estimating the 
enduring strength of attachment to the nation-state. The latter, and realist considerations 
associated with it, remains a major feature of the post-Cold War world. Furthermore, as 
we have seen, a more significant clash than that between `civilisations' is likely to be 
the divide between North and South based on economic inequality. As Graham Fuller 
puts it: 
`Civilisational clash' is not so much over Jesus Christ, Confucius, or the Prophet 
Muhammad as it is over the unequal distribution of world power, wealth, and 
influence, and the perceived historical lack of respect accorded to small states and 
peoples by larger ones. Culture is the vehicle for expression of conflict, not its 
cause. 15 
14 For detailed criticism of the article, see Rubinstein and Crocker (1994); and - particularly for problems 
with the concept of `civilisations' and its historical inapplicability - Couloumbis and Veremis (1994). 15 Fuller (1995), pp. 153-4. 
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Institutionalism 
Huntington's thesis is difficult to categorise. On the one hand, it might be considered 
part of the attempt to find a basis for co-operation and peace between states, akin to 
liberal internationalism. On the other hand, it emphasises immutable differences 
between `civilisations' that are the basis for friction and potential war. The question 
remains: can peace only be built between states which have a similar socio-political and 
economic system, or a similar religion/language? And how can the effects of the 
anarchical nature of the international arena be mitigated? 
An `anarchical' international system exists because there is no equivalent to the 
domestic state - with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force - at the international 
level. Countries have no choice but to maximise power in order to protect themselves. 
But a world government replicating the national state on a global scale is inconceivable. 
The nation-state remains the basic unit of political organisation (as well as the aspiration 
of sub-state national movements). Governments of nation-states are, on the whole, as 
unwilling to cede control to a larger political entity as they are to allow secession from 
within (even moves towards union in Western Europe are fraught with friction and 
mistrust). 
Nevertheless, international institutions such as the United Nations and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, previously the 
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE) represent a potential 
framework for moving towards greater co-operation and control at the international 
level while maintaining for individual states a significant degree of national sovereignty. 
`Institutionalism' holds that such developments are both possible and desirable. 16 
Realists are inclined to interpret the institutions as means for states to pursue their 
own interests, rather than as instruments for the application of universal values. They 
may recognise that one way out of the security dilemma is for powers to act in 
`concert'; but the effect is that the great powers that make up the `poles' of the 
international system are likely to deal with disputes among the smaller states in such a 
way as to reduce tensions among themselves, rather than to apply any principles of 
justice or effective conflict resolution. For example, during the nineteenth century, a 
great power `concert' operated much of the time, by which the major European states 
resolved disputes in, for instance, the Balkans by making settlements that achieved a 
compromise between their own interests, rather than by applying any principles such as 
the right to self-determination to tackle the issues themselves. Nevertheless, even this 
16 Andrew Linklater calls this `rationalism'; Linklater (1996). 
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means of reducing disputes between the powers broke down in the face of the arms race, 
the alliance system, and expansionist policies of the major European powers in the 
period before the First World War. 
In the inter-war period, the League of Nations was powerless to prevent the rise of 
fascism and the outbreak of world war. But the Second World War led to a conviction 
on the part of the victorious Western powers at least that human rights should be 
protected by law, even if this required an erosion of state sovereignty. Consequently, 
minority and individual rights were enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1951), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987), and so on. Progress towards fulfilment of 
the principles of these documents was hindered by the Cold War, but in the 1990s they 
were increasingly put into practice. This entailed a move towards liberal 
institutionalism, away from realism. 
One effect was the creation of international war crimes tribunals, for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, and moves towards a permanent International Criminal Court. In addition, 
the European Union has increasingly become a forum for the promulgation of rights, 
through, for example, the European Court of Human Rights. However, these 
developments were not accompanied by reform of the supreme international institution, 
the United Nations. The result is a mismatch between these developments in 
international law and the structure of the main institution that is supposed to implement 
and enforce that law. For example, military enforcement action, which is envisaged in 
chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter (1945), is only authorised if there is 
a consensus among the great powers in the Security Council; yet those powers usually 
act on the basis of their own interests rather than the impartial application of 
international law. If a consensus cannot be reached - for example, if one power blocks 
such action - then the other powers either have to accept this limitation and do nothing, 
or act without a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Such unilateral 
action is likely to be interpreted by other powers as violating the UN Charter, and the 
states may be accused of acting merely to promote their own interests. 
Since 1993, Russia has been less prepared to accept the idea of universal 
international law which it espoused in the immediate post-Cold War situation. As I shall 
argue in the following chapter, this was partly the result of the wasted opportunities of 
1992, when Western states did not seize the opportunity provided by the liberal 
approach of the Russian government to develop inclusive institutions that would be 
capable of implementing international law. In part also, it was due to the preponderance 
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of realist thinking in the Russian elite. But it was also due to continued realist thinking 
in the West. For example, a lack of consistency in the application of military 
intervention or other action to protect human rights undermines the claims that the West 
is an impartial protector of such rights. And the United States in particular refuses to 
accept the authority of such impartial organs of international law as the International 
Criminal Court; if the world's strongest power will not allow its citizens to be subject to 
its jurisdiction, then why should the other states? Finally, in relation to Russia, the main 
problem was the refusal to rule out expansion of NATO (without envisaging Russia 
becoming a member) or its radical re-structuring. It is obvious that a military alliance of 
a limited number of states cannot serve as both a collective security organisation and an 
organisation deciding on and implementing military intervention in the name of 
international law. Not surprisingly, NATO expansion is interpreted in Russia as the 
result of continued zero-sum thinking in the West. 
Social democratic institutionalism 
Russian disillusionment with the West has also resulted from the application of neo- 
liberal economic theory to Russian reform. The increase in application of human rights 
law, with its effect of undermining state sovereignty, has coincided with globalisation 
and the American-led global application of neo-liberal economic principles. Russia was 
one of the worst victims of the latter. The ideology of global free trade is promoted most 
vigorously by the United States, the country which - being the strongest country - 
benefits most from its application (just as Great Britain benefited from its promotion in 
the nineteenth century). Not surprisingly, the espousal of neo-liberalism is widely 
viewed as serving American interests. The result, as I shall examine in the next chapter, 
is to undermine belief in `Western values' including the idea of universal human rights, 
since they are perceived as being part of the same package. 
Disillusionment with the West encourages more nationalist and authoritarian 
approaches, and gives extremists the opportunity to play on the fears of the population, 
which may be particularly dangerous at a time of democratisation. Exclusive 
nationalism or abuse of individual rights can be justified as necessary for the rebirth of 
the country. Human rights principles can be represented as part of the overall Western 
`neo-imperialism'. The charge of `cultural imperialism' and the undermining effect of 
relativism has devastated the confidence of many Western liberals. One response is to 
question whose interests resistance to notions of human rights serves; talk of `traditional 
culture' is often used to mask policies that serve the interests of the ruling group. 
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But it is equally important to abandon the dogma of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberals 
argue that a market economy is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of basic human 
freedom. But pure neo-liberalism - the application of `market forces' to all areas of 
human activity and across the world - undermines some of the most basic human needs 
- work, health, food - and consigns millions of people to poverty and insecurity. The 
human rights element of liberal internationalism can and should be separated from the 
free trade, laissez faire economic principles, and extended to include basic human needs 
as well as freedoms. This can only be done through international institutions supported 
by the major powers, but without the latter dictating the form of internal economic 
arrangements or assuming that a global `free market' will solve all problems. It is also 
vital to include in the programme of human rights, the right to have a say in the 
decisions of the society; in other words, democracy. Although it is often claimed that a 
market economy is a pre-requisite of democracy and the development of a civil society, 
there is no logically necessary reason why this should take the form of a pure market 
economy on the neo-liberal model; as Hoffmann puts it, it is questionable whether `free 
economics must "ultimately" lead to free polities as well'. " On the contrary, a pure 
market economy is likely to be profoundly undemocratic. Firstly, as Marx 
demonstrated, accumulation of capital confers economic power. Furthermore, money 
may confer advantages and power in a wide range of areas, not just purely economic; in 
Michael Walzer's terminology, money is a `dominant good'. 18 And, thirdly, a strongly 
authoritarian government may be needed to preserve a pure market economy since it is 
an artificial creation. 19 
Rather than liberal internationalism, then, perhaps it is time to promote social 
democratic institutionalism. 
Conclusion 
I have argued a form of answer to our initial fourth question. It combines an attempt to 
reduce the anarchical nature of the international arena through institutions which 
enhance co-operation and enforce peaceful international norms of conduct and 
international law. These institutions reproduce some of the functions of domestic states 
at the international level, while retaining the democratic state as the basic political unit. 
They would work most effectively as a hierarchy of institutions, building up from the 
regional level. In Europe, the European Union does not necessarily fulfil this role as it 
develops into an economic super-state. NATO remains a military alliance which 
" Hoffmann (1995), p. 175. 'g Walzer (1983); as he points out, this is a generalisation of Marx's analysis. 
'9 Gray (1998a). 
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originated as an anti-Soviet alliance; as a military organisation, it also has a limited 
capability to implement economic justice and oversee the protection of human rights. 
The OSCE fulfils some of the functions in relation to the latter - it organises 
observations of elections, for example - as does the Council of Europe, but the major 
Western powers remain suspicious of giving full commitment to a broader role for 
them. At present, the supreme arbiter is the United Nations Security Council, but this is 
too often an institution that serves the interests of the great powers. 
My answer to the second question, then, is that states should act in such a way as to 
promote inclusive institutions such as the OSCE and the UN: for moral reasons, but also 
because, in the long term, it will promote a more secure world which is in every state's 
interests. However, for individual states such as Russia, there is a major obstacle if a 
perception exists that other states are not acting in this way or that they themselves are 
being excluded. They are faced with a `games theory' scenario, and are forced to resort 
to realist calculations. Much depends, therefore, on the actions of the major Western 
powers, and perceptions of them, in which the former Yugoslavia - as a major conflict 
zone within Europe - occupies a key place. 
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Chapter 2 
Russian foreign policy from 1992 to 1995 
The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation since it became an 
independent state at the end of 1991 has been the subject of numerous articles, books, 
and studies, and there is no need to go into chronological detail here. ' Instead, I shall 
attempt to analyse the theoretical underpinnings of the official policy and of the 
arguments of its critics, as far as possible within the framework developed in chapter 1. 
This will provide a context for investigating rival approaches to the Yugoslav crisis. 
It is generally recognised that Russia's foreign policy from 1992 to 1995 can be 
divided into three periods: an initial `liberal Westernising' phase during the first half of 
1992; a transitional phase of criticism, debate, and adjustment in the second half of 1992 
and early 1993; and a period of relative consensus, during which there was coalescence 
around a more assertive, `pragmatic nationalist' approach, from spring 1993.2 How do 
these labels correspond to the international relations theories identified in the first 
chapter? 
The liberal Westernising phase 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the newly independent Russian Federation, 
under Andrei Kozyrev, pursued a form of liberal internationalism. The main focus of 
attention was relations with Western Europe and, in particular, the United States, 
because Kozyrev believed that Russia had common interests with those states, which 
would lead to a true partnership between them. Those common interests derived from 
the fact that Russia was now a democracy, was developing a market economy, and was 
seeking to participate fully in the global economy and to develop trading links with 
other leading industrialised states. This was a clear expression of liberal democratic 
internationalism, making assumptions from the internal nature of the state (its 
economic, political, and social form). It was thus closely linked to the domestic reform 
programme. The Yeltsin leadership answered the question: what kind of state should the 
Russian Federation be? by arguing that it should be a secular, liberal, democratic, 
capitalist state. They believed that liberal, market democracy was morally superior 
(replacing the totalitarian experiment of communism with true freedom), that it would 
lead to prosperity, and that it would ensure peace with other states. Hence, Russia would 
become a member of the society of `civilised' states. The liberal Westernisers believed 
I See bibliographical note for a survey of the literature on post-1991 Russian foreign policy. 
2 The labels `liberal Westernisers' and `pragmatic nationalists' are used in Malcolm eta! (1996). 
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that Russia would act as an equal partner with other liberal democratic states in building 
a `new world order'. At the same time, those states would support Russia in its 
transition period, by providing substantial aid and opening their markets for trade. They 
would recognise the importance of a successful transformation in Russia and the peace 
and prosperity that it would bring. 
In addition, the liberal Westernisers emphasised the importance of international 
institutions in enhancing co-operation between states. They believed that institutions, 
based on the enforcement of international law and the recognition by their members of 
civilised norms of behaviour between states, would, along with the spread of liberal 
democracy, enable states to escape from the `security dilemma' that realists claimed 
necessitated the search for security through power. Russia, as a great liberal democratic 
power, would contribute on equal terms to the work of these institutions, including 
through peace-keeping and even peace-making. 
This shows that the idea of Russia as a great power is not exclusive to a realist 
approach. As Kozyrev wrote in 1992: 
No doubt Russia will not cease to be a great power. But it will be a normal great 
power. Its national interests will be a priority. But these will be interests 
understandable to democratic countries, and Russia will be defending them through 
interaction with partners, not through confrontation. In economic matters, too, once 
on its own feet and later, after acquiring a weight commensurate with its potential 
in world trade, Russia will be a serious competitor to many but, at the same time, 
an honest partner complying with the established rules of the game in world 
markets. 3 
This reads as a fairly sophisticated expression of liberal democratic internationalism. It 
assumes that the transition to liberal democracy will minimise the risk of war, without 
idealistically ignoring the continued importance of competition. In other words, liberal 
democracies can be `partners' - in the sense that they work together to achieve common 
aims and uphold peace - while continuing to be economic rivals; but that economic 
rivalry is contained within the `rules of the game' and hence need not escalate to war. 
Liberal internationalists can also recognise that some powers are stronger than others, 
but still argue that the great powers should participate in international institutions and 
abide by international law and norms in their relations with other states. In fact, if it is 
admitted that military methods may be required to enforce international law, then the 
`greater' powers have a significant contribution to make; they also have the potential to 
3 Kozyrev (1992a), p. 10. 
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devote resources to international institutions in the struggle against global poverty and 
environmental crises, as well as meeting much of the costs of those institutions. 
Criticism of liberal Westernism 
Neglect of the `near abroad' 
One thrust of the attack on Russian foreign policy in 1992 was that it was too 
ideological and ignored pressing concerns deriving from Russia's geo-political position, 
in particular in relation to the other newly-independent states of the former Soviet 
Union, Russia's `near abroad'. Russia had important concerns in relations in this area 
because of continued economic inter-dependence, the lack of border controls between 
Russia and the new states, the threat of ethnic disputes spreading to the Russian 
Federation, the presence of more than twenty-five million `ethnic Russians' and thirty- 
seven million `Russian speakers' within those states, and the fact that Russian armed 
forces were still stationed outside the Russian Federation itself. Instead of focusing on 
these priority issues, the Yeltsin administration was concerned mainly with relations 
with Western Europe and the United States because of its liberal internationalist 
principles. 
Despite Kozyrev's own statement in early 1992 that `Russia's main foreign policy 
priority is relations with [its] partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States, -Y4 the 
Yeltsin administration undoubtedly did neglect the region of the former Soviet Union. 
Only after several months of Russian independence were embassies opened in former 
Soviet republics, and Kozyrev rarely visited those states. This lack of attention was a 
result of the liberal Westernising ideology, which led the MFA to concentrate on 
relations with Western states at the expense of more urgent matters in Russia's 
immediate environment. It was compounded by the government's economic policy. The 
Yeltsin administration promoted Russian independence and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union after the failed coup in August 1991 partly because it wanted to implement rapid 
market reforms, and the other republics could not be expected to proceed with reform at 
a similar pace. The Russian government therefore decided to act alone, a policy that 
entailed, for example, dissolving the rouble zone. The effect was to break up the 
integrated economy of the former Soviet Union. 
This situation could not last; sooner or later, Russian policy makers would have to 
turn more attention to the `near abroad'. But this did not mean that they had to abandon 
the liberal institutionalist approach and adopt a neo-realist perspective. Nor did it mean 
4 Ibid.. 
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that a liberal institutionalist approach entailed neglecting Russia's immediate 
neighbours. As Robert Legvold argues, we must make a `distinction between liberal 
internationalism [here used to refer to an emphasis on institutions, what I have called 
`institutionalism'] and the peculiar limitations of the original Yeltsin-Kozyrev policy': 
If in that policy Russian leaders placed too much emphasis on the West and 
foolishly not enough on their new neighbours, the fault lay in their priorities, not in 
the assumptions of liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism, with its 
emphasis on collective responsibility and multilateral mechanisms, is about the 
way Russia deals with the so-called `Near Abroad', not whether it deals with it. 
Similarly, if originally Russia's leadership was too smitten with the industrialised 
democracies of the West and too dismissive of its country's own history, again, 
liberal internationalism's requirements are not to blame, but rather the 
psychological needs of these leaders. ' 
Many critics accused the administration of neglecting Russia's `real interests'. This 
was true in the sense that it was ignoring the `near abroad'. But this criticism was 
usually part of a neo-realist attack on official policy. Critics implied that protecting 
Russian interests in the former Soviet space and Eastern Europe meant maximising 
Russian power and influence on a zero-sum realist model. But the notion of `national 
interests' is not exclusive to realism, it varies according to theoretical, historical, and 
individual perspective. In other words, to claim that a state must protect its national 
interests merely begs the question of what those interests are. No doubt Andrei Kozyrev 
and Boris Yeltsin believed that their policy was in Russia's `real interests', just as 
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze before them had believed that the policies which 
constituted New Political Thinking were in the Soviet Union's `real interests'. On the 
other hand, ethnic nationalists would define Russia's `real interests' in a very different 
way; and so on. Realists, however, disingenuously portrayed their own approach as the 
only one that took national interests into account (I shall examine this in more detail in 
relation to policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts). 
The neo-realist reaction against the liberal internationalist approach of Kozyrev 
(and of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze before him) was partly a reflection of the residual 
realist thinking and suspicion of the West within Russia. This mistrust was not 
surprising given the rivalry and rhetoric of the only recently ended Cold War, and was 
also echoed in Western mistrust of Russia. But it was also the result of policy errors by 
the Russian government and Western governments and institutions during 1992 and 
1993. 
5 Legvold (1994), p. 271. 
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The economic disaster 
The government adopted a reform programme based on neo-liberal principles which 
had a calamitous impact on the economy, destroying the infrastructure of the country 
and creating enormous poverty, unemployment, and ill-health. The decision to opt for 
`shock therapy' was made on the advocacy of Egor Gaidar and Anatolii Chubais, who 
were advised by free market economists in the West. 6 Those Western `advisors' bear 
significant responsibility for the disaster. There is a common perception in Russia that 
Western policy makers deliberately planned the destruction of the Russian economy. 
For example, a public opinion survey by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion 
Research (VTsIOM) in December 1994 showed that 49 per cent of those surveyed 
believed that the goal of the West was to bring Russia to a state of destitution and 
collapse.? This perception is probably unjustified, since the `advisors' genuinely 
believed in the programme of `shock therapy' - although, with their Russian partners, 
they did make a lot of money from it. 8 But the fact that they genuinely believed in it 
does not absolve them from responsibility; nor does their claim that the policy only 
appears wrong in hindsight. A more gradual and controlled transition to a socially- 
orientated market economy - such as that implemented in post-war West Germany - 
might have brought about the desired results more effectively, more justly, and with far 
less hardship, and this was in fact the argument of certain economists, such as J. K. 
Galbraith. 9 
Russian distrust of the West due to `shock therapy' is compounded by the uncritical 
support that Western governments - particularly the Clinton administration - gave to 
Yeltsin as an individual politician, as well as to the `Chubais Clan'. 10 Yeltsin was seen 
as the guarantor of the transition to a market democracy. He and his followers 
manipulated this, partly by warning of the consequences if the opposition `red-brown' 
coalition were to gain power. Western governments continued to support the 
`democrats' despite the high levels of corruption in the administration, the storming of 
the parliament building in October 1993, the Chechen wars, and manipulation of the 
media in election campaigns. For many Russians, this is further evidence of Western 
interference and malevolence. It is also, as one critic puts it, the continuation of a 
6 For an account of Russian economic `reform', see Lloyd (15 August 1999); Stiglitz (1999); Gray 
(1998a), chapter 6; and Wedel (2000). 
' Sazonov (6 December 1994). 
8 See Wedel (2000). 
9 See Sakwa (1993), p. 215. 
10 Wedel (2000). 
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`consistent pattern of favouring capitalism over democracy in American foreign 
policy'. ' 1 
The failure of the domestic reform programme had a negative impact on the foreign 
policy not least because the two were so closely connected. The liberal Westernisers 
were caught in their own `linkage' trap. They had presented their programme as a 
coherent whole, with domestic reforms contributing to and reinforced by developments 
in foreign policy, but the failure of `shock therapy' discredited the foreign policy to 
which it was explicitly linked. 12 Russia did not become a strong, liberal, capitalist 
power. This discredited the liberal internationalist aspect of the foreign policy. 
Failure to develop a strategic partnership 
The institutionalist aspect of the foreign policy - as well as the liberal internationalist 
aspect - was also discredited, by the failures of Western policy in particular. There was 
a unique opportunity in the post-Cold War world, with a pro-Western reforming 
government in Russia, to transform the European security structure, to build institutions 
that could implement and enforce international law and would involve Russia on an 
equal basis. This opportunity was missed. For example, when the Russian MFA began 
to deal more attentively with the former Soviet Union, it promoted an institutionalist 
policy that recognised the fully-sovereign status of the states of the former Soviet Union 
and, while encouraging links and recognising inter-dependency, consciously sought to 
act within the framework of international law and norms. 13 But attempts by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry to involve the CSCE and the United Nations in mediation of ethnic 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union, for example, met with little response. 14 Russia was 
therefore forced to act unilaterally. 
Instead of developing partnership and acting to promote human rights in the former 
Soviet Union, in 1992 the European Community concentrated primarily on greater 
internal integration through Maastricht. Even worse, Western policy makers began to 
search for a new purpose for NATO, and to consider taking in new members among the 
former Warsaw Pact states, rather than seeking a true partnership with Russia. Russian 
objections to NATO expansion were perfectly legitimate. NATO is a military and 
political alliance that was established to oppose the Soviet Union, the state which the 
Russian Federation legally succeeded. There is no realistic prospect of Russia joining 
" Mahoney (23 March 2000). 
12 For a similar argument, see Matveyev (1995); and G. Arbatov (1994). 
13 See Kozyrev (1992b). 
14 It should be recognised, however, that an additional problem was that the Defence Ministry and the 
armed forces were following a more interventionist and hegemonic policy, thus arousing suspicions of 
neo-imperialism. This was another negative consequence of the MFA's failure to focus on the `near 
abroad' earlier, such that the military were able to set the policy line in the former Soviet Union. 
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the alliance. NATO expansion is often seen as an attempt to exclude Russia from 
`Europe', particularly because the new members regard NATO membership as a means 
of gaining membership of the European Union and moving the focus of economic 
relations away from Russia and towards the West. The dominant feeling in Russia is 
that the West took advantage of Russian weakness - including, according to Gorbachev, 
abrogating a verbal agreement made when the Soviet leadership agreed to accept 
German unification, not to expand NATO into Central and Eastern Europe15 - to push 
Russia out of its traditional spheres of interest. This feeling undoubtedly contributed to a 
more assertive Russian policy. 
Political calculations 
Domestic opponents attacked the Kozyrev foreign policy partly because they rejected its 
premises. Nationalists and communists opposed Russian subservience to the Cold War 
enemy and wanted an authoritarian state with an assertive foreign policy (the `negative' 
of official policy). Neo-realists believed that the leadership was allowing the West to 
weaken Russia and drive it from areas of traditional economic and strategic interest. But 
there was also a political dimension: opponents in the Supreme Soviet attacked the 
official foreign policy because it was a means of attacking the government in the 
institutional power struggle between the administration and the parliament. 
Furthermore, they hoped to gain electoral advantage by playing on popular sentiments 
of wounded pride. 
But rather than defending the foreign policy on its own grounds, the administration 
adopted a more assertive realist approach in order to assuage criticism of the whole 
policy approach. The result was a policy not of social democratic institutionalism, but of 
anarcho-capitalism in the economic sphere, state-centred authoritarianism in the 
political sphere, and neo-realism in the foreign policy sphere. While not the worst of all 
possible worlds - that would have resulted from the pursuit also of an extreme 
nationalist policy of the kind practised by Serbia - it was perhaps the second worst. 
Post-1992 foreign policy 
There are two defining features of Russian foreign policy after the initial liberal 
internationalist phase: a greater assertiveness within the `near abroad', and an emphasis 
on Russia's great power status beyond it. As we have seen, the latter concept can be part 
of a liberal internationalist approach, and was emphasised by Kozyrev throughout 1992. 
But it also has a specific meaning within neo-realist theory. 
'5 Volkov (1997), p. 63; confirmed also by former US Ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock; we Hearst 
(15 February 1997). 
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Russian neo-realist great power concepts 
We saw in chapter 1 that neo-realists believe that the `structure' of the international 
system in any period is defined by the number of `poles', that is the number of great 
powers. Most neo-realists argue that the Cold War bi-polar system is evolving into a 
multi-polar system, possibly through a transitional `uni-polar' stage (with the United 
States as the single `pole'). Where does Russia fit into this analysis? There is a 
difference of opinion between those commentators, policy makers, and politicians who 
believe that Russia has the potential - on account of its size, population, and resources - 
to be one of the great powers that constitute the multi-polar world, and those who 
believe that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia can expect to be only a 
`middle-echelon' power given its actual level of economic development and the lack of 
state stability. Therefore, some neo-realists who opposed the early liberal Westernising 
policy also argue that the post-1992 policy is misguided because it is based on the 
notion that Russia is a top-level great power; they argue that Russia is not sufficiently 
strong economically at present to play a global role, and should concentrate resources 
on preserving and re-building the Russian Federation itself. 
Others argue that Russian policy should be aimed at establishing its great power 
status. This does not follow necessarily from neo-realist theory, because in that theory 
the number of poles is considered an objective fact; hence Russia's great power status 
cannot be created merely by insisting on it. 16 Nevertheless, many policy makers and 
commentators assume that Russia is a great power and that it needs to prove this after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. This has gradually developed into the doctrine of 
multi-polarism, of resisting an international system dominated by the United States. The 
shift from liberal internationalism to neo-realism in Russian foreign policy is marked by 
a shift from insistence on Russia's duties/responsibilities as a great power to Russia's 
rights as a great power. 
If there is a shift to a multi-polar world, then each great power which constitutes 
one of the `poles' will dominate its own region. This gives us a distinction between 
`regional' and `global' powers, where the latter are those that can exert influence in 
regions other than their own. Russian realists argue that Russia is a regional power both 
in the region of the former Soviet Union, and in Europe. In other words, it is a 
`Eurasian' power. But they also claim that Russia is a global great power. I shall argue 
that Russian policy makers after 1992 viewed the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in both 
of these ways: as a conflict with global implications that Russia - as one of the world's 
16 Adomeit (1995). 
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great powers - must be involved in resolving, but also as a conflict within a region of 
Russian interests. 
Post-1992 policy in the `near abroad', the former `outer empire', and 
the `far abroad' 
We have seen that early Russian foreign policy relatively neglected the newly 
independent states of the former Soviet Union partly as a result of the rhetoric of 
partnership with the West. Whatever the theoretical underpinning of foreign policy, 
Russian policy soon had to shift the focus of attention to the `near abroad'. But when 
this occurred, it was soon associated not only with a shift in focus, but a shift in 
approach. A Russian `Monroe Doctrine' was adopted, by which the `near abroad' was 
considered to be an area of vital interests in which Russia would exert hegemony. As 
part of the realist outlook, there was often a zero-sum belief in great power rivalry in the 
region, and Russian policy makers sought to minimise influence by other regional or 
global powers. For example, they no longer asked for the CSCE to become directly 
involved in peace-keeping; instead, Yeltsin called on international institutions such as 
the CSCE or UN to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in 
the regions of the former Soviet Union. '7 And the Caspian Sea region and the 
Transcaucasus became the focus for rivalry between Western powers and Russia for 
access to the gas and oil reserves and routes for their transportation. This was played as 
a zero-sum struggle -a new `great game' - by all of the powers involved. 
Hence, the former Soviet space was not only recognised as an area of vital Russian 
interests - something which would be accepted by liberal internationalists as well as 
realists - but Russia also sought an hegemonic influence within it. This is a result partly 
of the realist attack on the liberal internationalist policy originally pursued, and partly of 
the lack of response by Western powers and international institutions to the problems of 
minority rights and ethnic conflict in the region. To a certain extent, Russia was 
fulfilling a necessary role in filling the security vacuum in the region. The Military 
Doctrine that was approved in November 1993, for example, describes one of the main 
principles of Russia's policy in the sphere of military security `to maintain stability in 
regions bordering on the Russian Federation'. "' 
After 1992, the Yeltsin administration also began to emphasise Russian security 
interests in the former `outer empire' - the former Warsaw Pact region of Central and 
Eastern Europe. For example, the Military Doctrine stated among its guidelines for 
17 Russia TV (28 February 1993). 
18 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (1993). 
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ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation: `to develop mutually 
advantageous military co-operation with foreign states, above all with states belonging 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States and countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. ' But the main issue was NATO expansion into the region. Initially, NATO 
created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in order to show its concern for the 
security of the former Eastern bloc states without promising membership. The PfP 
programme also included Russia and provide a basis for military co-operation with it. 
However, Central/Eastern European states, particularly Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, regarded the programme as a poor substitute for membership of NATO, and 
lobbied for accession, particularly after the success of Vladimir Zhirinovskii's extreme 
nationalist Liberal Democratic Party in the Russian Duma elections of December 1993. 
Crucially, towards the end of 1993, the Clinton administration itself began to favour 
NATO expansion and it was supported by the German Defence Ministry. NATO 
expansion was then considered a real option. 19 
Russian diplomats responded by warning against a new division of Europe. They 
portrayed NATO expansion as potentially threatening to Russia's security and vital 
interests. For example, among the `main existing and potential sources of military threat 
outside the Russian Federation', the Military Doctrine included the `expansion of 
military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the military security of 
the Russian Federation'. Members of the administration also argued that NATO 
expansion would benefit the nationalist-communist forces in Russia. 
NATO's decision to accept new members was, as I have suggested, a factor in the 
adoption of a neo-realist foreign policy in Russia. Nevertheless, the Yeltsin 
administration rejected calls from the nationalist-communist opposition and hard-line 
zero-sum realists to end co-operative relations with the West. Russian policy makers 
continued to assume that co-operative relations could exist, if not the strategic 
partnership that they had assumed in the liberal internationalist phase. But they insisted 
that Russia must be treated as an equal power, and argued that Russia itself had distinct 
interests from the West. This was to have a significant effect on policy towards 
Yugoslavia. 
Russian diplomats wanted the other major European powers and the United States 
to recognise Russia's great power status and its equality with them. In policy outside the 
`near abroad' and the former `outer empire', the main aim of Russian foreign policy 
makers after 1992 was to establish Russia's credentials as a global great power. 
Although the abandonment of ideological struggle with capitalism has reduced Russian 
19 Duncan (1996). 
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involvement in many areas of the world (such as in Southern Africa), Russian diplomats 
still want Russia to have an influence in world affairs commensurate with its supposed 
`great power' status. In practice, this means involvement in areas of crisis, through 
diplomatic measures to find peace or through peace-keeping. 
Eurasianism, pan-[Orthodox] Slavism, and ethnic nationalism 
Some Russian critics of the official foreign policy have been described as `Eurasianists'. 
However, Eurasianism is a misleading term because it refers to two distinct approaches. 
On the one hand, some commentators have used it to refer to the theory that - due to its 
geo-political position as part of both Europe and Asia - Russia has interests distinct 
from those of the Western powers; this could be called political Eurasianism. I have 
already suggested that there is nothing controversial about this claim, and that 
recognising it is essential for a successful Russian foreign policy. On the other hand, 
there is a cultural aspect of the term. It was originally used in the 1920s by a group of 
Russian emigres, who claimed that because of its unique culture, Russia has a specific 
role to play in world affairs. In this can be seen an echo of the idea of Moscow as the 
`Third Rome'. 
Cultural Eurasianism seeks a return to the Russian empire after the Soviet period 
(which is interpreted as an alien application of Western European rationalism and 
materialism). The Russian empire is viewed as a unifier of Orthodox and Islamic 
peoples. The political implication of these views is that policy makers should promote a 
re-integration of the peoples of the Russian empire/Soviet Union, and that they should 
reject the Western model - democracy, market economy, and materialism - and re-build 
instead a society consistent with Eurasian culture: communal at the local level, 
paternalistic or authoritarian at the state level. `Neo-imperialists' may also seek re- 
integration of the former Soviet Union, but by force if necessary, and more on the basis 
of Russian domination. 
Pan-Slavists also see Russia as different from the West. However, unlike 
Eurasianists, they emphasise the Slav nature of much of the Russian empire. They 
advocate a foreign policy orientated to the development of close relations with other 
Slav states (realists may also favour this sort of approach as a basis for finding allies). 
Pan-Orthodox Slavists adopt the same approach, but directed towards the Orthodox Slav 
states. Some pan-Slavists may be more radical, advocating the creation of a Slav state - 
a Slavonic union - incorporating the Eastern Slav populations of the former Soviet 
Union; pan-Orthodox Slavists might want a union incorporating the Orthodox Slav 
populations of Eurasia. 
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Pan-[Orthodox] Slavism can be viewed as an application of Huntington's `clash of 
civilisations' theory. In Huntington's formulation, the `Slavic-Orthodox' is one of the 
major civilisations. He contends that Russia occupies a pivotal position as the natural 
leader of Orthodox Christian civilisation: 
Despite the fact that Russia remains a secular state and the majority of Russians, as 
with the majority in the West, hold secular views, Russia simultaneously remains a 
pivotal state of one of the basic world civilisations, historically identified with 
Orthodox Christianity... As a pivotal state Russia bears a fundamental 
responsibility for the support of order and stability among Orthodox states and 
peoples. 20 
Once again, there is no clear reason why any of this should be the case. 21 It is obvious 
that a policy derived from this viewpoint will lead to accusations of neo-imperialism, 
particularly since some Orthodox Slav states (such as Bulgaria) experienced this 
`responsibility' after the Second World War. 
A third radical programme with implications for the borders in the former Soviet 
space is ethnic nationalism. The liberal Westernisers were civic nationalists. They 
sought to create a multi-national, secular, non-imperial state on the basis of inclusive 
citizenship within the existing borders of the Russian Federation. In contrast, ethnic 
nationalists want to create an ethnic nation-state, in other words a Russia for ethnic 
Russians, or Russian-speakers. This is an exclusive notion of citizenship, based on the 
concept of a nation defined by its ethnicity, its language, and its religion. It differs from 
Eurasianism in that it wants to create an ethnic nation-state rather than a multi-cultural 
empire, and from pan-[Orthodox] Slavism in its focus on the narrower concepts of 
Russian ethnicity and language, rather than `Slavonic-ness' and Orthodoxy. The policy 
implications are most apparent in relation to the `near abroad'. Ethnic nationalists would 
like to integrate those areas of the former Soviet Union with majority Russian 
populations into the Russian Federation to form a `Greater Russia'. Unlike Eurasianists, 
however, Russian ethnic nationalists may be more willing to allow non-Orthodox, non- 
Russian populated areas of the Russian Federation to secede; but they may also hope to 
remove the non-Russian population from the country. 
There are clearly similarities between these issues and the issues facing post- 
communist leaders in former Yugoslavia. In the following chapter, I shall discuss the 
links between the post-Soviet and the post-Yugoslav environments, and examine the 
20 Huntington (1995), p. 135. 
21 For a detailed criticism of the application of Huntington's notions to Russia, see Kandelj (1996a). 
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application to Russian policy towards the conflicts in former Yugoslavia of the various 
foreign policy approaches that I have outlined. 
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Chapter 3 
Russian perceptions of the Yugoslav conflicts 
While the Yugoslav conflicts of 1991 to 1995 were not an issue of huge concern among 
the general population in Russia, they became an issue of great importance in political 
circles, more so than in the West. This was partly because of domestic political 
developments: the conflicts were seen as an issue on which the government could be 
attacked effectively, which was particularly significant during the struggle for power 
between parliament and presidency. But the conflicts in former Yugoslavia raised issues 
of what kind of foreign policy the Russian Federation should pursue now that the 
ideological basis of the Cold War had disappeared. And there was also an extra level 
that was of much less significance within the West: the parallel between the situation in 
former Yugoslavia and the situation in the former Soviet Union and the Russian 
Federation itself. 
The Yugoslav conflicts and the post-Cold War international 
framework 
For liberal Westernisers in the Russian government, the Yugoslav crisis provided the 
opportunity to demonstrate Russia's `liberal democratic' credentials and to forge a 
`strategic partnership' with Western liberal democratic states. In relation to the conflicts 
themselves, `democratic, capitalist Russia' could not be expected to support an ethnic 
nationalist, communist Serbia. It was in Russia's interests to control and limit the 
conflicts in co-operation with its Western partners. The inclusion of Russia in mediation 
efforts would act not only as a balancing force, preventing any potential bias, but would 
also serve to demonstrate Russia's great power credentials (as I have already argued, 
this concept is not exclusive to realism/neo-realism, and we have seen the importance 
that Andrei Kozyrev himself attached to it). Furthermore, the Yugoslav crisis provided 
an opportunity for co-ordination through international organisations that would promote 
the development of an institutionalist `new world order'; but this co-ordination must be 
through institutions that included Russia, preferably the CSCE and the United Nations. 
In this institutionalist context, the use of sanctions and even force could not be ruled 
out, but should be used only as a last resort. The development of international 
humanitarian law, even into the domain previously considered the internal affairs of the 
sovereign state, was also to be welcomed. 
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Such developments are resisted resolutely by neo-realists, for whom state 
sovereignty is one of the foundations of the international system. From a realist 
viewpoint, intervention in local ethnic conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia 
should be kept to a minimum, and morality should not spur the `international 
community' to become too involved. It was often accepted that the strongest side would 
be allowed to win, and that this was the natural outcome. According to Igor Zevelev and 
Sharyl Cross, some politicians and intellectuals in Russia believed that 
external involvement in the crisis under the auspices of the UN has only prolonged 
the war. Otherwise, the Serbs would have won long ago, and the map of the former 
Yugoslavia would have been reshaped to appropriately reflect the balance of 
forces. ' 
International action might be necessary, particularly to prevent a spill-over of the 
fighting and the drawing in of major powers, but a great power concert on the 
nineteenth century model would be preferable to the involvement of a wider 
international institution. Kirill Benediktov, for instance, suggests that a Balkan `Security 
Council' should be formed. 2 Whichever institution is used - be it the UNSC, the 
Contact Group, or the G8 - it must consist of a small number of major powers, and it 
must include Russia; the worst scenario is for Russia to be pushed aside, to be excluded 
from conflict resolution and peace enforcement. 
The implications of the Yugoslav conflicts for the framework of the post-Cold War 
world may lead to more instrumentalist calculations. For instance, the evolution of 
European institutions is significant for the disputes in the former Soviet Union, and 
while neo-realists would prefer Russia to have the main responsibility for the `near 
abroad', liberal internationalists might be more amenable to an OSCE role in that 
region, as in former Yugoslavia. Also, for the liberal Westernisers, co-operation with 
the West over the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, by demonstrating Russia's pro- 
Western orientation, might bring significant benefits for Russia in terms of trade and 
aid. Hence, policy may take an instrumentalist form in which the approach to the 
Yugoslav conflicts is determined by the aim of achieving goals in a different area. Neo- 
realists, regarding this as humiliating subservience to the West and believing that 
interests should be derived directly from geo-political position, are adamantly opposed 
to such an approach (as we shall see in the sanctions debate). For instance, Elena 
Gus'kova, head of the Centre for the Study of the Contemporary Balkans Crisis at the 
1 Zevelev and Cross (1997), p. 264. 
2 Benediktov (1998). 
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Institute for Slavonic and Balkan Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences, RAN) 
criticises official Russian policy to the Yugoslav conflicts for having `tactics, but no 
strategy'. 3 
Nevertheless, neo-realists might seek to use the crisis in another instrumentalist 
form: to establish Russia's great power credentials and to insist on Russia's rights as a 
great power. The idea is that Russia has an interest in using the conflicts to achieve the 
goal of establishing its great power status and preventing the development of a uni-polar 
system, that is American global hegemony. And it should prevent any developments in 
relation to former Yugoslavia - such as military intervention by NATO - that would be 
contrary to Russian interests elsewhere, in particular in the former Soviet space and the 
Russian Federation itself. 
The insistence on Russia's rights as a great power often sounded tautological, in the 
sense that the chief `right' which Russia claimed as a great power in relation to the 
Yugoslav crisis was the right to be recognised as a great power. I shall argue that, after 
1992, attempts were made to `create' Russian interests in the Balkans distinct from 
Western interests there, in order to show that Russia must be taken into account in 
conflict resolution. However, most neo-realists genuinely believe that Russia does have 
strategic and economic interests in the Balkans, and they view the Yugoslav conflicts in 
this regional context. 
Russia's interests in the Balkans 
Strategic interests 
Events in former Yugoslavia cannot be said to threaten directly the security of the 
Russian Federation. Most commentators would agree that the expanse of the former 
Soviet Union, in three distinct areas - Eastern European, Transcaucasus, and Central 
Asia - is more significant for Russia than the Balkans are, but some analysts and 
politicians remain convinced that the Balkans as a whole are also important for Russian 
security. 
Those who tend towards traditional realism may emphasise the strategic 
importance of the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles). Historically, the Straits 
were believed to be the key to defending Russia's `soft underbelly'; Russia's 
vulnerability was demonstrated during the Crimean War and by the British incursion 
into the Black Sea during the civil war. Both the Soviet authorities and their Tsarist 
predecessors sought to gain control of the Straits - or at least to secure a favourable 
3 Interview with Gus'kova (4 June 1998). 
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regime - in order to prevent access to the Black Sea by the navies of other great powers. 
After the Second World War, the Straits gained strategic importance as the warm water 
outlet for the Black Sea Fleet as the Soviet Union developed a navy capable of global 
reach. 4 On the other hand, the advent of nuclear weapons and the growing importance of 
air power perhaps diminished the relative military significance of the Straits. 
The Soviet authorities were clearer than their Tsarist predecessors in differentiating 
strategically between the Balkans and the Straits. ' The Tsarist preoccupation with the 
Straits had led it to seek influence in the Balkans, particularly through Bulgaria. 
However, Russian policy became trapped in a vicious circle. Geo-political 
considerations supposedly necessitated Balkan commitments in order to control the 
Straits. But the defence and expansion of those commitments in the Balkans created 
tensions with rival European powers and led to wars, one of which, the Crimean War, 
brought about the very invasion launched through the Straits that the Balkan policy was 
supposed to prevent. Defeat led to an increased pre-occupation with the importance of 
the Straits, which entailed more activity in the Balkans, eventually leading to Russian 
involvement in World War One and the subsequent collapse of the Tsarist empire. 
This indicates the flaw in the strategy of attempting to gain control of the Straits 
through control of parts of the Balkans. But it also demonstrates the problem of getting 
trapped in a realist zero-sum struggle for strategic goals, particularly when the state is 
not sufficiently strong economically to pursue such commitments. Even before the First 
World War, the economic and human costs of wars with Turkey that resulted from 
Russia's Balkan commitments vastly outweighed the gains and hindered Russia's 
development. 6 Russia was too weak domestically to succeed in its Balkan operations, 
and those operations contributed to its domestic weakness because of the cost. 
Despite these lessons, some realist commentators continue to think in such a way. 
For instance, Nadia Arbatova of the Institute of World Economic and International 
Relations (IMEMO, RAN) suggests that, with the loss of Ukraine, and the disputes over 
the Black Sea Fleet, Russia is now even weaker on its Black Sea coastline; she argues 
that the Straits have, therefore, retained their strategic significance because of Russian 
vulnerability. ' 
The other supposed Russian strategic interest in the Balkans relates to the danger of 
a land invasion: the Balkans could be used as a base for an invasion of Russia. This was 
4 Arbatova (1996), pp. 404-5. 
5 Lederer (1962a), p. 423. 
6 Jelavich (1991), conclusion Jelavich points out that those who supported reform at home, particularly 
the Finance Ministers, opposed an adventurous Balkan policy. 
Ari atova (1996), p. 409. 
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demonstrated in June 1941 when the southern army of the three-pronged German attack 
invaded the Soviet Union (Ukraine) from Romania. Elena Gus'kova uses this fact to 
argue that Russia still has strategic interests in the Balkans. " Connected with this is the 
argument that the Belgrade revolt delayed the launch of Operation Barbarossa, with 
crucial consequences for that campaign. According to Arbatova, `the old generation of 
Russians cannot forget ... that the uprising 
in Belgrade in 1941 delayed the Germans 
and they reached Moscow late in autumn, '9 thus getting caught by the Russian winter. 
Many historians, however, now question the significance of this delay. J. Grenville, for 
instance, suggests that, since it took less than two weeks to overcome Yugoslav 
resistance, `the military diversion was too slight to affect significantly the time it took to 
assemble the huge build-up of men, equipment and supplies for the Russian invasion'. 10 
And James Gow refers to his own discussion with Aleksandr Korsik, First Secretary at 
the Russian Embassy in London, who also highlighted the Russian perception of the 
significance of the Belgrade revolt, but stressed that it was `an emotional response 
rather than one based on objective analysis'. " 
Given Russia's new borders, and the independence of Ukraine, the danger of 
invasion through the Balkans is now at still one more remove (see map 1). And any new 
attempts to gain control of the Straits would be doomed to fail. Hence, there are no 
clear-cut strategic interests for Russia in the Balkans that require an assertive, zero-sum 
approach. This does not mean, however, that neo-realist politicians and policy makers 
do not perceive there to be such interests. 
8 Interview with Gus'kova (4 June 1998). 
Arbatova (1995), p. 51. 
'o Grenville (1980), p. 489. 
11 Gow (1997a), p. 188. 
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Economic interests 
For the post-communist Russian Federation, trade will be important from the viewpoint 
of both neo-realism and liberal internationalism. Neo-realism emphasises the 
importance of trade in defining a state's great power credentials, while liberal 
internationalism is built on the idea of states trading freely with each other and 
competing freely for markets; a state's prosperity will be a measure of its success in this 
regard. 
Nevertheless, the degree to which the Balkans and former Yugoslavia constitute 
potentially lucrative markets for Russia is a matter of dispute. Many commentators 
assume that the Balkans region as a whole, and former Yugoslavia in particular, is a 
natural Russian market because of its proximity to the Russian Federation and because 
of the historical links between it and Russia. This would mean, for instance, that 
economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the FRY, consisting of 
Serbia and Montenegro) have cost Russia dearly since May 1992; as we shall see, this 
factual issue became a matter of dispute even between different government ministries. 
m Russian Federation 
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There are reasons to suppose that the claims of strong Russian economic interests 
in the Balkans are at best optimistic. The historical record is not convincing; although 
nineteenth century Russia had close military and cultural links with Balkan states 
seeking and gaining independence from the Ottoman empire, trade was limited. Trade 
was even lower between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia during the Cold War because 
of the Tito-Stalin split. Despite a resurgence in the 1980s, the level of Russian-Yugoslav 
trade had again dropped in the period immediately prior to the imposition of sanctions. 12 
Liberal internationalism in particular plays down the significance of historical and 
cultural links as a basis for trade, and neo-realists would also recognise that economic 
logic is the main determinant. There is no reason to assume that the Balkans region in 
general, and Yugoslavia in particular, is a `natural' trading partner of the Russian 
Federation. As Pavel Kandel' of the Institute of Europe (RAN) writes with regard to the 
prevalence of the German mark in the FRY: `The logic of economics turns out stronger 
than political sympathies and antipathies'. He goes on to argue that: 
There is no serious basis to suppose that the removal of sanctions can change the 
situation in Russian-Yugoslav economic relations, which arose long before the 
Yugoslav crisis. Inherited problems (a structure of commodity circulation 
unfavourable for Russia, difficulties with calculations, the smaller capacity of the 
FRY market, outside of which are situated the most industrially developed 
republics of the SFRY - Slovenia and Croatia) will also in the future hamper the 
development of trade-economic links between Russia and the new Yugoslavia. 
Hence, he concludes that `the actual economic interests of Russia in the FRY and the 
real possibilities of the Russian economy in this market are much more modest than the 
rhetoric about them'. 13 
Nevertheless, there are at least two areas in which trade can be expected to flourish. 
First, there is the supply of natural gas. This has already led Russia into the Balkans 
through its pipeline to Greece, and Russia has also supplied gas to all sides in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Second, there are arms sales, which have the potential to destabilise the 
region, and became a matter of particular controversy with regard to Cyprus. A third 
area in which the Balkans as a whole are held to be of future economic significance is 
connected with the export of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. 
The announcement by Turkey in 1994 that it wanted to review the article of the 
1936 Montreux Convention on the regime of the Straits in order to reduce the size of 
12 Kandel' (1996b), p. 18; and Moscow Home Service (9 April 1991). 
13 Kandel' (1996b), p. 19. 
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tankers travelling through them alarmed Russian commentators and diplomats. Some 
commentators suggested that it directly threatened Russian trade interests, particularly 
the shipping of Caspian oil. For example, Stephen Larrabee of the International Policy 
Department of the RAND Corporation comments that 
the official reason for the restrictions was to prevent ecological damage. While 
ecological factors undoubtedly did play a role, geo-strategic factors appear to have 
been far more important... The new restrictions give Turkey important leverage 
over Russia's ability to transport Central Asian oil and over the overall 
development of the energy sector in Central Asia. '14 
It was because of the precariousness of access to the Straits that a scheme was 
proposed to build a pipe-line from the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria to the Greek port of 
Alexandroupolis. '5 According to Kandel', this makes the Balkans, from the Russian 
perspective, inseparably linked with the Transcaucasus and Central Asian regions of the 
former Soviet Union: 
Russia's Balkan interests turn out to be connected inseparably with its vitally 
important interests in the post-Soviet space, they have a fully material basis and 
strategic significance. 16 
Neo-realists point out with relish that the old Straits issue is connected with the new 
`great game' surrounding Caspian oil and gas, giving rise to Russian `geo-strategic' 
interests in the Balkans. As Stephen Larrabee puts it: 
Russia's larger interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus give it a strong incentive 
to remain engaged in the Balkans. These interests extend beyond vague feelings of 
Slav solidarity with Serbia. They involve important geopolitical and economic 
interests associated with Russia's broader goals in Central Asia and the Caucasus. " 
The supposed linkage of the Balkans with Central Asia and the Caucasus also feeds 
into the neo-realist idea of regional rivalry. 
Regional rivalry 
Rivalry is seen to exist with three groups of powers. Firstly, neo-realists believe that 
there will be rivalry with other regional powers - Turkey and Iran - in the 
Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Thus these regions are linked through 
" Larrabee (1996), p. 401. 
'5 See Tsekhmistrcnko (1996); and Larrabee (1996), pp. 401-2. 
16 Kandel' (1996b), pp. 24-25. 
17 Larrabee (1996), p. 402. 
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this rivalry for influence, as well as through the issue of Caspian oil. As Arbatova 
writes: 
The emergence of newly independent states and new regional `superpowers' 
(Turkey, Iran) with a strong propensity to fill the geo-political vacuum in the 
regional balance of power after the end of the US-Soviet bipolarity significantly 
reinforced the regional interdependence. Thus Eastern Mediterranean, South 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia became parts of one geo-political space. 18 
Turkey is seen as attempting to seek influence in Muslim and Turkic-speaking 
former Soviet republics. Hence there is an ethnic-religious dimension; while this does 
not mean that there is a full `clash of civilisations', it is supposed that regional powers 
can use links based on language, religion, and ethnicity to increase their influence. With 
Turkey perceived as supporting Muslims in Bosnia, it has been suggested that an `arc of 
Islam' is being established, stretching from Albania, through Bosnia and Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, to the Northern Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan. 19 In response, Russia should seek allies in those states which also feel 
threatened by this: Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, and Serbia. 20 Hence, from the 
perspective of regional great power competition, a policy is derived for Russia in 
relation to the Yugoslav crisis. 
The second area of rivalry is in relation to Western European states; the latter may 
be perceived as rivals with Russia for influence in the Balkans as they were before the 
First World War. Although Russia may have common interests with Western European 
states in containing and curtailing the wars in former Yugoslavia, traditional realists 
may be suspicious of, for example, German policy, particularly considering the German 
government's pressure for early recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence 
(chapter 4). 
According to neo-realists, such regional rivalry is natural and Russia should define 
clearly, and pursue resolutely, its own interests in this situation; otherwise it will lose in 
the race for influence. Arbatova, for instance, argues: 
One of Russia's central foreign policy challenges in the new geopolitical situation 
was posed by the emergence of regional centres of power - i. e. Germany, Turkey 
and Iran - capable of expanding their influence over the unstable zones of the 
former Soviet Union. All these countries became involved, although in different 
18 Arbatova (1998a), p. 196; see also Larrabee (1996). 
19 Larrabee (1996), p. 401. 
20 For example, Nadia Arbatova argues that Greece and Bulgaria are natural allies for Russia; Arbatova 
(1996), p. 408; see also Larrabee (1996), p. 401. 
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ways, in the Yugoslav conflict. Turkey, a main actor in the Balkans, began to look 
toward re-establishing influence in the region and expanding it to the Muslim 
republics of the former Soviet Union... For post-unification Germany, the 
Yugoslav conflict presented an opportunity to play a major role in European 
politics. Iran, now competing with Turkey in the former Soviet Muslim republics, 
became involved because of its ambitions in and commitments to the Muslim 
world... It is quite logical that these states should also define their interests in the 
context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and take positions consistent with 
those interests. But there is no logic to Russia's failure to formulate its own 
objectives in the region. 2' 
This is a straightforward expression of realism, in which Russia should maximise its 
power wherever possible and minimise the power of other states. 
In the third area of rivalry, neo-realists increasingly perceived the United States, 
and the American-dominated NATO, as seeking hegemony in the Balkans to the 
exclusion of Russia. As we shall see, this led many Russian commentators and 
politicians to accuse NATO of using the Yugoslav conflicts to create a new raison 
d'etre for the alliance as well as to expand into the Balkans and secure a sphere of 
influence there, just as it was doing elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Neo- 
realists called on the Russian government to direct their policy towards resisting such 
developments. This might involve supporting those states that were also hostile to 
NATO, primarily Serbia. 
Some realists argue further that Russia should support Serbia because of historical, 
religious, and ethnic links. 
Pan-[Orthodox] Slavism 
Pan-Slavists believe that Russia should support other Slav nations. In the conflicts in 
Bosnia and Croatia, however, the leading protagonists were all Slavs. Nevertheless, 
taking into account religious affinity, there were calls for Russia to support the Serbs 
because they are Slav and - as a generalisation - Orthodox. Supposedly, there were 
historical links between Russians and Serbs based on this ethno-religious affinity and 
there were many calls for Russia to support its `traditional ally'. 
This historical assumption was deep-rooted, even within the administration. For 
example, when I interviewed an MFA official, he began by stating: 
21 Arbatova (1997a), p. 465. 
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As you will realise, Yugoslavia has always been traditionally and historically our 
major partner in the Balkans. 22 
Yet this is simply not true. For forty years after 1948, the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) regarded the Soviet Union as its greatest threat. In the inter-war 
period, official relations between the Soviet Union and all of the Balkan states were 
negligible, primarily for ideological reasons. Even before the First World War, relations 
between Russia and Serbia varied over time. Certainly, there were links based on 
common religion and ethnicity and there was a perception of having a common enemy, 
first in the Ottoman empire, and then in the Habsburg empire. But the historical record 
is more complex. 
Firstly, both the Tsarist administration and the Balkan leaders placed their own 
interests foremost. As we have seen, Russia's main interest in the Balkans was strategic: 
control of the Straits. Two contradictory policies were pursued to achieve this, 
sometimes simultaneously by different members of the diplomatic service. At times, 
Russian policy supported the independence movements of the Balkan nations in the 
belief that this would give it influence once the nations had gained independence. At 
other times, Russia aimed to preserve the weak Ottoman empire, from which it was able 
to extract concessions and exert influence; it was feared that in the event of Ottoman 
collapse, other powers would gain control of the Straits, or a major war might break out 
for control of them. 
Even when Russia did support the Balkan nations, this was fraught with problems. 
Since these nations were in competition for control of territory, it was impossible to 
support all of them equally in their aims; nor was it possible to choose the Slav, 
Orthodox nation when - as was the case with Serbia and Bulgaria - both nations were 
Slav and Orthodox. Russia generally favoured Bulgaria because it provided more direct 
access to the Straits. For example, even after Russia had supported the Serbs in their 
struggle against the Ottoman empire in 1876-78, the Russian-brokered treaty of San 
Stefano would have created (had it been implemented) a Greater Bulgaria, upsetting the 
local balance of power and frustrating the ambitions of Greece and Serbia in Macedonia 
(as well as Romania, which lost southern Bessarabia). 23 When the Serbs protested, they 
`were informed bluntly that Russia's interests came first, Bulgaria's second, and 
Serbia's last'. 24 Serbia subsequently looked to Austria-Hungary to further its interests, 
n Interview with representative of MFA (1 July 1998). 
23Lederer (1962a), p. 435. 
24 Stavrianos (1958), p. 409. 
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effectively moving into its sphere of influence, and it was only after 1907 that Serbia 
again appealed to Russia. 
Russian policy in the nineteenth century was not motivated purely by self-interest; 
there was genuine ideological support for the Slav and Orthodox Balkan nations. But, 
once again, the historical record is complex. Certainly, there was a surge of popular 
sympathy for the Serbs and Bulgarians in the 1870s, particularly in response to 
massacres of the latter by Ottoman forces, and this influenced the Tsar's decision to 
fight Turkey. Successive Tsars also felt bound by treaty obligations and a sense of 
personal honour to protect the Balkan nations. Nicholas II stated in his manifesto on 3 
August 1914: 
Today it is not only the protection of a country related to us and unjustly attacked 
that must be accorded, but we must safeguard the honour, the dignity, and the 
integrity of Russia and her position among the great powers. 25 
But there was also a further manifestation of ideology in the Tsarist foreign policy: 
at various times in the nineteenth century, the Tsar strongly resisted change. This was 
particularly true of Nicholas I. Nicholas Riasanovsky writes that Nicholas I was 
`determined to maintain and defend the existing order in Europe, just as he considered it 
his sacred duty to preserve the archaic system in his own country'; this `conservative 
and legitimist orientation' represented the very opposite of the messianic role that the 
pan-Slavists envisaged for Russia. 26 As a result, Tsarist Russia at times worked in 
concert with other autocratic states, in particular the other key multi-national European 
empire, Austria, to withstand progressivism. So, in August 1849, Russian troops helped 
to put down the uprising in Hungary, thus re-establishing stability within Russia's main 
rival in the Balkans. At the same time, Russia carried out similar actions in the Ottoman 
possessions, demonstrating that ideological as well as strategic considerations lay 
behind the policy of upholding the Ottoman empire. 27 
Thus, just as the two strategic approaches contradicted each other, so did the two 
ideological principles. It is wrong therefore to suppose that Russia always supported the 
Balkan Slav and Orthodox nations (and Serbia in particular) in their fight for 
independence from the Ottoman empire. Again, this does not mean that there are not 
wide-spread perceptions in Russia (and Serbia) that there is a history of strong links; 
whatever the reality of Russian-Serbian relations in the nineteenth century, the truth 
11 Quoted in Jelavich (1991), p. 275; for a discussion of the influence of notions of `honour', see ibid., 
conclusion, and Glover (1999), chapter 21. 
26 Riasanovsky (1974), pp. xxiii, xxxiii. 
27 Jelavich (1991), p. 110. 
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does not diminish the potency of the myth of eternal friendship. 28 Furthermore, present 
day pan-[Orthodox] Slavists might attack the government for not offering the Serbs 
sufficient support, just as their predecessors did in the 1870s. 
Liberal internationalists would, of course, reject a policy based on such an 
approach; although they might support intervention on behalf of the oppressed or 
persecuted, this would not be because of religious or ethnic affinity but because of 
universal moral duty and international legal - not just narrow treaty - obligations. Neo- 
realists would also oppose an ideological pan-Slavic/pan-Orthodox Slavic policy, 
although they might use ethnic-religious links to promote Russian interests. But they 
may also have learnt the lessons of 1914, which would make them wary of risking 
conflict with other great powers in support of one of the sides in the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Instead, they might hope to develop a great power concert in order to avoid a split 
between the powers and the danger of a proxy war (a direct war being unlikely in the 
era of nuclear deterrence). 
More radical realists might look for close relations with the FRY, perhaps even a 
confederation. This is also true of pan-Orthodox Slavists; during the conflicts, there 
were calls for the formation of a Slavonic union, incorporating Russia, Belarus, and 
Serbia and Montenegro. Such proposals, and appeals for support of the Serbs, also 
served political purposes: they were a means of attacking the government. But the 
political dimension had another aspect: the opposition in Russia supported Serbia 
because it was pursuing a policy in former Yugoslavia that they wanted Russia to 
pursue in the former Soviet Union. There was also a domestic political agenda common 
to the Serb authorities and the Russian nationalist-communist opposition. 
Mirror Factors 
Much of the interest in events in Yugoslavia aroused in 1991 among Soviet/Russian 
political circles as well as in Western elites, arose from awareness of the parallel 
situations in the Soviet Union and the SFRY. This resulted in the explicit policy agreed 
between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991 to hold the SFRY together because its 
disintegration might precipitate a similar fate for the Soviet Union. 29 After the break-up 
of both federations, the similarities continued. 
2" For the continuation of this myth, and an analysis of its perpetuation through Russian school text books, 
see Mendelofi (1999). 
29 USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (30 July 1991). 
54 
Diaspora 
When the administrative borders of the Soviet Union became international borders 
between independent states, twenty-five million ethnic Russians found themselves 
living outside the Russian Federation in other newly independent states. This became a 
cause of instability in the region. In particular, the Russian minority in Moldova created 
the `Trans-Dniestr Republic', while the Crimean parliament became a forum for efforts 
to make Crimea a part of the Russian Federation, rather than part of Ukraine as it had 
been since 1954. Crimea had an ethnic Russian majority, and Transdniester a majority 
of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. The situation in the latter appeared more serious 
because of what was in effect the outbreak of war in 1992, confused by the presence of 
the Russian 14th army; the situation in Crimea had potential to become more serious 
because of the relatively recent transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the issue of the Black Sea 
Fleet, and Crimea's proximity to the Russian Federation. With time, the issue of the 
rights of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia also gained prominence and was 
deliberately linked by the Russian government to the withdrawal of Russian troops. 
The break-up of the SFRY also left significant ethnic minorities outside their titular 
state. The most prominent were ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia, who, like 
Russians in Moldova, established their own `republic', the `Republic of Serbian 
Krajina'. Ethnic Serbs were also a minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the `Serb 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' was proclaimed. But there was also a significant 
ethnic Croatian minority in Herzegovina, bordering Croatia. And the formerly 
autonomous province of Kosovo within Serbia had a ninety per cent ethnic Albanian 
population, which began to demand not just autonomy, but independence. 
Similarities in terms of diaspora therefore existed between Russia, Serbia, Croatia, 
and Albania. 
Internal Minorities 
Each of these republics with a significant diaspora in neighbouring republics also had 
internal minorities. So, Serbia had the Kosovo Albanians, Croatia the Krajina Serbs. 
Ukrainians, Latvians, and so on, also live in the Russian Federation, but the significant 
minorities are those concentrated in areas that are ethnically-designated constituent 
republics of the Russian Federation. The Russian government therefore has its own 
problems to face with minorities that might wish to secede. Although Moscow now has 
bilateral treaties with most of the ethnic republics, the Chechen republic obviously 
remains a primary concern. In the long term, the influx of Chinese to the Russian Far 
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East may also pose significant problems, `similar to those in the Serbia-Kosovo-Albania 
triangle'. 30 
Consequently, Russia has `interests on both sides of the borders-versus-diaspora 
issue'. 3' This would seem to mitigate against arguments of the form: because Russia 
faces this problem, it should support X in the Yugoslav conflict because X faces a 
similar problem. For example, should Russia support Serbian efforts to aid the Serb 
minority in Krajina in 1992, because of the situation in Moldova, or support Croatia in 
its attempts to put down what might be seen as a threat to its territorial integrity, 
because of Chechnya? 
If policy towards former Yugoslavia is influenced by such considerations, then it is 
likely to reflect the Russian leadership's priorities. Russia's most vital security interest 
is considered to be the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation; 
the second is the `near abroad'. 32 This suggests, for instance, that Chechnya is of more 
concern than the issue of ethnic Russians outside the Russian Federation; in other 
words, the borders issue is more significant than the diaspora issue. Applied to the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia, this would mean that Russian diplomats are more likely 
to support Croatian control of Krajina and Slavonia than to encourage independence for 
the Serb minority (while still expressing concern over the rights of that minority, just as 
they have expressed concern over the rights of Russians in the former Soviet Union). 
And they are more likely to have been tolerant of Serbia's actions in Kosovo than of its 
support of the Bosnian Serbs, because those actions were aimed at upholding the 
maintenance of Serbia's territorial integrity. 
Russian opposition figures held different views from the Yeltsin administration on 
the needs of Russian domestic policy and policy in the former Soviet Union, and this 
was reflected in their interpretations of the Yugoslav conflicts. In other words, they 
viewed the conflicts through the prism of the former Soviet Union. Cultural Eurasianists 
and neo-imperialists supported what they saw as the efforts by the federal Yugoslav 
authorities, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and the Serbian government to 
preserve a South Slav state, believing that their equivalents in the Soviet Union should 
have acted in a similar way. Nationalist-communists after 1991 viewed the Milosevic 
regime as a model for the kind of socialist, nationalist state that they wanted to create in 
the former Soviet Union. Ethnic nationalists saw the Serbian government in 1992 as 
30 Arbatova (1995), p. 53. 
31 Gow (1997a), p. 189. 
32 See `Russia's Foreign Policy Concept', appendix to Rahr and Krause (1995). 
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aiming to create a Greater Serbia. They wanted a Greater Russia, or at least a Russian 
policy of supporting ethnic Russians in the `near abroad'. They were therefore 
sympathetic towards Serb aims. As we shall see, many were critical of Slobodan 
Milosevic after 1994 for `abandoning' the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia, just as they 
criticised Yeltsin for `abandoning' the ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics. 
Russian ethnic nationalists also identified with Serb grievances relating to their 
status within the SFRY. For example, there were Serb complaints about the 1974 
Federal Constitution, which established Vojvodina and Kosovo as autonomous 
provinces; these provinces were allowed to have a say in Serbian affairs, but Serbia had 
no say in their affairs. This constitution `was considered to be discrimination of Serbia 
in Yugoslavia and became the primary target of the Serbian intelligentsia after Tito's 
death'. 33 The intelligentsia also aired other complaints of discrimination against Serbs 
within the SFRY, as shown by the famous `Memorandum' of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts (SANU) of September 1986.34 Milosevic, of course, addressed these 
grievances, particularly with regard to Kosovo, thus embarking on a policy that led 
directly to the wars of Yugoslav succession. 
Many Russians had similar grievances, which began to be aired with the onset of 
glasnost'. There was the complaint, for example, that Russia had suffered in comparison 
to other republics in terms of having to subsidise their development, and also that the 
Russian Federation lacked institutions possessed by other republics (it had no Academy 
of Sciences, nor even a Communist Party, separate from the Union institutions). 
Arbatova suggests that they also had grievances over borders similar to the Serb 
grievances over the 1974 constitution, particularly over Nikita Khrushchev's transferral 
of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1956.35 
After war broke out in former Yugoslavia - first in Slovenia, then in Croatia, and then 
Bosnia-Herzegovina - the devastation and the isolation that it brought the Serbs served 
as a disincentive to the reformist Russian leadership to play an equivalent role in the 
former Soviet Union. Kozyrev, for example, in May 1992 urged the Supreme Soviet to 
adopt `well-thought out' and `balanced decisions' in relation to Crimea; otherwise `we 
may find ourselves in a Yugoslav position'. 36 According to Arbatova, 
33 Arbatova (1995), p. 54. 
34 The memorandum is included in Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1995). 
35 Arbatova (1995), p. 54. 
36 ITAR-TASS (20 May 1992). 
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[i]t goes without saying that the Yugoslav experience had a strong repercussion on 
the foreign policy of Russia both in the near abroad and in the far abroad. The 
mirror effect of the Yugoslav conflict was in general positive: in bloodshed, 
destruction and in an atmosphere of hatred and mistrust Russia saw its own 
probable future and shivered with horror. 7 
But the politicians who urged the JNA attack on Vukovar, or oversaw `ethnic 
cleansing' within Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not shiver with horror. Eduard Limonov (a 
`very, very famous' Russian writer, according to the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, 
Radovan Karadzic) in the documentary `Serbian Epics', did not shiver in horror when 
he visited Serb forces besieging Sarajevo. Instead, he praised the glorious bravery of the 
Serbs: 
You are very courageous people: despite anything what is against you, it is a great 
power, it will always be. Fifteen countries are against you, and you resist... And I 
repeat again, we Russians should take an example from you. You are people of my 
blood, of my religion. I really admire ... 
I have found the right word now, that is 
'admiration'. 33 
This admiration was representative of the views of the red-brown coalition in 
Russia. While the Russian government was determined not to re-create the Yugoslav 
events on an incalculable scale in the former Soviet Union, 
the communist-nationalist opposition in its own approach in just the same way 
proceed[ed] from a direct projection of the Yugoslav situation onto the former 
[Soviet] Union, striving in former Yugoslavia to create a precedent for its 
reproduction within the former Soviet Union. 39 
As we shall see, these differences highlighted the deep divisions over the future of 
Russia, reflecting profound political, philosophical, and moral differences. 
Conclusions 
Evaluation of Russia's policy towards the conflicts is based on interpretation of the 
conflicts themselves, as well as on opinions of what kind of power Russia should be and 
how it should behave on the international scene. There is a network of connections 
linking interpretation of events in former Yugoslavia, policy towards the conflicts, the 
history of relations between Russia and the Balkan states, and the implications of 
37 Arbatova (1994), p. 35. 
38 `Serbian Epics' (1992). For more examples of Limonov's admiration, see Limonov (13 January 1992). 
39 rande1' (1992). 
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`mirror' factors. Underlying and to a certain extent unifying them is, I believe, an 
interpretation of what kind of international system is operating in the post-Cold War 
world, and a prescriptive view of what system should operate and how Russia should 
act. 
There are arguments on all sides concerning the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, 
which is why there have been so many disputes over it within academic circles and why 
policy makers from other states and international organisations have found it so difficult 
to agree on a programme of action in response. But, by examining the wider 
interpretative and moral outlook of commentators and politicians, by analysing their 
arguments and determining the assumptions behind them, we can gain a picture of the 
wider beliefs by which events are interpreted and presented. And it is perhaps at this 
level that they should be judged. 
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Chapter 4 
The liberal internationalist phase: January - autumn 
1992 
I argued in Chapter 2 that official Russian foreign policy during most of 1992 fitted into 
a liberal institutionalist framework. This was explicitly espoused by the Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Kozyrev. He believed that a democratising Russia shared interests with 
the West, or the `civilised world', because they shared values (associated with liberal 
democracy). The institutionalist aspect of Russian foreign policy consisted of an 
emphasis on the role of international institutions and international law in dealing with 
aggression and with abuses of human and minority rights. This role potentially included 
the use of economic sanctions and military intervention, although it was to be hoped 
that dialogue and peaceful pressure would achieve the desired results. 
Kozyrev expounded this view in an article entitled `Russia and Human Rights' in 
early 1992: 
The provision adopted in Moscow at the Conference on the Human Dimension of 
the Council [sic] on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to the effect that concern 
for human rights is not interference in the internal affairs of states, opens up a new 
phase of international interaction for the benefit of mankind and for world peace... 
We believe that the international community should not limit itself to moral and 
political condemnation of any state that violates human rights; the establishment of 
an international force specially trained to protect human rights deserves 
consideration. We proposed ... 
imposing economic and, perhaps, other sanctions to 
prevent massive and flagrant violations of human rights. ' 
These comments related primarily to the issue of ethnic Russians/Russian speakers in 
the former Soviet republics, particularly the Baltic states; but the principles could also 
have been applied to the Yugoslav conflicts directly. 
The liberal institutionalist approach was reflected in the major policy decisions 
concerning the Yugoslav crisis made during most of 1992: support for the establishment 
of UNPROFOR and the subsequent contribution of Russian troops (February/March); 
support for humanitarian aid efforts; recognition of the independence of Croatia and 
Slovenia (February); recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (April); voting in the UN 
Security Council for the imposition of sanctions against the FRY (May); suspension of 
Kozyrev (1992b), pp. 289-291. 
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the FRY from the CSCE (July) and the United Nations (September); and recognition of 
the Republic of Macedonia (August). These actions were opposed in Russia by ethnic 
nationalists, neo-imperialists, and pan-Slavists as well as by neo-realists/state centrists. 
Support for UNPROFOR and the UNHCR 
On 21 February 1992, Russia voted in favour of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 743 which established the UN Protection Force - UNPROFOR - 
in Croatia. UN peace-keeping forces were deployed in four sectors, called `United 
Nations Protected Areas' (UNPAs): East (Eastern Slavonia), West (Western Slavonia), 
North (northern Krajina), South (southern Krajina, including Knin) (see map 2). In 
March, the CIS joint armed forces' commander-in-chief ordered the despatch of 900 
Russian peace-keepers - one airborne battalion - to serve in UNPROFOR. 2 The 
Supreme Soviet gave its consent on 6 March, and the troops left for Sector East on 8 
3 April. 
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According to Sergei Shakhrai, State Counsellor for Legal Affairs and a close 
Yeltsin ally, 
Russia's agreeing to co-operate with the UN will contribute to strengthening 
Russia's international prestige. At the same time, experience in direct participation 
in the UN's peace-keeping activities is also valuable from the point of view of the 
domestic problems of the Russian Federation. 
This was not, however, a unanimous opinion. In particular, the Russian military was 
sceptical about the decision. According to the MFA diplomat Vitalii Churkin, high- 
ranking military personnel did not want Russia to participate because they did not 
approve of the contacts between Russian and Western soldiers and officers that would 
result. ' In addition, the Russian military was unwilling to contribute to the UN mission 
while Russia was not actively involved in conflict settlement (until this time, the 
European Community - the EC - had taken primary responsibility for conflict 
management). Most importantly, the armed forces were experiencing a period of 
difficult transition and shortage of resources at a time when a number of conflicts had 
broken out in the former Soviet Union and were threatening to erupt within the Russian 
Federation itself. This naturally increased the General Staff's reluctance to commit 
troops to UNPROFOR, regardless of the experience that might be gained. In the words 
of the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff (later to be Chief of the General Staff), 
General Mikhail Kolesnikov, `[w]e have let it be known that [this battalion] will be the 
first and the last one of its kind. Russian men should not be sent to fight abroad when 
there is so much to be done now in their own country. '6 
The MFA prevailed in this dispute. This was partly because at that stage it was the 
dominant policy making institution in relation to states outside the former Soviet Union. 
In fact, it was only when the Russian government saw the necessity for the Russian 
Federation to form its own army - after it became clear that the CIS would not be 
sufficiently integrated to have its own armed forces - that Yeltsin issued a decree on the 
formation of a Russian Defence Ministry, on 16 March 1992.7 Pavel Grachev was not 
appointed Minister of Defence until 18 May. Hence, there was no Defence Ministry to 
4 Russian Television (6 March 1992); Shakhrai presumably included disputes in the `near abroad' among 
`domestic problems'. 
5 Arbatova (1996), pp. 411-2. 
6 Felgenhauer (1994a); again, Kolesnikov presumably meant the former Soviet Union when he referred to 
`their own country'. By 1994, Russia had approximately 16,000 troops in peace-keeping missions in the 
`near abroad'; MacFarlane and Schnabel (1995), p. 308. 
Sakwa (1993), p. 316. 
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oppose the move, " while the primary concern of the CIS Joint Command under Marshal 
Shaposhnikov was the former Soviet Union. 
Moscow continued to express its support for UN peace-keeping by voting for 
resolutions extending UNPROFOR's mandate into Bosnia-Herzegovina, 9 where its 
main role was to guarantee the safe provision of humanitarian supplies. In addition, 
Russia supported UNSCR 795 in December which established an UNPROFOR 
presence in Macedonia. 
At times, Kozyrev even suggested that UN forces might be justified in going 
beyond peace-keeping to peace enforcement. For example, during the Supreme Soviet 
debate of 26 June 1992, he suggested that Russian forces might take part in a peace 
establishment mission in order, perhaps, to open Sarajevo airport, ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian aid supplies, and protect national minorities. Such a mission must be 
under a UN aegis: `It must not be a NATO operation, which we categorically reject. 
Any one-sided actions by whatever country, and any military intervention, are fully 
excluded. ' 10 
Kozyrev's comments did not get a positive reception in Russia. Even an 
intervention under United Nations aegis was treated with scepticism because of the 
potential implications: there was opposition across the Russian political spectrum to a 
precedent being set by a large scale, multi-lateral, UN-sponsored military intervention 
in former Yugoslavia, which might then be applied to civil wars in parts of the former 
Soviet Union. " In addition, it was generally suspected that any intervention would be 
NATO-led or dominated by NATO, particularly as NATO began to take the primary 
role in organising UNPROFOR. 12 
At this stage, the future role of NATO was uncertain after it had achieved its 
primary purpose with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. But two possible re-definitions 
of its role began to emerge: to expand into Eastern Europe, and to adopt a peace- 
keeping and peace enforcing role particularly in response to the proliferating ethnic 
conflicts in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. At a session of the NATO 
council in Oslo in June 1992, the head of the American delegation, Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger, urged NATO to `take on a new role'; it should act in 
Yugoslavia to `alleviate the suffering there', and `should also play a role in efforts to 
establish the peace in Nagorno-Karabakh'. According to one West European diplomat, 
8 Baev (1996a), p. 75. 
9 In 1992, UNSCRs 758,761,764, and 776. 
'o Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a). See al so Mal ak Radio (28 May 1992). 
" Lough (1993a). 
12 Gow (1997a), pp. 112-13. 
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NATO was `not yet ready for large-scale operations, for efforts to impose peace by 
force, but the first step toward a decisive broadening of NATO's zone of responsibility 
has been taken today'. 13 
Recognition of the Yugoslav successor republics 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Russia recognised the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 17 February 1992, just 
over a month after the European Community countries, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 28 
April 1992, three weeks after the EC and the United States. Kozyrev believed that those 
republics had a right to independence and sovereignty, and that recognition might help 
protect them from aggressive actions which challenged that right. His interpretation of 
events in Yugoslavia was clearly shaped by what had happened in the Soviet Union the 
previous year. The government of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) had itself sought `self-determination' - sovereignty and independence - from 
the Soviet Union. Consequently, at the start of 1992 the Russian government was 
sympathetic to the aims of the republics of the SFRY that shared this goal. And it 
respected the decision of the EC since the West was perceived as the representative of 
`civilised' international society; this meant, for example, that Russian diplomats did not 
at this stage suspect Western states such as Germany of seeking to extend great power 
influence in the region and of supporting traditional allies or co-religionists. As Kozyrev 
put it, speaking of the opposition demand to take into account the `Slavonic factor', 
`today not one state is governed by such criteria in its foreign policy, if, of course, we 
are talking about civilised democratic countries'. '4 
The desire to `follow the West', the intention to apply international law, and the 
willingness to allow the republics of Yugoslavia the independence that Russia now 
enjoyed, were inter-related aspects of the overall outlook of the new Russian 
government. This was expressed clearly by the commentator Andrei Ostal'skii in 
Izvestiia: 
Russia's decision not to lag behind Western Europe any more and to recognise the 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia can hardly be seen as unexpected. We were 
prompted to take the step by a desire to respect the principles of international law, 
the values of contemporary civilisation and the very logic of events. After all, the 
two former republics have already gained de facto independence, and that 
13 Ostal'skii (5 June 1992). 
14 Kozyrev (20 August 1992). 
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independence is recognised de jure by virtually all of Europe. And perhaps most 
importantly, we know well from our own experience what attempts to ignore 
reality and to deny peoples their right to self-determination can lead to. 's 
The special envoy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Iurii Deriabin, also emphasised 
the pragmatic logic of the decision. He called the necessity to recognise `unfortunate', 
but the `reality' of the failure of the policy aimed at holding Yugoslavia together. The 
priority of Russian diplomacy was to maintain co-operation with the EC and with the 
Yugoslav successor states. Delaying recognition would jeopardise this: `We have 
already lagged behind on more than one occasion, and it hasn't been to our advantage. ' 
Instead, it was necessary to `take political realities into account', and recognition 
increased the chances of Russia facilitating a satisfactory solution to the issue of the 
Serb minority in Croatia, and of promoting a comprehensive political resolution of the 
Yugoslav crisis. 16 
Kozyrev presented the decision to recognise these republics as the application of 
international law. He claimed in August 1992 that recognition of all the former 
Yugoslav republics that had declared their independence was governed by the political 
necessity of buttressing the legal right of those states to sovereignty and independence. 
Referring to Macedonia, he wrote that it 
has remained already for several months unrecognised and hence can become easy 
booty in the region, where very aggressive forces are operating even against those 
countries which possess a solid international-legal status. This was precisely the 
point of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, before that, 
of Croatia and Slovenia; it was (and is now with Bosnia and Herzegovina) being 
attempted by force to deprive them of their rights to independence and 
sovereignty. " 
The problem with this argument is that international law did not conclusively grant 
the former Yugoslav republics the right to independence. Firstly, while the SFRY 
continued to exist as a sovereign state, the Yugoslav constitution was the legal regulator 
of relations between the republics. Unlike the constitution of the USSR, however, the 
Yugoslav constitution did not unambiguously grant constituent republics the right to 
secession. '' Secondly, if the SFRY was breaking up, it was not clear what the 
15 Ostal'skii (6 February 1992). 
16 Ibid.; Edemskii (1996), p. 33; and MFA representative quoted in Volobuev and Tiagunenko (28 
February 1992). 
" Kozyrev (20 August 1992). 
18 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1974). 
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appropriate precedent in international law was. One commentator suggests that the 
Yugoslav case is an instance of the collapse of a multi-national state, of which the only 
previous examples were the dissolution of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires; in those 
cases, the frontiers of the successor states `were established by considerations of 
ethnicity, language, historic settlement, regional security, and economic violability, and 
were adjudicated through the mechanism of international conferences'. The internal 
boundaries `did not retain upon dissolution any special sanctity' and plebiscites were 
one useful means of determining the preferences of the populations concerned. 19 
Nevertheless, the Arbitration Commission set up by the EC under Robert Badinter 
applied the principle of uti possidetis ('have what you have had'), which was originally 
established in the context of de-colonisation and meant that, in the absence of a peaceful 
agreement to alter frontiers, the colonial administrative boundaries became the borders 
of the new states. This was in line with the general trend of international law, since the 
right to national self-determination has been interpreted on a territorial rather than an 
ethnic basis in post-war international legal practice. As such, it was a coherent argument 
of practical merit, since the consequence of departing from the civic interpretation of 
self-determination would be a plethora of demands for the re-drawing of borders across 
Europe, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, with 
the inevitable consequence of major `population transfers'. 
Unfortunately, in Yugoslavia itself, self-determination tended to be understood 
ethnically, rather than territorially, by the various leaderships and the population as a 
whole. For example, the preamble to the Croatian constitution adopted at the end of 
1990 laid insistent emphasis on `the historical right of the Croatian people to full state 
sovereignty', based on `the thousand-year-long national identity and state existence of 
the Croatian nation' (defined ethnically). 20 The Serbian leadership argued that the Serbs 
living in Croatia, as part of the Serb `nation', had as much right to self-determination as 
the Slovenes and the Croats, and the Serbian delegation to the Conference for Peace in 
Yugoslavia asked the Arbitration Commission to clarify this point. The answer was that 
they enjoyed a second-order right to self-determination (they could, for instance, 
demand autonomy) but this did not mean a right to secession. Their first-order right to 
self-determination was as part of the civic nation, that is the population of Croatia, and 
meant a right to democracy. 21 
19 Rady (1996). 
20 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (22 December 1990). 
21 Weller (1992), p. 591. 
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While the Badinter Commission upheld Croatian territorial self-determination, it 
was in fact careful to demand more guarantees of the rights of the members of the 
population who were not ethnic Croats. On 11 January 1992, it declared that the 
Republic of Croatia now met the necessary conditions for its recognition (in accordance 
with the Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, adopted by the Council of the 
European Communities on 16 December 1991), but subject to the reservation that the 
Republic supplement the Constitutional Act in such a way as to satisfy conditions 
relating to rights of minorities. 22 Without waiting for those conditions to be met, the 
German government announced the following day that it intended to recognise Croatia 
unconditionally. Rather than insist that the Croatian government meet the Badinter 
conditions before gaining recognition, the other EC countries soon followed Germany. 
A similar process occurred when the EC states recognised the independence of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in April. Yet, one republic - Macedonia - remained unrecognised even 
though it had satisfied the Badinter commission's conditions, because of the objections 
of Greece (see below). 
The impression was thus created that the EC was not abiding by its own guidelines 
for recognition. Elena Gus'kova states the problem concisely: 
After the adoption of the EC Declaration, Croatia was hastily recognised, although 
it violated at least four of the five EC conditions, but recognition of Macedonia was 
put off, although it violated none. Meanwhile, the independence of war-tom Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was supported, a territory with an unstable internal situation, with 
an undefined political structure, and with relations between the peoples [narodami] 
living there unclear. 23 
Realist critics believed that Western states - in particular, Germany and the United 
States - were using the recognition issue to re-establish their influence in the Balkans. 
For example, Aleksandr Chudakov wrote in the nationalist Sovetskaia Rossiia: 
More than once, in sitting down to a game of European political solitaire, Germany 
has begun with the Yugoslav card. And not surprisingly: whoever controls 
Yugoslavia (or dominates it) automatically becomes the master of all south-eastern 
Europe... Today it is much cheaper and much easier to rule by dividing rather than 
by conquering. The openly pro-German orientation of Slovenia and Croatia, plus 
22 `Opinion No. 5 on the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by the European Community and its 
Member States, Paris, 11 January 1992', in Trifunovska (1994), pp. 489-490. 
23 Gus'kova (1998a), p. 14. 
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the influence of `His Majesty the Bundesmark', have played a decisive role. Is it 
any wonder that Germany has become the staunchest supporter of unconditional 
recognition of the new Balkan republics? 24 
Such realist approaches often yield highly imaginative conspiracy theories that 
have no relation to actual facts, or at least have no evidence to support them; the authors 
are either slightly self-congratulatory in their discovery of the `truth', or simply assume 
that all policy makers share their reductive realism. One fine example appeared in 
Komsomol'skaia pravda, after the United States recognised the independence of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
The strengthening of Germany's position, and Europe's desire for a single set of 
borders that leaves little room for the US, could not help but cause concern. From 
an objective standpoint, the Americans had lost Croatia [to Germany]. However, 
even then the US had its sights on another republic, one much more important in 
terms of industrial potential and with the same strategic access to the 
Mediterranean Sea - and, most importantly, the only republic in Europe that 
professes Islam. And when the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it wasn't 
Germany but the US that took a leading role... Following Germany's example, the 
US has decided to use Serbia as a ploy to win over Bosnia-Herzegovina and, at the 
same time, to gain supporters and enhance its prestige in other Muslim countries - 
prestige that has noticeably slipped of late. 25 
Many Russian commentators were critical of their own government for recognising 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina so `hastily'. For example, Nadia Arbatova 
wrote that 
the Western position on recognition of the former Yugoslav republics was never 
criticised or even analysed on an official level in Russia. This may be explained by 
two facts. First, after years of confrontation, unity with the West came to be the 
major priority for Moscow. It did not want to cast a cloud over its new relations by 
introducing any objections or disagreements. Second, it wanted to persuade the 
West that Russia was a more reliable partner than the USSR. Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev missed no opportunity to underline the point. 26 
The political, theoretical, and moral differences between the liberal Westernisers 
and their realist and ethnic nationalist critics were sharply revealed in many of the 
24 Chudakov (21 March 1992). 
's Gorlov (28 April 1992). For a more lengthy exposition of this theory, see Gus'kova (1998b). 
26 Arbatova (1996), p. 411. 
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reactions to recognition. If Kozyrev's policy entwined support for the West, for 
international law, and for `civilised divorce' in the former Soviet Union, many of his 
opponents displayed continued antagonism towards the West, advocated the pursuit of 
Russian interests in relation to the Yugoslav conflicts, and favoured the re-establishment 
of the Soviet Union, or at least the incorporation of those areas outside Russia with a 
large ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking population. We can see a `negative' of the 
official Russian approach as described above by Ostal'skii, in an article in Pravda by 
Pavel Volobuev and Liudmila Tiagunenko of the Institute of International Economic 
and Political Research (RAN): 
We cannot fail to give due credit to the Serbian leadership. For it, the fate of 
its own people, no matter where they live, is by no means a secondary question. It 
seems that the vague references to realities [in Deriabin's statement] conceals 
something else -a reluctance to `offend' the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] 
(a zealous champion of Croatian and Slovenian independence)... 
There is concern that our Foreign Ministry's excessive haste in recognising the 
former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could turn against 
the Russian Federation itself. After all, it has inherited certain geo-political 
interests and historical traditions. Also well-known is the rich concept of long-term 
interests, which differ significantly from short-term interests and expediency. Nor 
have such foreign policy categories as spheres of interests and long-term traditions 
of alliance disappeared (whether certain of our highly-moral commentators like it 
or not). 27 
Chudakov went further: recognition was the `price' of aid from the EC: 
The unintelligible muttering of present-day Nesselrodes about the need `not to lag 
behind contemporary processes and new political realities in Europe' is poor 
justification for betraying Serbia. How can one talk about geopolitics when Russia 
is pinning all its hopes on `humanitarian' rations from the Bundeswehr! Only a 
naive person could have thought that we wouldn't have to pay for the German 
sausages. Needless to say, the first bills have now been paid... 28 
Shed of the vituperative rhetoric, there was an element of truth in these allegations. 
It was not so much that Russian diplomats consciously sought a trade-off between 
support of Western policy on the Yugoslav conflicts and aid to Russia, at least in the 
case of recognition (I shall discuss the accusations in relation to sanctions below). 
27 Volobuev and Tiagunenko (28 February 1992). 
28 Chudakov (21 March 1992). 
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Rather, they somewhat unquestioningly accepted the EC and US approach to the issue 
because they believed that the West was the guardian of international law and of 
`civilised' international society. 
No convincing evidence has been uncovered to prove that Germany or the United 
States were attempting to establish a sphere of influence in the Balkans, or that they 
were supporting traditional allies and creating future allies. In fact, there were strong 
political arguments for recognition of Croatia after war had broken out, particularly 
after the shelling of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and recognition did seem to contribute to 
creating a cease-fire in Krajina. 29 And although the decision to recognise Bosnia has 
been widely criticised for pushing the country into war, fighting there also preceded the 
act of recognition (by April there were widespread incidents of conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina), and recognition allowed the problem to be internationalised. 
But Western policy in the recognition process was inconsistent and haphazard and 
thus paved the way for accusations of power politics. The inconsistency was initially 
neglected by Russian policy makers in their naive belief in the West, but it ultimately 
contributed to undermining their institutionalist belief in the possibility of impartial 
application of international law. Furthermore, while Russian policy was shaped in part 
by the approach Russian policy makers had themselves adopted during the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, they failed to recognise both the extent to which, for example, the 
Croatian authorities did not share their own civic nationalist approach, and the legal 
differences between the status of the USSR and the SFRY. 
The issue of Macedonia, however, offered the Russian administration the 
opportunity to respond to its domestic critics. 
Recognition of Macedonia 
Russia became only the sixth state to recognise the Republic of Macedonia, on 6 August 
1992. The decision was announced by Boris Yeltsin after meeting the Bulgarian 
President, Zhelyu Zhelev, in Sofia. Many Russian observers regarded this as an example 
of Yeltsin's tendency to take dramatic and apparently impulsive foreign policy 
initiatives during official visits. 30 As early as May 1992, however, when Kozyrev 
visited Skopje, it had been thought that Russia was about to recognise Macedonia . 
31 But 
the MFA decided not to do so at this stage, because it was wary of damaging relations 
29 Gow (1992), p. 200. For a defence of the German decision, see Libal (1997). 
30 See, for example, Nekrasov (16 August 1992); and Crow (13 November 1992), p. 37. 
31 Izvestiia (30 May 1992). 
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with Greece which remained, according to Kozyrev, a `friendly country', 32 and whose 
government had warned Moscow that recognition of Macedonia before the EC had 
taken a final decision would be regarded as an `unfriendly act'. 33 Moscow agreed to 
postpone recognition at least until the European Community had decided where it stood 
on the matter. 34 
The decision in May to delay recognition further, despite the expectations aroused, 
did little to counter the growing impression in Russia that the MFA was failing to take 
an independent line on the Yugoslav crisis, and was merely demurring to Western 
decision makers (or, in the case of Macedonia, non-decision makers). After all, this was 
one issue on which Russia could justifiably act without accusations in the West of 
adopting a pro-Serb stance. It offered an opportunity to assert Russia's great power 
interests in contributing to a resolution of events in the Balkans within the context of the 
liberal internationalist approach espoused by Kozyrev. In other words, it would show 
that Russia itself could be an agent of international law, able to act independently where 
necessary to correct contradictions, errors, or bias in the Western approach. 
35 In fact, the major Western powers might have welcomed the decision. For, once 
again, the policy of the EC was being dictated by one state; in the case of the early 
recognition of Croatia, this had been Germany; in the case of tardy recognition of 
Macedonia, it was Greece. The attempt to use the Yugoslav crisis to establish the EC as 
the significant institution in Europe for solving such disputes, and as an impartial 
upholder of international law, was failing disastrously; instead, the EC gave the 
impression of being an organisation in which the principle of unanimity enabled any 
one state to hold the others to ransom and thus pursue its own interests. 
After the Macedonian parliament had adopted two constitutional amendments 
stating explicitly that the Republic did not have territorial pretensions towards 
neighbouring states, that the borders could be changed only through peaceful agreement 
and in correspondence with international norms, and that the Republic would not violate 
the sovereign rights of other states or intervene in their internal affairs, 36 the Badinter 
Commission declared on 11 January 1992 that the Republic of Macedonia satisfied all 
its guideline conditions concerning recognition of new states, and also those in the 
Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted at the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 
32 Iusin (28 May 1992). 
33 Tsekhmistrenko (1996), p. 80. 
34 Iusin (5 August 1992). 
35 Iusin (28 May 1992). 
36 Amendment of 6 January 1992, Konstitutsiia Respubliki Makedonii (17 November 1991), pp. 144-145. 
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1991.37 Yet Greece continued to block EC recognition, and also carried out a trade 
blockade of Macedonia to which the EC `closed their eyes'. 38 Such categorical 
statements on the part of Macedonia were considered insufficient in Greece while the 
Republic retained that name as well as the use of national symbols which the Greeks 
claimed as their own. 39 
The acquiescence of other EC governments to the Greek position, allowing 
recognition to be delayed despite agreeing with it in principle, was explained in the 
Russian press as being not just a result of the requirement of unanimity, but also 
because Macedonia, unlike Croatia and Slovenia, lacked powerful patrons. 40 The 
implication was, firstly, that the EC's policy on recognition of former Yugoslav 
republics was dictated by politics, not neutral international law, and, secondly, that 
Russia could act as the patron of Macedonia. But Russia appeared to accept the decision 
of the Lisbon conference of EC Foreign Ministers in June at which it was declared that 
the EC states were ready to recognise the republic under a name not including the word 
`Macedonia'. A Foreign Ministry briefing stated that Russia preferred a synchronous 
European decision. 4' 
It was for this reason that Yeltsin's announcement at the start of August created 
such a sensation. Yeltsin appears to have been convinced of the need to recognise by the 
arguments of Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev during his visit (Bulgaria was the first 
country to recognise Macedonia, on 16 January 1992, and consistently advocated 
support of the republic). 42 
The following day, Yeltsin signed the decree officially recognising Macedonia and 
stating that the Russian Foreign Ministry would conduct negotiations regarding the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. 43 In announcing this, Vitalii Churkin, representing 
the MFA, underlined that `we are convinced that our political act promotes peace and 
stability in the Balkans'. 44Responding to criticism from Western European states that 
Russia should have concurred with the position adopted by the EC at the Lisbon 
conference, Churkin revealed an assertiveness that was to become more prevalent, 
saying that, since Russia had not been consulted on the document issued after the 
37 Printed (in Russian) in Gus'kova (1997), pp. 393-399. 
38 Nekrasov (16 August 1992). 
39 Ackerman (1996), p. 413. 
40 lusin (28 May 1992). 
41 ITAR-TASS (30 June 1992). 
42 Russian Federation President (3 August 1992). 
43 Russian Federation President (4 August 1992). 
44 Russian Federation MFA (5 August 1992). 
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Lisbon meeting, the Russian Federation had `no commitment to anyone'. 45 And 
Kozyrev himself used Yeltsin's Macedonian initiative to argue that `in those cases, 
when it is a question of justice, Russia can, ought, and will act solo in the Balkans'. 46 
As expected, Greek reaction was extremely hostile, and Yeltsin's blunt final 
statement that `Macedonia itself ought to decide what it is called' did little to soothe 
feelings. 47 The Greek government considered the Russian initiative to be a `blatantly 
unfriendly act' that might have negative consequences for Greek-Russian relations, as 
well as `a great political mistake that threatens to undermine efforts for peace and 
stability in the region'. 48 
Nevertheless, tensions were reduced by a lengthy telephone conversation between 
acting Russian prime minister, Egor Gaidar, and the Prime Minister of Greece, 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Thus, the Greek threat to veto EC aid to Russia did not 
materialise. As one commentator put it, 
the threat of a Greek veto in the EC of the granting of aid to Russia looks 
unconvincing; the development of West-East relations is too high a stake to be 
sacrificed for the sake of Alexander the Great's helmet. 49 
But the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Macedonia was 
delayed for a sufficiently long period to confirm that the MFA was wary of offending 
Greece further. An announcement of the intention to negotiate with Macedonia the 
exchange of ambassadors was not made until 18 August 1993,50 and diplomatic 
relations were finally established on 31 January 1994. Russia was the thirtieth country 
to do so, a month later than France. 51 This compares with a gap of only three months 
between Russian recognition of Croatia and the establishment of diplomatic relations on 
25 May 1992. 
Limiting the impact on relations with Greece proved not too difficult, because 
relations had hitherto been very positive, and remained so on other issues; Greece had 
no great incentive to curtail this relationship, particularly since the support of a 
permanent Security Council member on issues such as Cyprus (and, potentially, 
disputes with Turkey) remained a significant calculation. 52 The position of the two 
45 Crow (13 November 1992), p. 37. 
46 Kozyrev (20 August 1992). 
" Russian Federation President (3 August 1992). 
48 Tsekhmistrenko (1996), p. 80; Crow (13 November 1992), p. 38. 
49 Shchipanov (11 August 1992). 
50 Russian Federation MFA (18 August 1993). 
51 `Spisok gosudarsty ustanovivshikh diplomaticheskie otnosheniia c Respublikoi Makedoniei', in 
Gus'kova (1997), pp. 402-404. 
52 Iusin (5 August 1992). 
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countries towards the Bosnian crisis, in particular opposing military intervention against 
the Bosnian Serbs, was also a contributing factor. 53 
Much of the Russian press responded positively to Yeltsin's initiative, welcoming 
his incisive casting aside of recommendations from `super-cautious Foreign Ministry 
officials'. 54 Commentators saw it as a sign that Yeltsin was beginning to respond to 
domestic criticism of the MFA's foreign policy. For instance, Igor' Nekrasov wrote in 
Moskovskie novosti: 
It turns out that in the circumstances which have developed, only Russia could cut 
the `Macedonian knot', and Boris Yeltsin was suited for this task like nobody 
else... Will this step of Boris Yeltsin not turn out to be the beginning of the rebirth 
of the image of Russia as a great power, able to stand up for its own priorities, not 
adapting too much to the opinions of others? 55 
Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
By the end of December 1991, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and Macedonia had all declared their independence and applied to the EC for 
recognition; as we have seen, recognition was accorded to all except Macedonia by the 
end of April 1992. Serbia and Montenegro had not applied for recognition, on the 
grounds that that they had been recognised at the Berlin Congress of 1878 and had 
maintained full international legal continuity since then. 56 However, with Western states 
threatening to expel it from international organisation such as the UN and the CSCE, the 
leadership of rump Yugoslavia decided that its status needed to be assured. 
Consequently, on 27 April 1992, a joint session of the rump Parliamentary 
Assembly of the former SFRY and the National Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro 
proclaimed the `Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', `continuing the State, international 
legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. 57 This 
meant that it was claiming to succeed the rights and obligations of the SFRY, in the 
same way that Russia had succeeded those of the Soviet Union. Its claim was defended 
on the basis that the population and territory of the present state constituted a large 
portion of the previous state, and that the nucleus of the SFRY was formed by Serbia 
and Montenegro. 58 
53 Abarinov (12 January 1993). 
54 lusin (5 August 1992). 
s5 Nekrasov (16 August 1992). 
56 Markovia (1996), p. 30. 
s' Quoted in Weller (1992), p. 595. 
58 Statement of Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovi6,9 March 1992, quoted in ibid., p. 595. 
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For the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities, continuity status meant that it would 
not need to re-apply for membership of the UN, CSCE, and other international bodies. 
This was important because acceptance might be delayed as a result of international 
disapproval of Serb actions in Bosnia and Croatia, and any delay would also prevent the 
FRY from vetoing CSCE decisions (the CSCE had until then operated on the principle 
of consensus). They also hoped that if continuity status was confirmed, then they could 
follow the Soviet example whereby the Russian Federation took over all assets and 
liabilities of the Soviet Union and, significantly for the FRY authorities, took 
responsibility for the Soviet Army stationed outside the Russian Federation. However, 
the agreement of the other republics was necessary for this to happen. 59 In the Soviet 
Union, the decision on assets and liabilities was an agreement of political convenience 
between Russia and the other successor states (initially with the exception of Ukraine). 60 
The former Soviet republics also believed that the agreement on the army would 
promote stability by clarifying control of Soviet armed forces remaining in those 
republics. 61 Such consent was, not surprisingly, lacking in former Yugoslavia. 
The issue was first raised at the CSCE meeting in April 1992. The United States 
wanted the FRY/Serbia at least to be suspended regardless of the issue of legal 
succession, `until its behaviour conforms to established norms', while Russia called for 
a `balanced approach' including all parties to the conflict. 62 Russian diplomats believed 
that it was preferable to have FRY representation at the CSCE during this critical time. 63 
Although this may be interpreted as protecting Serb interests, we have already seen that 
they held the same opinion with regards to Macedonia. Other delegations, such as 
Romania, also shared the Russian view. 64 
Rather than support the FRY's automatic legal succession to the SFRY, Russian 
diplomats recommended that it re-apply for membership of the CSCE, implying that 
they would support its immediate acceptance without acknowledging legal succession. 
This allowed a compromise solution to be reached. After heated debates, fifty-one out 
of fifty-two states of the CSCE adopted a resolution which excluded Yugoslav 
representatives from discussions on the crisis in former Yugoslavia, but delayed until 
the July meeting a decision on full suspension. 65 
59 Ibid., p. 596. The point was also made by Kozyrev himself; MaiakRadio (17 September 1992). 
60 Miillerson (1994) p. 144. 
61 Ibid., p. 142. 
62 Vostrukhov and Rodionov (7 May 1992). 
63 Rodionov (30 April 1992). 
6' Weller (1992), p. 599. 
65 Crow (24 July 1992), p. 33. The FRY opposed the resolution, but the decision marked the introduction 
of a `consensus-minus-one' rule at the CSCE, allowing the majority to over-rule its objections. 
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Russia was accused by many delegations of blocking a more radical resolution; 
Austria, for example, claimed that Russia `was on the same bench as the Yugoslav 
aggressors'. But the Russian delegate, lu. Gusarov, denied this: 
We explained to our partners that our position was not dictated by a pro-Serbian 
orientation or a desire to shield Belgrade. We believe that expelling from the CSCE 
process one of the parties to the conflict is hardly in the interests of settling the 
crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 66 
Nevertheless, the apparent continuation of FRY involvement in the Bosnian conflict led 
Russia to accept at the CSCE summit from 9-10 July that Yugoslavia should be 
suspended from the CSCE until 14 October 1992 (the decision was then re-affirmed). 
67 
A similar process occurred in relation to the FRY's membership of the UN. 
Russian policy was now directed at supporting the federal Yugoslav authorities under 
President Dobrica Cosic and Prime Minister Milan Panic, which were more moderate 
than the republican leadership under Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. When 
Kozyrev met Panic on 10 July, the latter informed him that he intended to achieve a 
radical turnaround in the course of the Yugoslav government towards democracy, an 
end to bloodshed, and a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Kozyrev stated that Russia would back this course, and would therefore support 
Yugoslavia in maintaining its place in the UN and the CSCE. 68 Aiming to prevent the 
expulsion of the FRY from the UN, Russia adopted a policy similar to that regarding 
CSCE membership: it urged the FRY leadership not to insist on continuity status, but to 
submit a new application for membership, which Russia would support . 
69 When Panic 
accepted this proposal, Kozyrev declared: `we want the new Yugoslavia - the 
Yugoslavia of Panic - to receive international recognition and to occupy its proper place 
in the family of civilised free peoples. 770 
There were obstacles to a compromise on UN membership both from the Serbian 
side and from certain Western states. The Serbian government announced that Panic's 
statement on application for membership in the UN `is legally neither a decision nor 
binding for the FRY' and added that with such an application `we would participate in 
the destruction of our own state... Renunciation of international continuity would bring 
the FRY into a state of institutional isolation. '" On the other side, the United States and 
66 Zubko (13 May 1992). 
61 Crow (24 July 1992), p. 33. 
68 ITAR-TASS (10 July 1992). 
69 lusin (17 September 1992). 
70 ITAR-TASS (16 September 1992). 
71 Markovid (1996), p. 60. 
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the United Kingdom seemed determined to create just such institutional isolation by 
expelling the FRY from the UN, but Russia was expected to veto any such proposal in 
the Security Council. 72 It was perhaps this implicit threat that led the Security Council 
to adopt Resolution 777, which adopted the compromise solution that Kozyrev had been 
seeking. 
Panic was satisfied that the resolution made it possible to avoid the humiliation of 
expulsion; although the FRY would in the meantime take no part in the General 
Assembly, Belgrade would still be able to participate in the work of other UN bodies, 
the mission of the FRY would continue to function, and the `Yugoslav' plaque would 
remain in the General Assembly's meeting hall. 73 Nevertheless, the opposition Russian 
media were not satisfied; Pravda reported that by ratifying UNSCR 777, the General 
Assembly had expelled the FRY from the UN - the first time that any state had been 
expelled in the United Nations' forty-seven year history. The Russian delegation was 
criticised for not vetoing the resolution. 74 Oleg Rumiantsev, Executive Secretary of the 
Constitutional Commission, accused Kozyrev of betraying Russia's interests and once 
again demonstrating that Russian foreign policy had no independence. 75 In response to 
such criticism, the MFA issued a statement accusing the media of creating `a distorted 
picture of the UN Security Council's decisions on Yugoslavia', and explaining that 
Yugoslavia had not been expelled. 76 
Sanctions imposed on the FRY 
It was the Russian vote in the Security Council in favour of imposing economic 
sanctions against the FRY on 30 May 1992 that sparked the wide-ranging debate in 
Russia concerning Russia's Balkans policy. Opposition was expressed in the press, by 
academics, and by deputies in the Supreme Soviet who put official policy under heavy 
scrutiny, including calling Kozyrev to a joint session on 26 June. Thus, the vote for 
sanctions revealed deep divisions within the political elite in relation to what kind of 
policy Russia should pursue towards the Yugoslav conflicts. These divisions reflected 
differing approaches to the question of what kind of state the post-Soviet Russian 
Federation should be, and what should be the basis of its relations with the outside 
world. These differences reflected the distinct approaches that I outlined in chapter 3. 
72 Iusin (17 September 1992). 
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The Foreign Ministry view 
Russian diplomats initially resisted the imposition of sanctions against any side in the 
conflict in Bosnia, just as they initially resisted the suspension/expulsion of the FRY 
from the CSCE and the UN. They hoped that a political agreement could be reached that 
would preclude the need for coercive measures. To this end, Kozyrev himself embarked 
on a peace-promoting mission to the various capitals of former Yugoslavia. He argued 
that Russia had advantages over Western states and institutions in making a break- 
through, on account of its Slavonic and historic links with the region. Secondly, Russia 
was in a unique position to understand post-communist problems. And because Russia 
gave advice rather than issued threats or offered crude rewards - in Kozyrev's words, 
`economic confetti or truncheons' - it was more likely to be successful. 
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Unfortunately, this optimism did not match reality; Kozyrev was no more 
successful than the many other negotiators seeking peace in Bosnia. He hoped that he 
had persuaded the acting chairman of the Yugoslav collective presidency, Branko 
Kostic, as well as Milosevic, to agree in principle to a cease-fire and the lifting of the 
blockade around Sarajevo airport to enable relief goods to be delivered. But the cease- 
fire lasted only a few hours, and Serbia still appeared to be supporting the Bosnian 
Serbs. 78 It was this failure that led to the vote for sanctions. Kozyrev was also 
influenced by the personal impact of witnessing at first hand the horrors of the war. 79 
We have seen already that Kozyrev did not object to sanctions in principle; indeed, 
he believed that they might be an essential political tool in deterring abuses of human 
rights. And he explicitly stated that this position had now been reached with regard to 
Yugoslavia: 
I think that we have a full moral right and duty to say now that if you do not want 
to act in good faith, as we have advised in a friendly fashion, then let us use a 
different language... I believe at least that our means of persuasion have now 
reached such a stage that we need to back them up with fairly harsh political 
actions. 80 
According to Kozyrev, the FRY was `not one hundred per cent responsible' for the 
bloodshed, but it bore the greatest responsibility as the `leading power ... the power 
which has a great influence on the way the situation is developing'. 8' 
77 Maiak Radio (28 May 1992). 
78 Crow (24 July 1992), pp. 31-32. 




Since Bosnia-Herzegovina was now considered an independent state, outside 
military interference in its affairs was deemed a breach of international law, especially 
given the crimes being committed. The Security Council therefore passed Resolution 
752 on 15 May 1992 demanding that `all forms of interference from outside Bosnia- 
Hercegovina 
... cease 
immediately' and that 
those units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and elements of the Croatian 
Army now in Bosnia-Hercegovina must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the 
authority of the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed 
with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring. 82 
As fighting continued, these demands had obviously not been met. The Security Council 
consequently passed Resolution 757 on 30 May which, under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, condemned `the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), to take 
effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992)' and imposed 
mandatory sanctions on that country. 
The Russian government issued a declaration the same day justifying in strong 
terms its decision to vote for sanctions, and again hinting at the possibility of peace- 
making action: 
Belgrade has not listened to our good advice and warnings, has not carried out the 
demands of the international community and has thus inflicted upon itself sanctions 
from the United Nations. 
Voting for these sanctions, Russia is carrying out its responsibility as a great 
power to uphold international order. At the same time we believe that the Security 
Council ought to go further and take responsibility for regulation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in the Yugoslav crisis as a whole using all measures envisaged in 
the UN Charter to restore peace. 83 
The imposition of sanctions against the FRY appeared to have an immediate effect 
on the Yugoslav government, which called for an end to all hostile actions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. This appeal was received favourably in Moscow, where the Foreign 
Ministry stated that if the situation did begin to improve in Bosnia - if the fighting 
stopped and humanitarian supplies were able to reach their intended recipients - then 
Russia would raise the issue of lifting sanctions. 84 However, in the same statement, the 
82 All quotes from UNSCRs are taken from the resolutions as posted on the UN web-site at 
http: //www. un. org/documents/scres. htm. 
83 Russian Federation MFA (3 June 1992). 
84 Russian Federation MFA (5 June 1992). 
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MFA - in response to the outcry that the vote had caused in Russia - elaborated the 
reasons why it had supported sanctions: the ministry was devoted to traditionally 
friendly relations with all the republics of former Yugoslavia without exception, it 
explained, and would take into account the historical links with their traditional and 
historical components, but 
the ethnic principle, about which certain parts of the anti-reformist press speak so 
emotionally, cannot be a basic criterion in the formulation of a serious and 
responsible policy. Blind orientation towards this principle could lead the situation 
in the Balkans to a global explosion, a third world war. 
Second: yes, we are friends, but true friends must be honest with each other, 
without double standards. It is well known that Russia, in striving to achieve a 
cease-fire, to relieve the situation by political means without any kind of pressure, 
went further than anyone. Unfortunately, our opinion wasn't heeded. That led to 
our support for UN sanctions... 
Nobody should be in any doubt as to the right of the Serb side, as of the other 
sides, to defend their own rights. But we are convinced that this should be on a 
defensive basis only, not going beyond the boundaries of self-defence. 
Unfortunately, in Bosnia and Herzegovina we come across other motives, based on 
hatred, ethnic intolerance, revenge. We categorically condemn such motives; they 
are unacceptable, regardless of who holds them. 85 
There is no doubt that this genuinely was the view of the key figures in the Foreign 
Ministry at that time. Regardless of other motivations behind the vote for sanctions - 
the desire to be part of a consensus view in `international society' and not to alienate the 
West, particularly when the government was hoping for significant economic benefits - 
the interpretation of events was close to that in Western capitals. This also reflected the 
values of key Russian policy makers. Kozyrev in particular recognised the correlation 
between the red-brown alliance in Russia, and the Serb nationalists in former 
Yugoslavia, and believed that it was necessary to resist both. Hence, he warned in June 
that `our "CPSU" and our red-browns are, completely logically, moving to assist their 
Serbian brothers-in-arms'. m This was a further reason to isolate such forces in Serbia: 
Playing up to these forces would be a betrayal of friendship with Serbia and the 
neighbouring republics, and of Russia's long-term interests and positions in the 
Balkans, in Europe, and in the world as a whole. Because, if the Russian Federation 
85 Ibid.. 
" Izvestiia (30 June 1992). 
80 
were recklessly to support only the Serbian national-Bolsheviks out of all the South 
Slavs, it would be left in isolation in the Balkans, in the CSCE, and in the UN. * 
The reaction 
Russia's vote for sanctions sparked a fierce debate in Russia over the government's 
policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts and its foreign policy orientation in general. The 
conflicts in Yugoslavia became the second most important foreign policy issue, after the 
`near abroad'. I shall discuss this debate in relation to five arenas: the media, academic 
circles, nationalist and communist political organisations and societies outside 
parliament, public opinion, and the Supreme Soviet. In each of these areas, opinion was 
divided, and we can observe how those views reflected different political and moral 
outlooks. 
The media 
As we have seen already in references from the Russian press, certain newspapers 
tended to adopt a particular approach, while others carried a variety of opinions. Elena 
Gus'kova suggests that, initially, newspapers were unwilling to publish articles 
expressing opinions that differed from the official stand, a legacy perhaps of the 
Communist era. 88 This was certainly not true by mid-1992 (and was not really true 
before that). 89 Firstly, there were a number of newspapers publishing opinions 
extremely opposed to the official line. These included the communist Pravda, the 
Defence Ministry's Krasnaia zvezda, the nationalist newspapers Sovetskaia Rossiia and 
Literaturnaia Rossiia, and the extreme nationalist Russkii vesinik, and Den'. Secondly, 
other papers presented a variety of opinions and interpretations: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 
Moskovskie novosti, Moskovskaia pravda. Gus'kova claims that certain newspapers 
`persistently supported and implemented only one - official - policy', and lists Izvestiia, 
Novoe vremia, Moskovskii komsomolets, and Komsomol 'skaia pravda. 90 
Yet Izvestiia, for one, undoubtedly presented a variety of opinions. Maksim lusin 
and Andrei Ostal'skii tended to support the official policy. But other commentators 
were more critical. For example, a strongly critical article was printed a few days after 
sanctions vote, in which Boris Rodionov argued that sanctions would harm the ordinary 
population in Serbia and Montenegro rather than those `ultras' actually carrying out 
87 Kozyrev (8 June 1992). 
"s Gus'kova (1995a), p. 40. 
89 For a selection of newspaper articles showing the range of views, see Gus'kova (1993), chapter V, 
`Chetvertaia vlast': put' k istine'. 
90 Gus'kova (1995a), p. 40. 
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atrocities in Bosnia; that sanctions might strengthen the position of more radical 
nationalists such as Vojislav Seselj; that, although Russian interests did not consist in 
indulging the Belgrade military, they also did not consist in blaming Serbia for actions it 
had not committed; that Russia was likely to suffer from the sanctions in terms of 
reduced trade; and, finally, hypothesising that `perhaps, after the "splendid isolation" in 
Helsinki [the CSCE meeting at which Russia blocked expulsion of the FRY], were 
officials on Staraia and Smolensk squares simply afraid to risk the billions that the West 
is still promising? '91 
As for the broadcasting media, it is difficult to gain a detailed impression from this 
distance of their coverage of the Yugoslav conflicts, 92 but transcripts of interviews and 
reports in SWB suggests that a wide range of views were covered. Kozyrev, however, 
accused television channels of a kind of self-imposed censorship: 
Journalists from the TASS television service travelled with us during my visit to 
the republics of Yugoslavia. They took more risks than any of us, shooting 
honestly what was happening in Sarajevo. And what do you think happened? Our 
television didn't want to show their material! But before we left, they had talked 
about their keen interest. Obviously they expected it to turn out to be some kind of 
propaganda in favour of the national-patriotic regime in Belgrade, but what was 
clear from the film was that the Yugoslav army is fighting in Sarajevo, and these 
formations, of course, are supported and to a significant extent controlled by 
Belgrade. This kind of film appeared not to be needed. 
He even went so far as to suggest that this indicated that journalists and editors were 




The vote for sanctions revealed differences of opinion among Russian academics 
similar to those among media commentators. 94 At one end of the spectrum were those 
who broadly favoured official policy because they shared Kozyrev's liberal 
internationalist conceptions, opposed the ethnic nationalist policy of the Serbian 
leadership, and believed that Russia could and should co-operate with the West in 
91 Rodionov (4 June 1992). 
92 See chapter on Russia by Milena Michalski in Gow et al (1996) for a survey of the coverage of the war 
in Bosnia in May 1994 by the main news programme Uremia; Michalski concludes that this reporting 
conveyed a pro-Serbian bias. 
93 Izvestifa (30 June 1992). 
94 For a selection showing the range of views, see Gus'kova (1993), chapter IV, `Uchenye - za i protiv'. 
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attempting to curb such actions. Among these were Pavel Kandel'; A. Iaz'kova (expert 
on Romania) and V. Kamenetskii (expert on Yugoslavia) at the Institute of International 
Economic and Political Research (RAN); Nina Smirnova, expert on Albania at the 
Institute of General History (RAN); and Sergei Romanenko, expert on Yugoslav history 
at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies (RAN). 
Kandel', for instance, wrote that `Russia was left with no choice but to join the 
overwhelming majority of world society and support sanctions' after the Serbian 
government failed to `use the last chance to leave the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina' provided by Russian mediation. 95 Iaz'kova and Kamenetskii also 
applauded the MFA's policy on the grounds that 
the immediate cause of the outbreak of civil war in the summer of 1991 ... was the 
attempt by the Serbian government to unite with Serb Krajina... These were also 
the roots of the conflict between Serbia and Bosnia... In the conditions of the 
break-up of the Yugoslav federation the issue was, in this manner, about attempts 
at forceful revision of the internal borders. And this could not but lead to civil war, 
whatever kind of noble motives of `defence of fellow ethnics - Serbs' the 
administration of Slobodan Milosevic was guided by... The Serbian national- 
communist government turned out to be insusceptible to reasoned argument. The 
world community had no choice but to resort to sanctions. To the honour of the 
Russian government, it did not perceive this act as a `warning' directed at itself ... 
and, having occupied a reasonable position against the exclusion of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) from the CSCE, at the same time supported international sanctions against 
it. % 
Then there were those who were more critical of official policy, believing that it 
was inconsistent and failed to defend Russia's interests as they perceived them, but who 
were critical too of the communist-nationalist opposition and of its allies in Belgrade. 
They included Andrei Edemskii, expert on Yugoslav-Russian relations at the Institute of 
Slavonic and Balkan Studies; and Nadia Arbatova, who - as I showed in chapter 3- 
interprets the conflicts in neo-realist terms. 
Thirdly, there were those who strongly opposed official policy. Often, this was 
from a realist stand-point, based on the argument that Russian policy did not embody a 
clear conception of national interests, taken to mean the protection of its historical 
position in the Balkans and its traditional historical allies. This in practice implied 
9s Kandel' (1992), p. 421. 
96 Iaz'kova and Kamenetskii (12 July 1992). 
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support for Serbia and for the Bosnian Serbs. The vote for sanctions was interpreted as 
challenging Russian interests: powers eager to assert/re-assert control in the Balkans (in 
particular, Austria, Germany, and the United States) were using the fact that Russia was 
at that time too weak to protect its `traditional ally' in order to weaken Serbia and limit 
Russia's influence. Although couched in realist terms, these arguments assumed some 
sort of commonality between Russia and Serbia: as traditional allies/`friends', as fellow 
Slav/Orthodox `brothers', as contemporary victims of the West, or as nations sharing a 
common fate in the aftermath of the collapse of their former federations. This usually 
implied at least an underlying ethnic nationalist, neo-imperialist, or cultural Eurasianist 
or pan-Slav outlook. 
Academics who displayed at least some of these viewpoints included Vladimir 
Volkov, director of the Institute for Slavonic and Balkan Studies; Elena Gus'kova; 
Pavel Volobuev; Liudmila Tiagunenko; and E. Eliseeva of IMEMO. For example, 
Eliseeva's interpretation of the conflicts is markedly different from that of Iaz'kova and 
Kamenetskii: 
In the West, the actions of the Bosnian Serbs are synonymously associated with 
Belgrade, and the policy of the Serb government is classified as none other than a 
struggle for the creation of a `Greater Serbia'. 
Western politicians include in this concept an exclusively negative meaning. 
But if we consider the problem from the other side, if we recall, how for centuries 
suffering under the yoke of the Ottoman empire and scattered around the Balkan 
land the Serb people strove to unification, if we attempt to understand its mentality, 
then the politics of Serbia can be perceived as the striving to gather and unite the 
Serbs and to defend their interests. Especially since the rights of the Serb minority 
outside the republic are far from being always observed. The fundamental cause of 
the Serbo-Croat conflict is that in a referendum, the Serbs living on the territory of 
Croatia declared their own opposition to separating from Yugoslavia. Zagreb 
ignored the results of the referendum and attempted to compel the Serb population 
by force to leave the federation. " 
It is difficult to calculate the influence that academic opinion had in political 
circles, but a group of academics of the latter conviction (including Volkov, Gus'kova, 
and Tiagunenko) appealed directly to parliament on two occasions in 1992. Their appeal 
to the Supreme Soviet in June displayed the full range of opposition complaints. 
91 Eliseeva (4 August 1992), p. 429. 
84 
Accusing the MFA of lacking a well thought-out conception of Russia's long-term and 
short-term interests, they argued: 
Today, associating with accusations against Serbia that are mainly unjust, actually 
means inflicting a violent blow against the traditional economic, political, 
historical, cultural and spiritual links between the Russian and Serbian peoples, 
between Russia and Yugoslavia, and, in our opinion, does not correspond with the 
long-term interests of Russia in this region of the world. If Russia had abstained in 
the vote [on sanctions], then the pressure on Belgrade would have been weakened. 
Furthermore, they highlighted the similar circumstances of Russia and Serbia. They 
suggested that the sanctions vote was intended as a warning to Russia, and implied that, 
in the region of the former Soviet Union, Russia should adopt the kind of policy that 
Serbia was pursuing in the former Yugoslavia: 
It can hardly be doubted that there is a further aim behind the adoption of sanctions 
against Serbia: it is an unambiguous warning to Russia in the case of its 
recalcitrance. The similarity of our problems is clear. Russia's joining in the 
blockade against Serbia actually means condemnation of Serbia's policy of 
defending its own compatriots in the other republics of the former SFRY. 98 
Nationalist-communist opposition 
Nationalist and communist groups operated at a number of levels: in parliament as 
parties, factions, and blocs, and outside parliament as countless different parties and 
groups, often associated through umbrella movements such as the Russian National 
Council (Russkii natsional 'nyi sobor) and the Russian People's Assembly (Rossiiskoe 
narodnoe sobranie). 99 Many of these groups expressed opposition to official Russian 
policy towards Yugoslavia, usually calling for solidarity with Serbia and ethnic Serbs in 
former Yugoslavia on grounds of Slav or Orthodox solidarity, a position that Il'ja Levin 
calls `neopanslavism'. 100 These protests took the form of appeals and declarations to 
parliament, the public, or to `colleagues' in Yugoslavia, '0' as well as trips to former 
Yugoslavia and, in some cases, the recruitment of volunteers to fight in former 
Yugoslavia. 
98 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (4 June 1992). 
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101 For a number of examples, see Gus'kova (1993), chapter III, 'Ot serdtsa -k serdtsu: obrashcheniia, 
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85 
One small taste of the rhetoric contained in these declarations should be sufficient 
to appreciate the flavour. In response to rumours that NATO was planning to intervene 
militarily in the Bosnian conflict, in January 1993 Den' published an appeal to the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It began: 
Brother Slavs! 
Today our fate is being decided! The `New World Order', acting through its people 
in our governments, is not only robbing and destroying our countries, is not only 
provoking disorder and bloodshed throughout the world, in order then to establish 
its dominion: it is already this very month preparing an armed invasion inside the 
Slav world. 
After accusing the enemies of the Serbs of monstrous propaganda, and Germany, the 
Vatican, and the rich Muslim states of fanning the flames of a Slavonic war, it warned: 
If the Serbs are denied the support of Russians [russkikh], they are fated to 
disappear from the face of the earth, because they will defend themselves against 
the interventionists until the last man. And then it will be the turn of the Orthodox 
Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians... 
It then demanded the use of the Russian great power veto on actions against the FRY, 
and decisive measures by the Russian government to support the Serbs. Not 
surprisingly, it called for the Supreme Soviet to drive Kozyrev from office because he 
was conducting by all available means an `anti-Slav policy, encapsulated above all in 
support for the destruction of the Serb people'. Finally, it issued a call to arms explicitly 
on the model of the 1870s: 
If these measures are not taken, we appeal to you to remember the Slavonic 
committees, created in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, which 
criticised their own government for its insufficient support of Orthodox Slavs in 
their struggle for freedom and independence, sending to Serbia material help and 
officer-volunteers... We believe that our call will be heard also by the noble 
officers of Russia and of other countries. 
Remember, if today they destroy the Serbs, tomorrow they will start on us. 102 
This appeal was signed by an extensive list of representatives of various extreme 
nationalist groups, a veritable `Who's Who' of the Russian extreme right. There are the 
editors of the main nationalist newspapers, Russkii vesinik, Sovetskaia Rossiia, Den', 
Nash sovremennik, Literaturnaia Rossiia. There are representatives from the larger 
102 Den ' (17-30 January 1993). 
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umbrella organisations and established political parties, including the Constitutional 
Democratic Party (Kadets), the movement of `Russian National Unity', Dmitrii 
Vasil'ev, leader of the National Patriotic Front `Pamiat ", the Russian National Council, 
and the National Salvation Front, which served as a forum to unite much of the right- 
wing and nationalist communist opposition (the appeal was signed by the Front's co- 
chairman Gennadii Ziuganov, who was soon to be elected chairman of the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation). 103 It was also signed by individuals and 
representatives of even more esoteric groups: Alexandr Nevzorov, the presenter of the 
investigative television programme `600 seconds', the Council of the United Nobility 
Society of Russia, the Union of Officers, the Union of Cossacks, the Mothers of Russia 
movement, and the chief secretary of the Fund for the Restoration of the Christ the 
Saviour Cathedral. 
The call to establish `Slavonic committees' and to recruit volunteers to fight 
alongside Serbs did not go unanswered. From the beginning of 1992, there were 
Russian volunteers and mercenaries among the Serb troops in Bosnia. '°4 However, they 
never numbered more than a few hundred at any one time. And there were also Russian 
volunteers/mercenaries fighting on the other side, against the Bosnian or Croatian 
Serbs. 105 Some may have been Muslim volunteers from the former Soviet Union and 
from the Russian Federation itself, one report stated that detachments were being 
trained in Chechnya to participate in combat operations in former Yugoslavia and to 
defend the Muslim population of Bosnia. 106 
The third way in which nationalists conveyed their solidarity with the Serbs was by 
visiting Belgrade and Bosnia. General Filatov, `War Minister' in the shadow cabinet 
created by the National Salvation Front, the editors of the nationalist newspapers, 
including Aleksandr Prokhanov (editor of Den') and Aleksandr Dugin (editor of the 
magazine Elementy), Lieutenant General Vladislav Achalov (one of the leaders of the 
red-brown opposition among Russian officers and Ruslan Khasbulatov's military 
advisor), Eduard Limonov (who promised his hosts `at least an atomic bomb' from 
Russia), Nikolai Burliaev (film director), all made the journey. '07 
But the most common visitors were members of parliament from the National 
Salvation Front. Levin estimates that one of every ten opposition deputies travelled to 
1 03 Tolz et al (14 May 1993), p. 24. 
104 For details, see Levin (1995); and Moskovskie novosti (6 December 1992). 
105 Nekrasov and Gubarev (16 February 1992). 
106 Nezavisimaia gazela, 28 April 1993, p. 3 [untitled]. 
101 Levin (1995), p. 78; for Filatov's trip, see Vostrukhov (20 November 1992); for Limonov's trip, see 
his own account in Limonov (1993). 
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Yugoslavia between the end of 1992 and autumn 1993, meeting a range of people from 
Milosevic to geselj. This obviously gave political support to Serbian nationalists, but 
Levin suggests that there may also have been material incentives for both sides, in 
particular sanctions-busting. Many of these deputies had their power base in the Russian 
regions, particularly in industrial towns in Siberia, and `many goods imported from 
Yugoslav companies (perhaps with falsified Austrian or British brand names) end up 
there'. 108 
Public opinion 
Russian extremist groups fitted the description of their nineteenth century counter-parts 
that Tolstoy gives in Anna Karenina. Referring to the growing movement in the 1870s 
to support the Serbs and Montenegrins against the Ottoman empire, Tolstoy writes that 
Koznyshev saw 
that too many people were taking up the question from motives of self-interest and 
self-advertisement. He recognised that the newspapers printed much that was 
unnecessary and exaggerated for the sole purpose of attracting attention and out- 
crying their rivals. He noticed that the people who leaped to the front and shouted 
loudest in this general surge of enthusiasm were the failures and those who were 
smarting under a sense of injury - generals without armies, ministers without 
portfolios, journalists without papers, and party leaders without followers. He saw 
much that was frivolous and absurd. 
There the similarity ends. Tolstoy continues: 
But he also saw and admitted an unmistakable, ever-growing enthusiasm, uniting 
all classes, with which it was impossible not to sympathise. The massacre of Slavs 
who were co-religionists and brothers excited sympathy for the sufferers and 
indignation against their oppressors. And the heroism of the Serbians and the 
Montenegrins, fighting for a great cause, begot in the whole nation a longing to 
help brothers not only in word but in deed. 109 
In the first half of the 1990s there was no such feeling. Issues nearer to home were 
far more pressing. Many Russians presumably also realised that this was not a case of 
the `heroism of the Serbians and Montenegrins, fighting for a great cause', and that the 
majority of the massacres of Slavs were being conducted by their co-religionists. 
Although there was a tendency to favour the Serbs, at least among the Orthodox 
108 Levin (1995), pp. 77-9; Baturin and Gryzunov (23 April 1993). 
109 Tolstoy (1978). 
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population of Russia, it was not universal and many people did not have strong opinions 
on the conflicts. 110 This lack of popular pressure enabled the government to resist 
opposition demands to support the Serbs more forcefully. There was, however, broad 
support for preserving Russia's status as a great power; one opinion poll taken in 1992 
showed that 69 per cent of Muscovites agreed with the proposition that `Russia must 
remain a great power, even if this leads to worse relations with the outside world'. 11' 
This shows that the neo-realist consensus that developed in the elite in 1993 enjoyed 
considerable backing among the general population, encouraging a more assertive 
policy in relation to the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Parliamentary opposition 
The Supreme Soviet was dominated by nationalists/communists and state centrists, who 
opposed official Russian policy on ideological grounds. But there was a further 
dimension to parliamentary activity: leading committee members and most of all the 
speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, wanted to extend parliament's power, including over 
foreign policy. Hence the Yugoslav issue became a weapon in the institutional 
competition between the parliament and the government and president. In addition, the 
main target for many deputies was the domestic reform programme; it was only natural 
to attack also the foreign policy to which it was explicitly linked, including policy 
towards the Yugoslav crisis. Thus, within parliament there was a mixture of ideological 
antagonism towards the Yeltsin-Kozyrev Yugoslav policy, institutional rivalry with the 
government and MFA, and deep resentment over the Russia that they were creating. 
Institutional competition 
Institutional rivalry had two facets. In any system of separation of powers, powers are 
never so sharply separate as to preclude conflict between the executive and the 
legislature if they have different political outlooks, and this is just as likely to extend to 
foreign policy. Part of the struggle in Russia, then, was an ideological conflict carried 
out in the forum of competing institutions. But, until a new constitution was approved, 
the very delineation of powers was also at issue. In other words, there was competition 
over the institutional prerogatives as well as within the boundaries already delineated. 
The Supreme Soviet's resolution of 26 June reflected the parliament's ambitions. 
Point four required the MFA 
"o See, for example, the following reports on opinion poll surveys: Mlechin (26 November 1994); Drobot 
(1995); Interfax (21 September 1995); Kondrashov (13 October 1995). 
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urgently to present to the Supreme Soviet detailed information about the key 
problems of foreign policy, defining the choice of strategically important decisions 
and questions affecting Russia's core state interests. To guarantee timely 
consultation on such questions with the Supreme Soviet Committee for 
international affairs and foreign economic relations. 112 
Nominally at least, Kozyrev showed a willingness to allow the Supreme Soviet a 
more active role in the formulation of foreign policy. He stated that this point of the 
resolution was an absolutely essential recommendation which he fully supported. ' 13 
Furthermore, he agreed with many deputies that it was essential to find time for 
discussions about a set of principles relating to international issues. 114 This, in fact, was 
not an idle boast: Kozyrev and his staff did appreciate the need to liaise with parliament. 
The Foreign Minister made more than forty speeches and statements in the White House 
in 1992, `scores of speeches' were made by deputy ministers, and more than 120 
speeches by other diplomats. 115 
Evgenii Ambartsumov, chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Economic Relations (the most important foreign policy committee in the parliament) 
accepted that, on the whole, the MFA was aware of its obligations to parliament. ' 16 in 
general, he argued, there was co-operation between the Ministry and the Committee. 
Nevertheless, he argued that there were some cases when the Committee was given a 
fait accompli. One such example was the vote for sanctions. 
Ambartsumov backed up this argument by referring to a document published in 
Den', which the newspaper claimed was a classified memorandum written by the 
Russian ambassador to the UN, Iulii Vorontsov, on the eve of the sanctions vote. "7 
Ambartsumov pointed out that in the leaked memorandum, Vorontsov outlined two 
options for the MFA: to vote for sanctions or to abstain. If the former option was 
chosen, the ambassador apparently stated, this `might cause difficulties for us [the 
MFA] with the Supreme Soviet'. But a note on the bottom of the document recorded 
that the response from the MFA was to vote for sanctions. In other words, the Supreme 
12 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992b). 
113 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a), p. 89. 
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Soviet was not consulted, and its opinion was not heeded. As Ambartsumov put it, the 
decision `only became known to us too post factum'. Although it was not necessary for 
the Foreign Ministry to agree every detail with the committee, he argued, this matter 
was not a `tactical choice' but an `important strategic choice'. ' 18 
In fact, Ambartsumov was to become more satisfied with the behaviour of the 
Foreign Ministry. This was partly because Kozyrev did make an effort to liaise, as 
stated above, and also because he deliberately chose to involve the Committee for 
Foreign Affairs in decision making. For example, Ambartsumov was invited to take a 
place in the Russian delegation at the London Conference on Former Yugoslavia from 
26 to 28 August 1992, apparently in the hope that this would pre-empt subsequent 
criticism of the MFA's stance at the conference. Kozyrev assured him that he would not 
simply be an observer but would contribute. "9 
But Ambartsumov's increased satisfaction was due also to the change of approach 
of Russian policy, not just the fact of participation in its formulation, as we shall see in 
the next chapter. 
The Supreme Soviet debate 
The Supreme Soviet debated Yugoslavia on 26 June 1992. The debate began with an 
address by Kozyrev which was in many ways geared towards the specific audience: 
From the very beginning we proceeded and will continue to proceed from the fact 
that this is a zone of our special interests because of historical traditions and 
because of cultural and other links which join Russia with this region. 
However, Kozyrev's desire both to appease the Supreme Soviet and to defend his own 
policy led to inconsistencies, since the two positions could not be reconciled. This was 
shown, for example, in his discussion of the possibility of imposing sanctions on 
Croatia, which many deputies were demanding: 
the adoption of sanctions ... against 
Croatia is also negative, just as those against 
Serbia, since they hit the peaceful population, and so on. But, of course, to allow 
only one side be punished while the other had the possibility to act recklessly by 
military means - this is also unacceptable. 120 
Yet this is exactly what Russia had allowed to happen. 
"" Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a), p. 95. 
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Nevertheless, Kozyrev stuck by the decision to vote for sanctions. And despite his 
conciliatory efforts, he highlighted the differences of approach of the Russian and 
Serbian governments in a manner that was likely to have riled the nationalists in 
parliament: 
This tragedy is as if Russia, let's say, used the Armed Forces of the former Union 
against Belarus in response to its aspiration to establish its independence and 
sovereignty. '2' 
Many deputies would probably have approved of such a course. 
A major theme in the debate was that the vote for sanctions was `over hasty' or 
`premature'. Kozyrev rejected this. After reiterating the fact that Russian diplomats had 
successfully averted the expulsion of the FRY from the CSCE, he stated: 
For a month we delayed the adoption of sanctions against ... 
Yugoslavia. We did 
this not because we consider it necessary recklessly to support the Belgrade 
government, which by its own actions leads Serbia and Montenegro to the 
continuation of a war with all the other Yugoslav republics, to a national 
catastrophe. But we did it because we consider it necessary to use everything 
possible of our special influence, our friendly influence on the Yugoslav 
republics. 122 
This defence was not accepted by the Supreme Soviet. Many deputies referred to a 
report by the United Nations Secretary General on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
There were accusations by deputies and in the press that the distribution of this report 
had been delayed deliberately through an agreement between Russia and the USA until 
after the sanctions vote in the UNSC. 123 Even if the report was not delayed deliberately, 
the vote was `hasty' because the Security Council should have waited to see the 
contents. 124 The point was that the report supposedly showed that sanctions were not 
justified. According to Boris Rodionov in Izvestiia: 
there were some very interesting things in the report! For example: `There is no 
proof that the Belgrade government is in control of the situation in the new state, 
which is in the grip of civil war, or that it is exercising command over the Serbian 
armed formations in Bosnia. ' Moreover, the report said that `units of the Croatian 
army are not leaving Bosnian territory'. 12' 
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So, it is suggested that had the report been read and accepted, sanctions would not have 
been introduced against Serbia and Montenegro alone. 
Kozyrev rejected the argument. He dismissed the relevance of the presence of 
Croatian troops on the grounds that it was not intervention since they were in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina at the request of the Bosnian government: `The Bosnian government and 
all of the other republics do not recognise Serbia's intervention, but do recognise and 
invite Croatia, ' he argued during the debate. 126 In addition, he insisted that those 
elements of the report stating that the Belgrade government did not bear sole 
responsibility were not only well-known to the MFA, but were actually included in the 
report on Russian insistence. However, sanctions were still justified against Serbia alone 
because Serbia bore `not the only, not the exclusive responsibility, but the lion's share. 
Why? Because today Belgrade has the key levers of influence on the situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. ' 127 
Kozyrev explained also that, as with the issue of FRY membership of the CSCE, 
Russia was isolated internationally on the question of sanctions. But by becoming 
independent and turning away from the Soviet past, Russia had committed itself to work 
with the United States, NATO, and so on, rather than return to confrontation. '28 This 
explanation would appear to support Rodionov's thesis that, after their isolation at the 
CSCE summit, Russian diplomats felt the need to accept the consensus at the United 
Nations on sanctions, especially, according to Kozyrev, after delaying the decision for a 
month. The Vorontsov memorandum seemed to prove this. Vorontsov apparently stated 
that the overwhelming majority of delegations saw sanctions as the only way to 
influence effectively the Serbian government and population as a whole (and thus 
prevent an even worse conflict in Kosovo). The memorandum also pointed out that 
many delegates in discussion with the Russian representatives had made it clear that the 
support by Russia of Belgrade in the CSCE and the UN was incorrectly interpreted by 
Belgrade as encouragement of its policy of creating a `Greater Serbia'. Its author 
therefore proposed to vote for the resolution; this would signify unambiguous 
condemnation by Russia of any acts leading to the kindling of inter-ethnic enmity and 
conflict, attempts to re-draw borders and create ethnically pure regions, which `has great 
significance from the point of view of containing such tendencies in the countries of the 
CIS'. 129 If the document was genuine, this shows that Vorontsov did not want Russia to 
1 26 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a), p. 106. 
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be isolated in the UN. It also shows the liberal institutionalist approach to the problem 
of ethnic minorities, both in former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union. 
The key sentence in the memorandum as far as opposition forces were concerned 
was the comment that 
it is very important also that we do not oppose on this point the Western European 
countries and the USA, where public opinion is very strongly against Milosevic... 
Our country must not be associated personally with him, especially on the eve of 
the presidential summit in the USA. 130 
The implication was that continued Russian support of Milosevic in the face of the 
unanimous opposition of Western states would harm Russian relations with the West 
and was consequently against Russia's interests. As we have seen, this was Kozyrev's 
view. But the fact that the imminent summit would involve discussions of a Western aid 
programme for Russia added to the feeling among opponents of official policy that that 
policy was being shaped by the need to get money from the West, leading Russia to 
abandon its principles and interests in the Balkans, or, as many put it, Russia's historical 
and natural ally. Rodionov also alluded to the fact that the stay of `Monsieur Delors of 
the EC' in Moscow `coincided with the Russian Federation's determination of its 
position'. 131 
Such supposed calculations were also apparently a source of resentment of Russia 
in the FRY itself. One report in Komsomol 'skaia pravda even showed an implicit 
acceptance of the myth of Serbia's Christ-like suffering and betrayal: 
People in Belgrade speak openly of betrayal, saying that Russia has knuckled under 
to the West and sold itself out, and that it is not even clear whether Russia will get 
its thirty pieces of silver - $24 billion. "" 
The `balanced' position of the state centrists 
The Supreme Soviet was dominated by, on the one hand, `state centrists' who wanted an 
assertive great power foreign policy but supported domestic reform, and `national- 
patriots' who wanted an aggressively nationalist and pan-Slavist foreign policy (and, 
among the left, a return to communism). Particularly prominent among the latter were 
Sergei Baburin and Nikolai Pavlov, leaders of the Russian All-People's Union, which 
advocated the re-creation of the USSR on a unitary basis. 113 They supported a pro-Serb 
130 Ibid. 
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policy towards the conflicts. Many deputies in the Supreme Soviet or Congress of 
People's Deputies also had links with the `red-brown' groups discussed previously. 
The most prominent proponents of a `neo-realist' position in the Supreme Soviet 
were Ambartsumov and Rumiantsev. They were critical of official policy because it was 
too pro-Western and not independent and did not protect Russia's `national interests'; at 
the same time they were careful to distinguish their position from that of the `red- 
brown' coalition, those who openly supported Milosevic and Serb extreme nationalist 
leaders. This position was stated very clearly by Rumiantsev during the Supreme Soviet 
debate: 
During his trip to the Balkans, Andrei Vladimirovich [Kozyrev] said one very 
remarkable phrase which inspired in me great confidence. He said that Russia 
ought more often to act solo in the Balkans. But, very unfortunately, this good 
phrase, which could become the basis of our new Balkans policy, didn't lead to real 
actions because our voice was drowned in the general chorus of protest against 
Yugoslavia and practical protest against Serbia, which was indirectly, of course, a 
strike aimed at the new Russia. Against new Russia. Consequently, in my view, it 
is very important today not to give up the idea of patriotism to the ultra-right 
forces, but our Foreign Ministry policy ought to proceed from a conception of 
patriotic policy, if you like, because our foreign policy today ought to become a 
buttress of patriotism. '` 
In his contribution to the Supreme Soviet debate, Ambartsumov called on Russia to 
adopt a `balanced' policy. He argued that the UN Secretary-General's report showed 
that all sides were guilty, which made it `incomprehensible' that sanctions were then 
directed only against one side, Serbia. Sanctions were one-sided when Croat and 
Muslim forces were also participating in the war: `In general, the impression is that the 
world community, above all the West, has occupied in relation to an internal conflict a 
position that was not fully just, ' he argued. Sanctions were harsher than those adopted 
against Iraq, which had been guilty of a clear case of aggression against another state, 
whereas the Bosnian conflict was an inter-ethnic conflict, a `very complex, tangled 
situation'. Russia, he suggested, should adopt an objective stance: `we ought to proceed 
from the defence of human rights, from a just, objective position to all sides. '135 Being 
critical of the sanctions vote did not mean `pitting themselves against the international 
34 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a), p. 103. 
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Ambartsumov was influential in shaping the Supreme Soviet resolution on 
Yugoslavia, which was initiated in the Committee for Foreign Affairs. As well as point 
four already quoted, the resolution called on the government 
1. to maintain a balanced, objective approach to all sides in the Yugoslav crisis in 
the light of the real role and responsibility of each participant in the armed 
conflict; 
2. to guarantee the conduct of a foreign policy line, excluding the possibility of 
armed intervention from outside in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
any country or group of countries, whatever the pretext. At the same time to 
augment international mediation efforts with the purpose of achieving a political 
settlement to the conflict. To enable the unobstructed supply of humanitarian aid 
to the republic; 
3. to instruct the MFA to study the possibility of a resolution in the UNSC for a 
reduction in the sanctions in relation to the FRY established by UNSC resolution 
757, or for the introduction of a moratorium on their application in response to 
the receipt of evidence of the readiness of the FRY to carry out the directions 
included in the points of the resolution. 137 
To what extent was Ambartsumov's position and that of the committee a `balanced, 
objective' position? Ambartsumov did not ignore Russia's supposedly traditional links 
with Serbia, although he argued that they should not be the sole basis for policy. For 
example, during the debate, he stated that 
the position of the committee is defined not only, and not so much by, the fact that 
Russia traditionally had friendly relations with Serbia, although of course it is 
impossible to discard this, and the traditions of our foreign policy from the 
equation. 138 
And one comment in particular has been quoted by many Western commentators: `It 
would hardly seem obligatory that Russia, which naturally has its own state interests, 
duplicate the US position in all respects -a position that is by no means always 
indisputable. ' 139 Russia, then, had its `own state interests' and should take into account 
136 Ambartsumov (29 June 1992). 
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its traditional pro-Serb policy. Russia should pursue its own interests, acting as a 
corrective to the West's anti-Serb stance, although this need not jeopardise relations 
with the West: there should be no trade-off between support on sanctions and aid/trade 
from the West (which Ambartsumov supported), since these were separate issues. 
Unfortunately, it was never fully specified what exactly Russia's `own state 
interests' in the Yugoslav conflicts were, except that they must be different from those 
of the West and the United States in particular. This means that Ambartsumov proposed 
a policy that was still not derived directly from Russia's interests in relation to the 
conflicts, but only in relation to the West; and then in a superficial manner, based on the 
assumption that Russia, as a great power, must have interests distinct from other great 
powers. This was a simplistic, realist approach of maximising power on a zero-sum 
model. 
Furthermore, if Russia was to pursue its own interests in relation to the conflicts, 
this could not by definition be an `objective and fair approach to a complicated ethnic 
conflict', as Ambartsumov also claimed. 140 If Russia took into account its supposed 
traditional pro-Serb policy and friendly relations with Serbia, this was extremely 
unlikely to lead to an `objective' position. And, in fact, Ambartsumov's actions and 
statements did suggest a pro-Serb bias. 
In August 1992, he visited former Yugoslavia (at the invitation of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts, SANU) with Rumiantsev, where they met Panic, Cosic, 
and Karadzic, but no Croat or Bosnian Muslim leaders. '4' The aim, Ambartsumov said, 
was to `facilitate efforts to overcome the one-sided position that the international 
community has taken in the Yugoslav conflict'; but, as Maksim lusin comments, they 
were unlikely to succeed by meeting representatives of only one side. 142 Furthermore, 
they claimed that the situation in Yugoslavia was being distorted: `we intend to dispel 
some myths, ' Rumiantsev said, `particularly the myth of the concentration camps on the 
territory of Yugoslavia'. '43 Naturally, setting out with such an intention made its 
fulfilment more likely. Ambartsumov concluded that the refugee camps he saw were 
like `poor quality sports camps' serving free food `perfectly decent by contemporary 
Moscow standards'. Description of the camps as concentration camps was 
'40 Ambartsumov (25 August 1992). 
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`disinformation'. ' And, according to Agence France-Presse, Ambartsumov told 
journalists in Belgrade that the Supreme Soviet would insist that Russia ally itself with 
Belgrade at the international conference on Yugoslavia due to open in London later in 
August. 145 In particular, Ambartsumov was pushing for closer Russian support of the 
federal government and president. He hoped, in particular, to arrange a meeting between 
Yeltsin and Panic, but this did not happen. '46 
The contention that Ambartsumov and Rumiantsev wanted a more pro-Serb 
emphasis in official policy is borne out by subsequent declarations. For instance, in 
August, after Russia had supported UNSCRs 770 and 771 enabling the use of military 
force to ensure the supply of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to gain access 
to detention camps in the FRY, Rumiantsev said that Russia's position on the situation 
in the Balkans was `not quite right', and warned that the United States would conclude 
from Russia's handling of affairs in the region that the Balkans had ceased to be 
counted in Russia's sphere of influence. 147 
Also illustrative is their position on Macedonia. Khasbulatov, Rumiantsev, and 
Ambartsumov all criticised the decision to recognise Macedonia. 148 This was surprising, 
given the fact that here was perhaps the clearest example of an independent Russian 
initiative. In fact, Ambartsumov cited it as an example that `Russia today is beginning to 
play a much more noticeable role in the regulation of the Yugoslav conflict, a more 
independent role'. 149 Furthermore, the decision to recognise a republic with a majority 
Slav and Orthodox population, linked with Russia by close historical and cultural ties, 
might be expected to garner support even from the `patriotic' opposition. '" But state 
centrists objected to the decision because recognition complicated relations with Greece 
and came at an inopportune time. From their point of view, Greece was an important 
ally in the region and should not be offended. According to Ambartsumov, more 
attention should have been paid to Greece's position since it plays an important role `in 
countering the Islamic revanchism that threatens the region from the Adriatic to the 
Black and Caspian Seas'. "' But, as lusin dryly remarks: 
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Just what this threat is and from whom it emanates Ambartsumov did not specify. 
Nor did he explain, unfortunately, how recognising Orthodox Macedonia will lead 
to growing Islamic revanchism, especially in the region adjacent to the Caspian 
Sea. '52 
Conclusions 
On the eve of the anniversary of the August 1991 putsch, Kozyrev published an article 
in Nezavisimaia gazeta in which he stated again the basic tenets of his foreign policy 
approach. Comparing the Belgrade leadership to those who had tried to come to power a 
year previously in Moscow, he argued that the reason why Serbia found itself an 
international outcast while Russia had an `unprecedentedly favourable international 
environment', was not because of some `imaginary Slavophobia of the West', but 
because on 19 August 1991, Russians [rossiiane] rejected the forceful preservation of 
the Soviet Union, and avoided stirring inter-ethnic tensions and using the army to 
punish those striving for sovereignty and independence. `In Belgrade, unfortunately, 
just such a line has predominated until now, ' he wrote. "' 
Kozyrev divided opponents of his policy into `national-Bolsheviks' and `national- 
democrats'. There was no need to explain why `an alliance with the national-Bolsheviks 
in Belgrade so attracts our national-Bolsheviks'. The `national-democrats', however, 
were motivated particularly by anti-Western feeling. Kozyrev argued that the logic of 
their position was really quite simple: `as "democrats", they don't stand hand-in-hand 
with the Bolsheviks', but as `nationalists, a union with the cosmopolitan West is 
sickening'. The position of the `national-democrats' was also muddled by the `notorious 
Slav factor' in foreign policy: 
There is no doubt that this factor to a certain degree ought to be taken into account 
in the policies of a state with an enormous Slav population. But this relates by no 
means only to the Serb national-Bolsheviks, who, by the way, are acting against the 
national interests of the Serb Slavs themselves, but also to all the Slav peoples of 
the former Yugoslavia. Don't forget that even the Muslims in Bosnia are also 
Slavs... 134 
Basing policy on the `Slavonic' or `Orthodox' factor created dangers in relation to 
other powers and also within the Russian Federation itself: 
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Any attempt to divide Europe into Slavonic, Germanic or French communities 
threatens to return to the situation not even of the second, but the first world war, 
and if applied to the Yugoslav crisis, for the second time in history to make Serbia 
the detonator of global catastrophe. Secondly, such an ethnic-religious foreign 
policy would be anti-Russian, since it could promote the division of Russia itself, 
where alongside millions of Orthodox Slavs live millions of people of other 
nationalities and faiths, in particular Muslims. 'ss 
In fact, Russia's multi-national character, its many languages and religions, provided a 
`rich, broad palate' for its foreign policy, which was especially important, given its 
Eurasian position, for developing good relations with all its neighbours. '56 
This was to be the last such categorical statement by Kozyrev of an unfettered 
liberal internationalist approach. Increasingly, diplomats came to emphasise Russian 
geo-political interests, and its rights rather than duties as a great power. This was 
reflected in a shift in policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts that began towards the end 
of 1992 and was both a result of, and a contributor to, the change in overall foreign 
policy. It was in part a political reaction to the concerted domestic political opposition 
to official policy, but it also showed that key foreign policy actors now believed that 
changes were necessary. In particular, there was the feeling that Western powers were 
taking Russian support for granted and were taking advantage of Russia's weakness to 
further their own interests in the Balkans. Many Russian policy makers believed that 
Russia should now define its own interests in relation to the conflicts and devise an 
independent policy to protect them. 
In addition, the issue of NATO's role in the post-Cold War international system 
began to affect Russia's relations with the West. Across the Russian political spectrum 
it was believed that NATO must not be allowed to dominate the security structure of 
Europe by taking new members, former allies of the Soviet Union. Nor should it 
intervene militarily outside its borders in regions in which Russia still had interests. This 
was to have a major impact on Russian policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts from 
1992, as Russia defined its primary interest in relation to the conflicts as keeping NATO 
out of former Yugoslavia. 
iss Ibid.. 
1 56 Ibid.. 
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Chapter 5 
Transitional phase: autumn 1992 - end 1993 
Domestic criticism and developments in foreign policy thinking in general, as outlined 
in chapter 2, began to have a perceptible influence on Russian policy towards the 
Yugoslav conflicts in the summer of 1992. Previously, Yeltsin had not been directly 
involved in foreign policy, restricting himself to the occasional dramatic gesture, such 
as announcing the decision to recognise Macedonia. But he now realised that, with the 
sustained opposition attack on it, the liberal Westernising policy could be a political 
liability. Hence, he himself criticised the Foreign Ministry's approach as well as the 
West's attitude towards Russia. Addressing the MFA's collegium on 27 October, he 
stated: 
We have acquired a reputation as a state that answers `yes' to all proposals, 
whether or not they are advantageous to us. What's more, we have started to put up 
with slights and even insults, we allow Russia to be treated in ways which would 
be unacceptable to any other great power. But Russia is not a country that can be 
kept in the waiting room. In any such instance, we must express our 
disappointment in the partner which has been tactless, and that includes America. ' 
By the end of 1993, policy had evolved into a neo-realist or state centric approach. 
This enabled the administration to build a domestic consensus behind its policy; 
although the `intransigent opposition' continued to attack all aspects of domestic and 
foreign policy, centrist critics were now more happy to support it, although it took the 
Sarajevo crisis (chapter 6) to prove that this really was the MFA's new line. Hence, 
Russian policy went through a transitional phase from the liberal Westernising of the 
first half of 1992, to the unambiguous great power policy of 1994. 
In relation to policy to the Yugoslav conflicts, there was no sudden change, no 
dramatic break with the West; instead, two elements gradually emerged in the Russian 
approach. Firstly, diplomats adopted what they considered to be a more neutral stance 
towards the combatants, distinct from Western opinion, which they considered anti- 
Serb. According to Viacheslav Bakhim, head of the Foreign Ministry's Department for 
International Humanitarian and Cultural Co-operation, decisions of international fora on 
Yugoslavia were often unilateral and provoked a `hunted down' complex, and so Russia 
was acting not from pro-Serb but against anti-Serb positions. Sergei Lavrov, deputy 2 
Shinkarenko (29 October 1992); see also Lepingwell (6 November 1992). 
2 ITAR-TASS (26 February 1993). 
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foreign minister, expressed the Russian position unequivocally in February 1993: `it is 
impossible in this conflict to determine who is right and who is wrong'. 3 This echoed 
the claim by many parliamentarians that, since this was a civil war, each side bore equal 
responsibility. 4 
Adopting a `balanced' position served the purpose of distinguishing Russia's policy 
from that of the West, and was therefore aimed partly at domestic critics. But the 
motivation behind this was not solely instrumentalist nor simply a reaction to domestic 
criticism: it was also a matter of genuine belief. It was generally believed in Russia that 
Western policy makers, in response to media pressure, were viewing the conflict 
simplistically and were unjustifiably singling out the Serbs for blame. 
The second element was the emphasis now placed on the necessity for Russian 
involvement in conflict mediation for former Yugoslavia. As stated in chapter 2, this 
reflected a shift from emphasis on duties as a great power to rights as a great power. 
The shift was partly because policy makers believed that Russia was being ignored in 
the peace process, whereas it should automatically be included, but it also demonstrated 
the more assertive approach in foreign policy as a whole. Kozyrev now began to 
respond to criticism that, by apparently being too pro-Western and too subservient, 
Russian support was taken for granted while it was side-lined in the conflict resolution 
process. Nevertheless, this heightened assertiveness still applied within the framework 
of co-operation with the West. Policy makers were not prepared to sacrifice good 
relations with what they called their `partners' for the sake of an alliance with the Serbs, 
while any close alliance as demanded by the red-brown opposition was unacceptable if 
it was based on the principle of pan-Slav/Orthodox solidarity. ' 
The London Conference 
Russian diplomacy at the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia, which took 
place from 26-28 August 1992, illustrates this new emphasis in Russia's approach. This 
joint UN-EC conference was an attempt to bring the major powers into the mediation 
process as well as to reincorporate the United Nations. The EC had taken the lead from 
the end of 1991 but had failed to halt the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there 
were doubts about its impartiality and suspicions that certain of its members were in fact 
b pursuing their own interests. A more inclusive conference gave Russia the opportunity 
3 Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 343. 
See, for example, Parkhomenko (30 April 1994). 
5 See, for example, comments by Kozyrev in Kuznetsova (16 February 1993). 
6 Baev (1994a), pp. 40-1. 
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to establish its involvement, to prove its significance in relation to the Yugoslav 
conflict, and to ensure that a `balanced' approach was preserved. 
The conference established a set of principles that any future peace agreement 
would need to guarantee, as well as some preliminary procedures to promote them and 
to alleviate the suffering of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The principles 
included the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state and the 
inviolability of its borders, acceptance by all sides that territory could not be acquired 
by force, and constitutional guarantees on human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
members of ethnic and national communities. A continuous negotiating forum - the 
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) - was set up to find an 
agreement that would secure these principles; it was co-chaired by a UN Representative, 
Cyrus Vance, and a representative of the EC, Lord Owen. The most significant 
immediate demands were for the Bosnian Serb forces, which occupied over seventy per 
cent of the country, to withdraw from those territories acquired by force, and to hand 
over heavy weapons within range of major cities to UN forces within seven days. The 
conference aimed also to establish better conditions to guarantee the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, and demanded the immediate dismantling of concentration camps.? 
Russian delegates were quick to highlight the positive role that Russia had played 
in the conference. Both Kozyrev and his deputy, Vitalii Churkin, claimed that they had 
prevented the conference from collapsing. On the last day, the Serbian delegation had 
refused to return to the hall after a recess because it appeared that a resolution 
condemning the Serbs would be adopted on the insistence of the Bosnian government. 
Churkin boasted afterwards that John Major appealed directly to the Russian delegation, 
which held intensive talks and, by persuading the Serbs that the documents being 
adopted were sufficiently balanced and did not encroach on their interests, 8 `managed to 
hammer out a formula for the conclusion of the conference which allowed all 
delegations to return to the negotiating table'. `It is quite obvious, ' he concluded, `that 
our work was appreciated not just by the Yugoslav sides, but also by other participants 
in the conference'. 9 
Russian diplomats believed that they were able to play an intermediary role 
because they adopted a `balanced position', neither anti- nor pro-Serb. As Churkin put 
it: 
Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 341; Gow (1997a), pp. 224-232. 
8 Shchedrunova (29 August 1992). 
9 Maiak Radio (29 August 1992). 
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I think we can state with every confidence that, in the first place, we again 
confirmed that our position is a balanced one... In other words, we do not succumb 
to extremist solutions. We are not adopting a blanket anti-Serb position, as some 
representatives are doing. But at the same time we are not offering the Serbs any 
guarantees along the lines of "eve are your traditional friends - we won't let 
anything happen to you, we will help you. " ... we are telling them: 
"we realise how 
difficult the situation is. If you wish to help yourselves, we are here, we are 
prepared to do what needs to be done. s1° 
Churkin believed that Russia played a `substantial, independent role' in ensuring 
that the conference achieved what he considered were substantial results. " This opinion 
was shared by many commentators in the Russian press. 12 Unfortunately, the outcome 
of the conference proved not to be as auspicious for the achievement of peace as these 
evaluations might have led people to believe. According to James Gow, this was 
because the follow-through was weak, as the relevant powers sat back in satisfaction 
rather than acting on the initiative created in London. 13 And Reneo Lukic and Allen 
Lynch point to the fact that unlike with Iraq, `no timetable for military action in the 
event of the failure to observe these conditions was established, and in the end Serbia 
was able to avoid the infliction of military action by the West in spite of the fact that 
none of the agreed conditions sanctioned by the United Nations and the major NATO 
powers was observed. '' 4 
Kozyrev, they claim, was quick to point out the `loopholes in Western diplomacy' 
in his briefing for Russian journalists after the conference; although he spoke of a 
sharpening of sanctions and international isolation for Serbia if it did not consent to an 
acceptable settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, `he pointedly did not mention (nor did his 
Western interlocutors) the possibility of military action against Serbia'. 15 On the other 
hand, neither did he rule out punitive action against violators of the conference 
principles. 16 But Lynch and Lukic's interpretation is borne out by subsequent statements 
by MFA representatives. During a Foreign Ministry briefing on 2 September 1992, for 
example, spokesman Sergei Iastrzhembskii said that Russia believed that a mechanism 
for reaching a settlement had been defined at the London Conference and there was 
`even less justification than previously in discussing a hypothetical chance of a military 
10 Ibid.. 
" Ibid.. 
lZ See, for example, Shchedranova (29 August 1992). 
13 Gow (1997a), p. 225. 
4 Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 341 
15 Ibid.. 
16 Edemskii (1996), note 29, p. 49. 
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intervention in Yugoslavia'. " Russia would continue to support the ICFY and the 
`constructive forces' of Panic and Cosic. Unfortunately, this failed to take into account 
the fact that, with the military advantage on their side, the Bosnian Serbs had little 
incentive to accept the London principles (in particular, the demand that territorial gains 
could not be made by force), but willingly continued negotiating in order to avert 
outside intervention; while, in the FRY, Milosevic retained his grip on power. But the 
Russian resistance to a military intervention shows the MFA's shift towards the centrist 
position after the sanctions debate. 
Kozyrev commented after the conference that not only was there a pooling of 
efforts at the world level, but also at the national level. He expressed particular 
satisfaction at Ambartsumov's support for the delegation. '' Ambartsumov, on his part, 
seemed satisfied with the positive reception that his input had received, and noted that 
Russia's policy had become `more adequate'. He claimed that it was thanks to the joint 
efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Soviet committee that the 
leaders of all the former Yugoslav republics were represented on an equal basis, a 
refrain taken up by Kozyrev in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in October. 19 Expressing 
admiration for the way Russia's diplomats had worked, Ambartsumov singled out 
Churkin for showing exceptional expertise. 20 This admiration was presumably based not 
only on respect for Churkin's professionalism, but also for his policy priorities: it was 
Churkin in particular who argued that by being more independent, Russia could 
establish its great power priorities. In fact, Churkin's conclusions about the conference 
chimed exactly with Ambartsumov's policy recommendations that I discussed in the 
previous chapter: an important result of Russian diplomacy at the London Conference, 
Churkin said, was that `we demonstrated that we have our own voice, that we have our 
own views and that these views are listened to'. 21 
Government-opposition relations 
Official policy was now closer to the views of the state centrists, or neo-realists - 
typified by Ambartsumov - who were less critical of the official line than previously. At 
the Supreme Soviet session of 17 December 1992, deputy foreign minister Anatolii 
Adamishin claimed that the MFA was definitely working in the direction defined by the 
" ITAR-TASS (2 September 1992). 
'8 Shchedrunova (29 August 1992). 
19 Ambartsumov (25 August 1992); Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (22 October 1992). 
20 Crow (7 May 1993), p. 38. 
21 Maiak Radio (29 August 1992). 
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Supreme Soviet resolution of July. 22 This was an opinion that Ambartsumov appeared 
to share. At the Supreme Soviet session of 18 February 1993, he welcomed the fact that 
the approach of the Foreign Ministry had greatly changed, particularly regarding the 
Yugoslav question: 
We often argue with minister Kozyrev, deputy minister Churkin, but I can say that 
actually, thanks to the actions of the MFA, the possibility of the use of collective 
sanctions, the possibility of carrying out collective military intervention on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia from the side of the world community, has now 
been put into the background. 23 
Nevertheless, there remained some distance between official policy and the policy 
that Ambartsumov wanted to see implemented. He wanted a more overtly realist 
approach to the conflicts, not merely in the instrumental sense of demonstrating the 
importance of Russia through conflict mediation in the Balkans, but basing policy on 
the identification of the Balkans as a Russian sphere of interest and Serbia as a potential 
ally: 
But now the task is for Russia to carry out a more active policy and not simply to 
enable an end to the bloodshed - this is the paramount task - but to occupy its own 
position in the Balkans, to insist on the national-state interests of Russia, which 
cannot be abstracted from the interests of Yugoslavia, and to find corresponding 
political means to achieve this. 24 
However, Ambartsumov clearly distinguished his own position from that of the 
red-brown coalition. For instance, at the December 1992 Supreme Soviet session, he 
called on deputies to accept the resolution adopted by his committee as the basis for the 
Supreme Soviet resolution, and `not to inflame passions ... not to set 
itself against the 
world community' . 
2' The more hard-line opposition deputies were not prepared to 
accept this, in their desire to support the Serbs and oppose the West. They were also 
intent on attacking the MFA and Yeltsin for political reasons and were critical of 
Ambartsumov's conciliatory approach. S. Sh. Dzhamaldinov, for example, wanted 
Ambartsumov to explain how the MFA's policy was improving if sanctions were still in 
place after parliament had been talking about lifting them for eight months. 26 
22 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (17 December 1992a). 
23 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (18 February 1993a), p. 172. See also his comments in Pushkov 
(28 February 1993). 
24 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (18 February 1993a), p. 173. 
25 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (17 December 1992a), p. 133. 
26 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (18 February 1993a), p. 175. 
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But ideological divisions also extended into the administration. The most striking 
anomaly was the position of Vice-President Alexandr Rutskoi, who increasingly 
associated with the red-brown opposition forces. His interpretation of the Yugoslav 
conflicts matched that of the hard-line realists and the red-brown coalition. For example, 
in May 1993, addressing the organising committee of the so-called Conference of 
Spiritually Related (Eastern Orthodox) Peoples, he described the conflict as a `fight for 
spheres of interest in international relations'. Rather than allow `foreign interest' to 
impose itself on the region, the people of former Yugoslavia should seek a way out the 
conflict by themselves. 27 Such pronouncements hardly contributed to the MFA's 
diplomatic efforts at that time. 
Institutional competition 
The Supreme Soviet's resolution of 17 December 1992 on the Yugoslav crisis instructed 
the Russian government to order the MFA to take necessary measures to avert external 
military intervention, not excluding in case of extreme necessity the use of the veto in 
the UNSC; to put to the UNSC the question of introducing sanctions against all three 
sides responsible for the continuation of the conflict; and not to allow the lifting of the 
arms embargo. It also required the government to decide the question of re-establishing 
humanitarian supplies to the FRY within two weeks. 28 The resolution was passed 
overwhelmingly, with 151 votes in favour, 5 against, and 13 abstentions. Contrary to the 
opinion of some pro-government commentators such as Maksim lusin in Izvestiia, 
29 this 
was not a particularly radical resolution if one considers the views of many opposition 
deputies. Ambartsumov's influence was clearly prominent. 
The MFA was irritated partly by the timing of the resolution, coming a few days 
before elections in the FRY (see below). lusin claims that the Supreme Soviet ignored a 
request from the MFA to delay its decision at least for a few days: 
the haste shown by the resolution's authors was no accident. The Russian 
parliament's demarche, coming three days before the presidential election in 
Serbia, will strengthen the hand of Slobodan Milogevic and the alliance of former 
Communists and nationalists that backs him. 30 
27 Tanjug (19 May 1993). 
28 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (17 December 1992b). 
29 Iusin (18 December 1992). lusin claimed that the point in the resolution about humanitarian aid 
proposed that Russia should act unilaterally, in circumvention of the international sanctions. 
3°Ibid.. 
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The MFA's other main objection to the resolution was the Supreme Soviet's 
`interference' in the affairs of the Ministry. One leading MFA official told journalists 
that meddling in Russia's foreign policy by `non-professionals', most often by `those 
who appear at the microphone in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's 
Deputies', could carry very serious consequences: `A car cannot have 249 or 1,049 
drivers. This is dangerous for the passengers and for international road travel'. 
Furthermore, this very important decision was adopted by the parliament practically by 
`word of mouth', without the advice of experts; and, in his view, the document violated 
the principle of the separation of powers. 3' And Kozyrev objected that `the resolution 
appears to constitute direct interference in the affairs of the executive authorities. Even 
President Yeltsin never gives us [the MFA] such detailed instructions. ' 32 
Hence, the institutional competition continued with disputes over which body 
should shape foreign policy, but parliament was by no means solely to blame. Tatiana 
Bogdasarova in Moskovskie novosti described the deficiencies in the MFA's handling of 
relations with parliament: 
Once Russia's position is formulated, it is essential to know how to `sell' it to the 
public, the news media and, finally, the legislative branch. To all appearances, our 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs realised this much too late and, on the whole, was 
ineffective in this area... One sometimes got the impression that Smolensk Square 
was deliberately provoking the Russian parliament, alienating even its own 
potential allies in Balkan affairs. 
Bogdasarova claims that a point of confrontation was reached between the Supreme 
Soviet and the MFA which resulted in the resolution of 17 December; she suggests that 
the confrontation was caused `not so much by fundamental differences as by the 
absence of a good working relationship and proper information on the Foreign 
Ministry's part'. 33 This is undoubtedly over-stating the case; there were major 
differences of policy between the MFA and many deputies, particularly of the red- 
brown coalition. But she is right to point out that, despite the efforts to include 
Ambartsumov in policy making and to liaise with parliament, Kozyrev at times 
alienated the centrist deputies whose support he needed, by his style as much as by his 
policy. 
31 Interfax (18 December 1992). 
32 Iusin (19 January 1993). 
33 Bogdasarova (3 January 1993). 
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One example occurred only days before the December resolution. Kozyrev's 
speech in Stockholm at the meeting of the CSCE on 14 December 1992 began with the 
bald statement: `I must make amendments to the conception of Russian foreign policy', 
and continued: 
We see as essentially unaltered - although there has been some evolution - the 
objectives of NATO and the Western European Union, which are working out 
plans to strengthen their military presence in the Baltics and other regions on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union and to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia. The sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were 
evidently dictated by this course. We demand that they are rescinded, and if this is 
not done, we reserve the right to take unilateral measures necessary to defend our 
interests. The current government of Serbia can count on the support of great 
Russia in its struggle. 
He went on to define the former Soviet space as an area in which Russia would use all 
means to defend its interests, and concluded: 
All those who hope to be able to disregard these special features and interests, who 
hope that the fate of the Soviet Union is lying in wait for Russia, should not forget 
that they are dealing with a state that is able to stand up for itself and its friends. 
After a break of half an hour, Kozyrev returned to the hall and explained that it had 
all been a hoax: 
I want to assure you ... that neither 
President Yeltsin, who remains the leader and 
guarantor of Russian domestic and foreign policy, nor I, as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, will ever agree to what I read out in my earlier speech... The text that I 
read out before is a rather thorough compilation of the demands that are being 
made by what is by no means the most extreme opposition in Russia. The sharp 
words in my speech have no official force. They were merely a tactic - to show the 
danger that would be posed if events were to develop differently. TM 
The demands certainly were not just those of the `most extreme opposition', since 
much of what Kozyrev had said embodied key elements of the centrist, neo-realist 
criticism of official policy. 3S And, in fact, Ambartsumov, while tactfully declining to 
34 Iusin (15 December 1992). 
35 A point also made by lusin, who claims that according to information from reliable sources, `most of 
the theses that the Minister used were taken from an article by a well-known figure in the Civic Union'; 
ibid.. 
109 
comment on the unusual tactics of the Minister of Foreign Affairs while he was still 
attending the conference, did question Kozyrev's comments regarding Serbia: 
It seems to me that the minister's approach, striving to compromise the very fact of 
possible support for the people of Serbia is ... extremely unreasonable... 
I don't 
understand why a strictly favourable attitude towards Serbia - not, of course, to 
those carrying out murder and persecution, but to the Serbian people - should be 
considered a reactionary policy, unacceptable for Russia. 36 
The fact that Kozyrev deliberately did not include in his speech the demands made 
by the extreme opposition makes his motivation even more questionable. 37 As well as 
being politically naive, there was something diplomatically suspect about criticising 
mainstream domestic opposition in a mock speech in an international institution. 
Kozyrev himself later acknowledged that the ideas he presented were `far from being 
the most extreme held by Yeltsin's opponents', but explained that `it was the attempt of 
Western politicians, particularly Americans, to refrain from unequivocally supporting 
Yeltsin's team and to look for an alternative within the so-called centrist forces in 
Moscow that led me to use shock techniques. '38 Such a tactic brought strong reactions 
in Moscow. For example, Iurii Glukhov wrote in Pravda: 
From all indications, the Minister of Foreign Affairs decided to give battle in 
absentia to the Congress of People's Deputies by using a forbidden method, 
submitting domestic problems to the judgement of the world community and, in 
essence, provoking outside interference and pressure... 
Some people have rather unflatteringly referred to the member of the outgoing 
government as `boys in pink shorts'. It seems that Mr Kozyrev has never outgrown 
those shorts. This time, too, he behaved like a vindictive and malicious little boy. 
Departing, he left a puddle behind him. 
It is shameful that there has been such a minister in Russia's history. 39 
What really seems to have offended many people was that Kozyrev showed a very 
clear understanding of the views of the opposition he was attacking. Evgenii Popov in 
Sovetskaia Rossiia whole-heartedly backed the content of Kozyrev's mock speech and 
despaired of his subsequent renunciation: 
I Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (17 December 1992a), p. 132. 
37 Iusin (15 December 1992). 
38 Kozyrev (1995a), pp. 3-4. 
39 Glukhov (16 December 1992). The comment reveals the widely-held perception that Kozyrev would 
soon be replaced. 
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Whereas A. Gromyko 
... was nicknamed 
"Mr No" for his unyielding stance in 
defending the interests of his state, A. Kozyrev has acquired a reputation as "Mr 
Yes" for his servility. 
Therefore, it is easy to imagine how shocked the participants in the Stockholm 
foreign ministers' conference were when A. Kozyrev suddenly began speaking not 
only with amazing good sense, but also - for the first time since he took up his 
ministerial post! - from the standpoint of a defender of his country's interests... 
However, the role of zealous fighter for Russian interests proved to be agonisingly 
beyond Kozyrev's ability: he immediately admitted that, without waiting for April 
1, he had pulled a little practical joke on his Western colleagues, but that they had 
nothing to worry about, because he had been and would remain "Mr Yes"... 
Kozyrev's little joke in Stockholm is not only a blasphemous insult to the 
Serbs, the Montenegrins and other faithful friends of ours who have been betrayed 
by the present Russian authorities. It is an insult to every one of us... 40 
These passages give an indication of the vitriolic sentiments that the hard-line 
opposition held towards the Foreign Minister. The red-brown coalition, of course, used 
the Yugoslav issue to attack Kozyrev and the government at every opportunity. In this 
context, Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe, noted in April 
1993: `Almost nobody is interested in Serbia here, but the opposition is playing it up to 
make things difficult for the administration, and the administration has to bow to that. Al 
But although there were political motives, the ideological links should not be ignored; 
not only were there some genuine pan-Slavists in Moscow, there was also a coincidence 
of interests and ideology between the red-brown coalition in Moscow and the Milogevic 
government in Belgrade. 
This natural solidarity was demonstrated by the continued frequency of trips to 
Belgrade by certain Russian deputies. The first official visit, led by Ambartsumov in 
April 1993, coincided with a trip by Churkin (in support of the Vance-Owen plan), who 
diplomatically called it a `useful duplication' of effort. 42 Yet it resulted in a curious 
situation, since members of the parliamentary delegation issued a statement condemning 
Russia's tacit agreement (by abstaining rather than vetoing) to UNSCR 820 which 
strengthened sanctions against the FRY (see below). They also made a number of 
statements that were sharply critical of the official Russian policy. 43 These statements 
were welcomed by their hosts, in particular the more extreme Serb nationalists. Vojislav 
40 Popov (17 December 1992). 
41 Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 340. 
42 Baturin and Gryzunov (23 April 1993). 
43 Rumiantsev et a/ (19 April 1993). 
111 
Seselj, for instance, called the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs a `staff member of 
the US State Department' and labelled the Russian leadership a `fifth column'. Seselj 
claimed that `the only thing that will help us is the fall of the treacherous Yeltsin- 
Kozyrev leadership and the coming to power in Russia of the patriotic forces'. 44 Such 
comments by Serbian and Russian nationalists were made in the context of the political 
struggle in Russia, a focus for which was the referendum due to take place on 26 April 
(see below); after Yeltsin won the referendum, Kozyrev remarked: 
I am afraid that the national patriotic forces in Belgrade, not without prompting 
from some of our deputies, possibly expected that similar national patriotic forces 
will take the upper hand in Moscow. Let's hope that the results of the referendum 
will have a sobering effect on them... ' 
Russian diplomacy after London 
After the London Conference, Russia gave full backing to the ICFY as the forum in 
which a `peaceful resolution' to the conflict could be achieved, while insisting that any 
final decisions be made by the UNSC. 46 This support extended to a strong endorsement 
of the Vance-Owen peace plan (VOPP), although this too would have to be mandated 
by the UNSC and its implementation be under the political control of that body. 47 The 
other main strategy was to support the `constructive forces' of Panic and Cosic in the 
federal government. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov was convinced 
that `the leadership of the new Yugoslav republic really [was] trying to resolve the 
conflict in that country'. 48 Examples of its constructive co-operation included, according 
to the MFA, its agreement to long-term CSCE missions to Kosovo, Sandzak, and 
Vojvodina. 49 
On 20 December 1992, there were federal, republican, and provincial elections in 
the FRY, but the key election was for the Serbian presidency in which Panic and 
Milosevic were rival candidates. As the elections approached, Russian support for Panic 
became increasingly outspoken. For example, on 15 December, Churkin said in an 
interview in Izvestiia: 
Generalising somewhat, I would say that there are two Yugoslavias. The first is 
working towards exacerbating the conflict and prolonging the confrontation with 
44 Baturin and Gryzunov (23 April 1993). 
45 Ostankino TV (26 April 1993a). 
46 Gow (1997a), p. 195. 
47 Comments by Sergei Lavrov, Maiak Radio (2 February 1993). 
48 ITAR-TASS (14 September 1992). 
49 Russian Federation MFA (3 November 1992). 
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virtually the whole world community. The second advocates specific moves 
towards reconciliation. The presidential and parliamentary elections on 20 
December will disclose this demarcation. Need it be said that Russia is 
wholeheartedly for this second Yugoslavia, the one that puts its stake on 
democracy and detente. so 
And at the CSCE council of ministers meeting, the same day as Kozyrev's phoney 
speech, Russia and the United States issued a joint declaration in which they expressed 
regret at Serbia's isolation, and in this context awaited `with great interest' the results of 
the elections: 
Russia and the United States hope that the people of Serbia thoroughly endorse the 
possible alternatives. It is up to them to decide whether to return the country to the 
community of nations or to remain in the status of a pariah in economic and 
political isolation - the consequences of the policies conducted by the present 
regime. If the right choice is made, Russia and the US will help the Serbian 
government to return the country to its former position in the world arena. If a 
radical change of policy occurs after this election, as Russia and the US sincerely 
hope, then conditions will be created for easing and lifting of sanctions. " 
According to a Tanjug report, Yeltsin even sent a message of support to Panic 
immediately prior to the election. 52 
However, Milosevic's alliance won a resounding victory in the parliamentary 
elections, and Milosevic himself was elected President of Serbia. It is possible that as 
well as constituting unorthodox external influence, pressure from outside may have 
been counter-productive. These points were made vividly by E. Popov in Sovetskaia 
Rossiia: 
As for support by outside forces, it took on a downright scandalous character. 
Probably never before have attempts been made to exert such crude, cynical and 
brazen pressure on the outcome of an election in a state that is sovereign, not 
someone else's colony. Unfortunately, Russia's present authorities also played an 
active role in this arm-twisting... 
There are even louder threats not only to toughen further the economic 
sanctions against the country that has dared to defend its independence, but also to 
launch air strikes against targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the FRY. But 
so Ermolovich (15 December 1992). 
51 Nezavisimaia gazeta (18 December 1992). 
52 lusin (18 December 1992). 
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despite that - or rather, precisely because of it! - Serbia has chosen freedom and 
the defence of its national dignity by voting for Slobodan Milosevi6.53 
Bogdasarova makes a similar point regarding Russia's tactics, arguing that `so far, being 
in a "besieged fortress" has helped the extremists, not the moderates'. 54 
Although Russian diplomats had implied that a victory by Milosevic in the 
elections would spell an end to any hope of a less belligerent approach from the FRY, 
they declined to follow through the logic of these comments after the elections. Instead, 
the MFA preferred to think that Milosevic would now become more moderate, although 
Panic was soon removed as federal prime minister in a vote of confidence. 55 Following 
a meeting with Milosevic a week after the elections, Churkin said that he did not 
consider the result a `factor blocking the settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia' and 
claimed that Milosevic was `well aware that Serbia's policy of international 
confrontation is absolutely inadmissible and will lead the country nowhere'. 56 
Furthermore, despite the widely reported irregularities in the Yugoslav elections, in 
Russian eyes Milosevic had been legitimated as Serbian leader. 57 These views are 
encapsulated in a comment by Kozyrev in February 1993, that the impression was being 
formed that Milosevic was `using his mandate received at elections in order to show 
support for the Vance-Owen plan', as well as there being signs of his `positive 
influence' on the situation in Bosnia. 58 Although this might appear to be a blatant U- 
turn on the part of the MFA, there was some truth in the comments, since Milogevic did 
advocate acceptance of the VOPP. 
The Russian policy was now to encourage Belgrade to put pressure on Pale to 
accept the Vance-Owen plan, and to use the promise of easing sanctions as an incentive 
for it do so. In a sense, then, the tactic remained unchanged, but the `carrot' was now to 
be dangled in front of Milosevic rather than Panic. Under pressure from the opposition 
in the Supreme Soviet, however, the MFA would not endorse a stronger `stick'; neither 
stronger sanctions, nor military intervention. I shall look first at these aspects of Russian 
policy before examining diplomacy in relation to the Vance-Owen plan. 
13 Popov (24 December 1992). 
54 Bogdasarova (3 January 1993). For similar arguments, see Kesic (1993); Dyker and Bojicic (21 May 
1993); Palairet (27 August 1993). 
ss Vostrukhov (30 December 1992). 
Interfax (29 December 1992). 
S' Edemskii (1996), pp. 38-9. 
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Sanctions 
Russia used the promise of easing/lifting sanctions to encourage the FRY to adopt a 
more constructive course. It sought to ease the sanctions particularly in humanitarian 
areas; for example, Russia encouraged the UN sanctions committee to respond 
positively to Panic's requests to allow the delivery of fuel to the FRY for humanitarian 
purposes, a decision which Iastrzhembskii described as a positive step by the 
international community in support of constructive forces in the Yugoslav leadership. 59 
This was partly the result of domestic pressure. In resolutions, and in speeches and 
interviews, deputies continued to call for sanctions to be lifted, repeating previous 
arguments. But another aspect of the debate now became prominent: the cost for Russia 
of joining sanctions against the FRY. This revealed sharp divisions within the foreign 
policy establishment. 
The price of sanctions 
As early as July 1992, the Russian trade representative in Belgrade, Valerii Ignatov, 
estimated that the Russian economy would suffer a loss of $2 billion because of the 
severance of trade links with the FRY; the Russian car industry would suffer 
particularly because it would be unable to obtain spare units and components, while 
individual regions of the Russian Federation, primarily Western Siberia, would lose 
supplies of Yugoslav goods that were in chronically short supply in Russia (medicines, 
baby food, and so on). 60 Then, in September, Interfax reported that UN sanctions 
against Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya had deprived Russia of $16 billion (approximately 
$8 billion due to the suspension of exports and imports, and around $8 billion from lost 
profits) of which $2 billion related to Serbia and Montenegro. 61 
It later turned out that these figures came from the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations (MFER), which had been commissioned by the Congress of People's 
Deputies to do an `audit' of losses from sanctions; the report was distributed among 
deputies at the seventh Congress, at Ambartsumov's request. 62 Committee hearings 
were held in which the deputy director of one of the MFER departments and one of the 
report's authors, I. Kofanov, confirmed that the calculations were made on a 
`hypothetical basis'. 63 Yet, the following month, the Minister of Foreign Economic 
59 ITAR-TASS (18 December 1992) and (22 December 1992). 
60 ITAR-TASS (2 July 1992). 
61 Interfax (20 September 1992). 
62 Iusin (18 December 1992). 
63 Vinogradov (22 December 1992). 
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Relations, Sergei Glazev, again quoted the estimate, and claimed that appropriate 
documents had been prepared for closed Supreme Soviet hearings, and that Ministry 
experts were `prepared to vouch for every figure they contain, including the bottom line 
of $16 billion'. He argued that the international community should compensate Russia 
for these losses, and proposed that the problem be discussed in the UNSC. 64 
The MFA rebutted the claims on two levels. First, it argued that the figures in 
themselves were inaccurate estimates and that important facts had been neglected. 
Lavrov argued before the Supreme Soviet committee that although the figures might be 
correct, they were also `crafty' and taken out of context . 
6' As a representative of the 
MFA explained in the Supreme Soviet hearing of 21 December, the $1.5-2 billion 
estimate for the cost of sanctions against the FRY `does not take into account the real 
currency and export potential of the FRY in trade with us, which barely a year ago was 
seriously disrupted above all by the armed conflict'. 66 Lavrov elaborated: the main 
component of Russia's exports to the FRY was oil, which had in general not been 
delivered since the start of 1992, half a year before the sanctions were introduced; and 
from June 1991, there were no military supplies (the other main export) to Yugoslavia 
because of the arms embargo. Furthermore, Russia's debt to Yugoslavia was valued at 
around $1.6 billion; therefore, even if the profit had materialised, it would have been 
`eaten up' by the necessity to pay back the debt. 67 And Kozyrev himself claimed that 
`the mythical $16 billion does not exist, for the simple reason that all these states pay 
petrodollars, and in order to receive petrodollars they have to sell to the West'. 68 
Although this appears not to apply to Yugoslavia, and there was always the possibility 
for barter, the fact remains that the FRY's economy would have been hit by sanctions 
from the West and therefore was less capable of producing exports to trade with Russia. 
The second line of argument was that if Russia had not joined the sanctions regime, 
it would have suffered losses in other areas. A memorandum issued by the MFA put the 
matter starkly: 
if we had not joined the sanctions, our country's actual losses would have been 
much greater. We would not have been able to count on Western support in the 
form of credits (which were around $15 billion in 1991-2) nor on deferments of 
Russia's debt repayments (which saved our treasury $18 billion this year alone), to 
64 Eggert (21 January 1993); Ostankino TV(20 January 1993). 
65 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (21 December 1992), p. 146. 
66 Ibid., p. 144. 
67 Ibid.. 
68 Russian Television, 12 February 1993, quoted in Crow (19 March 1993), p. 3. 
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say nothing of the long-term debt restructuring that is now being discussed in 
Paris 69 
Politically, this was an unwise admission to make. Opponents questioned the logic 
of such profit and loss calculations; for example, Sergei Mikhailov argued during the 
Supreme Soviet debate that 
the majority of countries do not pay their debts... If our debts weren't rescheduled 
now, what could we pay? We simply have no money. They rescheduled our debts 
not because they love us, not because our policies are good, not because we are 
striving to enter the world community but because in reality we cannot pay them. 70 
These were valid points. The MFA seemed to be deriving its policy from instrumentalist 
calculations related to domestic economics, rather than addressing directly what kind of 
policy Russia should adopt towards the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Hence, instead of defending the policy in terms of an institutionalist approach to 
the conflicts, the MFA laid itself open to accusations that Russia had `sold out' Serbia 
and - according to the hard-line opposition - Russia's own interests, in return for short- 
term help from the West. Sergei Filatov's response in Pravda to the MFA memorandum 
is illustrative: 
Russia cannot pursue an independent foreign policy. This deplorable fact, carefully 
hidden by the leadership of the MFA, has unexpectedly been documented by the 
spokesman for Smolensk-Sennaia Square himself. At a briefing, S. Iastrzhembskii 
... 
in defending his ministry's position from criticism, said something that has long 
been clear to many people: Russia is not free in making foreign policy decisions... 
Nobody will deny that our country's economic situation is such that it is 
extraordinarily difficult to part with that $18 billion just now, or that the $15 billion 
won't come in handy. But think about it: the West simply bought Russia's vote in 
the UN with the same money we will eventually be forced to return in the form of 
payments on our debt... Meanwhile the political gain is exceedingly dubious: 
Moscow lost its independence. Former friends - and others as well - now see 
Russia as a traitor, while new ones have been further convinced that everything on 
earth can be bought and sold. 
Such is the true nature of the `co-operation' with democratic countries that Mr 
Kozyrev so zealously propagandises. Can it really be unclear that, in response to all 
69 Rossiiskie vesti (2 December 1992). 
10 Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (21 December 1992), pp. 152-3. 
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our present and future concessions, the West is going to make us even more 
dependent - above all, financially?! 
" 
As we saw in the initial debate over sanctions, Kozyrev was accused of allowing 
short-term financial/economic concerns to dictate Russian policy rather than calculation 
of Russia's strategic interests in the Balkans. The MFA's response was that these 
concerns were an integral part of Russia's true national interests, as was partnership 
with the West. However, the criticism had some force because it played on a widely- 
held perception that the Yeltsin administration would do anything to maintain that 
`partnership', resulting in a very unequal partnership indeed. The vulnerability of the 
MFA's position contributed to a shift in emphasis aimed at demonstrating Russia's 
independence. Unfortunately, if the original policy was shaped in part by factors outside 
the immediate Balkans context - in an instrumental manner - then the new approach, 
concerned with Russia's prestige, was also not derived from the situation in the conflicts 
themselves. It was therefore no more conducive to a just resolution of the conflicts. 
Resolution 820 
The UNSC did not discuss the easing of sanctions against the FRY as the Russian 
Supreme Soviet demanded. Instead, it discussed a draft resolution to impose stricter 
measures. This was intended to give an additional incentive to Milosevic to put pressure 
on the Bosnian Serbs to sign all aspects of the Vance-Owen peace plan. 
The Security Council vote was due to occur on 12 April. But Russian diplomats 
wanted it to be delayed, ostensibly to give the Yugoslav leadership more time to 
influence Pale. According to Kozyrev, the adoption of the resolution would have been 
`untimely': 
today Russia will again prevent the corresponding resolution being adopted in the 
UNSC so that the sides in the conflict are given the opportunity, with the help of 
international mediation, to reach a compromise on the basis of the Vance-Owen 
plan. n 
But it was also suspected that the Russian administration did not want the Security 
Council resolution to affect the result of the referendum called by Yeltsin for 25 April 
(which was in effect a national vote of confidence in his presidency). Such linkage 73 
" Filatov (4 December 1992). 
72 ITAR-TASS (12 April 1993). 
73 Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 344. 
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was denied by the MFA; Iastrzhembskii, for example, said that the accusation was 
`groundless 




Whatever the motive it seemed that Russia would veto the resolution. Since no veto 
had been cast since 1990, and it had now become the norm for consensus to be reached 
before putting resolutions to the vote, proponents of the new sanctions - the United 
States, France, and Britain - agreed to postpone the vote until 26 April. 
75 
However, fighting around Srebrenica led to fears that the Serb forces were going to 
capture one of the last non-Serb enclaves in the Drina valley. 76 In response, the UNSC 
vote was brought forward to 17 April. If Russia's objection was that a vote on sanctions 
at that stage would be `untimely' with regard to the peace process, then it might have 
been expected to vote against the resolution. '? Indeed, after the vote, Churkin made no 
attempt to conceal Moscow's coolness toward the resolution and described it as an ill- 
timed decision that could only harden the Serbs' position and make dialogue more 
difficult. 78 Furthermore, he did not believe that the initiators of the vote had `fully 
observed the agreement to postpone the vote until 26 April'. 79 Nevertheless, Russia 
abstained and UNSCR 820 was passed. In it, the UNSC denounced the Bosnian Serb 
refusal to endorse the VOPP and decided to tighten sanctions on the FRY. 8° These new 
sanctions would go into effect after nine days, on 26 April; " this gave the FRY 
leadership time to exert further pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the 
plan and thus avert the imposition of the new sanctions. 
Russia chose to abstain, rather than veto the resolution, for two reasons. Firstly, 
Churkin explained, Russia had already twice succeeded in postponing the vote on the 
understanding that it would not veto the resolution when it came to a vote. 82 More 
importantly, Russian diplomats did not want an open split with Western powers. This 
was partly because of the need for international unity in these crucial weeks for the 
Vance-Owen plan, but also because Russian policy makers still believed in a broad 
partnership with the West. For example, in response to a question from a Belgrade 
journalist at a press conference, Churkin argued: `You should entertain no illusions. 
74 ITAR-TASS (14 April 1993). 
75 Shal'nev (14 April 1993). 
76 Watson and Ware (28 April 1993), p. 3. 
" Arbatova (1997a), p. 471. 
78 Iusin (21 April 1993); Ostanldno TV (18 April 1993). 
79 ITAR-TASS (19 April 1993a). 
80 They were very severe measures, stopping transit of goods across the FRY, and freezing all financial 
assets, effectively turning it into a blockade; Gow (1997a), p. 246; Owen (19%), p. 145. 
81 Thus the new sanctions applied after the Russian referendum, but the vote occurred before it (it had no 
significant discernible impact on the referendum vote which gave Yeltsin the mandate he wanted). 
82 Arbatova (1997a), p. 471. 
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Russia has its own foreign-policy priorities. We will never get into confrontation with 
the world community over the map of Bosnia. '83 
This illustrates the compromise nature of Russia's policy during this transitional 
phase, when the MFA tried to be independent and show a `balanced' approach but also 
continued to promote close relations with the West. Russia was prepared to allow the 
international community's frustrations with Serbia to be expressed through sanctions 
rather than through military action; as Churkin put it, `economic sanctions do not mean 
the end of the world' for the FRY. 84 In any case, as Kozyrev explained two days after 
the Security Council vote, Russia did not object to tougher sanctions against the FRY, 
but simply believed that they should be implemented after 26 April in order to give the 
Serb side more time to come to the correct decision. 85 
The domestic constraints on policy were shown by the way that the Russian 
attitude towards the new sanctions appeared to change dramatically on 25 April. 
Kozyrev stated that Russia would support sanctions because the Bosnian Serbs seemed 
to have made their choice in support of war by rejecting even in principle the Vance- 
Owen plan. In a much quoted phrase, he said that he felt `sick at heart' over the fact that 
Russia had abstained in the UNSC vote: `This decision was probably correct in 
principle, but in the future we must vote not with the national-patriots, but with those 
who support a civilised solution to issues. '86 After the referendum, the administration's 
policy became more hard-line towards the Bosnian Serbs, indicating in part that the 
previous policy had been a compromise due to domestic pressure. 
The problem with this zig-zag policy was that the administration did not set out a 
clear position and defend it in the face of opposition, but conceded when it felt 
necessary and then retracted the concession when it felt stronger. Given, for instance, 
Churkin's comments after the UNSC vote that increased sanctions would provoke the 
Bosnian Serbs to be more recalcitrant, when they were indeed so, a more consistent 
position would have been to say, `we told you so! ' Instead, Kozyrev repudiated the 
MFA's previous position; asked what he thought of the Bosnian Serbs' refusal to accept 
the Vance-Owen plan, he replied: 
The outcome of the vote in the Bosnian Serbs' parliament confirmed the worst 
fears. By way of self-criticism, I want to say that our tactic of delaying the 
adoption of a resolution toughening sanctions against Yugoslavia proved to be 
S3 lusin (21 April 1993). 
84 Arbatova (1997a), p. 472. 
85 ITAR-TASS (19 April 1993b). 
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insufficiently effective. The Bosnian Serb leadership and the national-patriotic 
forces in Belgrade had no intention of using the three-month delay we had secured 
to hold serious negotiations . 
97 
Perhaps his honesty is laudable, but this admission, in the light of previous categorical 
warnings about the effect of the sanctions vote, reveals a clearly inadequate and 
inconsistent approach. If what he now said was correct - which it probably was - why 
had it taken him so long to realise it? 
Certainly, the result of the Russian referendum gave Kozyrev the confidence to 
return to a position closer to that of Russia's Western `partners'; asked about how the 
referendum outcome would be reflected in Russian foreign policy, he stated that `in 
supporting the President, the voters also endorsed his foreign policy course. This should 
lend confidence to our actions in the international arena'. 88 
Military factors 
The arms embargo 
Russia opposed lifting the arms embargo, believing that it should be as strictly enforced 
as economic sanctions against the FRY. 89 Like their British and French counterparts, 
Russian diplomats believed that lifting the embargo would escalate the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina itself and heighten the danger of the conflict spreading. As 
Kozyrev put it, `such a decision would lead to a new round of confrontation... We 
would in effect be acknowledging that the conflict can be resolved only by military 
means'. 90 European governments, including Russia, warned that lifting the embargo 
might turn the war into a great power proxy conflict if, for example, Russia armed the 
Serbs, and the United States armed the Bosnian government forces. 91 Such warnings 
served the purpose of averting American demands for the embargo to be lifted, which 
neither Russia nor Western European powers wanted. However, the underlying 
assumption behind them was that Russia was a natural ally of the Serbs. 
Peace enforcement/peace-making 
From 1993, Russia was opposed to any direct military intervention by the `international 
community' in order to impose a settlement or to support one of the conflicting sides; 
87 Iusin (29 April 1993). 
"8 Ibid.. 
89 ITAR-TASS (22 December 1992). 
90 Iusin (29 April 1993). 
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policy makers frequently re-iterated their commitment to what they termed `political 
methods' of conflict resolution. The MFA was fully aware that if it did not veto any 
UNSC resolution about the use of force, the domestic outcry would be stronger even 
than that which followed the sanctions vote the previous May. But it also resisted 
intervention because of the role that NATO would play in any enforcement action. 
The MFA, the Defence Ministry, and the parliamentary centrists and opposition all 
shared concerns regarding the role of NATO in any international military action, and it 
was this above all else that determined their intention to prevent it. It is not surprising, 
for example, to find Ambartsumov in December 1992 objecting to NATO action - the 
possibility of which was mooted at the North Atlantic Council meeting that month - 
because it would not lead to a positive resolution of the conflict and did not `correspond 
with Russia's national-state interests'. 92 This gradually became the policy of the MFA, 
with the full backing of the Defence Ministry, particularly as NATO expansion became 
a real possibility. 
Peace enforcement action in Bosnia would provide NATO with a raison d'etre, a 
fact that many Russians believed was a primary motivation for NATO taking the lead. 93 
It would also mean that Russia would be excluded from decision making. Russia 
preferred to see international organisations of which it was a member take responsibility 
for peace-keeping/peace-enforcement, that is the UN or the CSCE. But since neither of 
these had the capability to mount an intervention, then there should be no intervention. 
Enforcement action might also set a precedent for UN or NATO involvement in the 
former Soviet Union. One aspect of Russia's more assertive foreign policy was the aim 
of establishing exclusive influence in the `near abroad'. It was therefore considered 
important that no military action, particularly by NATO, be carried out in conditions 
analogous to those pertaining in many regions of the former Soviet Union. 
Yet, Russian policy-makers were never prepared to come to an implicit agreement 
on spheres of influence whereby NATO would recognise the `near abroad' as Russia's 
zone, and Russia would recognise the Balkans as NATO's zone (its `near abroad'). The 
Yugoslav conflict was too important an opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its great 
power credentials; moreover, such an agreement would provide NATO with a renewed 
role and encourage it to expand into other areas of Central and Eastern Europe; and it 
would never be acceptable domestically for the Russian government to `abandon' a 
region that historically had been significant to Russia. 
' Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (22 December 1992), p. 157. 
93 See Baev (1996a), p. 76; and Baev (1996b), p. 159. 
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Peace-keeping 
Concerns over NATO's role also extended to the issue of peace-keeping in former 
Yugoslavia, although somewhat contradictory conclusions were drawn by different 
institutions and individuals. The MFA continued to support UNPROFOR and proposed 
that Russia extend its contribution, perhaps offering troops to serve in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in addition to those already stationed in Sector East in Croatia. This was 
envisaged particularly in the context of the large scale operation to implement the 
Vance-Owen plan and was designed partly to prevent this from becoming a NATO- 
dominated operation. For instance, speaking at a joint meeting of the Russian Foreign 
and Defence ministries, Kozyrev claimed that there was widespread enthusiasm for 
Russian involvement in any peace-keeping operation and that it would be wrong for 
NATO to have to organise the entire project. 94 
But the Defence Ministry and the military continued to take a somewhat different 
stance. In late 1992, the Russian General Staff opposed MFA proposals to increase 
Russia's contribution to UNPROFOR since it was already faced with a deficit of elite 
forces as a result of involvement in at least three large scale peace-keeping missions 
(Transdniestr, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia). 95 While the Vance-Owen plan was under 
consideration, Grachev told the NATO meeting of Defence Ministers that Russian 
forces were already `overworked' in the peace-keeping operations in the former Soviet 
Union. 96 Yet, the Defence Ministry considered the Balkans to be a sphere of interest for 
Russia. This meant that it was unwilling to leave the peace-keeping task exclusively to 
Western powers. This reveals a mismatch between Russian great power aspirations and 
great power capability, the result of which was obstruction of effective action by 
Western powers. Such reasoning was shown, for example, when the United States sent 
300 peace-keepers to Macedonia as a preventative measure. Belgrade media reported 
that the Russian ambassador to the FRY had visited Skopje in a failed attempt to 
persuade the Macedonians to reject the US offer; this was interpreted by some 
commentators as a result of the unwillingness of Russia's Defence Ministry not only to 
participate in peace-keeping efforts in the Balkans, but also to allow an expanded 
American presence in the area. 97 
94 Interfax (6 May 1993). 
95 Baev (1994a), p. 44. 
96 Tsekhmistrenko et al (2 April 1993). 
9' Gryzunov and Baturin (23 June 1993). Gryzunov and Baturin viewed as a `pretext' the argument that 
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In fact, one of the concerns of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff was the 
vulnerability of peace-keepers in former Yugoslavia; for instance, in January, they 
expressed alarm at the threat the Croat offensive posed to the Russian battalion 
(RUSSBAT) in Sector East. 98 There were also cases reported in the Russian media of 
casualties among UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia - particularly from the Ukrainian 
contingent deployed in Sarajevo - which did little to encourage the Russian military to 
offer troops to serve there. Strict rules of engagement applied in former Yugoslavia; 
troops could act only in clear cases of self-defence and in line with the principle of 
proportionate response. This was a further disincentive for the Russian Defence 
Ministry to deploy troops that were accustomed to operating with more flexibility in the 
former Soviet Union. 99 Of course, Russia itself had insisted on such rules to prevent a 
creeping intervention by NATO against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs; but those rules 
were a further reason for the Russian military not to be involved, and therefore 
increased the danger of a NATO monopoly. The Defence Ministry thus appeared to be 
in a vicious circle; but its preferred exit was for no major peace-keeping or peace 
enforcement operation to be deployed in former Yugoslavia without the complete 
support of all sides. This was in contrast to its policy in the `near abroad' where it 
favoured resolute, often partial intervention by Russia/the CIS in ethnic conflicts. 
Had the Bosnian Serbs signed the Vance-Owen plan, it is almost certain that the 
MFA would have prevailed and that Russian troops would have participated in the 
implementation force. Churkin stated why: `The question is about the need to confirm 
our role as a great state. If we want our voice to resound loudly in the Balkans, we 
simply cannot afford to shun this participation. ' 100 This remained the MFA's position 
throughout the conflict. For instance, in the context of the Geneva conference later in 
1993, Kozyrev argued: 
If the Geneva talks are successful ... the scale of the peace-keeping operations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will drastically increase. And, I think, if Russia wants to 
retain its role as one of the leading forces in the Bosnian settlement and in the 
the Balkans: Islamic, Russian, and European (German). For such promulgators of crude realism and the 
`clash of civilisations' - in Serbia and in Russia - no action by Western powers in the Balkans could be 
performed from the simple motive of trying to limit or end the war. 
98 Speech by Vorontsov in UNSC, ITAR-TASS (26 January 1993); in fact, by January 1994, two 
servicemen of RUSSBAT had been killed and nineteen wounded; Radio Moscow International (6 January 
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100 Pushkov (21 March 1993). 
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Balkans as a whole, this role must also be reinforced by real involvement in this 
operation. 10' 
And when a peace deal was finally signed, Russia did participate, despite the fact that 
IFOR was a 'NATO-led' force (chapter 8). 
Use of force by UNPROFOR and NATO 
In certain clearly defined circumstances, Russia allowed the use of force to protect 
UNPROFOR troops and to enforce UNSC resolutions, as long as it was limited and 
impartial. In August 1992, Russia was a co-author of UNSCR 770, which called upon 
states to `take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures 
necessary' to ensure the delivery of relief supplies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, 
spokesman Aleksandr Rozanov stated that the resolution allowed the use of force only 
`against a concrete violator impeding the deliveries of aid'. 102 This interpretation was 
reinforced by British diplomats who also made it clear that the resolution legitimised the 
use of force only in self-defence by troops protecting convoys and did not allow force to 
be used to ensure the delivery of aid if obstructed by local militias. 103 
Similarly, Russia voted in October 1992 for UNSCR 781, which established the no- 
fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Kozyrev - fearing domestic criticism of 
another `anti-Serb' resolution - repeatedly emphasised that the ban was aimed against 
all the warring parties and should not be regarded as anti-Serb. 104 Despite objections 
from Grachev, 105 the MFA later accepted active enforcement of the zone by NATO as 
long as any military action was approved first by the UN (the `dual key' mechanism). 106 
Hence, Russia voted on 31 March 1993 for UNSCR 816 which - after more than 400 
recorded violations of UNSCR 781, mainly by Serb aircraft - authorised member states 
to `take all necessary measures' to ensure compliance with the flight ban. The MFA did, 
however, get the vote postponed three times, until after the ninth Congress of People's 
Deputies, and also achieved significant changes to the text to mitigate the effects on the 
Serbs. Mention of the possibility of strikes against ground targets was deleted (only the 
Serb side had aviation bases on the ground), and - at Moscow's insistence - the 
resolution stated explicitly that force could be used only over the territory of Bosnia- 
101 Kozyrev (I September 1993). 
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Herzegovina (it had seemed likely that NATO would carry out air strikes against targets 
in Serbia itself). 107 
Thirdly, Russia allowed the use of force in response to attacks on UNPROFOR, but 
only in self-defence, that is under traditional UN peace-keeping rules of engagement. 
Opposition opinion 
The nationalist and communist opposition and press in Russia were, of course, 
outspoken in their suspicion of anything that might lead to military intervention. In 
December 1992, Pravda published an appeal by eight scholars - including Gus'kova, 
Volobuev, Volkov, Tiagunenko - to the CPD in which they wrote that 
one does not have to be a profound analyst to realise that behind the new 
toughening of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are certain forces that are 
seeking ... to pave the way 
for a decisive step - military interference, which in all 
probability would be direct intervention in Yugoslavia by NATO under the 
specious excuse of peace-keeping. 1°8 
And Vladimir Peresada wrote that UNSCR 816 gave the pretext which NATO had been 
lacking to enforce the flight ban: `in this way the Western bloc is starting on the path of 
direct armed intervention in the Yugoslav crisis'. '09 
Warnings by Russian nationalists of the consequences of military intervention 
became increasingly vivid as the question of enforcement of the Vance-Owen peace 
plan came to the fore. Nikolai Pavlov, for instance, read a statement from the National 
Salvation Front warning that in the event of war being waged against Yugoslavia, 
popular indignation in Russia could take `unpredictable forms': 
We must warn that the spontaneous indignation of Russia's citizens is able to 
create a threat to the security of the US and Western subjects staying on the 
territory of the Russian Federation after the beginning of aggression waged by the 
forces of the New World Order. lto 
Russian Diplomacy in 1993 
Russian diplomacy in relation to the Yugoslav conflicts became more distinctive and 
high profile in early 1993. This, as we have seen, was partly in response to criticism 
107 lusin (2 April 1993); Watson and Ware (28 April 1993), pp. 2-3; Tsekhmistrenko et al (2 April 1993). 
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from the CPD and the Supreme Soviet; but it was also a reaction to a perceived 
tendency on the part of Western diplomats to ignore Russia. For example, in the context 
of Iraq and Yugoslavia, Yeltsin stated at a press conference on 25 January that the 
United States had a `tendency to dictate terms' instead of engaging in dialogue. "' 
Russian diplomats claimed in response to this tendency that their appraisal of the 
situation in Yugoslavia was - in Kozyrev's words - `more competent' than that of the 
West. 112 
At the beginning of 1993, Russia embarked on a `diplomatic offensive' in former 
Yugoslavia, taking advantage of the pause in US actions due to the change of 
administration. 113 This included the announcement of an eight-point plan for the 
resolution of the conflict, which called for: a cease-fire during negotiations; the end of 
military actions in Croatia (with possible sanctions if the offensive continued); adoption 
of the Vance-Owen peace plan backed by a UNSC resolution; gradual lifting of 
sanctions against the FRY after the Serb side had signed the peace plan; the creation of 
UN multi-national forces to facilitate implementation of the plan, with possible Russian 
participation, and the involvement of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (in 
accordance with Chapter VIII - on regional organisations - of the UN Charter); 
tightened control of the arms embargo; the creation of a UN international tribunal to 
investigate war crimes in the former Yugoslavia; and the elaboration of guarantees of 
human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "a One commentator greeted this plan as an 
indication that Russian diplomacy had advantages over that of the US in particular, 
claiming that it contained fuller proposals than Clinton's own six-point plan, and was 
more comprehensive, going beyond the Bosnian war to cover all-Balkan stabilisation. "' 
Nevertheless, the eight-point plan was really a re-statement of Russia's position: its 
backing of UN-sponsored proposals and, above all, the Vance-Owen peace plan. 
The Vance-Owen plan 
According to the 1991 census, Bosnia-Herzegovina had the following ethnic 
composition: 43.7 per cent Muslims, 31.4 per cent Serbs, 17.3 per cent Croats, 5.5 per 
cent Yugoslavs, 2.1 per cent other. 116 Areas of majority of each of the groups were 
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disjointed (see map 3). A large proportion of towns and villages were ethnically mixed. 
There was also a high percentage of mixed marriages (27 per cent). ' 17 
Map 3 Ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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The Vance-Owen peace plan would have maintained Bosnia-Herzegovina's unity, 
but devolved significant powers to ten provinces. Four of these provinces would have a 
Muslim majority, three a Serb majority, and two a Croat majority. Province 10 would be 
predominantly Croat and Muslim. Sarajevo region would be mixed. The plan was 
criticised by many analysts in the West, and by members of the Clinton administration, 
primarily because the provinces were based on ethnic criteria and hence seemed to 
recognise the results of `ethnic cleansing' and the division of the country into ethnic 
sub-states. Nevertheless, refugees were supposed to return and thus `ethnic cleansing' 
would be reversed, and decentralisation was the most realistic compromise to prevent 
11' Anzulovic (1999), p. 138. 
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the division of the country. The provinces were also distributed in such a way that it was 
difficult for an ethnic group to join `its' provinces to create a contiguous region (see 
map 4). 
Map 4 Vance-Owen plan, spring 1993 
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Russia's support for the VOPP derived from several factors. The plan appeared to 
provide a basis for a settlement that upheld the London Conference principles and its 
acceptance would avert any Western demands for outside military intervention in the 
conflict. It also served Russia's own interests and strategic goals as understood by the 
Yeltsin administration. 
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Firstly, the Vance-Owen plan would be endorsed by the Security Council and be 
implemented by UN forces; although NATO would be involved, its actions would be 
subservient to the UN Secretary-General and the UNSC. 118 
Secondly, the MFA supported the maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial 
integrity. This partly resulted from an interpretation of Russia's interests in terms of 
`mirror factors'. For example, when asked what Moscow's reaction was to the idea of 
merging the Serb-controlled regions of Bosnia and Croatia into a single `Serbian 
republic', Kozyrev responded that it was totally unacceptable; as well as the 
implications for Serbia itself, `in upholding the principle of inviolability of borders, we 
are also proceeding from the interests of the Russian Federation'. 119 
Thirdly, the Vance-Owen plan was a compromise, the strength of which was that it 
did not satisfy `the absolutist or extremist demands of any side' ; 120 it reflected `the 
balance of interests and responsibilities of all three Bosnian sides, and also the balance 
of interests and responsibilities of other, above all neighbouring, states'. 12, Hence, it 
suited Russia's `balanced and objective' approach and prevented the success of forces 
that Russian diplomacy had attempted to check. But Russian diplomats also portrayed 
the plan as protecting the Serbs' interests. Churkin told the Supreme Soviet that the deal 
`fully guarantees the security, rights and interests of the Serbs of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina'. 122 He also explained that certain amendments/understandings had been 
made to the plan and map in order to take into account Bosnian Serb fears. For instance, 
those areas from which they would have to withdraw their forces would be occupied not 
by Muslim or Croat forces, but by UN peace-keepers. The MFA also promised to 
deploy Russian peace-keeping troops in the Posavina corridor in the north, linking the 
north-western province with a Serb majority to Serbia proper. 123 
Not all of Churkin's audience was convinced, of course, although the Supreme 
Soviet's attitude towards the VOPP was inconsistent. On the one hand, in February the 
Supreme Soviet appealed to all sides in the Bosnian conflict to accept the Vance-Owen 
plan. 124 Ambartsumov reinforced the MFA's efforts to persuade Karadzic to sign, 
holding a telephone conversation with him to that end in April. But the `intransigent 
opposition' opposed adoption of the plan because it `damaged the interests of the 
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Bosnian Serbs'. 125 A group of deputies of a `certain tendency' invited Karadzic for an 
unofficial visit to Moscow in mid-April, which Iastrzhembskii described as `untimely', 
sending out the wrong signal at an `intricate and difficult moment'. 126 Most 
significantly, the Supreme Soviet rejected the clause of a draft resolution of 27 April 
urging political and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs to adopt the plan, with 
necessary adjustments, as proposed in an appeal by the presidents of Serbia, 
Montenegro, and the FRY. 127 Churkin regretted that by failing to endorse the presidents' 
appeal, the Supreme Soviet had `lost an opportunity to bring a weighty contribution to 
international efforts of crisis settlement'. 128 
Opposition to the plan was not confined to the `red-brown' alliance. Rumiantsev 
(usually more anti-Western than Ambartsumov), for instance, expressed realist 
objections: claiming that Lord Owen had rejected an agreement made between Croats 
and Serbs over the Posavina corridor (province 3 on the map), he argued that `the sides 
themselves can carry out amendments to the map, if there is no coarse pressure from 
outside, coarse pressure, behind which lie large-scale geopolitical interests. 129 His own 
position was clear: Russia should back the Serbs in the same way that the Muslim world 
was helping the Muslim side by, for example, financing arms supplies to Bosnia: 
To whom are the Serbs looking? If you go to any town in Serbia today, to any 
village in Serbia, regardless of whether you are a democrat, a patriot, a communist 
or a centrist, they will always say to you: "Russians, you are our real hope". 
We have lost too many allies in recent times. And this nation is our ally. Not 
the regime, not specific political forces, but this nation is our ally. To forget this is 
simply a crime today... 13° 
Regardless, the MFA continued to push for acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan, by 
appeals, promises, and threats. Churkin made several visits to Belgrade to exert pressure 
on the FRY leadership and the Bosnian Serbs, although without success. 131 As the eight- 
point plan showed, Russia promised to bring a vote in the UNSC to ease sanctions if the 
Serbs signed the Vance-Owen plan. But Russian diplomats also used threats, 
particularly after the Russian referendum, and when the Bosnian Serbs appeared to have 
rejected the VOPP. Yeltsin, for example, warned that Russia would `not protect those 
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who set themselves in opposition to the world community' and hoped that the Bosnian 
Serb referendum would come up with a `more carefully considered decision' than the 
Bosnian Serb assembly had in rejecting the plan. 132 Yeltsin issued a further statement on 
6 May, warning that although Russia would `extend firm support to all those who will 
honestly follow the path of peace on the basis of the Vance-Owen plan', it would not 
`back anyone who would seek to avoid it'. 133 These statements reinforced the message 
that Russia would not sacrifice relations with the West for the sake of the Bosnian Serbs 
or the `national patriotic forces in Belgrade'. As Kozyrev put it after the Russian 
referendum, `it will be a great political error to count on Russia pulling the chestnuts out 
of the fire for the forces it rejects internally', i. e. the `national patriots' in Moscow. 134 
At this stage, Russian diplomats did not rule out explicitly the use of force to 
compel acceptance of the VOPP, hoping that their ambiguous stance would have a 
positive impact. Hence, when Rumiantsev asked Churkin directly how the Russian 
representative on the UNSC would vote if the question of military intervention arose, 
Churkin refused to be drawn, leaving the matter open in order to increase the pressure 
on the Serbs: 
if the Serbs undertake this or that criminal action in Bosnia, then inevitably and 
immediately the question will arise in the Security Council about the necessity to 
use some form of vigorous measures in relation to the situation. We have made this 
absolutely clear to the Serbs... 
But as to how we would vote in this situation ... 
I am not now authorised (I 
have no instruction, and, as far as I know, no such decision has been taken) to tell 
you, how exactly we will act in this situation ... a 
lot depends on what the situation 
really is at that time. 135 
This did not satisfy the Supreme Soviet which then adopted a resolution stating that the 
government must consider it obligatory for the representative of the Russian Federation 
in the Security Council to use the right of veto in a vote on possible military 
intervention of international forces in the Yugoslav crisis, because `such actions affect 
vitally important interests of the Russian Federation and will not lead to a resolution of 
the crisis'. 136 
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Progressive implementation, the `Joint Action Programme', and the 
demise of the VOPP 
The Russian administration was unwilling to abandon the VOPP even after the Bosnian 
Serbs had rejected it in their referendum. Like their Western European counterparts, 
Russian policy makers regarded the plan as the best basis for a just and lasting peace as 
well as a focus for international accord. On 16 May, after talks with David Owen and 
Thorvald Stoltenberg (who had replaced Vance as the UN negotiator), Kozyrev argued 
that it was `now essential, disregarding the obstructionist position of those forces 
interested in war, to begin strict implementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen 
plan'. 137 He believed that the international community `did not have to wait until the last 
Bosnian fighter endorses the plan' and that it could `put out the fire in former 
Yugoslavia step by step'. 138 Hence, Kozyrev and Yeltsin proposed `progressive 
implementation' of the plan, and called for a meeting of the UNSC at foreign minister 
level to adopt a resolution drafted by Russia. 139 
The idea was to apply the VOPP in areas controlled by Bosnian government and 
Croat forces, without waiting for acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs. Russia would join 
the US and European states in providing peace-keepers, although the question of 
numbers of the Russian contingent could only be tackled after the UNSC had adopted 
the plan and devised a mechanism for implementing it. 140 The problem was that, as we 
have seen, the Russian MFA would have found it extremely difficult to convince the 
Defence Ministry and the General Staff to commit significant numbers of troops to a 
continuing conflict situation outside the former Soviet space . 
141 Furthermore, since one 
side had rejected the VOPP, ultimately the plan could be enforced only by coercion, 
even if implementation was progressive. But Russia was very unlikely to endorse 
coercive action, even though the MFA fully supported the London Conference 
principles and the VOPP, and was itself proposing progressive implementation. In other 
words, the MFA was unlikely to follow through the logic of its own proposal. This was 
because of the likely political impact. It was also due to scepticism from the Defence 
Ministry and the armed forces which were unwilling to take part in a peace enforcement 
operation but refused to countenance an action in which they were not involved. 
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The Clinton administration did not support `progressive implementation' because it 
did not favour the VOPP and would not commit troops without a comprehensive peace 
settlement. The American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, refused to attend the 
planned ministerial meeting of the Security Council on 21 May; instead, Foreign 
Ministers of the four European UNSC members - Russia, France, the United Kingdom, 
and Spain - met Christopher in Washington and drew up the so-called Joint Action 
Programme. This was a means of overcoming differences between the great powers 
over further responses to the continuing conflict. The result was a compromise that did 
little to promote an effective settlement. Although it supposed the achievement of a 
peace settlement through negotiations based on the VOPP, the Joint Action Programme 
marked a shift to concentration on the `safe area' concept. This was to prove disastrous. 
Kozyrev continued to portray the Joint Action Programme as a means of salvaging 
the VOPP; for instance, on the flight back from Washington, he told journalists that 
`urgent measures' had been necessary to prevent the VOPP being derailed, but that it 
had undoubtedly been saved. 142 A seven-point `Russian plan number two' called for full 
respect for the experience, ideas, and principles of the London Conference, the Vance- 
Owen plan and the Washington Joint Action Programme. But soon Churkin was 
admitting that the Geneva negotiators had `deviated a little' from the VOPP and were 
instead considering a three-way federation ('a unified Bosnian state consisting of three 
national entities - Serbian, Muslim and Croatian'), which Yeltsin described as 
`probably the most viable idea'. 143 On 31 July, Kozyrev issued a statement announcing 
an `important result' at the Geneva talks, an agreement between the parties to create the 
United Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the constitutional framework for 
the co-existence of the three peoples had been defined. '44 An MFA declaration in 
August stated, like previous declarations, that the principles of the London Conference, 
the Washington Programme, as well as UN documents, provided the world community 
with a good basis for further activity in the Bosnian process; but there was no mention 
of the VOPP. 145 
Failure to enforce the VOPP was an admission that the `international community' 
did not have the unity of purpose to reverse `ethnic cleansing' and Serb territorial gains 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This implied tacit acknowledgement that the Bosnian Serbs 
would achieve their constitutional purposes, if not their territorial ambitions. Hence, all 
Paz ITAR-TASS (24 May 1993); Maiak Radio (24 May 1993a). 
13 Serbian TV (29 June 1993); Russia's Radio (30 June 1993). 
144 ITAR-TASS (31 July 1993). 
145 Russian Federation MFA (23 August 1993). 
134 
subsequent plans were based on de facto partition, beginning with the three-part 
confederation plan proposed by the Serbs and Croats. Russia endorsed this, and, in fact, 
Kozyrev played an active role in facilitating acceptance of de facto partition. "6 
Nevertheless, Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch's claim that the shelving of the VOPP, and 
the acceptance of Serb territorial gains as the basis of a settlement, represented `a 
considerable victory for Russian diplomacy', and that `the effective ratification of 
Serbian military gains in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... 
has come about largely through 
Russia's diplomatic intervention' is simply not true. 147 The MFA and Yeltsin genuinely 
favoured the adoption of the VOPP; whether they were prepared to countenance the 
kind of action necessary to see it implemented is another matter. 
But there is also no evidence to prove James Gow's assertion that the US failure to 
endorse `progressive implementation' of the VOPP marked a turning-point in Russian 
policy after which there was a `realisation that its faith in Washington had not been 
returned' leading to an emphasis on great power status and the need for forceful 
assertion of a policy based on national interests. 148 This shift occurred, but the failure of 
the VOPP does not seem to have been the pivot. The change was more gradual than this 
implies and was also part of the overall adjustment in foreign policy. Certainly, the US 
approach was disheartening, given the full support that Russian diplomats had given 
Vance, Owen, Stoltenberg, and the ICFY as a process. It was also humiliating for 
Kozyrev in particular that the US Secretary of State refused to attend the UNSC meeting 
of foreign ministers that Russia had called for 21 May, and instead `summoned' them to 
Washington. As the commentator Viktor Levin remarked on Maiak Radio, the 
American reaction after their `lift and strike' proposal was turned down was `rather like 
a child in a sandpit: take your toys away, I'm not playing with you any more'. '49 
Nevertheless, Russian diplomats continued to support international mediation efforts 
through the ICFY and remained active in the mediation process. Russia shared the fears 
of the other `Yugoslav Five' that open divisions might develop between the major 
powers and was satisfied that the Joint Action Programme averted this. 
And, given the problems inherent in it, there may in fact have been some relief in 
Moscow that the `progressive implementation' strategy did not proceed. Russia's real 
unwillingness to provide troops while the conflict continued was demonstrated by 
subsequent events. Although the Joint Action Programme stated that Russia intended to 
" Edcroskii (1996), p. 41. 
141 Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 345. 
48 Gow (1997a), p. 199. 
149 Maiak Rad o (24 May 1993b). 
135 
provide peace-keeping troops in Bosnia in addition to those in Croatia, Russian 
diplomats soon began to back down on this declaration. '50 Indeed, Iastrzhembskii 
denied that Russia had ever made such a commitment: consequently, it could not renege 
on it. Instead, he suggested that the Russian Federation could participate in other ways 
in the UN operation in Bosnia, perhaps by providing observers stationed along the 
border (although no resolution on observers existed yet). "' In the event, no troops were 
sent until February 1994, and then it was to oversee a local cease-fire deal around 
Sarajevo accepted by all sides; crucially, the gain in Russian prestige was calculated as 
counter-balancing the risk to troops (chapter 6). 
Diplomacy after the VOPP 
Russia's principles remained the same as before: to encourage negotiations, to retain the 
arms embargo, and to prevent military intervention. On 30 June, Yeltsin stated in a 
press conference in Athens that if someone `insisted on using force, on lifting the 
weapons embargo, we would exercise our right of veto in the Security Council in order 
to prevent this'. 152 In fact, in the UNSC the previous evening, in the vote on a draft 
resolution proposed by the Non-Aligned and Islamic states on lifting the embargo on 
arms supplies to the Bosnian government, Russia had abstained along with France and 
Great Britain, while the United States had voted in favour. The resolution fell three 
votes short of the nine votes required for it to be adopted, and the MFA made it clear 
that had there been even the slightest chance of the resolution passing, the Russian 
representative would have used the veto power. '53 
The Russian position was more ambiguous on methods of enforcing existing 
UNSC resolutions, in particular UNSCRs 770 and 836 (on ensuring the delivery of 
humanitarian supplies and protecting the safe areas respectively). The Joint Action 
Programme had shifted emphasis onto the `safe areas' concept. Srebrenica had been 
declared a `safe area' in UNSCR 819 of 16 April 1993; this `protection' was extended 
to Sarajevo, Tuzla, 2epa, Goraide, and Bihac in UNSCR 824 of 6 May (see map 5). 
150 in Orion to opposition from the Defence Ministry, this was also because it was clear that Britain, 
France, and Spain did not intend to send additional troops, and that the US had no intention of sending 
any ground troops to Bosnia. 
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Map 5 United Nations safe areas 
Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993 - after the Washington meeting - strengthened the 
concept. It authorised (paragraph 5) UNPROFOR, under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, to 
deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the 
withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the 
ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the 
population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992. 
It also authorised (paragraph 9) UNPROFOR 
in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 
776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in 
self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to 
bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion 
into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to 
the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. 
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And (paragraph 10) stated that 
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or 
arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to 
close co-ordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary 
measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance 
of its mandate set out in paragraph 5 and 9 above. 
This was the first time that the UNSC had authorised a peace-keeping force to use 
force except in self-defence, that is to go beyond peace-keeping to enforcement. 154 In a 
report outlining the operational concept for the safe areas project, the UN Secretary- 
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noting that the peace-keeping force would be the `light 
option' of 7,600 and thus insufficient to resist a concerted attack on the safe areas, '55 
argued that `particular emphasis must be placed on the availability of a credible air- 
strike capability provided by Member States'. The first decision to use air power (for air 
cover or air strikes) in this context, the report stated, would be taken by the Secretary- 
General himself. 156 In UNSCR 844 of 16 June, the Security Council (including Russia) 
approved the Secretary-General's report. 
These resolutions and the report were not absolutely clear as to the circumstances 
in which force could be used, but they certainly authorised the provision of close air 
support to provide air cover for UNPROFOR in the `safe areas', and also probably the 
use of strategic air strikes to deter an attack on the `safe areas', that is limited 
enforcement measures. Hence, when Bosnian Serb forces launched an assault on Mount 
Igman above Sarajevo, threatening to complete the encirclement of that `safe area', the 
United States argued that resolutions 770 and 836 authorised the use of `selective air 
strikes' to `protect the civilian population and UN "blue helmets"'. '57 However, its 
European allies and Canada, who had peace-keepers on the ground, continued to be 
concerned about possible retaliation in the event of air strikes, while UNPROFOR 
commanders argued that Serb attacks on Mount Igman did not represent a significant 
threat to Sarajevo. "" 
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As for the Russian view, an unnamed senior MFA official admitted that the 
resolutions provided for `defence of "safe areas"' but argued that this did not mean that 
these actions could be taken `outside the normal procedure', meaning without direct UN 
authorisation, as outlined in Boutros-Ghali's report. '59 The director of the MFA's 
Information and Press Department, Grigorii Karasin, elaborated, explaining that the 
decision on the first air strike to protect UN troops must be taken by the UN Secretary- 
General after consultation with representatives of the five permanent members of the 
UNSC, in order to maintain firm and strict UN control over any operations. Subsequent 
strikes could, if necessary, be carried out on the orders of the UN forces commander, 
but a report to the UNSC would be obligatory. As Karasin put it, in this way `any 
possible action will be of a genuinely UN nature', reflecting Russian concerns that the 
UN role would be diminished and NATO would take the decisions. 160 At the very least, 
Moscow should be consulted before any specific step was undertaken. 161 
But the reality was that Russia opposed the use of air strikes, despite having voted 
for the relevant resolutions in the Security Council. On 2 August, after extensive talks, 
NATO announced that it had decided to make `immediate preparations for undertaking, 
in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas continues, including 
wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance, stronger measures including air 
strikes against those responsible'. 162 Contradicting previous statements, Karasin 
responded by stating that Moscow proceeded from the premise that the UNSC 
resolutions permitted the use of air power only for the protection of UN peace-keepers; 
US plans for pre-emptive strikes against Bosnian Serb positions were unacceptable, he 
argued, because they would contradict resolutions 770 and 836.163 On 9 August, the 
North Atlantic Council approved the `operational options' (command and control and 
decision-making arrangements) for air strikes. It was careful to point out, however, that 
it agreed with the `position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use of air power in 
the theatre shall be authorised by him', and stressed that possible strikes `must not be 
interpreted as a decision to intervene militarily in the conflict'. 164 
In response, Kozyrev personally contacted the Yugoslav and American leaderships 
to convey `Moscow's firm position in favour of a swift political settlement to the 
'59lnterfax (2 August 1993). 
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'bz Leurdijk (1996), p. 38. 
163 ITAR-TASS (3 August 1993). 
'64 Leurdijk (1996), pp. 38-39. 
139 
Yugoslav crisis and against gambling on strong-arm methods of solving it'. 165 
Nevertheless, the result of the NATO threat was that the Bosnian Serbs backed down 
over Sarajevo. On 18 August, Boutros-Ghali informed the UNSC that the United 
Nations now had the `initial operation capability for the use of air power in support of 
UNPROFOR'; the same day, NATO carried out its first air support exercise. The 
Bosnian Serbs stopped their attack on Mount Igman and the area came under UN 
control. 166 As Dick Leurdijk explains, 
It was the first time that the UN - through NATO - really threatened to use force 
and the Bosnian Serbs gave in. This outcome would have important consequences 
for later decisions on air strikes in the context of NAC's decisions on Sarajevo, 
Gorazde and the other safe areas. 167 
After the October clash 
In October 1993, during the clash between the administration and the parliament in 
Russia, Serb nationalist forces hoped for the victory of their natural allies. As Sergei 
Gryzunov expressed it: 
Every time that a crisis arises in Russia ... they open the champagne 
in Belgrade, 
and every time they grieve in Belgrade when those forces who want to restore the 
old order in Russia lose. 168 
After its defeat of parliament, the administration had a relatively free hand in 
foreign policy. Both Lenard Cohen and Robin Remington refer to the vote on extension 
of UNPROFOR's mandate as an indication of a temporary shift in Russia's policy 
towards the Bosnian conflict, 169 similar to that which occurred after Yeltsin's victory in 
the referendum in April. Russia voted on 4 October for UNSCR 871 which extended 
UNPROFOR's mandate in former Yugoslavia until 31 March 1994. The vote had twice 
been postponed because of Russia's objections to a draft that tied the lifting of sanctions 
against the FRY to the Krajina crisis. 170 As a statement by the MFA explained: 
During the consultations before the resolution was passed, there had been attempts 
to link the issue of extending UNPROFOR's mandate - and, on a wider scale, the 
resolution of the situation in Croatia - with the sanctions against the Federal 
65ITAR-TASS (10 August 1993). 
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Republic of Yugoslavia, whose gradual lifting - simultaneous with reaching a 
solution in Bosnia - the Russian Federation advocates. In our opinion, such links 
are not in line with earlier decisions by the UN Security Council, and they do not 
take into consideration the role which the FRY has recently played. 171 
In other words, the MFA claimed - correctly - that sanctions had been introduced 
against the FRY because of its involvement in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not 
because of the unresolved situation in Croatia; consequently, sanctions should be lifted 
now that the FRY had begun to isolate the Bosnian Serbs and to co-operate with the 
international community. 
As a result of Russian objections, the linkage in the resolution was made more 
ambiguous; according to the MFA, the new formulation `should in no way be 
understood as a unilateral threat or an attempt at creating a direct link'. 172 This suggests 
that the MFA voted for the resolution because of amendments to it, rather than because, 
as Remington argues, it agreed to link the removal of sanctions to a peace deal for 
Croatia after the victory over parliament. 173 Yet, the Russian Ambassador to Croatia 
appeared to confirm the impact of domestic events; speaking on Croatian Television, he 
said that Russia voted for Resolution 871 only after an intercession of the Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman with Yeltsin and only at a time when it was clear that the 
supporters of the dissolved parliament would be defeated: `Minister Kozyrev and 
Ambassador Vorontsov gave their consent to the resolution after the fall of the Supreme 
Soviet in Moscow, ' he explained. In his view, the postponement of the vote had been 
linked with the situation in Moscow, and Tudjman's request to Yeltsin had come at a 
time when the rebel parliament and its supporters were losing the battle. '74 
So, Russia would not have voted for the resolution while the battle with parliament 
continued. Nevertheless, the MFA was probably sincere in its refusal to vote for a 
resolution directly linking the lifting of sanctions with the issue of Croatia, since this 
would undermine its policy regarding sanctions: gradual lifting in response to positive 
moves from Belgrade in relation to Bosnia. '" Hence, as in April 1993 with UNSCR 
820, events in Russia affected the timing and emphasis of Russian diplomacy in the 
Security Council, but did not alter its general principles. The fact that Yeltsin now had a 
I" Tanjug (5 October 1993). 
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`free hand' in foreign policy did not result in any significant shift in policy towards 
Yugoslavia; for instance, Kozyrev continued to reject any military intervention and, 
according to Edemskii, promised to veto any such proposals. 176 
It should be noted, of course, that Yeltsin was not as `free' as might appear. First, 
his reliance on the military in the clash of October 1993 made him more dependent on 
the General Staff and the Defence Ministry, whose position on military intervention in 
the Yugoslav conflicts, for example, was clear. Second, with elections to the new Duma 
due in December 1993, the Yeltsin administration could not risk undertaking any 
venture that would be attacked vociferously in much of the press and - it was assumed - 
would cost votes. 
The election results - with Vladimir Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalist `Liberal 
Democratic Party' receiving almost a quarter of the votes and thus 63 seats in the State 
Duma, and the Communist Party and their allies gaining 100 seats - were interpreted by 
some commentators as a popular rejection of the Kozyrev-Yeltsin foreign policy. For 
example, Aleksei Bogaturov wrote in Nezavisimaia gazeta that the election results 
illustrated the `contradiction' that had arisen `between the ideological-political 
universalism of the government's foreign policy and the mood in society'. In relation to 
Kozyrev's pro-Westernism, he argued that `this mindless following after our Western 
partners only compromises the West in the eyes of Russia's people, giving rise to anti- 
foreigner sentiments and rocking the ship of state'. 177 This account seems rather out of 
date, however; it is simply not valid to accuse Russian foreign policy in 1993 of 
mindlessly following the West. Gennadii Sysoev described in Izvestiia how people in 
Belgrade always asked the same question: `Why doesn't Russia give a firm "no" to the 
West on the Yugoslav crisis? ' His answer was: 
Moscow hasn't forgotten how to say "no", when it considers it necessary, of 
course. It said "no" to foreign military intervention in Bosnia and to lifting the 
arms embargo on the Muslims. Were it not for that Russian "no", who knows how 
the situation in the Balkans would have turned out? ' 
It is likely that those who voted for the LDPR and for the Communists were more 
concerned with economic issues - rejecting the reform course pursued by the Yeltsin 
administration - and the former Soviet Union, rather than issues further abroad. 
Nevertheless, one analysis of voter attitudes showed that there was a `solid basis of 
16 Edemskii (1996), p. 41. 
"' Bogaturov (29 December 1993). 
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support for anti-Western and anti-minority positions, though these attitudes, the latter in 
particular, are less widely shared among the population than the more basic antipathies 
to the course of market and democratic reform so far'. 179 And Vera Tolz suggested that 
`the vote for Zhrinovskii seems to indicate that national pride is a significant issue in 
Russia today'. 180 Kozyrev himself rejected the theory of some Western observers that 
the election results were `proof that an "imperial consciousness" is practically a national 
trait among the Russian people', and argued that in his Murmansk electoral district, 
voters were `reacting against the unbearably high social price of market reforms'. '8' 
Yet, he could not ignore the widespread desire for national assertiveness that the 
elections revealed. 
Under the new constitution, which was adopted by referendum on the same day as 
the elections, the President should `exercise guidance over the foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation' (Article 86), while the government was responsible for `the 
realisation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation' (Article 114). According to 
Kozyrev, this meant that foreign policy was the prerogative of the President; therefore 
the election results could not fundamentally alter Russia's foreign policy. 182 
Nevertheless, the administration was eager to co-operate with the new Federal 
Assembly; Kozyrev suggested that when the Duma had met and formulated its 
approach, it could influence the shaping of foreign and domestic policy. And the 
following day, he stated that changes would be made in Moscow's foreign policy, not to 
please Zhirinovskii, but because it was essential to take into account people's problems 
and sentiments as revealed in the elections. In fact, the impact of the elections on the 
presentation - if not the content - of policy towards Yugoslavia was immediate. On 21 
December, the MFA claimed that two resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly - `On Human Rights Violations in the Former Yugoslavia' and `The 
Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina' - suffered from a one-sided, accusatory slant and 
were anti-Serb in nature. 183 
Russia and NATO 
Yeltsin and Kozyrev now became more committed to proving Russia's independent 
stance and its great power status. The elections were the final impetus in this process, 
which was dictated to a large degree by domestic calculations. Nevertheless, we should 
179 Whitefield and Evans (1994), p. 51. 
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not ignore the impact of international developments, including events in former 
Yugoslavia. The most significant trend connecting Russia's security concerns in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, events in Yugoslavia, and domestic opinion 
was the evolving role of NATO. 
A report by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), presented by its then 
director Evgenii Primakov on 25 November 1993, expressed concerns about NATO 
expansion if it was not matched by a change in the Alliance's functions, although it 
acknowledged that Russia had `no right to dictate to the sovereign states of Central and 
Eastern Europe whether or not they should join NATO or other international 
organisations'. 184 Boris Poklad in Pravda was more forthright: 
No one should be misled by the assertions of NATO leaders that this organisation 
is now supposedly needed for peace-keeping activity and for the elimination of 
military conflicts. This alliance cannot live without tense situations and various 
types of cataclysm. If such conflicts do not arise of their own accord, NATO will 
generate them... 
Taking advantage of the destabilisation of the situation in the countries of the 
former USSR and putting forth every conceivable pretext (such as `preventing new 
Yugoslavias' and the emergence of a threat to the security of the NATO member- 
countries), this organisation is trying to extend its peace-keeping operations in 
Europe to the East. In the West, there are already calls for the expansion of 
NATO's `sphere of responsibility' to all countries of the former USSR, including 
the Baltic republics. 185 
In the context of general disillusionment with the West as described in chapter 2, 
the prospect of NATO expansion may have had some impact on the December 
elections. But the effect was to create a vicious circle, since the Zhirinovskii vote in 
Russia caused such alarm in Central and Eastern European states that they began to look 
more urgently towards NATO to guarantee their security, or at least - as it was seen by 
many in Moscow - they used Zhirinovskii's success as a pretext. 186 The increased 
likelihood of NATO expansion that resulted from lobbying by Central/Eastern European 
states in turn led not only to more threats by Zhirinovskii, but also to more forceful 
Russian opposition at the official level. Kozyrev, for instance, declared that he would 
not allow any of Russia's near or distant neighbours to play on the Zhirinovskii factor. 
He believed that the Baltic states would cite Zhirinovskii's success in the elections to 
184 Nezavisimaia gazeta (26 November 1993). 
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demand immediate withdrawal of Russian Federation troops (although troops had 
already been withdrawn from Lithuania in August 1993), while Eastern European states 
would request rapid admission to NATO. He warned that the governments of the three 
Baltic republics should not demand concessions from Russia, but rather work with 
Russia to improve the situation of the Russian-speaking population and thereby deprive 
Zhirinovskii of a social base. If this did not happen, Moscow's position would become 
tougher. '87 All of this, of course, was calculated to appeal to the perceived public mood 
in Russia; the next Duma elections were, after all, only two years ahead. 
NATO action in Yugoslavia was now seen in the context of NATO expansion and 
NATO's search for a new role. Boris Poklad again provides an extreme statement of a 
common perception: 
the events in Yugoslavia have proven to be a life-saver for the US and its allies. 
NATO's interference in Yugoslavia's affairs under the UN flag was supposed to 
demonstrate the need for this alliance under new conditions and to justify its 
existence. The operations in Iraq and Somalia are evidence of the same intent. 188 
It was certainly true that the Clinton administration wanted NATO to take the 
leading role in any peace-keeping or intervention operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
desired to reduce the UN's control of operations. Surely an element in this was the aim 
to demonstrate NATO's relevance, although the Pravda view that this was the reason 
for Western intervention in Yugoslavia (let alone in Somalia and Iraq), and that NATO 
had fomented such conflicts for that purpose, is a paranoid delusion. Problems had been 
revealed with the operating provisions for NATO action under UN command in 
Bosnia; ' in particular, the dual-key mechanism for the authorisation of air cover to 
protect UNPROFOR troops under attack took too much time and consequently put 
troops in danger; 190 and the United States wanted more robust action and felt hindered 
by the UN Secretary-General's envoy Yasushi Akashi and by local UNPROFOR 
commanders. NATO also had the command and control structures and the capability to 
organise a peace-keeping mission after a settlement was signed, and it had the most 
advanced air forces for air strikes and provision of air cover while the war continued. 
Elinor Sloan has argued that, by 1994, Western states had begun to consider that 
their national interests were now being challenged by the continuing conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina: 
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In 1992 and much of 1993 the Bosnian crisis posed a threat primarily to core 
values. Such a threat was not sufficient to create the political will required to 
intervene on behalf of the Muslims, and as a result, the international community 
adopted the minimalist measures of delivering humanitarian aid and protecting safe 
havens. In the summer of 1993 the United States started talking about a threat to 
core interests - in the form of a threat to NATO credibility - but these interests 
were not enough to compel the United States to take the lead and convince the 
European powers of the merits of intervention, much less to prompt it to `go it 
alone' and abandon what was the powers' paramount interest: alliance and great 
power unity to contain the crisis. 
The collapse of the European Union peace effort in the fall of 1993 meant that 
by early 1994 the European powers had begun to consider Western credibility - 
and thus core interests - to be at stake in Bosnia. 
19' 
Hence, Clinton told the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994: `What is at stake is 
not only the safety of the people in Sarajevo and any possibility of bringing this terrible 
conflict to an end, but the credibility of the Alliance itself. 192 
If NATO credibility made action over Bosnia a perceived national interest for 
Western powers, then it made NATO inaction a perceived national interest for Russia. 
After all, if NATO was intent on expansion into Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and 
sought a peace-keeping role that might bring it into other parts of the former Soviet 
Union, then Russian diplomats wanted it to fail at the first attempt. Furthermore, from a 
neo-realist perspective, NATO action might result in Russia being pushed aside and its 
great power aspirations being thwarted, such that its presence in a region of traditional 
Russian interests would be threatened. Thus, the overall security environment and the 
specifics of the Yugoslav conflict combined to force Russian policy-makers to consider 
the Yugoslav conflict to have strategic significance, and thus reinforced the general 
move towards a neo-realist approach. 
By the end of 1993, then, Russia was set on a more assertive course. This was 
demonstrated by its actions during the Sarajevo crisis in February 1994. 
1 91 Sloan (1998), p. 109. 
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Chapter 6 
The Sarajevo crisis, February 1994: Russian neo- 
realism in action 
In the new year, 1994, there was another addition to the list of unofficial Russian 
ambassadors who had visited former Yugoslavia in order to declare their solidarity with 
their Serb or Montenegrin hosts: Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leader of the so-called Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), which had gained the most votes on the party lists 
in the Duma elections. Zhirinovskii became the first member of the new Duma to visit 
former Yugoslavia (the second was to be Gennadii Ziuganov, leader of the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation, the CPRF). He was invited by the Serb Democratic 
Party of Serbian Lands and the Serbian-Russian Friendship Society, and was greeted 
everywhere by local political leaders and astonishingly large crowds. 
In Podgorica (capital of Montenegro), Zhirinovskii held talks with the Secretary- 
General of the Democratic Party of Socialists and representatives of most of the 
Montenegrin opposition parties. Afterwards, a crowd of over 50,000 gathered in Ivan 
Milutinovic Square to hear him speak, giving frequent shouts of `Russia, Russia' and 
`Vladimir, Vladimir'. Addressing his audience mainly as `brother Serbs', Zhirinovskii 
delivered his analysis of the conflicts: 
The world wants to divide the Balkans into many little statelets, so that the West 
can Catholicise half the peninsular, and Islamise the other half. They are trying to 
destroy our Orthodox religion, and your only fault is that you are on the border 
with the West, and therefore the attacks on you are all the fiercer. 
He assured them, however, that they need have no fear: regarding sanctions, Russia 
would give them all the imports they needed, while for defence, Russia had not only 
state-of-the-art weapons, but also a secret sonar weapon which it would use for its own 
defence and for the defence of its `Orthodox brothers'. More pragmatically, he 
reminded his audience that there were still Russian soldiers in Germany: `If the 
Germans have lost their appetite for war, if necessary, we will transfer those 300,000 
soldiers from Germany to the Balkans and help the Serbs. " 
After visiting Serb fighters in Br&ko (Bosnia) and Erdut (Eastern Slavonia), 2 he 
made his final speech of the tour in Vukovar, to two thousand loyal fans. It was a 
' Tanjug (1 February 1994) and Serbian Radio (1 February 1994). 
2 Tanjug (2 February 1994). 
147 
thoroughly fitting climax, bringing together the diverse threads of his pronouncements 
during the visit: 
Who dares say it? Who dares claim falsely that Serbia is a small country? It's not 
small! It's not small! Three times it has waged war! Here is an old country that has 
an emperor in heaven! Serbia, our dear mother, gave birth to us all. Long live 
Serbia! 
We Slavs cannot continue to be the victims of the struggle to save Western 
civilisation from the barbarians. The time has come to repay us for all our 
sacrifices. There are 300 million of us altogether. 
I assure the governments of some Western countries that using force will not 
help them. If a single bomb falls on the towns of Bosnia, I warn you that this 
means a declaration of war on Russia, and we will punish them for it. My name, 
Vladimir, means "ruler of the world". Let us Slavs rule the world in the twentieth 
century. 3 
It would seem that, by this stage, he had absorbed key themes of contemporary Serbian 
mythology. Unfortunately, he did not show the same aptitude for recent military history 
when, in the same speech, he condemned the `barbarians who destroyed this marvellous 
city', thus putting his hosts in a rather awkward position. 4 
The content of much of this rhetoric was, of course, far from original, directly 
echoing the refrains of Russian `red-brown' forces that I quoted in chapter 4. We might 
interpret Zhirinovskii's philosophy when applied to the Yugoslav conflicts as a mixture 
of pan-Orthodoxy, pan-Slavism, and anti-Westernism. Or we might simply agree with 
the man whose removal he repeatedly demanded and whom he described as `America's 
extended hand', 5 the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, that Zhirinovskii was a 
`medical, not a political, problem', and enter his global competition to find a cure. 6 
Yet, the impact of the extreme nationalists was not as negligible as this comment 
might imply. It is true that their direct influence on policy was limited, but the election 
results and the fact that the Duma was dominated by nationalists and state centrists 
reinforced the move towards a neo-realist approach in official policy, including towards 
the Yugoslav crisis. Yeltsin did not want to be vulnerable to attacks on the 
administration's foreign policy and aimed to avoid further confrontation with 
parliament. Increasingly, government officials used the threat posed by the extreme 
3 Frazer and Lancelle (1994), p. 69. 
4 Iusin (5 February 1994). 
Tanjug (1 February 1994). 
6 Sestanovich (11 April 1994), p. 25. 
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opposition forces to seek acceptance in the West of policies that they believed to be in 
Russia's interests or which they believed necessary to protect their own political 
positions. For example, they warned that NATO expansion would strengthen the hand 
of the red-brown alliance; and they used a similar argument to avert more forceful 
NATO action in former Yugoslavia. Consequently, a paradoxical situation arose 
whereby the government insisted on a policy supported by the opposition in order 
ostensibly to prevent the opposition from implementing its policies. 
The new Russian Duma 
There was a high degree of continuity with the situation in the Supreme Soviet. 
Although the chairmanship of one committee, the Committee on Geopolitical Issues, 
was given to an LDPR member, Viktor Ustinov, the very creation of this committee was 
said to be a kind of `compensation' to the LDPR for the fact that the key foreign policy 
committee, the Committee for International Affairs, was to be chaired by Vladimir 
Lukin. 7 Lukin had previously been the Russian Ambassador to Washington, and his 
strained relations with Kozyrev were `no secret'. " His approach was close to that of his 
predecessor, Evgenii Ambartsumov (Ambartsumov was a member of the Iabloko 
faction of which Lukin was a leader), and reflected a neo-realist/state centric outlook. 
For example, after the first Duma debate on the Yugoslav conflicts, he was reported as 
telling journalists that Russia's interests were served by the strongest possible Serbia 
and Montenegro and, at the same time, a peaceful solution of the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia; while characterising the MFA's course as `correct' on the whole, he 
claimed that it had made a serious mistake in supporting sanctions against the FRY. He 
also suggested that the West's position on the former Yugoslavia was not in keeping 
with Russia's interests in the Balkan region in all respects, and opposed any air strikes 
or forceful methods of resolving the conflicts. 9 
As chairman of the International Affairs Committee, Lukin, like Ambartsumov in 
the Supreme Soviet, had control of the agenda for Duma discussions of foreign policy 
issues. This was shown by the outcome of the first debate on former Yugoslavia in the 
Duma, which was the first discussion of any foreign policy question (on 21 January 
1994). The Duma resolution, based on the Committee's draft, said that the Duma was 
greatly concerned about NATO discussions of possible air strikes: 
7Karpov (19 January 1994). 
8 lusin (26 January 1994). 
9 Sidorov (25 January 1994). 
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The State Duma considers that forceful measures not only will not lead to the end 
of the war in this region but, on the contrary, will intensify the conflict and bring 
further suffering and agony to the local people. 1° 
An amendment proposed by the Agrarian faction was also adopted, calling on the 
Russian Federation's permanent representative on the UNSC to propose an initiative in 
the UNSC to lift the sanctions imposed on the FRY. The final statement was adopted by 
a vote of 280 for, 2 against, and 8 abstentions. 
Hence, the Duma adopted a policy towards the conflicts that was very close to the 
Supreme Soviet's policy before it was forcibly dissolved in October 1993. The 
administration demonstrated its conciliatory approach towards the Duma by accepting 
the proposals and emphasising that they matched the government's own policy. For 
example, at the Duma hearings, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed 
satisfaction with the Committee's draft, saying that it had `something in common' with 
the official position that he himself had outlined, as did the amendment concerning 
sanctions. " And Vitalii Churkin said that there were `no radical contradictions' between 
what the MFA was doing and what was said in the Duma's declaration'. 12 This was not 
merely conciliatory politics; it was an illustration of the consensus that had developed in 
foreign policy between the government and the Duma. 
The use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The Russian position 
The Duma debate had been called because of the renewed threat of NATO air strikes 
(see below), and Lavrov devoted most of his speech to this issue. Russia, he stated, had 
never supported forceful measures to resolve the conflicts, even if one side disagreed 
with the course of peace negotiations or did not sign an agreement relating to the 
division of the territory: `This is a purely negotiating process, it has no relation to those 
conditions when the UNSC permits the use of coercive measures, ' he stated. 13 Existing 
UNSC resolutions possessed very strict and limited criteria for the justification of the 
use of force, as well as defining the process by which a decision could be reached. 
According to Lavrov, force could be used only in three instances: in the event of an 
attack on a convoy delivering humanitarian aid, violation of the no-fly zone, or `direct 
obstruction of the UN peace-keeping forces in carrying out their mandate' for the 
10 Russian Federation State Duma (21 January 1994a). 
" Russian Federation State Duma (21 January 1994b), p. 660. 
12 Russian Federation MFA (25 January 1994), p. 40. 
13 Russian Federation State Duma (21 January 1994b), pp. 653-4. 
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maintenance of the safe areas. 14 Lavrov emphasised the fact that these were in no way 
anti-Serb resolutions: whichever side carried out any of these three actions would be 
considered a violator. A special procedure was required for force then to be used: 
In all the enumerated decisions the question is only about a threat of the use of 
force against a violator. Its actual use requires a special additional procedure - 
consultations between the secretary general and the members of the Security 
Council. Our position in the course of such consultations, if they begin, will be 
negative. 's 
This would seem to indicate an a priori rejection of the use of air strikes in any 
circumstances. 
These comments were made specifically in relation to the decision by NATO at its 
January 1994 summit to re-affirm its August 1993 declaration. Lavrov claimed that 
certain NATO countries had made attempts to establish a `simplified interpretation' of 
the strict criteria for the use of force that he had outlined, as well as a simplified 
interpretation of the authorisation procedure. 16 Nevertheless, in all cases, according to 
Lavrov, Russian representatives had resisted such attempts, insisting on observing the 
UNSC decisions. This had occurred, for instance, in autumn 1993, and to a large degree 
thanks to this position, the question of air strikes had been removed from the agenda. " 
Now, the issue had arisen again, in a blatantly anti-Serb context and hence departed 
from the UNSC decisions, which envisaged measures to exert influence on all sides in 
the conflict. "' Furthermore, Russia had been pushed aside in the decision-making 
process: 
It hasn't helped matters, of course, that Russia was not even informed of the 
preparation of the [NATO] declaration. Russia is an active participant in the 
settlement process of the Yugoslav crisis, a permanent member of the Security 
Council of the UN; it is impossible to use any kind of force in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina without consultation with it. 19 
His earlier comments, however, show that it was impossible to use force even with 
consultation with Russia. 
14 Ibid., p. 654. 
15 Ibid.. 
16 Ibid., p. 655. 
" Ibid. 
18 Ibid., pp. 655-6. 
19 Ibid., p. 656. 
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It appears, in fact, that there was some disagreement within the Russian 
government concerning the use of force in former Yugoslavia. Vitalii Churkin, at a 
briefing on 2 January 1994, stated that Russia had voted for UNSC resolutions that 
envisaged conditions for the use of force - including air strikes - in the event of attacks 
on UN peace-keepers, deliberate obstruction of humanitarian operations, or attacks on 
safe areas. The final point is significantly different from Lavrov's formulation, since 
Lavrov only includes `safe areas' in the context of hindering the UN peace-keepers. 
Churkin appeared therefore more willing to accept the implications of UNSC 
resolutions for which Russia had voted. Like Lavrov, he emphasised that the procedure 
for authorisation of strikes must be followed, and pointed out that the resolutions 
referred to all sides. In this context, he gave the example of Mostar where, he said, 
Croat forces had for the previous ten days been blocking one of the main routes for the 
supply of aid to Sarajevo: 
There may occur other, more dramatic turns of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It was for this that the resolution was adopted. That is why we ought, in my 
opinion, to use the potential, placed in the resolution, in order not to allow those 
negative and outrageous occurrences, the possibility of which the resolution 
speaks. 20 
Nevertheless, with the increased likelihood of imminent NATO air strikes in 
February 1994, Lavrov's formulation became the dominant interpretation in Moscow. 
Kozyrev admitted that `hypothetically the possibility of air strikes exists' in case of an 
attack on UN peace-keepers, but stated that `punishment strikes' were `absolutely 
inadmissible'. 21 The Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, also made it clear that 
Russia was categorically opposed to Western air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions. 22 
The consensus was reinforced when the Defence Minister Pavel Grachev stated on 8 
February that `the use of NATO countries' combat aviation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
capable of provoking a new escalation of combat actions and is permissible only in the 
event of a direct attack by Bosnian armed formations on the peace-keeping forces'. 23 
Hence, the Russian position was defined: air strikes could be used only to protect 
UN peace-keepers in the event of an attack and they must be authorised by the UN 
Secretary-General after consultation with the permanent members of the Security 
20 Russian Federation MFA (25 January 1994), p. 43. 
21 ITAR-TASS (1 February 1994). 
22 lusin (3 February 1994). Iusin reports that an MFA diplomat explained that Chernomyrdin apparently 
had in mind `punitive strikes', and so did not rule out air strikes in the event of attacks on UN forces. 
23 Radio Moscow International (8 February 1994). 
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Council. Close air support (to defend UN peace-keepers), as opposed to strategic air 
strikes (to enforce a local or general peace), were considered legitimate in theory, 
although initial authorisation must come from the UN Secretary-General after 
consultations. In practice, this would compromise the efficacy of air support in 
protecting UN troops, since the procedure was so lengthy as to render any action either 
inappropriate in changed circumstances, or simply too late. In outlining this procedure, 
Kozyrev seemed unaware of its military inappropriateness: 
In this case [a direct attack on UN peace-keeping forces], the UN military 
command in Bosnia should submit a proposal on military support, including air 
support, to the UN secretary-general, who is to consult permanent Security Council 
members. Then we shall adopt a decision. In Russia, the decision will be adopted 
by the president. 24 
The protection of peace-keepers in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, etc., thus depended on 
Boutros-Ghali being able to contact Yeltsin, and the latter being conscious, sober, and in 
a magnanimous mood. 
Existing UNSC resolutions did authorise the use of strategic air strikes; not, as 
Russian diplomats correctly pointed out, for the imposition of a peace deal, but for the 
protection of the `safe areas' and delivery of humanitarian aid. The Russian position as 
now formulated was thus not consistent with UNSC resolutions for which they 
themselves had voted, a point made by Ambartsumov in the Duma debate: `I fear that 
the Russian side has, to a certain degree, already fallen into the trap of previous [UNSC] 
decisions'. 25 One only has to compare the attitude of Russian diplomats at the start of 
1994 with the statement of the Russian representative on the UN Security Council, Iulii 
Vorontsov, immediately after sponsoring and voting for Resolution 836 on 4 June 1993: 
The Russian delegation is firmly convinced that the implementation of this 
resolution will be an important practical step by the world community genuinely to 
curb the violence and to stop the shooting on the long-suffering land of the 
Bosnians. Henceforth, any attempted military attacks, shooting and shelling of safe 
areas, any armed incursions into those areas, and any hindrance to the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance will be stopped by using all necessary measures, including 
the use of armed force. This will be an important factor for stabilising the situation 
in these areas and for lessening the suffering of the civilian population. 26 
24 ITAR-TASS (7 February 1994). 
25 Russian Federation State Duma (21 January 1994b), p. 660. 
26 United Nations Security Council (4 June 1993), p. 46. 
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The change was soon demonstrated by Russia's reaction to the threat of NATO air 
strikes in response to just such a `negative and outrageous occurrence', the possibility of 
which Churkin had warned. 
NATO's position 
While the Russian position in relation to air strikes was becoming clearer, so too was 
that of NATO. The NATO summit held in Brussels from 10-11 January 1994 was 
concerned primarily with the question of NATO's post-Cold War role and its relations 
with the former Warsaw Pact states. The Russian elections had caused alarm in 
Central/Eastern Europe, leading to calls for membership of NATO. In the Russian 
government's view, NATO expansion would play into the hands of nationalists in 
Russia since it would spark an anti-Western reaction. 27 This argument appeared to 
influence the Clinton administration; 28 appeals from Eastern Europe were resisted, and 
the NATO members decided instead to offer the Partnership for Peace programme as a 
way of developing relations with those states without necessarily having to accept them 
as members, although they did not rule this out. 
After its disaster in Somalia, the US was unwilling to commit itself to such peace 
enforcement enterprises elsewhere, and resisted French calls to put the war in Bosnia at 
the top of the agenda at the NATO summit. 29 European states were more intent on 
dealing with the issue, particularly after the collapse of the Geneva negotiations in 
December 1993. Despite US reluctance, they succeeded in including in the NATO 
communique a re-affirmation of their readiness to carry out air strikes `in order to 
prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina'; they also urged the UNPROFOR authorities to `draw up urgently 
plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica 
can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian 
relief purposes'. 30 French policy makers in particular believed that the credibility of the 
United Nations and NATO were at stake; the French President Jacques Chirac argued 
that `Western democracies are being ridiculed' and that the war in Bosnia was slowly 
becoming `not just a war of conscience but a war of self-interest too'. 31 
27 Zhdannikov (6 January 1994); Mlechin (12 January 1994). 
28 Ibid.. 
29 Sloan (1998), p. 56. 
30 Leurdijk (1996), p. 40. The Serbs were obstructing the replacement of Canadian `blue helmets' in 
Srebrenica by Dutch troops. 
31 Sloan (1998), pp. 56-7. 
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Kozyrev, in a meeting with Owen and Stoltenberg, expressed the necessity for a 
political resolution of the problems in Srebrenica and Tuzla, and the danger of hasty 
resort even to limited force. 32 And Lavrov, while admitting that the NATO communique 
reiterating the August declaration was in line with UNSC resolutions, observed that the 
NATO countries `unambiguously gave to their own decision an anti-Serb context', 
which was at odds with the UNSC decisions. 33 
It was clear that NATO was moving towards more vigorous action if a crisis 
situation developed, while Russia was becoming more firmly opposed to any action. 
Russian diplomats attempted to find a way out of this situation by un-blocking the 
stalled negotiation process. 
The negotiating framework 
After the Vance-Owen plan was abandoned, negotiations were based on the division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into three loosely linked, ethnically based entities. The first plan 
was the Union of Three Republics, under which the Bosnian Serbs would have 
controlled 52.5 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims 30 per 
cent, and the Croats 17.5 per cent (see map 6). 
32 Russian Federation MFA (1 February 1994). 
33 Russian Federation State Duma (21 January 1994b), p. 655. 
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Map 6 Union of Three Republics proposal, September 1993 
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The three parts would be joined in a loose union. However, since much of the Serb 
entity adjoined Serbia, and the Croat territory adjoined Croatia, there was a danger of 
the creation of a `Greater Serbia' and a `Greater Croatia', while the Muslim mini-state 
would be composed of disconnected areas linked by vulnerable corridors. 34 For this 
reason, and because it believed that the thirty per cent of territory allocated to it was 
insufficient, the Bosnian government rejected the plan. 
A modified version then became the basis for a potential agreement, called the 
European Union Action Plan. This time, the division would be: Serbs 49 per cent, 
Muslims 33.5 per cent, Croats 17.5 per cent. The plan was presented to the parties at 
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Geneva in November 1993, but again no agreement was reached. By now, the Muslims 
were gaining territory in Central Bosnia from the Croats, while the Serbs still held 
almost seventy per cent of the country and were unlikely to yield it voluntarily. 
Although a constitutional framework for Bosnia was beginning to emerge, the 
irresolvable disputes were over the percentage of land that each entity would possess 
and the actual areas that they would be allocated. As Churkin stated in announcing a 
Russian initiative to try to break the deadlock, negotiations in Geneva were `going 
round in circles'. 35 For this reason, Russia proposed a meeting of the UNSC with 
representatives of the three sides in Bosnia and of the governments of the FRY and of 
Croatia. It would be at foreign minister level, marking a strong international impulse 
without which the next round of negotiations would achieve no more than the previous 
round, but would take place in Geneva to show that it was a continuation of the existing 
negotiations. Negotiations would be on the basis of the EU plan. Secondly, the UN 
Secretary-General should prepare a report on all aspects of the situation in Bosnia, 
which would provide objective information in order to remove the obstacles to a 
peaceful settlement. Thirdly, the UNSC should prepare a resolution before the foreign 
ministers' session, containing demands for strict observation of a cease-fire, the 
guarantee of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the strengthening of the `safe 
areas'. 36 
This last element of the initiative gained heightened significance with subsequent 
events. The main problems with the `safe areas' were that sieges by the Serb side were 
continuing, indiscriminate shelling was taking place, while government forces were 
using the areas to launch attacks. It was the last point that Churkin chose to highlight, 
arguing that the `safe areas' had been established to protect the peaceful population but, 
while they continued to perform this role, they were turning into `areas for the 
preparation of new military actions'. The key problem, he argued, was that the 
organisations in charge of the areas had failed to envisage their demilitarisation; Russia 
therefore proposed strengthening the areas by carrying out full demilitarisation. 37 
According to Churkin, the Russian position was `objective', directed at achieving 
an immediate settlement in order to prevent the conflict from spreading and its `shadow 
falling far from the Balkans region ... 
into the Middle East and perhaps beyond'. 38 His 
35 Russian Federation MFA (25 January 1994), p. 40. 
361bid., p. 37-38. 
37 Ibid., p. 38. 
38 Ibid.. 
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interpretation of events was, however, intriguingly different from that prevailing in the 
West. Rejecting accusations of being anti-Muslim, he stated: 
We are convinced that those Muslim politicians who gamble on a victorious 
resolution of the war, declaring that they are ready to fight for ten years, more if 
necessary, are inciting their own people to suicide. At this very time, there is an 
agreement on the negotiation table, which is far from ideal, but which gives to all 
the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Muslims, the possibility for 
survival and for the settlement of numerous issues that, after all that has happened, 
will for a long time torment Bosnia and Herzegovina and its peoples. 39 
Describing how the EU had formulated definite criteria for a settlement, including that 
the Serbs guarantee 33.3 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the 
Muslims, he continued: 
I will say directly, that, when these conditions were formulated, I considered them 
to be unrealistic. The negotiations were very difficult, the co-chairmen from the 
beginning set themselves the target of thirty per cent. The Muslims at present 
control less than fifteen per cent. Overall, what stands out is that this political 
settlement is unprecedented. Let me put it frankly: the Muslim side were not able 
to achieve military success; nonetheless, as a result of negotiations, they more than 
doubled the territory which they will control. This is an unprecedented success of 
diplomacy and political negotiations. 40 
Perhaps such a result of political negotiations would have been unprecedented. But 
this outcome would partly have been the result of the Russian insistence that there 
should only be political mediation without any military coercion or termination of the 
arms embargo. Given this demand, it was `unrealistic' to expect more, and it was 
`realistic' to expect the Serbs not to give up a significant area of land. Perhaps Churkin 
genuinely believed that ending the war was the top priority and that justice had no place 
in the scheme. Certainly, many Russian commentators shared Churkin's view that the 
Bosnian Muslims were responsible for blocking a settlement and took the lack of a 
Western response - in contrast to its strengthening of sanctions against the Bosnian 
Serbs when they failed to sign the Vance-Owen plan - as evidence of the West's anti- 
Serb, pro-Muslim bias. 4' But such opinions, by failing to consider justice and morality, 
39 Ibid., p. 38. 
40 Ibid., p. 42. 
41 See, for instance, Arbatova (1995), p. 55; and Gus'kova (1998a), pp. 32-3. 
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either conceal an underlying sympathy with the Bosnian Serb cause behind a facade of 
`impartiality', or demonstrate a callous, amoral realism. 
In contrast to Russia, NATO used the Sarajevo market-place atrocity to pursue 
`diplomacy backed by a willingness to use force'. 42 
The Sarajevo crisis 
On 5 February 1994, a mortar shell was fired into the Markale market-place in Sarajevo, 
killing 68 people and wounding a further 200. This was clearly an event that in the 
existing climate would push NATO into action. On 6 February, Boutros-Ghali, 
apparently without consulting the permanent members of the Security Council, wrote to 
the NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, asking the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) to authorise its military command to launch air strikes on request from the UN. 43 
The Russian MFA expressed outrage at the market-place massacre, stating that 
`those guilty of this atrocity, whoever they are, must be severely punished', and urging 
that a `swift and objective investigation' be carried out to determine the guilty party. 44 
Nevertheless, Kozyrev warned against turning the incident into a repeat of Sarajevo in 
1914, and urged the world community to be guided by a `cold, political mind, and not 
by emotions'. 45 Russian diplomats again questioned the decision-making process for the 
use of force. As the NAC met to discuss its response to the massacre and Boutros- 
Ghali's request, one senior Russian diplomat stated: `We do not accept Boutros-Ghali's 
arguments, and we do not believe that this case falls under previous Security Council 
resolutions. Consultations with the members of the Security Council are necessary. ' At 
the very least, the international community should take no steps until responsibility for 
the massacre had been proven. 4' 
Initial UNPROFOR investigations of the incident reached contradictory 
conclusions. 47 The final investigation by a team of UNPROFOR artillery specialists, 
including a Russian lieutenant colonel, concluded that the shell could have come from 
anywhere in a cone of 2.5 square kilometres north to north-east of the market-place 
overlapping each side of the confrontation line by 2,000 metres. Although this 
conclusion might have seemed unsatisfactory, it was politically welcome because it 
enabled action to be taken without appearing to be partial. 48 As has often been pointed 
42 US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, quoted in Sloan (1998), p. 57. 
43 Watson (1994), p. 1. 
44 ITAR-TASS (6 February 1994). 
45 ITAR-TASS (7 February 1994). 
46 Iusin (8 February 1994). 
47 For a detailed account, see Binder (1994-95). 
48 For example, Binder suggests that UNPROFOR commanders were `greatly relieved'; ibid., p. 77. 
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out, shelling incidents occurred daily, perpetrated by both sides (although 
predominantly by Serb forces besieging the city). 49 
In Russia, however, it was assumed that NATO air strikes would be directed only 
against the Serb side. After the NAC had issued a statement to the warring sides, 
Krasnaia zvezda, for instance, argued that the `proposal to demand that the Bosnian 
Serbs withdraw their artillery and tanks from Sarajevo under the threat of air strikes 
suffers from one-sidedness'. 50 Certainly, NATO was unwilling to launch air strikes 
against government forces' positions. But it deliberately directed the declaration 
concerning demilitarisation of Sarajevo to both sides. 51 The declaration stated that the 
North Atlantic Council: 
(6) condemns the continuing of the siege of Sarajevo, and with a view to ending it 
calls for the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control 
within ten days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, 
multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian 
Serb forces located in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, 
and excluding an area within two kilometres of the centre of Pale. 
(7) calls upon the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, within the same period, to 
place the heavy weapons in its possession within the Sarajevo exclusion zone 
described above under UNPROFOR control, and to refrain from attacks 
launched from within the current confrontation lines in the city. 
(10) decides that, ten days from 2400 GMT February 10,1994, heavy weapons of 
any of the parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled 
by UNPROFOR, will, along with their direct and essential military support 
facilities, be subject to NATO air strikes which will be conducted in close co- 
ordination with the UN Secretary General and will be consistent with the North 
Atlantic Council's decisions of 2nd and 9th August, 1993; 
(11) accepts, effective today, the request of the UN Secretary General of 6th 
February and accordingly authorises the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces 
Southern Europe to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, 
against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo (including any 
49 See, for example, comments by the Czech representative to the UNSC, quoted in Leurdijk (1996), p. 
41; also, comments by David Owen in `A Peace Without Honour' (30 October 1995). 
so Sidorov (10 February 1994). 
51 Nor did they call it an `ultimatum', although this was the first time that the demand for withdrawal of 
weaponry had been tied to a specific deadline, and the first time that NATO had committed itself to using 
force according to a clearly defined set of criteria; Watson (1994), p. 3. 
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outside the exclusion zone) which are determined by UNPROFOR to be 
responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city. 52 
Russian diplomats broadly supported the aims of the declaration; after all, they had 
been calling for full demilitarisation of the `safe areas' since they had been established, 
and now they made a point of regretting the fact that the UNSC had failed to react to 
Russia's initiative two weeks previously to `strengthen' (demilitarise) the `safe areas', 
as this might have prevented the market-place massacre. Their criticism concentrated 
instead on means used to achieve the aims, and also the process by which a decision had 
been reached. 53 One of the primary objections was the fact that Russia had been side- 
lined in taking the decision. For example, Yeltsin told the visiting British Prime 
Minister, John Major, on 15 February: `We will not allow this problem to be resolved 
without Russia's participation. We will work towards having this conflict resolved at 
the negotiating table. '54 
According to Russian diplomats, it was the United Nations - in particular, the 
Security Council - that should deal with these issues, not NATO. This was expressed 
plainly by Churkin during a one-day visit to Sarajevo on 15 February, when he was 
asked of his views on possible air strikes: 
regardless of what they are telling us, I believe that NATO's decision goes beyond 
what UN Security Council resolutions stipulate. We should have taken it to the UN 
Security Council and then we would have had total unanimity in the international 
community's stance. This was feasible, since basically we are talking about the 
same views. We would have the UN Security Council's authority behind us. I 
believe that this method would have been far better. " 
This assertion that there would be unanimity is misleading, however. The views 
were not the same, at least concerning the means required to achieve the ends. Russia 
rejected any declaration of an `ultimatum' backed by the threat of force. For example, 
Churkin stated that NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions would be an extreme 
measure, permissible only in an emergency situation. 56 A similar position was adopted 
by Kozyrev. Calling for co-operation rather than competition in attempting to resolve 
the Sarajevo siege, he again stated that air strikes could be used for the defence of UN 
52 Reproduced on Owen (1995a). 
53 See, for example, Russian Federation MFA (10 February 1994). 
54 Kononenko (16 February 1994). 
35 Croatian TV (15 February 1994); see also comments by Kozyrev, ITAR-TASS (12 February 1994). 
56 ITAR-TASS (16 February 1994). 
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forces, but warned that the idea of air strikes `distracts world attention from the search 
for a political settlement in Bosnia'. As Vorontsov told the Security Council: S' 
In the present circumstances, we believe that it is extremely important to 
concentrate our efforts on preventing further bloodshed, to refrain from any action 
that might fan the flames of war, and, at last, make the breakthrough to a settlement 
to the conflict, guided first and foremost by the logic of peaces: 
The Russian view was that the threat of force undermined the peace process for 
Sarajevo and for Bosnia as a whole; as a result of the tendency of NATO countries to 
interpret the NAC declaration as an ultimatum to the Serbs, the Bosnian government 
59 side would be encouraged to continue fighting. 
Domestic Russian opinion 
According to Vladimir Mikheev in Izvestiia, opinion in Moscow was unanimous in its 
opposition to air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, `perhaps for the first time in the 
twenty-two months of civil war in the former Yugoslav federation'. 60 Grachev warned 
that `if the bomb strikes are still carried out, no good will come of it'. 61 Egor Gaidar 
warned against the international community `showing its muscles', while the Iabloko 
faction argued that NATO intended to get involved in the conflict `beyond the bounds 
of its responsibility', and that this `could lead to the disruption of the military-political 
equilibrium in Europe' and was `contrary to Russia's national and state interests'. 62 This 
reflected Lukin's neo-realist approach. Lukin, in fact, went so far as to compare the 
market-place mortar attack to the Reichstag fire, arguing that `it was as though it was 
done to order immediately prior to the foreign ministers' conference'. He also accused 
NATO and Western countries of `looking for any pretext, which is unfortunately being 
whipped up by some of the Muslim leaders, to intervene at any price and foist their own 
understanding and their own solution on this matter'. If bombing did go ahead, he 
warned, `it could lead to very bad consequences in terms of Russia's relations, our trust 
in the countries of the West. '63 
57 ITAR-TASS (12 February 1994). 
58 United Nations Security Council (14 February 1994), p. 42. 
'9 See, for example, comments by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatolii Adamishin, in 
Abarinov (11 February 1994). 
60 Mikheev (11 February 1994). 
61 ITAR-TASS (14 February 1994). 
621bid. 
63 Ostankino TV (13 February 1994). 
162 
The reaction of the ultra-nationalists was equally predictable. Zhirinovskii warned 
in the Duma that World War Ill would begin if NATO air strikes occurred. 64 Other 
deputies from the LDPR and the CPRF sought a guarantee from Lavrov (who was again 
representing the government in questions from the Duma) that Russia would insist on a 
further UNSC meeting and veto air strikes if necessary. 65 
Concern was not restricted to political circles; for instance, Patriarch Aleksei II 
issued a statement on 17 February, saying that the Russian Orthodox church had long 
been `deeply troubled' by the conflict in Bosnia, and continuing: 
The Patriarch urges the world community to abandon plans for armed intervention 
in the conflict, to renounce unilateral military support or a unilateral economic 
blockade of any of the parties involved, to prevent such a dangerous development 
of events, and to reject the very thought of bombing. It is essential to search 
persistently for a peaceful solution, and only a peaceful solution, to the problem. " 
Perhaps the only voices of dissent were from a few commentators in the press (in 
particular, in Izvestiia). Maksim lusin, for instance, wrote on 12 February that `having 
gone rather far in its support for the Serbs, the Kremlin is now forced to accomplish a 
very difficult task: to prevent a rift with the West and save face at the same time'. He 
also pointed out that Russia was in isolation in its opposition to air strikes, with Greece 
the only European state showing solidarity with its position. 67 This was shown when the 
UNSC was convened on 14 February at the request of a group of Islamic countries and 
Russia (with contrary objectives); although no resolution was adopted - because of a 
likely Russian veto - it was expected that thirteen of the fifteen Security Council 
members would support the NATO decision, while China would abstain, leaving Russia 
isolated in its opposition. 68 
Defusion of the crisis 
According to a report by Pavel Fel'gengauer, defence correspondent of Segodnia, on 14 
February 1994 UNPROFOR command ordered the Russian battalion in Sector East 
(Croatia) to send 400 troops to Bosnia; this caused a `storm of indignation' in the MFA 
and the Defence Ministry, and the commander of RUSSBAT received a categorical 
64 Russian Federation State Duma (16 February 1994), p. 436. 
65 Ibid., pp. 436-9. 
66 Izvestiia (18 February 1994). 
67 lusin (12 February 1994). 
68 Abarinov (15 February 1994). 
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directive not to implement any orders from the UN command to re-deploy his forces. 69 
Churkin remarked pointedly on 16 February that as long as the West took decisions on 
Bosnia without Russian participation, there could be absolutely no question of using the 
Russian army on the territory of the conflict. 70 The following day, Churkin delivered 
Milosevic and Karadzic a proposal by Yeltsin which they accepted. 7' Thus, Karadzic 
gave assurances that the Bosnian Serbs would withdraw their heavy weapons to 
positions twenty kilometres from Sarajevo within the time limit set in the NAC 
statement, while 400 Russian peace-keepers would be transferred to Sarajevo from 
Sector East. 72 Despite some concern over interpretation of the NATO demand that 
weapons be put under UN `control' if not withdrawn, 73 this agreement allowed the crisis 
to be resolved without resort to air strikes. The daily shelling of Sarajevo ceased. 
69 Fel'gengauer (16 February 1994). Russia's Radio also reported the `order', but stated that that it was 
not a `categorical order', rather, an inquiry about the possibility; Russia's Radio (16 February 1994). 
70 Ibid.. 
ITAR-TASS (17 February 1994). 
72 Sidorov (19 February 1994). Yeltsin asked and received permission from the UN Secretary-General 
and the UNPROFOR commander for this re-deployment; ITAR-TASS (18 February 1994). 
73 Leurdijk (1996), pp. 43-44. 






Map 7 Sarajevo heavy weapons exdusion zone 
%ýý Mont Igman Demilitarized Zone 
Urban areas 
Source: EFwall-UebelkrtandRaevsky 
am-we Front lines (1996), p. 174 
As the crisis abated, conflicting interpretations of its resolution were expressed in 
Western capitals and in Moscow. Western leaders recognised the positive role played by 
Russia in securing the agreement of the Bosnian Serbs; nevertheless, they argued that it 
was the NATO threat to use force that had been decisive. For instance, the NATO 
Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, referred to Russia's role, but also stated: `We have 
shown that diplomacy can succeed where it is backed by credible actions'. 74 Similarly, 
on 18 February, the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, prefaced remarks after 
74 Ibid., pp. 44-5. 
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meeting Kozyrev in Athens with the statement that there could be no peace in Bosnia 
without Russia, and that it was imperative that Russia be included in peace talks for 
Bosnia, but warned against over-enthusiasm before the demands were fully met: `The 
NATO ultimatum remains in force. It has evidently achieved its purpose. '75 And 
President Clinton stressed that the desired result had been achieved thanks to NATO's 
decisiveness. 76 
Russian diplomats and commentators whole-heartedly agreed that Russia was 
central to any peace agreement in Bosnia, but diverged from their Western counterparts 
in their interpretations of what had been the decisive factor in achieving a break-through 
in Sarajevo. Many analysts believed that Russia had rescued NATO from a situation 
that it had entered without considering the consequences. For example, Mikhail Karpov 
reported in Nezavisimaia gazeta that he had learned from an interview with a `very-high 
ranking diplomat' that 
immediately after the NATO Council adopted the ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, 
intensive unofficial exchanges of opinion began with leading diplomats from the 
organisation's member-countries, exchanges in which the refrain was the idea that 
Russia, even though deprived of the possibility to influence the adoption of the 
NATO decision, nevertheless should assume the entire burden of responsibility for 
preventing its implementation. After adopting the ultimatum on a wave of emotions 
rather than through precise calculation, and soon realising the dangers of its 
possible consequences, the NATO countries themselves began trying to persuade 
Russia to do everything it could to prevent things from reaching the point of actual 
real bombing strikes. " 
This would seem to be wishful-thinking, symptomatic of the degree to which 
perceptions of Russia's importance had grown to incredible levels as a result of the 
crisis. 
Sergei Sidorov claimed that `no matter what is said in the West about NATO's 
ultimatum scaring the Serbs stiff, trust played the decisive role in getting the Serbs to 
fulfil its terms - the trust that they have in Russia and its servicemen'. 
78 Comments by 
officials suggest that the trust was mutual; Russia gained agreement by respecting and 
trusting the Serbs. Churkin explained the success of the Russian proposal in contrast to 
the NATO `ultimatum' as follows: 
15 DPA News Agency (18 February 1994). 
76 Nadein (23 February 1994). 
" Karpov (19 February 1994). 
78 Sidorov (19 February 1994). 
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Firstly, it mentioned a request from Russia. That ... phrase, 
`a request from 
Russia', had a powerful psychological effect... 
Secondly, the letter was signed by the Russian president. 
And, thirdly, it is extremely significant ... that that request was 
backed by the 
undertaking by Russia, to deploy its own contingent, within the framework of the 
UN's peace-keeping operation, in Sarajevo. 79 
This opinion was echoed by Yeltsin, who noted that, `unlike the NATO bloc, which 
gave the Serbs an ultimatum, Russia had asked the Serbs to withdraw their heavy 
weapons ... this was 
in psychological terms a subtly calculated move that worked'. 8° 
These contrasting interpretations naturally led to divergent views of the lessons for 
the future. While Western leaders believed that the threat of force might be used to 
achieve agreement in other areas, Russian diplomats drew different conclusions. For 
instance, asked at a briefing on 22 February whether such a `prescription' could be used 
elsewhere, Karasin replied: 
In my opinion, the prescription that has been worked out by the international 
community consists of avoiding an approach based on force, the setting of any kind 
of conditions, intimidating by force... I think the time has passed when forceful 
decisions led to any positive long-term plan. Now there is another era. 81 
Similarly, on 25 February the President's press secretary issued a statement sharply 
critical of NATO countries for, among other reasons, suggesting that `a NATO 
ultimatum must be used to "impose order" at other points of the conflict' and for 
attempting to obscure Russia's role `in initiating a diplomatic resolution of the conflict': 
one cannot help but be alarmed by the price in human lives, the degree of risk, that 
the NATO command is prepared to accept in order to maintain its status... 
Russia rejects the language of military ultimata and welcomes the language of 
diplomacy... The Russian President is convinced that the arguments of peace in 
Europe are more compelling than the arguments of war, and he invites the leaders 
of Europe and the US to end the Bosnian conflict at the negotiating table. 92 
After meeting representatives of Western foreign ministries on 23 February, 
Churkin claimed that there was full understanding on the need for a political settlement: 
everyone now understood that `the Sarajevo experience' could not `fully be transplanted 
'9 St. Petersburg Channel 5 TV (20 February 1994). 
80 ITAR-TASS (23 February 1994a). 
81 Russian Federation MFA (22 February 1994). 
82 Pravda (25 February 1994). 
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to other regions and hot spots in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. 83 This appeared to reflect the 
hope of Russian diplomats that, after the Sarajevo crisis, a higher level of co-operation 
between the great powers would prevent actions from occurring that Russia opposed. 
But would the Russian initiative have worked without the coercive threat of air 
strikes? In their detailed analysis of the establishment of the heavy weapons exclusion 
zone of Sarajevo, Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky highlight the 
importance of the local cease-fire agreement of 9 February. 84 The ICFY negotiators had 
been working on a `Sarajevo First' initiative for some months, proposing to put 
Sarajevo under UN administration for two years and to establish complete 
demilitarisation. 85 This was envisaged in the context of an overall settlement, but it was 
also hoped that an early agreement over Sarajevo might encourage progress towards 
peace elsewhere in Bosnia. A few hours before the NAC decision of 9 February, 
Lieutenant General Rose, Yasushi Akashi, and UNPROFOR's Sector Commander for 
Sarajevo, Lt. General Soubieru, had brokered an oral agreement for a complete cease- 
fire to commence on 10 February, the withdrawal of all weapons and artillery, the 
positioning of UNPROFOR troops at sensitive and key positions, and the establishment 
of a joint commission under Soubieru. This agreement was due to be put in writing the 
following day. It was accepted because it suited the interests of all sides. Hence, 
according to Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky: 
At that time, already on 9 February, even before the North Atlantic Council 
decision, there was a willingness on the side of the Bosnian Serbs to remove heavy 
artillery from the Sarajevo area. There was no fundamental difference in the 
contents of this local agreement compared with the NATO ultimatum. " 
Russia's initiative also contributed to the success of the initiative by allowing the 
Bosnian Serbs to fulfil the terms of the agreement and the NAC statement without 
appearing to lose face: 
The intervention of Vitalii Churkin ... unblocked 
discussions concerning the 
implementation of the agreement, namely the exact meaning of "UN control" of 
the weapons. This clarification provided the Bosnian Serbs with much-desired 
security guarantees in the form of 800 [sic] Russian soldiers perceived to be an 
allied force. Of equal importance was the fact that the agreement allowed the 
831TAR-TASS (23 February 1994b). 
84 Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky (1996), chapter 6. 
85 Owen (1996), chapters 6 and 7. 
96 Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky (1996), p. 141. 
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disarmament to become an honourable action and not a sign of weakness and 
87 defeat. 
Does this mean that Russian commentators were right to criticise NATO for 
jeopardising the progress made towards a local agreement? Not according to Ekwall- 
Uebelhart and Raevsky: 
it is important to stress that the Bosnian Serbs were acting according to the 
agreement reached between them and the Bosnian Muslims, and not in response to 
the NATO decision when they withdrew their heavy weapons. Undoubtedly, 
however, the threat of air strikes helped to ensure the parties' compliance to the 
creation of the weapons exclusion zone. 88 
It was, of course, a risky strategy. Although the NAC declaration was directed at 
both sides, air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs would have compromised 
UNPROFOR's impartiality, with implications for the peace-keepers on the ground and 
the delivery of humanitarian aid, which relied on this impartiality. 89 Furthermore, the 
threat of air strikes might be a useful tool of coercion, but the actual implementation of 
the threat would not necessarily promote the aim of demilitarisation. The NAC decision 
was helpful, but it was a dangerous game. 90 
No doubt, the Russian initiative was greeted with relief behind the scenes in 
Western capitals, as Russian newspapers implied; but that does not mean that the NATO 
declaration was counter-productive. In fact, it may have been crucial in getting this 
agreement to stick where so many others had failed. Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky 
conclude: 
The Sarajevo disarmament operation in February 1994 was, for the most part, 
successful. Taking advantage of the special momentum created after the market 
place shelling was essential: the tide of public opinion was clearly against the war, 
and decision-making and implementation were done quickly and decisively. But 
most importantly, the disarmament operation was based upon an agreement which 
met the parties' mutual interests and was backed by the credible use of force. 9' 
Bearing in mind Churkin's remarks of 15 February, would Russia have supported 
the credible threat of force if the decision had been adopted through the United Nations 
Security Council instead of the NAC? This was the opinion of some commentators, who 
87 Ibid., p. 143. 
88 Ibid.. 
S91bid., p. 148. 
90 Ibid., p. 144. 
91 Ibid., p. 149. 
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suggest that Russia's main objection was that it was not informed of the decision. 
92 
However, as I have shown, Russian diplomats gave every indication even before the 
`ultimatum' that they would not countenance `punitive' strikes or strikes aimed at 
coercing the sides to accept a settlement; at most, they would allow air strikes for the 
protection of UNPROFOR personnel. Hence, their position was that Russia should have 
been consulted about the NATO decision; but, had Russia been consulted, they would 
have refused to support the declaration. As Pavel Baev writes, in early 1994 Moscow 
`unfortunately started to insist on two mutually incompatible points: that it should be 
consulted and that the air strikes were unacceptable as such'. 
93 
Domestic considerations meant that Russian diplomats would never vote in the 
UNSC for a decision that might lead to bombing of the Bosnian Serbs. This would be 
the case even if, like the NATO statement, the decision was neutral, that is if impartial 
conditions were set for all sides to meet. Unlike in May 1992, when Russia voted for 
sanctions and the MFA strongly defended the decision, the administration lacked the 
will to expose itself to the accusations and outrage that would follow such a vote. For 
example, when Owen explained to Churkin after the `ultimatum' that air power was 
being used `in an impartial way to protect UN personnel and enforce the UN's role', the 
latter argued, according to Owen, that air strikes would `damage Yeltsin' and there 
would be `Russian volunteers and a great deal of emotion'. 
94 
In fact, Stanislav Kondrashov in Izvestiia saw the Russian reaction to the NATO 
`ultimatum' and the subsequent Russian initiative as a sign that, in its position on the 
Yugoslav question, the government now attached primary importance to domestic 
consensus rather than, as previously, to consensus with the West. Kondrashov 
welcomed this development, arguing that after the December elections, the President 
and the MFA could no longer ignore public opinion: `In order to be strong, foreign 
policy must be based on prevailing sentiment at home. '95 Churkin shared this view, 
interpreting the Council of the Federation's agreement to Yeltsin's proposal to send 300 
additional peace-keepers to former Yugoslavia as a sign that a `democratic consensus' 
was forming between the President and the parliament, a consensus that would be the 
I Vladimir Abarinov, for instance, wrote in May 1994 that `Russia protested less about the Sarajevo 
ultimatum or the Gorazde air strikes [in April 1994, see chapter 7] than about the fact that it had been 
excluded from the decision-making'; Abarinov (1994a). 
93 Baev (1994a), p. 42. 
' Owen (10 February 1994); Owen's view expressed in this document was that the NATO statement 
`dove-tails with the negotiating strategy being pursued by Mr Akashi and Generals Cot and Rose on the 
one hand, and Thorvald Stoltenberg and myself on the other'. 
95 Kondrashov (24 February 1994). 
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`bulwark of a strong foreign policy' for Russia. 96 Pravda also suggested that `[w]ithout 
doubt 
... the 
Kremlin could not ignore the opinion of the State Duma, in which the 
overwhelming majority of deputies unequivocally condemned the NATO ultimatum and 
demanded that the Serbs be supported'. 97 
Implications of the crisis 
There was also domestic consensus in relation to the larger-scale implications of the 
crisis, concerning Russia's status and its position in the evolving European security 
structure. The Sarajevo initiative was interpreted within the elite and the press as an 
indication that Russia had established its status as a great power on the European and 
the world stage. The preponderance of this interpretation shows the ascendancy of the 
neo-realist outlook. 
Churkin claimed that the transitional period of foreign policy was over, that the line 
was drawn under it in Bosnia. Russia was recovering its status a great power, and the 
Sarajevo initiative heralded a `qualitatively new stage when we are not on the 
sidelines'. 98 In his speech to the Federal Assembly on 24 February, Yeltsin hoped that 
the lessons would be applied to other areas of foreign policy: 
Up to now, our foreign policy has been lacking in initiative and creativity. Russia's 
brilliant peace-keeping initiative in the Bosnian conflict is, unfortunately, only an 
exception so far... We are fond of repeating that [Russia] is a great country. And 
that is indeed the case. So then, in our foreign-policy thinking let us always meet 
this high standard. " 
If Russia was to be a great power, then it would have to take such initiatives and 
back them up with the provision of peace-keeping forces. Although this would put 
additional strain on Russia's army, it was necessary if Russia was to prove its prestige. 
This gave Yeltsin an incentive to overcome aversion in the military to adopting a peace- 
keeping role in Bosnia. According to Fel'gengauer, it also showed that Yeltsin had 
control over the military, since no-one consulted the General Staff before the offer to 
the Bosnian Serbs to deploy Russian troops, and the presidential decree concerning the 
movement of Russian troops was implemented immediately `without further ado'. 1°° 
96 Volkov, D. (26 February 1994); a further sign was the fact that Churkin's personal popularity soared in 
Russian opinion poll surveys; Cohen (1994), p. 840. 
97 Bol'shakov (22 February 1994). 
98 Molchanovyi (16 March 1994); Cohen (1994), p. 841. 
99 Rossliskaia gazeta (25 February 1994). 
10° Felgenhauer (1994a). Perhaps the military were also happy to support a high-profile gambit that would 
heighten Russian prestige; in addition, according to Baev, the cessation of fighting in several `hot spots' 
171 
There were three aspects to the concept of Russian great power interests in relation 
to the Yugoslav conflict that were revealed by Russian reactions to the Sarajevo crisis. 
Firstly, Russia had specific interests in the Balkans. This meant that the Yugoslav crisis 
could not be resolved without Russian participation. Hence, Kozyrev wrote: 
NATO's threat to bomb Bosnian Serb positions if the siege was not lifted by a 
certain date was made without Russian participation. It immediately became 
apparent that Russia could not and should not be excluded from the common 
efforts to regulate the conflict in the Balkans, a region where Russia has long term 
interests and influence. 10' 
Nevertheless, it was still not clear what those direct long term interests were, although 
there were hints that they resided in links with traditional allies. For example, Yeltsin's 
press secretary, Viacheslav Kostikov, claimed that the Sarajevo initiative showed to a 
domestic audience that Yeltsin was unarguably the leader of Russia and the protector of 
its national interests: `Russians [rossiiane] can be fully confident that their national 
interests and the interests of Russia's traditional allies will be reliably defended. ' 102 
The second aspect was perhaps more coherent. Russia was a major European 
power. The Yugoslav conflicts were occurring within this region. As Churkin put it: `we 
are not only a world power but also a European country and naturally it is in our 
interests that there should be peace in Europe. 103 International diplomacy towards the 
conflicts was also shaping the evolving European security structure, with implications 
for the position of Russia, NATO, and the CSCE within it. 
The third aspect was more instrumentalist: Russia would use the Yugoslav conflict 
to demonstrate Russia's status as a great world power. The point was that no global 
problem could be solved without Russia. For example, the head of the presidential staff, 
Sergei Filatov, called the initiative a `major victory of Russian diplomacy' which 
clearly showed that `the adoption without Russia of major decisions on the security of 
the world community does not work'. 104 And Kostikov argued that Russia had won a 
vital battle for its global status, and called it a `major Russian diplomatic victory not 
only on the European stage but on the world stage as well'. '05 In a similar vein, Churkin 
stated: 
in the former Soviet Union eased the deficit of troops and provided the possibility to contribute additional 
troops to UNPROFOR; Baev (1996a), p. 75. 
101 Kozyrev (1994a), pp. 65-6. 
102 Bunnistenko (22 February 1994). 
103 Ostankino TV (6 March 1994). 
'04 ITAR-TASS (21 February 1994). 
105 Burmistenko (22 February 1994). 
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the world community is interested in our participation, because a wide base is 
needed for the settlement of a crisis that is, in essence, global from the point of 
view of its political ramifications. And a wide base is impossible without Russia. 106 
As a global power, Russia should have a role in conflict resolution throughout the 
world. Russian policy-makers and commentators used the Sarajevo crisis to prove that 
Russia must be involved in the handling of other major crises. As Kostikov put it, 
`President Yeltsin believes that Russia should and will participate in the resolution of all 
major international problems. It will not allow itself to be discriminated against. ' 107 One 
immediate example was renewed activity by Russian diplomats in the Middle East 
peace process, culminating in the visit by Kozyrev to the region in March 1994. 
Kozyrev insisted that Russian participation was essential for the success of the Arab- 
Israeli peace process. 108 
The domestic consensus behind this assertive shift in foreign policy was evident in 
media reactions. Stanislav Kondrashov in Izvestiia was delighted with the new line, 
expressing thereby many features of the neo-realist position that was now part of the 
official policy: 
And Russia? At a critical moment its new partners seemed to have taken it for a 
non-entity, but with one step it put itself at the centre of attention. It was at that 
moment that Russia found the important place that it alone can occupy and played 
the role that no one else could have played. Bravo! ... 
it is impossible not to admire 
the skills of our diplomats, those who brilliantly prepared the move behind the 
scenes while giving the credit to the Russian President, who sealed the initiative 
with his consent and signature. 
Such obvious successes in the search for our place and identity are very rare, 
and so we are doubly pleased that realism combined with dignity is gaining the 
upper hand and foreign policy romanticism is retreating just as its colleague - 
market romanticism - has done. They exhibited similar features, incidentally - an 
infatuation with Western prescriptions to the point of losing a sense of measure, as 
well as our own identity. 
In the case of Yugoslavia, that loss occurred when Russia joined the economic 
blockade of Serbia, forgetting that history looks different when viewed from 
Moscow, Washington and Bonn, and that it would be the Russians, not the 
106 Russian Federation MFA (24 March 1994), p. 27. 
107 Pravda (25 February 1994). 
108 Ostankino TV (1 March 1994). 
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Americans or the Germans, who would have to take harsh measures against a 
kindred people. 109 
Even Pravda gave `due credit to President B. Yeltsin, the State Duma and all those 
who prevented reprisals against the Serbs', claiming that 
it is time for Russia to pursue its own policy, a policy that would be in its national 
interests, and would not be one hundred per cent subordinate to the interests of the 
US and the NATO block. We have come to our senses, though belatedly! "o 
Nevertheless, the government was not prepared to adopt the kind of openly pro- 
Serb and anti-Western policy that some opposition politicians and press demanded. "' 
Policy makers did not want the development of a situation in which the great powers 
supported their various `proxies' in the conflict. And it was still hoped that Russia could 
co-operate with the West as partners. Kozyrev claimed in relation to the Sarajevo crisis: 
Ultimately the advantages of partnership were illustrated when Russia and the 
West co-ordinated their efforts to persuade the warring parties to make peace. But 
the initial lack of consultation and co-ordination meant that first both sides had to 
run the risk of returning to the old benefactor-client relationship that had played 
such a pernicious role in the regional conflicts of the Cold War era. ' 12 
Hence, although Russia still sought `partnership' with the West, it must be an equal 
partnership based on real co-operation, rather than a diktat in which Russia was merely 
the junior partner: 
The majority of Russian political forces wants a strong, independent and 
prosperous Russia. From this fundamental fact it follows that the only policy with 
any chance of success is one that recognises the equal rights and mutual benefit of 
partnership for both Russia and the West, as well as the status and significance of 
Russia as a world power. 113 
Kozyrev applied this specifically to the Bosnia conflict: 
If a partnership is built on mutual trust, then it is natural to recognise other rules as 
well: the need not only to inform one another of decisions made, but also to agree 
on approaches beforehand. It would be hard to accept an interpretation of 
partnership in which one side demands that the other co-ordinate its every step with 
1°9 Kondrashov (24 February 1994). 
"0 Bo1'shakov (22 February 1994). 
"' For an example of a more virulently anti-American diatribe, see Bol'shakov (2 March 1994). 
112 Kozyrev (1994a), p. 66. 
113 Ibid., p. 65. 
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it while the former retains complete freedom for itself. Partners must have mutual 
respect for each other's interests and concerns. 
This is a key lesson from the decision-making process that led to the lifting of 
the siege in Sarajevo in February. ' 14 
In order to develop such a partnership, decisions had to be taken not by NATO, but 
by institutions in which Russia played a leading role. These institutions should be 
strengthened or created in order to reduce NATO's ability to act independently. On 23 
February in a speech in Krakow, Kozyrev announced what he called the `new Russian 
concept' of European security: transforming the North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(NACC) into an independent structure of military-political co-operation, an independent 
`peace-keeping laboratory', but one closely linked to the CSCE. The CSCE would be 
assigned the role of co-ordinator of the efforts of NATO, the European Union, the 
Council of Europe, the Western European Union, and the CIS in the areas of 
strengthening security and stability, peace-keeping, and protecting the rights of national 
minorities in Europe. "5 
Other policy makers pursued different routes to secure Russian participation. 
According to Yeltsin, `attempts by a number of leaders to keep Russia out of addressing 
issues of international security are discrimination against Russia, which should and will 
take part in all major international events as a member of the Security Council'. 116 As 
well as using the UNSC, Yeltsin proposed that the leaders of Russia, the USA, Britain, 
France, and Germany gather in Moscow, Geneva, or another capital in order `to sign a 
document which would be of historic importance and would put an end to the bloodshed 
in Yugoslavia'. ' 17 
Western states also hoped to avoid a split with Russia and recognised, after the 
Sarajevo crisis, that it must be more involved in the mediation process. With the United 
States also becoming more active, this encouraged the establishment of the Contact 
Group to provide a forum for great power co-operation. These developments were to 
have a significant impact on the mediation process. 
I4 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
' Grudinina (25 February 1994). 
116 ITAR-TASS (23 February 1994a). 
117 ITAR-TASS (23 February 1994c). 
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Chapter 7 
The great power concert, March 1994 - May 1995 
The Sarajevo crisis demonstrated the dominance of neo-realist thinking in the Russian 
foreign policy establishment, particularly the emphasis on Russia's great power status 
and the necessity of Russian involvement in conflict resolution in the Balkans. The 
diplomatic `triumph' appeared to prove that Russia was a great power that must be 
involved in mediation efforts if they were to bring about an end to the war. Western 
powers, while insisting on the importance of the NATO declaration in establishing the 
Sarajevo exclusion zone, recognised the dangers of excluding Russia from decision 
making and agreed that closer great power co-operation was desirable. Consequently, 
Russia became more involved in the mediation efforts, particularly through the Contact 
Group. From the Russian point of view, this was a reflection of its status, but 
participation also served other policy goals. In particular, it enabled Russia to avert any 
actions that it deemed to be against its interests or that might be considered anti-Serb 
and that would be attacked by domestic political forces. This contributed to the failure 
of the major powers to achieve an end to the conflict. 
One other aspect of Russian interests developed increasing significance in this 
period: Russia sought to gain a firmer presence in the Balkans through military and 
economic links with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yeltsin administration 
was not, however, prepared to risk open confrontation with the West by abrogating 
sanctions unilaterally or by offering the Serbs military support, despite pressure from 
the Duma; economic and military agreements were signed, but they would come into 
effect only after formal suspension of sanctions by the UNSC. 
The formation of the great power concert 
Initial moves 
After the Sarajevo crisis, both Russia and the United States became involved more 
directly in the mediation process. The US brought to fruition the plan to end the 
Muslim-Croat conflict and create a Muslim-Croat federation that it had been working on 
since the previous August. The agreement was officially signed in Washington on 2 
March 1994. It was greeted by Churkin as an important step on the path of peace 
negotiations which could `play a positive role in resolving the political crisis'. ' Churkin 
was also satisfied that he had been kept informed by his American counterpart, envoy 
1 Erlikh (4 March 1994). 
176 
Charles Redman, throughout the progress of the negotiations. 2 After talks with Bosnian 
Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, and the Croatian Foreign Minister, Mate Granit, 
Kozyrev also expressed support for the plan, although he warned that it was important 
to achieve an understanding with the Bosnian Serbs who must not be excluded from a 
final settlement. ' 
The Russian reaction to this American initiative was, therefore, guarded but 
positive. At the same time that the agreement was reached in Washington, Russian 
diplomats themselves achieved another breakthrough. After talks in Moscow between 
Kozyrev and Karadzic, the MFA announced that an accord had been reached on 
unblocking the airport in Tuzla, which would enable the delivery of humanitarian 
cargoes to be resumed. 4 It had seemed possible that NATO might again resort to air 
strikes to break the blockade, but `[a]s in the case of Sarajevo, Moscow stepped in to 
mediate', and achieved `another success'. 5 According to Karadiic, it was Russia's 
willingness to send observers to monitor shipments that was decisive: `We trust the 
Russians' impartiality. Their presence will guarantee that the Muslims will not receive 
arms instead of food. '6 Churkin announced on 24 March that the first UN flight had 
landed at Tuzla airport two days previously and that Russian observers were present as 
had been agreed; he added that the humanitarian situation in Tuzla had `improved 
significantly' as a result of the agreement. 
7 
Russian diplomats achieved what they believed to be another significant success in 
Zagreb on 29 March when, after talks conducted by Churkin at the Russian embassy, a 
cease-fire agreement was signed between the government of Croatia and the Krajina 
Serbs which re-established the collapsed cease-fire of February 1992. Russian diplomats 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Krajina issue; Churkin argued that it was 
impossible to resolve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina without resolving the Croatia- 
Krajina problem, ' while Karasin stressed the importance of Serb-Croat relations in 
progress towards a settlement of the whole Yugoslav crisis. 
9 According to Churkin, the 
document offered every reason to assert that the threat of an armed conflict between the 
Serbs and the Croats had been `reduced to zero'. 1° Although he saw the agreement as a 
21TAR-TASS (2 March 1994). 
3 NTV (9 March 1994). 
4 ITAR-TASS (1 March 1994). 
5 lusin (3 March 1994). 
6 Ibid.. 
Russian Federation MFA (24 March 1994). 
8 Tanjug (16 March 1994). 
9 Russian Federation MFA (22 March 1994). 
10 Shchedrunova (31 March 1994). 
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`major victory for Russian diplomacy', Churkin was careful to point out that a sizeable 
role was played also by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations, 
including the co-chairmen of the ICFY. " Shchedrunova reported Churkin as stating that 
[a]lthough Russia initiated and organised the meeting and subsequently invited the 
other participants, only full co-ordination of the actions of all the mediators made it 
possible to get an agreement signed... American and Russian diplomats, who have 
often talked in the past about their coinciding views on the Balkan conflict, had, for 
the first time, demonstrated this unanimity in actual practice. 12 
Churkin's final conclusion was equally significant: that the experience of the 
Zagreb talks could also be used for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 13 This reflected the hope 
after the Sarajevo crisis that divisions between the great powers could be overcome and 
a common approach achieved that would lead to a peace settlement for Bosnia, with the 
active involvement of Russia and the United States. As Churkin declared on 24 March, 
can unprecedented level of unity of approaches of the international community towards 
the problem of a Yugoslav settlement has now been achieved. In the first place, I have 
in mind the level of co-operation reached between Russia, the US and the EU. ' 14 Co- 
operating closely with Redman, Churkin hoped to achieve a cease-fire in Bosnia as a 
whole, and a settlement based on the EU plan, with concomitant lifting of sanctions. 
Churkin explained later: 
The big goal for me when I returned to Belgrade in early April was to try to 
arrange, not just a cease-fire, but a complete cessation of hostilities, something 
along the lines of what had been achieved in Croatia, the cessation of hostilities 
and the inter-positioning of UN troops. I think we really did have a chance. 's 
Unfortunately, a new crisis was developing that jeopardised this progress. The 
Goraide crisis initially threatened not only the imminent achievement of a peace 
agreement, but also the new spirit of co-operation. As it developed, however, it actually 
strengthened great power concordance, but the impetus towards a settlement had been 
lost. 
" Ibid.; and Russian Federation MFA (24 March 1994), p. 26. 
12 Shchedrunova (31 March 1994). 
13lbid.. 
" Russian Federation MFA (24 March 1994), p. 25. 
15 Quoted in Silber and Little (1996), p. 324. 
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The Gorazde crisis 
Gorazde was one of the six UN-designated `safe areas'. In the first week of April 1994, 
Serb forces besieging the city began to close in. The commander of UNPROFOR, 
General Rose, initially played down the crisis, but the Serb bombardment and advance 
sharply escalated after 7 April. UN military representatives and UNHCR representatives 
in the town reported that the situation was `very serious'. When the Bosnian Serb 
commander, Ratko Mladic, ignored warnings by Rose to stop the attacks or face NATO 
action, Rose obtained approval from Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary-General's 
special envoy, and ordered an air attack by two US Air Force planes on a Serb artillery 
command bunker on 10 April. The following day, Rose ordered a second wave of air 
strikes, on a group of tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers that had been firing on 
Gorazde. NATO justified the action by referring to UNSCR 836.16 
This was the first attack by NATO on ground targets in its history. Its first military 
action had taken place on 28 February 1994, when NATO planes had intercepted and 
brought down four Serb planes that were violating the no-fly zone. On that occasion, the 
Russian MFA recognised that the action was in line with UNSC resolutions and the 
mandate given to NATO to implement the no-fly zone. A statement released by the 
MFA stated: 
Any side that carried out a military flight over Bosnia in violation of corresponding 
resolutions of the UNSC about the no-fly zone itself bears full responsibility for the 
consequences. " 
The reaction to the air strikes around Gorazde was more critical, although not as strong 
as that to the NATO ultimatum over Sarajevo. This was because, in contrast to the 
Sarajevo declaration, the Goraide strikes were in line with existing UNSC resolutions 
on deterring attacks on `safe areas' and were not linked to an ultimatum to achieve 
additional aims, but Russian officials believed that matters were not as clear-cut as they 
were in the case of the strikes of 28 February. 
Firstly, Russia claimed that the crisis had begun with `provocative actions' by 
Muslim forces, which had led to an `inappropriate' response from Serb forces. '' The 
MFA declared that violations of UNSC resolutions establishing the `safe areas' were 
16 Jbid., pp. 3634. 
" Russian Federation MFA (28 February 1994). 
'8 Russian Federation MFA (13 April 1994). According to Silber and Little, government forces regularly 
launched raids from within the enclave, but NIIadic launched an offensive to tighten the Serb grip on the 
town (without necessarily capturing it) in order to secure Gora2de in advance of an overall peace 
settlement; Silber and Little (1996), pp. 324-6. 
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unacceptable, but the international community must not `indulge Muslim 
provocations'. '9 Secondly, as with the Sarajevo declaration, Russian officials objected 
to the fact that Russia had not been consulted before the air strikes, and was only 
informed after the event. Karasin argued that protection of `blue helmets' was not an 
empty question for Russia since Russian peace-keeping forces were also present in 
Bosnia, and declared that Moscow would not `resign itself to the role of junior partner, 
which is informed only in those cases when it is expected to say `yes"'. 20 Russian 
diplomats insisted on the unconditional observation of the approval procedure for air 
support as affirmed by the UNSC; again they demanded consultation with the 
permanent members of the Security Council prior to any strikes, arguing that Akashi did 
not have the authority to approve such actions. 21 Thirdly, Russian diplomats claimed 
that the air strikes had aggravated the military-political situation and had created the 
danger of escalation; they warned against Western leaders `gambling on force in 
Bosnian as well as in general world affairs'. 22 Russia demanded that the UN Secretary- 
General prepare a full report on the mechanism used to make the decision on the use of 
air strikes and on the results of the strikes, including data about the targets hit, the 
number of victims, and an evaluation of the implications of the strikes for the UN 
peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and the supply of humanitarian aid. 23 
The Gorazde crisis, like the Sarajevo crisis before it, had wider implications for 
NATO-Russian relations. Although Yeltsin claimed that Russia was making no direct 
linkage between events in Bosnia and the Partnership for Peace programme, he added 
that Russia was not `hurrying to sign'. 24 Kozyrev also hinted that the decision to 
postpone signing the programme was linked to events in Bosnia: 
We are interested in much more serious relations with NATO, than simply a 
framework document, so that surprises and unilateral measures, especially military 
ones, are ruled out in those areas where we must co-operate very closely. 25 
Nevertheless, the subsequent failure of Russian efforts to achieve an agreement in 
Gorazde similar to that achieved in Sarajevo actually encouraged closer co-operation 
19 Russian Federation MFA (11 April 1994). 
20 lusin (13 April 1994). 
21 Russian Federation MFA (14 April 1994). The NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, answering 
these criticisms, argued that preliminary consultations with Moscow would have taken too much time, 
which would have made it impossible to accomplish the main objective of protecting the UN personnel 
threatened by Serb guns; lusin (13 April 1994). 
22 Russian Federation MFA (13 April 1994). 
' Russian Federation MFA (11 April 1994), (13 April 1994), (14 April 1994). 
24 Rossiiskie vesti (13 April 1994). 
25 Grudinina (15 April 1994). 
180 
with the West. This failure was due to the actions of the Bosnian Serbs. After the first 
air strikes, Churkin went to Pale hoping to get an agreement that would avert the need 
for further NATO action. On 16 April, the Serbs announced that they had captured the 
strategic heights around Gorazde, and their attack continued. NATO aircraft again 
prepared to undertake air strikes after Rose requested close air support, but bad weather 
and the shooting down of a British plane caused the mission to be abandoned. 
Concerned at potential escalation, Churkin met the most senior Bosnian Serb `official' 
in Pale at that time, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker in the Bosnian Serb `parliament'. 
Krajisnik promised to stop the shelling of Gorazde, to pull back Serb forces to a 
distance of three kilometres from the town centre, and to release the 150 UN personnel 
who had been taken hostage after the first air strikes. The agreement was due to take 
immediate effect, and talks would resume in the morning. As a result, Akashi agreed to 
call off the air strikes. 26 
But the Bosnian Serbs made no attempt to honour the agreement, as Churkin 
himself explained: 
They gave me this promise of three things they would do. [But] they had not 
released anybody. They had not pulled back a single inch from where they were 
standing. And the shelling continued. 
Karadiic was procrastinating. After about two or three hours, it became clear 
to me that for reasons of his own he didn't want to come to any kind of agreement. 
So I told him of the opportunity to have sanctions lifted and I walked out of the 
meeting. 
Churkin later told journalists that he had heard more broken promises in one weekend 
than he had heard all his life. 27 
Russia's leaders strongly condemned the way that the Bosnian Serbs had broken 
their promises. President Yeltsin said that, despite Russian efforts, `it has not proved 
possible to avoid the escalation of military action. The Bosnian Serbs do not keep their 
word. 528 Kozyrev `resolutely recommended' the Serb side `not to test the patience of the 
world community'. 29 But the strongest reactions came from Churkin, who felt 
personally slighted and experienced the contrast with the Sarajevo `triumph' most 
acutely. He believed that Russia, as a great power, had been insulted by the Bosnian 
Serbs who had used it to achieve their own aims. As he put it, `the tail shouldn't wag the 
26 Silber and Little (1996), pp. 329-31. 
27 Ibid., pp. 367-8. 
29 ITAR-TASS (19 April 1994a). 
29 ITAR-TASS (19 April 1994b). 
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dog. It's really quite simple ... we 
have our own interests and our own positions, too. '30 
He urged Russian authorities to break off all contacts with the Bosnian Serbs who had 
`used Moscow's mediation as a cover and simply played for time': 
The Bosnian Serbs must understand that in Russia they are dealing with a great 
power, not a banana republic. Russia must decide whether a group of extremists 
can be allowed to use a great country's policy to achieve its own aims. Our answer 
31 is unequivocal: "never". 
Some Russian commentators went further, arguing that previous Russian 
diplomacy had encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to continue actions against the `safe 
areas'. For example, Leonid Mlechin wrote in Izvestiia: 
Moscow is promising to prevent any NATO action, believing that such an action 
would lead to a major war. 
Isn't it worth considering that Russia's diplomatic success in Sarajevo two 
months ago may have been one of the causes of the present catastrophe in Bosnia? 
When Russia thwarted the NATO ultimatum issued to the Serbs blockading 
Sarajevo, the Serb leaders decided that they had finally succeeded in causing a 
clash between Russia and the West, and that Moscow would never allow NATO to 
bomb their positions and would, in general, protect them. Filled with this 
confidence, the Serbs attacked Gorazde. 32 
Other commentators, however, continued to support the Bosnian Serbs and strongly 
opposed action by NATO and the West. In Rossiiskaia gazeta, Vladimir Kuznechevskii 
noticed that the situation in Bosnia had changed drastically as a result of the events 
around Gorazde, where, as a result of the `military provocation' by the Muslims and 
after `the support of this provocation by NATO military aircraft', the Serbs `stopped 
33 
restraining themselves'. And Evgenii Fadeev, in Pravda, concentrated his attack on 
Churkin, who `[c]ompletely unexpectedly ... 
harshly and inappropriately condemned 
the Serb side in Bosnia'. 34 
There appeared also to be differences within the administration. For example, the 
Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, stated: `I do not entirely agree with Vitalii Churkin, it 
would be wrong to put all the blame for the truce violations and the air strikes on the 
30 Russia TV (20 April 1994). 
31 lusin (20 April 1994). 
32 Mlechin (23 April 1994). 
33 Kuznechevskii (19 April 1994). 
34 Fadeev (20 April 1994). 
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Bosnian Serbs... The situation in the Gorazde region is confused - both sides are 
guilty. '35 
Reports suggested that the MFA accepted Churkin's view that further contacts with 
the Bosnian Serb leadership would be pointless. 36 Immediately following Churkin's 
return from Bosnia, the MFA prepared the text of a presidential statement on Bosnia, 
which, according to sources in the Ministry, asserted that the Bosnian Serb leadership 
was taking a deliberately un-constructive position with the aim of destroying the 
Muslim enclaves; that Russia's reserves of goodwill had run out and it saw no sense in 
continuing its mediation efforts; and that the world community could not reconcile itself 
to open aggression and genocide. Instead, peace must be enforced. 37 But the text was 
softened significantly in tone. According to Vladimir Abarinov, this was because 
Yeltsin `did not want an early confrontation with the Duma over what is, from his point 
of view, a secondary issue'. Furthermore, Yeltsin had protested against military 
intervention in Bosnia too often to support it now. 38 
Nevertheless, the final statement still displayed a change of emphasis in Russian 
rhetoric: 
The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina stands on the threshold of a dangerous 
escalation, despite Russia's energetic diplomatic efforts in conjunction with the UN 
and other members of the international community. The Bosnian Serb leadership 
must fulfil the commitments it made to Russia to stop the attacks and withdraw 
from the town of Gorazde, a UN-declared `safe area', to guarantee conditions for 
the introduction of UN forces, and release UN personnel in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The world community must take decisive measures for a political resolution of 
the Bosnian crisis. 
In this context, I re-affirm my proposal for a meeting at the highest level of 
Russia, the USA, the EU, with the participation of the UN. 39 
These points were repeated in subsequent statements by Russian diplomats. While 
condemning Serb action, Russia continued to oppose the use of air strikes which 
contained `an inherent danger of escalation', and of NATO being drawn in to the 
conflict and usurping the primacy of the UNSC. 40 
3s Fel'gengauer (21 April 1994). 
36 Iusin (21 April 1994). 
37 Abarinov (1994a); see also Iusin (21 April 1994). 
38 Abarinov (1994a). 
39 Russian Federation MFA (19 April 1994). 
40 Speech by Vorontsov, United Nations Security Council (21 April 1994), p. 53. 
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Formation of the Contact Group 
After the humiliation of Goraide, Russian policy makers believed that it was in Russia's 
interest to seek a common position with other `great powers' rather than to allow actions 
by the conflicting sides in Bosnia to create divisions between them. Therefore, they 
again aimed to achieve an international consensus and hoped that Yeltsin's appeal for a 
summit meeting would achieve this. As Iulii Vorontsov told the UN Security Council: 
Today, as never before, the time is ripe for these participants to work together to 
hammer out a political approach for a solution to the Bosnian problem and to put it 
before the belligerent parties, so that they are absolutely clear that it is essential to 
negotiate, and not just go from one crisis to another. 41 
Western leaders finally responded to Russian appeals for such a meeting. This was 
partly a result of the (temporary) resolution of the Gorazde crisis. The Bosnian Serbs 
complied with a NATO ultimatum which warned them that they would face further air 
strikes unless they respected an immediate cease-fire, withdrew troops to three 
kilometres from the town centre, and withdrew heavy weaponry to a distance of twenty 
kilometres. 42 Russian diplomats' reactions to this ultimatum were considerably less 
hostile than to previous NATO actions because of their disillusionment with the 
Bosnian Serbs. As a statement by the MFA expressed it, the UNSC (including Russia) 
`recognised the adequacy of NATO's decisions, which were taken in response to a 
request by the UN secretary-general for the defence of Gorazde'. 43 Kozyrev also stated 
that `[r]egrettably, last week the Bosnian Serbs left the UN secretary-general no other 
choice but to ask the North Atlantic Treaty for air support'; but a plan for `wide-ranging 
strikes, whereby NATO was to enter the war on the side of the Muslims' was rejected 
after Russia insisted on the UNSC meeting. 44 
Hence, in this case, Russia supported `close air support' to deter an attack on the 
`safe area'. Russian diplomats would not, however, support wider NATO action, and in 
this they were supported by General Rose, and some members of NATO - in particular, 
the United Kingdom - that were concerned about the implications of NATO action for 
the UNPROFOR operation. As well as making Russia more conducive to the use of `air 
support' to protect `safe areas', the Gorazde crisis brought into the open serious 
41 Ibid.. 42 Silber and Little (1996), pp. 332-4. 
43 Russian Federation MFA (25 April 1994). 
44 ITAR-TASS (27 April 1994). 
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divisions within NATO, a development that made NATO less likely to propose large 
scale air strikes in the near future. 45 
There was therefore a possibility of closer co-operation between Russia and the 
West. This enabled the West to respond to Russia's appeals for co-ordination, and the 
Contact Group - consisting of Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany - was established on 26 April. Vorontsov greeted this as `an important 
step' in the direction of creating an active joint effort, and called for an early summit 
meeting on a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 46 while Kozyrev claimed on 27 April 
that `the partnership [was] working' and argued that it was important to create a `united 
international front and put pressure on all sides' . 
47 
The process leading towards this `great power' convergence is summarised by 
Konstantin Eggert in Izvestiia: 
The upswings and failures of recent months seem to have sobered both Russia and 
the West. The Kremlin was subjected to shameful humiliation by the Serbs, while 
Europe and the US showed confusion and ineffectiveness in using military force. 
The spirit of defeat brought Moscow and the Western capitals closer together, 
forcing them, on the one hand, to engage in what might be called `mutual face 
saving', and, on the other hand, to try through a joint onslaught to move the 
Bosnian problem from standstill 4' 
There were, of course, still major differences between the positions of the major 
powers: between Russia and the West, and also between the individual Western states, 
particularly the US and the European powers. It was likely that another attack on a `safe 
area' or the failure to achieve a break-through in the mediation process would bring 
these differences into the open. For the moment, though, the leaderships of the major 
powers perceived to have interests in the region considered the development of a 
common policy to be in their interests, and used the Contact Group as a form of great 
power `concert' through which they sought a consensual approach to the conflicts 
which, they hoped, would prevent events in former Yugoslavia from exacerbating 
tensions between them. After Gorazde, the Russian administration was not prepared to 
risk a split with the West for the sake of the Bosnian Serbs who had humiliated them, 
while the Clinton administration was wary of opening the divisions within NATO and 
still attached great importance to relations with Russia and the Yeltsin administration. 
45 Silber and Little (1996), p. 334. 
1 United Nations Security Council (27 April 1994), p. 26. 
a' ITAR-TASS (27 April 1994). 
48 Eggert (30 April 1994). 
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The result, however, was a policy of the `lowest common denominator', as the major 
powers, through the Contact Group, avoided any decisions over which consensus could 
not be reached. 
Great power diplomacy, May 1994 - May 1995 
The Contact Group took over responsibility from the ICFY for devising a peace 
settlement to end the Bosnian conflict. Consensus was fragile, and there were major 
disputes behind the facade of unity. In a sense, there was a `tug of war' between the US 
and Russia for support of the Western European powers. Russia attempted to use the 
notion of European interests to gather support against certain US proposals, while the 
US attempted to use links through NATO. Any attempts to strengthen NATO's role 
were resisted by Russia, which still insisted on the primacy of the UNSC. Hence, while 
on one level the great powers conducted negotiations through the Contact Group, the 
debate over the role of NATO, the status of UNPROFOR, and the use of force, 
continued. 
NATO, UNPROFOR, and the use of force 
In certain circumstances, Russia fully supported the use of force by the international 
community: in the case of violation of the no-fly zone (as shown in February 1994) or a 
direct attack on UN peace-keepers. For example, when French peace-keepers came 
under attack on 22 September 1994 and NATO carried out air strikes against a Bosnian 
Serb tank, the MFA issued a statement declaring that `[a]ny side attacking the 
peacekeepers should be mindful of the possibly grave consequences', 49 while Kozyrev 
stated that `peacekeepers should be protected by all means at the disposal of the world 
community'. "' Reaction to a NATO attack on Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo 
on 5 August was also muted because there had been a clear violation of the Sarajevo 
exclusion zone when Bosnian Serb forces had taken artillery weapons from a storage 
site near Ilid2a controlled by UNPROFOR. An MFA declaration stated that the Bosnian 
Serbs `must not allow a repetition of such provocative actions' which complicated 
efforts to achieve a political settlement. 51 The Russian response to the use of NATO air 
power in November 1994 was, however, similar to its reaction to the Gorazde crisis. 
When NATO carried out air strikes on the Udbina air strip in Krajina after an aerial 
bombing attack on Bihac by Krajina Serb aircraft, Russia condemned both `Muslim 
49 Radio Russia (23 September 1994). 
so UNIAN News Agency (23 September 1994). 
st Russian Federation MFA (9 August 1994). 
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provocations' and `Serb over-reaction', recognised the legitimacy of air strikes, but 
warned against escalation. 52 This reflected an interweaving of concerns about the status 
of the `safe areas', the role of NATO, and the overall shape of the international system. 
Russia continued to express concern about the use of the `safe areas' by 
government forces to launch attacks on Bosnian Serb forces; according to Karasin, the 
initial cause of the Bihac crisis was attacks by Bosnian government forces on Serb 
positions which had led to a counter-strike. 53 Russia initiated UNSCR 959 of 19 
November 1994 which called on all sides to show restraint around the `safe areas' and 
to allow UNPROFOR to fulfil its functions. The resolution also called for an 
investigation by the UN Secretary-General into means to strengthen the `safe areas'. In 
this report of 1 December, Boutros-Ghali favoured full demilitarisation of the `safe 
areas', but he recognised that with the `light option' of 7,600 troops, UNPROFOR could 
not oversee adequately the weapons collection sites nor prevent the forceful withdrawal 
of weapons. Furthermore, without additional troops to guarantee their security, the `safe 
areas' would be vulnerable to attack. 54 
In these circumstances, by proposing full demilitarisation, Russia seemed more 
intent on preventing action by Bosnian government forces from within the `safe areas' 
than achieving the full protection of those areas. Speaking in the UNSC, Sergei Lavrov 
- who became Russia's permanent representative to the Security Council in July 1994 - 
argued that 
the main purpose of these areas is to protect the civilian population, not to protect 
the territory let alone the troops of one of the parties to the conflict. The role of 
UNPROFOR in the protection of the safe areas consists primarily in assisting 
humanitarian aid operations and also in contributing to a comprehensive peace 
process by bringing about agreements on a cease-fire and the separation of forces. " 
Unfortunately, he failed to explain how the `safe areas' were supposed to be `safe' for 
the population if the territory in which it lived was not protected. And the second 
sentence is also not justified if we look at UNSCR 836 (see chapter 5). 
Russia's second concern was that NATO was becoming more involved on the 
Bosnian government side, thus undermining the principle of international impartiality 
and casting into doubt the supremacy of the UN. After the NATO strike on Udbina 
52 Russian Federation MFA (22 November 1994). 
53 Ibid.. 
sa Leurdijk (1996), pp. 59-62. 
s5 United Nations Security Council (19 November 1994), p. 4. Karasin made the same argument earlier in 
the year; Russian Federation MFA (17 May 1994). 
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airstrip, Moscow demanded the immediate convening of the UNSC, at which session 
the Russian representative expressed the view that the use of air power ought strictly to 
correspond to the `letter and spirit' of UNSC decisions, should be proportionate and not 
lead to escalation. 56 When NATO planes carried out several strikes over the following 
days in response to missile attacks against NATO aircraft, it aroused further concern in 
Moscow. Karasin warned that `the danger of a chain reaction of power methods is 
already clear and, according to our conviction, they can result in nothing but a 
continuation of the bloodshed'. 57 And ITAR-TASS quoted a senior MFA diplomat who 
claimed that the international community was `gradually sliding toward supporting 
58 militarily only one of the parties involved in the conflict'. 
These developments led Kozyrev to write a frank letter to Boutros-Ghali on 25 
November, in which he warned against NATO becoming a party to the conflict and 
UNPROFOR losing its impartiality: 
The situation in and around Bosnia is growing increasingly alarming. Despite the 
efforts of recent days, especially of the UN Security Council, hostilities are 
continuing to escalate... 
Unfortunately, a number of Security Council resolutions are not being fully 
implemented or are being implemented in such a way that gives grounds for 
... accusations of partiality 
The purpose of the establishment of the UN `safe areas' is to protect the 
civilian population, and the defence of these areas by UNPROFOR should not 
make it one of the sides in the conflict. 
NATO actions should be limited to the support of UNPROFOR as it fulfils its 
mandate in strict conformity with Security Council resolutions. 
All forceful actions should be carried out on the basis of the principles of 
proportionality, impartiality, and timeliness... 
In our view, there is a real danger of UNPROFOR exceeding its tasks and 
being drawn into the fighting, which creates the impression of the UN forces 
supporting one of the sides in the conflict. 
He concluded by asking the Secretary-General to `pay serious attention to the above 
circumstances in order to prevent de facto changes in UNPROFOR's mandate, which 
could lead to further escalation of the conflict'. 59 
56 Russian Federation MFA (22 November 1994). 
5' ITAR-TASS (23 November 1994a). 
58 ITAR-TASS (23 November 1994b). 
59 Russian Federation MFA (25 November 1994). 
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It is difficult to see how UNPROFOR could fulfil its mandate without appearing 
`partial', for the simple reason that the `safe areas' were being besieged by one side, the 
Bosnian Serbs. Action to protect the `safe areas' in line with Security Council 
resolutions would therefore inevitably be directed against that one side. This was a 
consequence of the `safe areas' concept as laid out in Security Council resolutions, and 
also the nature of the war (as I shall discuss in more detail in the conclusion). 
Several factors prompted Kozyrev to make this statement at that time, in addition to 
the worsening of the conflict and the repeated instances of NATO action. Firstly, from 
October, there had been talks between NATO and the UN secretariat on proposals by 
certain NATO members aimed at simplifying the procedure for authorisation of the use 
of air power. 60 Kozyrev stated on 30 October that he had a clear mutual understanding 
with Boutros-Ghali that abolishing the `dual key' system was out of the question; but he 
warned that if the `dual key' was weakened significantly, if NATO was given a decisive 
say, then Russia would withdraw its troops since it would `no longer be a UN operation 
but a NATO operation'. 61 
Secondly, domestic considerations remained important. On 25 November, the 
Duma passed a declaration expressing serious concern at the further sharpening of the 
crisis in former Yugoslavia': 
It is impossible to consider the recent bombing strikes by NATO forces on the 
territory of Serb Krajina and Bosnia as justified. The impression is being created 
that the UN is increasingly being used for covert military intervention by NATO in 
the civil war in former Yugoslavia. This is discrediting the very idea of peace- 
keeping on the part of the UN. 
The Duma called on the international community to use solely political means to 
resolve the crisis, and to desist from the application of `double standards' leading to 
action only against the Serb side. It concluded by calling on the Russian President and 
MFA to use in the Contact Group and the UNSC `all political and diplomatic means, up 
to and including the use of the veto in the UN Security Council, to prevent external 
military intervention in the conflict in former Yugoslavia . 
62 
But the issue was also linked to the overall European security framework and the 
role of Russia and NATO within it. Earlier in 1994, Russia had put forward proposals to 
establish the CSCE as the primary European security organisation, including the 
60 Leurdijk (1996), p. 54. 
61 ITAR-TASS (30 October 1994). 
62 Russian Federation State Duma (25 November 1994). 
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creation of an executive body that would be a kind of Security Council for the 
organisation, with permanent members holding a right to veto. 63 These proposals 
received a sceptical reception, not only from the United States and Western European 
states, but also from Central and Eastern European states and the former Soviet 
republics which feared that the proposed changes would strengthen Russia's position 
and threaten the CSCE principle of `one country, one vote'. 64 At the CSCE summit in 
Budapest in December 1994, Yeltsin spoke of putting the CSCE at the centre of a 
comprehensive all-European security system, 65 but one of the few concessions to this 
view was the changing of the name to `Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe' (OSCE). 
At the same summit meeting, divisions over NATO expansion and the role of 
NATO in former Yugoslavia deepened between Russia and, in particular, the United 
States. Clinton declared that no country could prevent other states from joining the 
alliance, while Yeltsin warned that plans to expand NATO were at variance with moves 
towards European unity and would jeopardise democratic transition in Russia. 66 Yeltsin 
did not refer specifically to the Balkans, but Kozyrev had previously expressed similar 
doubts about NATO expansion, its effects on Russia's domestic situation, and directly 
linked this with NATO action in Bosnia. For example, after meeting NATO's deputy 
Secretary-General, he stated: 
Our ultra-nationalists trying to stage a domestic revanche would certainly take 
advantage of such ill-considered steps as hasty expansion of NATO membership or 
the alliance's bombing strikes in Bosnia. 67 
Despite the efforts in 1994 to achieve great power unity, it was obvious that deep 
divisions still existed over the key issues of the use of military force and the role of 
NATO. Disagreements were particularly sharp between the United States and Russia. In 
many respects, the Western European states shared Russian doubts over the use of 
force, although not necessarily for the same reasons. France, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom were concerned particularly about the impact that NATO air strikes were 
having on the UNPROFOR humanitarian mission and the implications for the security 
of their troops; 68 France also shared Russia's scepticism about NATO (historically, 
63 Aleyv (14 July 1994). Russia would, of course, be one of the permanent members of this 
`Security Council'. 
6' lusin (12 October 1994). 
65 Rossiiskaia gazeta (7 December 1994). 
66 Ibid.. 
67 Interfax (3 November 1994). 
68 Sloan (1998), pp. 634. 
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French policy makers regarded NATO as an instrument for American domination). 69 
These doubts allowed Russia to side with these powers in blocking American initiatives, 
mainly in the forum of the Contact Group, although Russian diplomats also backed 
other doubters within NATO, particularly Greece. 70 
The Contact Group plan 
The Contact Group formulated a map based on a 51: 49 per cent division of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb entity, Republika 
Srpska, respectively. They decided to leave the constitutional details until later, but 
declared that Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain a unitary state; Russia also insisted that 
Republika Srspka would have identical rights to the Muslim-Croat Federation, which in 
this context meant the right to confederal relations with Serbia. 71 The final map drawn 
up in Geneva was presented to the conflicting sides on 6 July 1994 (map 8). 
69 For an argument that Juppe and Kozyrev shared a suspicion of NATO, and combined in Budapest to 
block an increased NATO role in European affairs, leading to a `complete paralysis of the will of the UN 
and NATO air forces under its control in Bosnia', see Vmogradov et al (7 December 1994). 70 Sloan (1998) p. 64. 
71 NTV (20 July 1994); Eggert (3 August 1994). This principle was finally agreed by the Contact Group at 
its summit in December 1994. 
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The sides were given two weeks to accept the map on the understanding that it was 
not for negotiation, although changes could be made later if agreed mutually between 
the parties. Russian diplomats exerted pressure on the Serbs to accept. Churkin and 
Grachev were sent to Belgrade where they presented Karadzic with a letter from Yeltsin 
that was reported to outline Russian guarantees that certain Serb demands - relating to 
the possibility of confederation with Serbia, and a corridor through Brcko protected by 
Russian peace-keepers - would be met if the Bosnian Serbs accepted the Geneva 
package. 72 
The Contact Group spoke of incentives and disincentives to encourage both sides to 
accept the map, although they gave few details beyond promising the suspension of 
sanctions if the Serbs accepted, and tightening of sanctions if they rejected. The Bosnian 
government accepted the map with reservations, acknowledging that it preserved 
72 Baturin (30 July 1994). 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary state. The Bosnian Serbs rejected the map precisely 
because it preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary state and because they would not 
accept certain aspects of the details of the proposed division of territory; in any case, 
they would have to cede a large amount of territory that they now held (map 9). 
Map 9 Lines of confrontation, June 1994, and areas of 
withdrawal under Contact Group plan 
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Deputies of the Pale `assembly' sent a letter to Yeltsin and to Milosevic in which 
they stated that accepting the `incomplete and in many respects unknown' plan of the 
Contact Group would be `national suicide' for the Bosnian Serbs. 73 Supporters of the 








wrote that the map was `fundamentally unfavourable to the Serbs'. A page later, it is 
clear why: `the proposed variant of 49 per cent of the territory did not suit the Serbs 
who at that time held around 75 per cent of all of the territory Bosnia and 
Herzegovina'. 74 
The reason for the Contact Group's vagueness regarding disincentives now became 
clear: its members were divided over what action to take in response to the Bosnian 
Serb rejection and the positive response to the map by Milosevic, who again favoured 
Bosnian Serb acceptance of the plan. The Contact Group members were determined, 
however, not to allow these disagreements to split the group. Repeated declarations 
since the group's formation had stressed the unity of purpose among its members, and 
Kozyrev now emphasised the need for continued unity to prevent a 1914 scenario. 75 
Nevertheless, it was impossible to conceal the divisions over what policy now to pursue, 
which were particularly serious in relation to sanctions and the arms embargo. 
Potentially most divisive was the question of military enforcement of the plan, but at 
this stage no state was prepared to endorse this anyway. 
Sanctions 
All of the Contact Group members agreed that harsher sanctions were necessary against 
the Bosnian Serbs, and on 23 September 1994 these were imposed by UNSCR 942. 
Disagreements arose over how to respond to Serbia's support for the map and its 
decision on 4 August to break off political and economic relations with Republika 
Srpska and close the border except for food, clothing, and medicine. Russia proposed a 
`differentiated approach' of sharpening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, but lifting 
them against the FRY as recognition of, and encouragement for, its co-operative stance; 
as Karasin put it, continuing sanctions against Belgrade in these circumstances would be 
`illogical and counter-productive'. 76 On 30 August, Kozyrev admitted that the Western 
`partners' had major reservations about this proposal, but attributed this to `familiar 
politico-bureaucratic inertia' and lack of flexibility in response to new circumstances. 77 
The Western states, in particular the United States, insisted that observers must be 
placed on the border between the FRY and `Republika Srpska' to confirm that supplies 
were no longer going to the Bosnian Serbs; after all, a similar announcement after the 
Bosnian Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen plan had led to no long-term change in 
'" Gus'kova, (1998a), pp. 37-8. 
75 ITAR-TASS (29 July 1994). 
76 Russian Federation MFA (11 August 1994). 
77 ITAR-TASS (30 August 1994). 
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Belgrade's policy. In addition, the United States wanted to link the lifting of sanctions 
to a solution of the Krajina problem, and even of the Kosovo issue. 78 At the least they 
expected the FRY government to recognise the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina officially, but the FRY authorities were not yet prepared to do this, 
despite Kozyrev's efforts to persuade Milosevi6 . 
79 Russian diplomats, however, pointed 
out that sanctions had been introduced as a response to support by the FRY for the 
Bosnian Serbs in the conflict in Bosnia; if the FRY no longer supported the Bosnian 
Serbs, then the justification for sanctions no longer existed. Britain and France also 
rejected linkage over Croatia because it would delay a settlement on Bosnia but, on this 
issue, Germany supported the United States. 80 
It was unlikely that any of the Western powers would accept full lifting of the 
sanctions on the FRY until a peace deal was signed, because of the possibility that 
Milogevic would return to supporting the Bosnian Serbs militarily; in such 
circumstances, it would be difficult to avoid a Russian veto on a resolution to re- 
introduce sanctions given the present basis of Russian policy and the pressure of 
domestic political opinion. 81 A compromise was therefore reached by which certain 
sanctions would be suspended; initially, by UNSCR 943 of 23 September 1994, those 
preventing civilian flights, ferry services to Bar (Montenegro), and participation in 
sporting activities and cultural exchanges, for an initial period of 100 days. Russia 
continued to push for further relaxation of the sanctions regime; for instance, the 
Russian Security Council representative abstained on UNSCR 988 of 21 April 1995 
because it merely extended this suspension for 75 days. And Russian diplomats 
particularly pressured the UN sanctions committee to allow the supply of humanitarian 
goods to the FRY, especially fuel and medicine. 82 
This position on sanctions was not adopted purely from considerations of the 
situation in the FRY and the Bosnian conflict. During this period, Russia began to 
strengthen its bilateral relations with the FRY, laying a basis for the potential 
establishment of Yugoslavia as Russia's economic and military ally in the Balkans. The 
process began immediately after the split between Belgrade and Pale. Kozyrev made it 
clear in an interview on I August 1994: 
'8 Ludlow (1995). 
79 Shchedrunova (21 February 1995); Milogevid said that Belgrade would be `willing to recognise the 
separatist republics as independent states as soon as a political solution [was] found to the problems 
engendered by their unilateral and illegal separation from Yugoslavia'. 
80 Owen (1995b). 
g' lusin (20 April 1994). 
82 See, for example, Russian Federation MFA (3 November 1994). 
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Our bilateral relations with Yugoslavia or Serbia are nobody's business. It is our 
affair and how we build them is up to us. We have friendly relations and I am sure 
that, after they have said yes to the peace plan, the sanctions will be lifted and no 
one prevents us from having full-scale economic, cultural and, if you like, military 
relations in the sphere of security between Russia and Serbia. 83 
Later that month, the Russian and Yugoslav governments signed an agreement on 
trade and economic co-operation. 84 Talks also began on deliveries of Russian gas for 
humanitarian purposes as soon as the UN Committee on Sanctions authorised this 
(permission was finally granted on 17 February 1995), but there was also a longer-term 
plan to increase Russian gas deliveries to between 7 and 10 billion cubic metres a year 
after construction of a gas pipe-line through Bulgaria and Serbia (a joint venture 
between Gazprom and four Yugoslav enterprises had already been created). 85 And, on 
28 February 1995, the Russian and Yugoslav Defence Ministers signed an agreement on 
military co-operation which laid the foundation for, as Kozyrev put it, a `programme of 
full-scale co-operation between the Russian Federation and the FRY in the military and 
military-technical spheres'. 86 
After signing the agreement on trade and economic co-operation, the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, Oleg Davydov, said that, thanks to these 
documents, Russia would be `practically the first among the developed nations of the 
world to get a firm footing in the Yugoslav market'. 87 This shows that the motivation 
for the agreements was primarily economic rather than to provide support to the Serbs; 
for example, the military agreement did not cover weapons deliveries from Russia to the 
FRY, 88 while an agreement on supplying Russian gas was also signed with the Bosnian 
Muslim-Croat Federation after talks between the Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin (who was closely involved in Gazprom) and the Bosnian Prime Minister 
Hans Silajdzi6 . 
89 Furthermore, the MFA was adamant that the agreements with the FRY 
would come into force only when sanctions had been lifted fully, stating that it could 
not break international law. Nevertheless, it intensified its efforts to gain the abolition of 
the sanctions regime. 
83 Russia TV (1 August 1994). 
84 Portanskii (26 August 1994). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Tanjug (28 February 1995) and ITAR-TASS (28 February 1995). 
8' ITAR-TASS (24 August 1994). 
88 Grudinina (3 March 1995). 
89 Gornostaev (4 February 1995). 
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The Duma, as before, was pushing the government to lift sanctions unilaterally, 
without waiting for a vote in the UNSC. For example, in April 1995 the Duma repeated 
its demand to the government to work in the UNSC and Contact Group for the lifting of 
sanctions and the FRY's full reinstatement in international bodies such as the United 
Nations. 90 The Duma's actions were not simply a continuation of its previous policy on 
sanctions but also a shot in what Kozyrev called a `war of parliaments' with the United 
States Congress, which was pushing the US administration to lift the arms embargo 
unilaterally. 91 The result of this was serious division within the Contact Group. 
The arms embargo 
There had been hints from the Contact Group that the arms embargo might be lifted if 
the Serb side refused to accept the map. At the meetings in Geneva on 5 July and 30 
July, the foreign ministers warned that in the event of rejection of the Contact Group 
proposal, a decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo could become 
unavoidable as a last resort, with consequences for the continuation of UNPROFOR. 92 
But this idea was never seriously entertained by the UK, probably not by France, and 
certainly not by Russia, for whom it was inconceivable for domestic reasons, especially 
since the Duma repeatedly demanded that the government veto any such proposals. 
All of the European powers realised that UNPROFOR would have to withdraw 
from Bosnia if the embargo was lifted and that this would lead to an escalation of the 
fighting. Lavrov stated the Russian position clearly in the UNSC: 
Russia has repeatedly stated its vehement disagreement with the demand to lift the 
embargo, since this step would propel Bosnia and Herzegovina into an abyss of 
even more bloodshed. We continue to believe that this extremely undesirable 
measure is fraught with a number of very adverse consequences, one of which 
would be a curtailment of the United Nations peace-keeping operation. 93 
But in Washington, Congress was pressuring the Clinton administration to lift the 
arms embargo, unilaterally if necessary. In May 1994, the Senate voted for two 
alternative resolutions, one demanding that the administration lift the arms embargo on 
the Bosnian government side unilaterally, the other calling on it to pressure the UN to 
90 Russian Federation State Duma (14 April 1995). 
91 Abarinov (17 May 1994). 
92 Russian Federation MFA (5 July 1994a) and (30 July 1994). 
93 United Nations Security Council (23 September 1994), p. 31. 
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lift the embargo. 94 And in June, the House of Representatives voted for unilateral 
mandatory lifting of the embargo. 
Undoubtedly, lifting the embargo would have seriously affected relations between 
the great powers, and the Russian government would have been under intense domestic 
pressure to provide support to the Serb side. There again appeared to be a coalition of 
European members of the Contact Group against the United States (although France 
considered withdrawing its troops and lifting the arms embargo, it subsequently 
abandoned the idea). Ultimately, however, all the Contact Group members recognised 
that UNPROFOR would have to be withdrawn if the embargo was lifted. Not even the 
United States was prepared to do this, and it accepted the will of the other powers, 
adopting a compromise with international opinion by announcing in November 1994 
that it had ceased to monitor the embargo but was not abrogating it unilaterally. The 
official Russian reaction to this decision was critical but restrained, which reflected 
understanding of the domestic pressure on the Clinton administration. An MFA 
declaration stated that the decision caused `regret and concern', and expressed suspicion 
about the purpose, arguing that `[f]or a variety of reasons, including internal political 
reasons, the USA is all the more insistently attempting to implement one-sided 
decisions, outside the framework of concerted action'; if peace was to prevail, then 
concerted action was necessary not only of Europeans, but of the whole international 
community. 95 
Russian diplomats did, however, express `serious concern' at reports of 
infringements of the arms embargo. Karasin, for example, said that such actions could 
irreparably damage the international efforts to achieve an overall peace settlement, add 
fuel to the fire of the conflict, and play into the hands of the `war party' of each of the 
conflicting sides in Bosnia. 96 
Military enforcement 
The debate over sanctions and the arms embargo revealed divisions within the Contact 
Group, particularly between the European powers and the United States. The desire for 
unity and the lack of will to withdraw UNPROFOR and end the humanitarian mission 
meant that a compromise was reached on each issue, and the least controversial policy 
was adopted. The same applied to the use of force to impose the Contact Group map, 
94 The Russian Duma reacted by passing a resolution linking Russia's lifting of sanctions against Serbia to 
the United States' lifting of the arms embargo; Abarinov (17 May 1994). 
95 Russian Federation MFA (12 November 1994). 
96 Russian Federation MFA (5 July 1994b). 
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although even the United States was not enthusiastic and did not push the point. 
Nevertheless, Russian diplomats suspected that increased NATO action in Bosnia 
during November was leading to the development of events `exclusively in a scenario 
based on military force' as a result of American pressure. 97 Consequently, Kozyrev held 
bilateral meetings with the European members of the Contact Group, and together they 
proposed a meeting of the Group at ministerial level, at which `the position of the 
European participants was explained': 
In a word, a `difficult positive' was worked out in the direction of ending military 
actions. The impression was created that the majority of the politicians understand 
the senselessness of putting trust in force and air strikes, even if they are carried out 
on the request of UNPROFOR and the resolutions of the UNSC. 98 
The result was that, just as with the Vance-Owen plan, the major international 
states declined to impose the plan that they had adopted or, in this case, formulated. As 
David Owen wrote, it seemed `politically inconceivable that these five governments 
could now just leave such a map on the table. But it was more than conceivable: it was 
exactly what they did. '99 Owen in fact advised the EU Foreign Ministers to adopt `leave, 
lift and strike': '00 to use NATO to withdraw UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, then lift the arms embargo and use air strikes to hold back the likely Serb 
advance until the government forces had effective weapons. Such a strategy made sense 
in relation to an internationally-agreed peace plan, as Owen argues: 
This was leave as well as `lift and strike', and it contained two crucial differences 
from what President Clinton had suggested a year before: first, it would be air 
action threatened in support of a specific peace plan; and second, it would be air 
action which had Russian acquiescence, perhaps even Russian support. '°' 
Yet, while the first point is valid, there was every indication that Russia would not 
support the use of force. Throughout 1994, Russian diplomats were very clear on this 
point. They were suspicious of the use of close air support, they protested at the use of 
ultimata, and they also opposed the use of force to impose a peace settlement. 
According to David Ludlow (secretary of the Contact Group at that time), Churkin had 
made it clear at the Foreign Ministers' meeting before the presentation of the map that 
97 Russian Federation MFA (27 November 1994). 
98 Ibid.. 
9 Owen (1996), p. 302. 
100 Ibid., pp. 308-311. 
1 01 Ibid., pp. 302-3. 
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Russia could not accept the use of air power to fight on behalf of the Federation. 102 
After the Bosnian Serbs had rejected the map, Kozyrev again insisted on this. In his 
letter to Boutros-Ghali at the end of November, he wrote: 
I believe it necessary to underline that the role of the UN in former Yugoslavia is 
neither to `coerce' the sides to peace, nor to wage war, but to provide multi-faceted 
support for a peaceful political settlement. 'o3 
The rejection of force to impose the plan was presumably what Kozyrev meant 
when he described the Contact Group plan as a `peaceful ultimatum' [mirnyi 
ul'timatum]. 104 Nevertheless, Owen claimed in his letter to the EU Foreign Ministers 
that `[p]rovided air strikes are limited to Bosnian Serb territory, the Russians ought to 
be able to tolerate them'; 105 even more unrealistically, he believed that `Yeltsin could 
have been persuaded to accept the use of air power for a peace settlement; and in the 
right climate Russia would accept being involved, together with NATO, in carrying out 
any air action'. 106 What that `right climate' could be, given the domestic Russian 
situation, is beyond my imagination; but this argument gives Owen the chance again to 
lay the blame on the Clinton administration. 
Redman argued at the Contact Group meeting on 16 June that military options, 
possibly graduated, had to be considered; 107 but Owen is right to say that the US backed 
away from adopting this policy, as well as lifting the arms embargo and removing 
UNPROFOR. Perhaps he is also right to argue that this was because the Clinton 
administration had been `posturing' and had never seriously considered imposing a 
settlement. 108 For all the Contact Group members, international unity remained a 
priority; given Russia's position, and the doubts of the other European states, `leave, lift 
and strike' would have been impossible for the United States to implement in any other 
way but unilaterally. At this stage, the US was unlikely even to carry its NATO allies. 
Hence, no state believed that it was in its interest at this stage to abandon the 
consensual approach nor to withdraw the UN forces. Contact Group members were 
worried about the consequences of such an action for Bosnia; according to one senior 
Russian diplomat, `a withdrawal of UNPROFOR would be a humanitarian, political and 
X02 Ludlow (1995). 
103 Russian Federation MFA (25 November 1994). 
104 Russian Federation MFA (5 July 1994a); my italics. 
105 Owen (1996), p. 311. 
106 ]bid., p. 304. 
107 Ludlow (1995). 
108 Owen (1996), p. 312. 
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military catastrophe for Bosnia'. 109 Policy makers were concerned also at the likely 
effect of the escalation of the conflict on relations between the major powers, as were 
United Nations diplomats; Akashi, for instance, argued that if the UN troops left, `[t]he 
conflict would sharpen and spill out of Bosnia. Cleavages between the United States and 
Russia would be exacerbated. There would be a major destabilisation of Europe. '" 
Similarly, France abandoned the idea of withdrawal because it `would lead to a 
humanitarian crisis, encourage Muslim governments and Russia to enter the war on 
opposing sides and disgrace the United Nations'. "' 
Conclusion 
At the end of 1994, Russia remained a major participant in the search for a peace 
settlement, but its policy was a further brake on any efforts to enforce the map that the 
great powers had agreed. Repeated warnings of the impact of any enforcement action in 
Bosnia on Russian domestic politics reinforced the message. Russia also sought to build 
on European doubts about US interventionism, although this strategy was not entirely 
successful, since Germany increasingly sided with the US; this prevented the Contact 
Group from splitting into a partnership of the Europeans against America, which would 
have destroyed the consensual approach. 112 For all of the powers, the perceived interests 
in maintaining great power unity and containing the crisis out-weighed the risks of a 
more interventionist stance. As Ludlow writes, 
The [Contact] Group was in many ways seen as an experiment in international 
diplomacy, and this had implications for the negotiations on Bosnia. At times the 
driving force appeared to be the will to maintain European/Russian/American 
solidarity, even if this meant unwelcome compromises at potentially crucial stages 
of the peace process. A strong adverse reaction from one participant often resulted 
in the other representatives, even if they saw merit in the proposals, acquiescing in 
the interests of maintaining solidarity. ' 13 
This was to change with the escalation of the conflict in spring 1995 
1 09 Grudinina (16 December 1994). 
10 Sloan (1998), p. 64. 
'11 Ibid. 
112 Owen (1995b). 
113 Ludlow (1995). 
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Chapter 8 
Collapse of the great power concert and the end of the 
Bosnian conflict, May - December 1995 
The consensual approach, which was partly the consequence of Russia's insistence on 
its great power status and the necessity of its involvement in conflict resolution, 
maintained co-operative relations between the great powers but did little to resolve the 
conflict in Bosnia. Although a four-month cease-fire agreement negotiated by the 
former American president, Jimmy Carter, began on 1 February 1995, it was clear that 
the Bosnian government side, increasingly gaining strength, would not agree to a 
permanent cease-fire without the prior acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs of a peace plan 
that secured Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity and gave the Muslim-Croat 
Federation at least fifty-one per cent of the territory; while the Bosnian Serbs were 
determined to defend militarily the territory that they refused to give up through 
negotiations. The conflict was likely therefore to erupt ferociously at the end of the 
cease-fire. When this indeed happened in summer 1995, the Western powers considered 
that their own credibility, and that of NATO and the United Nations, was at stake since, 
after three years of war, their mediation and peace-keeping efforts appeared to have 
achieved very little. Led by the United States, NATO began to coerce the Bosnian Serbs 
to accept a peace agreement, in the process ignoring Russia's objections. Bringing an 
end to the conflict now out-weighed the risk of worsened relations with Russia in 
Western calculations, particularly for the Clinton administration with election year 
approaching. This action marked the failure of common great power diplomacy, since 
Russia was now pushed aside, and America took the lead in negotiating a cease-fire and 
then a peace settlement at Dayton, Ohio. Ultimately, the United States perceived that 
great power unity - in particular, between Russia and the West - was incompatible with 
effective peace enforcement. 
Russian policy was based on asserting its great power role in the Balkans and in 
conflict resolution. Not surprisingly, policy makers reacted angrily to the American and 
NATO actions. The domestic consensus was demonstrated as politicians across the 
political spectrum spoke out against the NATO air campaign and Russia's peripheral 
role. Nevertheless, the Yeltsin administration still valued co-operation with the West 
and also saw this as the only way to prevent Russia from being marginalised further. 
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Russia agreed therefore to participate in the NATO-led peace implementation force, 
IFOR. 
The events of summer 1995 showed that Russia had seriously over-estimated its 
own importance, as well as the achievements of Russian policy up to 1994. The 
Sarajevo agreement - Russia's greatest `triumph' - was increasingly broken, and its 
failure to protect the civilian population was demonstrated starkly by the mortar 
explosion in the market-place in 28 August 1995 that led to extensive NATO air strikes. 
And the conflict in Croatia, far from being `reduced to zero' as Churkin had claimed, 
erupted again dramatically in May 1995, the cease-fire having lasted only a few months. 
The Croatian offensives 
There had been major diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a permanent peaceful 
resolution of the situation in Croatia, which continued the co-operative work that had 
enabled the cease-fire agreement to be reached in March 1994. The forum was the 
`Zagreb Four' or `Z-4' of the US and Russian ambassadors to Croatia, Peter Galbraith 
and Leonid Kerestedzhiiants, and two ICFY diplomats, Geert Ahrens and Kai Eide. The 
Z-4 composed a draft agreement for Croatia that would have given Krajina a significant 
level of autonomy, incorporated Western Slavonia into the Croatian local government 
system - thus returning it fully to Croatia - and put Eastern Slavonia under UN- 
administration while demilitarisation occurred and refugees returned. The plan was a 
worthy co-operative attempt to use de-centralisation and autonomy to resolve the 
problem of minority rights in Croatia and reverse `ethnic cleansing', while preserving 
Croatia's territorial integrity. ' Unfortunately, it suffered a similar fate to the equivalent 
plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Vance-Owen plan. The `international community' 
was not prepared to impose it nor even to defend the outlines of the plan in the face of 
its non-acceptance. The plan soon became irrelevant because the Croatian authorities 
chose to re-take Western Slavonia and Krajina by force. In early May 1995, the 
Croatian Army used an incident on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway as a pretext to re-take 
Sector West. Then, at the start of August, a full-scale offensive led to the re-capture of 
Krajina, and a mass exodus of the Serb population. 
Russian reactions to these events constituted, in part, a reasonable attempt to be 
objective/balanced, to demonstrate a consistent policy to such actions by whichever side 
they were committed, and to show that Russia opposed all solutions based on force. 
This was in contrast to what they saw as Western collusion in the Croatian offensive. 
1 Hodonj (1995). 
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The MFA categorically condemned the offensives and the use of force to resolve the 
Krajina issue, and accused the Croatian government of violating a number of UNSC 
resolutions and ignoring the UN Secretary-General's calls for restraint. 2 It criticised in 
particular the Croatian government's abandonment of negotiations with representatives 
of the `Republic of Serb Krajina' (RSK) in Geneva. According to the MFA, these 
negotiations 
gave the sides in the conflict a real possibility to achieve compromises, opening the 
way to a political settlement. To our deep regret, the Croat side showed no 
readiness to work out accords, adopting a position based on ultimatum. The 
conclusion must be drawn that Zagreb was already inclined to seek not a political 
but a purely military solution? 
Russia appealed to the Security Council to condemn the offensives. On 17 May, the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 994 calling for an end to the offensive in Sector West, and 
respect for the mandate and personnel of UNCRO (United Nations Confidence 
Restoration Operation, as the UN forces in Croatia had been re-named in March). This 
resolution was prepared in the Contact Group and then in the UNSC; 4 nevertheless, 
according to First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Ivanov, other members of these bodies 
were unwilling to condemn the offensive so clearly: 
This was not an easy resolution to reach. Not everyone at the UN Security Council 
wanted objectively to condemn the aggressor. The aggressor, regardless of who it 
is, should be condemned. Unfortunately, there have been precedents before when 
only one party was condemned, whereas the Russian Federation's partners 
sometimes closed their eyes at unlawful actions of other parties. ' 
Similarly, in relation to the Krajina offensive in August, the Russian Federation was the 
initiator of UNSCR 1009 of 10 August 1995 which condemned the Croat offensive and 
demanded that the Croatian government cease all military activities in Sectors North 
and South and comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions. Again, other states 
were unwilling initially to support such a resolution, which accounts for the delay in its 
adoption (the offensive began on 4 August). 6 
In fact, Russian diplomats were critical of the attitude both of Western 
governments and the United Nations. They argued that the West had encouraged the 
2 Russian Federation MFA (4 August 1995). 
3 Ibid.. 
4 Speech by Lavrov, United Nations Security Council (17 May 1995), pp. 5-6. 5 Interfax (18 May 1995). 
6 Russian Federation MFA (11 August 1995). 
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attacks, by allowing the arms embargo to be broken, 7 and by failing to react to clear 
signs that an attack was imminent; they accused Western governments of preferring to 
accept a solution to the Krajina problem based on `ethnic cleansing'. And they claimed 
that the UNCRO commanders had not reacted to the attack in a forceful manner, 
thereby casting into doubt the effectiveness of the UN peace-keeping mission in former 
Yugoslavia and contrasting with action taken against the Bosnian Serbs. 
These points were made explicitly by Kozyrev in a letter to Boutros-Ghali, 
distributed in the Security Council on 8 August: 
Alas, in Zagreb, an inclination towards the forcible integration of the Serb- 
inhabited regions prevailed, and was indirectly encouraged from the capitals of a 
number of leading states. 
We are faced with a case where the principles of a just settlement are 
sacrificed to the philosophy of `accomplished facts'. We consider that such an 
approach will have fatal consequences both for settling the Yugoslav crisis and, 
more widely, for the role that the UN is called upon to play in supporting and 
restoring peace and security... 
The absence of an appropriate reaction to the latest developments serves as an 
additional basis for accusing the UN of double standards. Very serious 
consideration needs to be paid to the circumstance in which the UNCRO command 
did not request (or did not receive? ) NATO air support for the defence of its 
personnel, moreover at the same time that NATO aircraft, called on by B. Janvier, 
were firing on the positions of the Krajina Serbs already subject to the Croat 
attack. ' 
Russian diplomats attempted to counter-act this partiality by taking measures 
designed to show impartiality and a balanced approach. They suggested that they might 
raise the question of imposing sanctions against Croatia, although they recognised that 
there was no point in taking this to the Security Council since other members would not 
support it. 9 They tried to arrange a summit meeting in Moscow between Tudjman and 
Milosevic, but Tudjman refused to attend; 1° in this he was again supported by Western 
governments, who were suspicious of a meeting between those two leaders without the 
' Ironically, one report claimed that Russia itself had sold tanks and anti-aircraft missile systems to 
Croatia; Fel'gengauer (5 August 1995). 
8 Russian Federation MFA (8 August 1995a). 
9 Comments by director of the MFA's Department for International Organisations and Global Problems, 
Aleksandr Gorelik, Interfax (7 August 1995) and (11 August 1995). Gorelik interpreted UNSCR 1009 as 
`a kind of compromise ... the most that could 
be achieved'. 
10 Letter by Yeltsin to UNSC, Interfax (10 August 1995). 
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Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, being present. " (The result was that only 
Milosevic went to meet Yeltsin in Moscow). In addition, Russia began to send 
humanitarian aid to Serb refugees from Croatia. Finally, Russian policy makers 
repeatedly highlighted what they referred to as Belgrade's `restrained' reaction to the 
Croat offensive, which they argued was another reason to lift sanctions against the 
FRY. 12 
To what extent was Russia's position justified? Vladimir Abarinov in Segodnia 
claimed that `[d]espite the undesirability of forcible measures, the restoration of the 
territorial integrity of Croatia, whose borders are recognised by the world community, is 
an entirely legitimate goal of a legitimate government'. 13 This suggests an obvious 
problem with the Russian position: the administration was opposing an operation by the 
Croatian government that had identical aims to Russia's own action in Chechnya, which 
was still continuing. The comparison was not lost to many Russian commentators. For 
example, Konstantin Eggert and Maksim lusin wrote in Izvestiia: 
As far as Russia is concerned, its arguments will hardly be taken seriously after the 
events in Chechnya: in the final analysis, Tudjman did exactly what Yeltsin 
attempted to do in the North Caucasus, but he did it much more skilfully and, most 
importantly, with little bloodshed. 14 
Even Aleksandr Zotov - from November 1994, Churkin's successor as Russian Special 
Envoy in former Yugoslavia - agreed with an interviewer in May 1995 that it was 
`difficult enough for us to say anything' about the Croat offensive in Western Slavonia 
after Chechnya. '5 
The attack on the UNPAs demonstrated the weakness of a policy of 
demilitarisation - which had occurred to a certain extent in Sector West, but not Sector 
East16 - when combined with a lack of will and resources on the part of the UN to 
defend the areas. Yet, one of Russia's key demands in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
demilitarisation of the `safe areas', while Russian diplomats also sought to limit the 
response by UN forces to an attack on the `safe areas', particularly the use of air strikes. 
The inadequacy of such a policy was shown by the fall of Srebrenica in July, but also by 
the Croat offensive in Krajina and Western Slavonia. 
11 Eggert and Iusin (11 August 1995). 
12 See, for example, Russian Federation MFA (4 August 1995). 
13 Abarinov (8 August 1995). 
" Eggert and lusin (8 August 1995); also, Fel'gengauer (5 August 1995). 
15 Russian Public TV (3 May 1995). 
16 Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky (1996), p. 114. 
206 
The hostage crisis and the creation of the Rapid Reaction 
Force 
In May 1995, firing across the lines of separation and infringements of the heavy 
weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo were increasingly occurring. The UN 
command gave the Serb side an ultimatum to return four heavy weapons to a depot or 
face air strikes. Apparent failure to meet the deadline led to NATO air strikes. The Serb 
forces responded by shelling Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica. This in 
turn led to further air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions near Pale. In response, the Serbs 
seized United Nations military observers as hostages. " 
Once again, Russian statements conveyed a confusing mixture of condemnation of 
the Bosnian Serb actions and of the NATO/UN reactions. Yeltsin told journalists that 
Russia was against the use of NATO aircraft, but had warned the Bosnian Serbs that an 
air strike would be inevitable if they did not stop military operations; '8 instead, `Serbian 
leaders continued the military operations and got what they deserved'. 19 Nevertheless, 
when Helmut Kohl and John Major asked for Russian help in resolving the hostage 
crisis, according to the President's press service, Yeltsin again expressed `serious 
dissatisfaction over the fact that the decision on the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs was 
adopted without any exchange of opinions with Russia'. He complained to the British 
and German leaders that `now, when as a result of this action, the situation has become 
exacerbated, Russia is being asked to help'. 20 This annoyance with the failure to consult 
with Russia was understandable given that, as a consequence of the air strikes, hostages 
were taken, among whom were Russian personnel. But this merely reinforces the point 
that, as before, Russian policy makers wanted consultation not only because of the 
respect that it would accord Russia, but in order to prevent NATO action. This was clear 
from the fact that Yeltsin told Major and Kohl that Russia would do `everything 
possible to end the fighting in Bosnia on the understanding that there [would] be no 
further bombing'. 2' As Vladimir Abarinov commented, Yeltsin had adopted `a familiar 
pose, Moscow is not against air raids - it is against not being consulted . 
22 
That this was merely a `pose' was shown at the ministerial level meeting of the 
Contact Group which took place at the end of May. According to Maksim lusin, 
" Shchedrunova (27 May 1995); Leurdijk (1996), p. 63. 
18 ITAR-TASSIInterfax (26 May 1995). 
19 Shchedrunova (27 May 1995). 
20 Interfax (26 May 1995). 
21 Ibid.. 
22 Abarinov (30 May 1995). 
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Kozyrev opposed categorically the inclusion in the final document of any possibility of 
further air strikes if the Serbs continued shelling towns and provoking the peace- 
keeping forces. 23 One of the diplomats accompanying Kozyrev confirmed that the 
Russian delegation had managed to `minimise the demands' of its Western partners, 
including the proposed deployment of a `rapid reaction' force to protect peace-keepers 
in Bosnia. 24 Nevertheless, the Western states proceeded to create such a force - the 
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) - as a way of keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia with better 
protection. 25 Russian officials were highly sceptical about this development, suspecting 
that the force was intended to allow more rigorous military action outside UN control. 
They insisted therefore that there be no radical change in the UNPROFOR mandate and 
that the RRF be under the control of the United Nations, 26 emphasising that the UN 
forces should not overstep the boundary between maintaining peace and imposing 
peace. 27 
Consequently, Russia abstained in the vote on UNSCR 998, which established the 
force. Lavrov explained Russia's position to the Security Council: 
In principle, we favour enhancing the security of United Nations personnel, 
including through providing UNPROFOR with a rapid-reaction capability. Russia 
is as interested as others in ending the treacherous actions against peace-keeping 
personnel, whatever their source. But strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to 
protect the lives and safety of its peace-keepers should in no way make United 
Nations forces a party to the conflict. " 
A declaration by the MFA gave a number of reasons for Russia's abstention: the 
resolution did not manage to avoid the impression that the RRF was directed against one 
of the Bosnian sides; it appeared to indicate to the sides in the conflict that the UN was 
ready to cross the boundary between peace-keeping and peace-making; and the 
presentation of the resolution for a vote in the UNSC was hasty, particularly since the 
financial implications were not clear and the Secretary-General's report on these had not 
yet been distributed to the Security Council members. 29 
Russian doubts about the intentions behind the creation of the RRF were probably 
justified. Although, in deference to Russia, the RRF was formally part of the on-going 
23 Iusin (31 May 1995). 
24 Abarinov (31 May 1995). 
25 Lewdijk (1996), pp. 70-1. 
26 Comments by Kozyrev, ITAR-TASS (5 June 1995a), and Karasin, ITAR-TASS (5 June 1995b). 
27 Comments by Karasin, ITAR-TASS (6 June 1995). 
28 United Nations Security Council (16 June 1995), p. 9. 
29 Russian Federation MFA (16 June 1995). 
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UN operation, in practice it was geared towards peace enforcement. 3° It was part of a 
process of creating the conditions for the use of force not only to implement UNSC 
resolutions, but to coerce the sides - that is, the Bosnian Serbs - to accept a peace plan 
based on the Contact Group proposals. In July, the `dual key' arrangements were 
streamlined, so that that the UN `key' was held by the military command of 
UNPROFOR, and not by the UN Secretary-General's envoy Yasushi Akashi. In June, 
UNPROFOR troops were withdrawn from all weapons collection points around 
Sarajevo in Bosnian Serb territory, so that the exclusion zone effectively no longer 
existed . 
31 There was now less danger of UN peace-keepers being taken hostage in 
retaliation for air strikes. At the same time, the RRF would make the use of force more 
effective. Hence, UNPROFOR was not withdrawn, but it was re-configured and re- 
deployed to ensure that air power was a more effective option. 
The fall of Srebrenica 
In April 1995, Serb forces besieging Srebrenica began to tighten their stranglehold on 
the town and prevented aid convoys from entering. In June, Muslim forces from the 
town raided and left in ruins two Serb villages in the Srebrenica vicinity. Serb forces 
responded with serious shelling and then closed in to take the town; by 9 July, they had 
surrounded and outnumbered the Dutch troops supposedly protecting the town, and 
taken thirty Dutch hostages from an observation post. The Bosnian Serbs then delivered 
an ultimatum: the United Nations and the Muslim population must evacuate the enclave 
within forty-eight hours. One Dutch peace-keeper was killed by a hand grenade as 
Muslims demanded effective defence from UNPROFOR. On the morning of 10 July, 
the Dutch commander, Colonel Karremans, requested air support, but this request was 
rejected by General Janvier. Karremans again called for air strikes at 6 p. m., and Janvier 
finally agreed later that evening. Fifty NATO planes were due to strike at 6 a. m. the 
following morning, but the final authorisation was not given and the planes eventually 
returned to base in Italy because they were short of fuel; subsequent reports suggest that 
the authorisation was not given because the request was made on the wrong form. 32 At 
10.30 a. m., the Serbs again began shelling. Finally, Janvier authorised air strikes at 
midday; at 2.40 p. m. two Dutch planes dropped two bombs on Serb positions, 
destroying at most one tank. Serb shelling intensified and more air strikes were 
requested but were abandoned when the Serbs threatened to execute the hostages and to 
30 Sloan (1998), pp. 72-3. 
31 Leurdijk (1996), p. 77. 
32 `A Cry from the Grave' (27 November 1999). 
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shell refugees. 33 At 4.15 p. m., Mladic entered the town to claim it. His entry was filmed 
by Serb camera crews, and he recorded the following speech to the camera: 
Here we are, on 11 July 1995 in Serbian Srebrenica just before a great Serb holy 
day. We give this town to the Serb nation. Remember the uprising against the 
Turks. The time has come to take revenge on the Muslims. 34 
Between 7,000 and 8,000 Muslim men were subsequently murdered: - either captured 
and executed, or shot and shelled as they attempted to escape to government-held 
territory. 
Official Russian reactions to the attack on Srebrenica were similar to reactions to 
previous attacks on `safe areas' and NATO air strikes. These reactions were patently 
inadequate in the circumstances, and reflected a lack of understanding of what was 
actually happening: policy makers were blinded by their suspicion of Western partiality 
and were confined by their insistence on `objectivity'. Karasin stated on 11 July that 
Russia shared the concerns expressed by the President of the UNSC (who had called for 
full observation of the status of the `safe areas', declared that the UN would not accept 
actions directed against UNPROFOR personnel, and demanded the immediate and 
unconditional release of the Dutch hostages). He continued: 
At the same time, we must state that the latest actions of the government forces, a 
direct result of which was the death of a Dutch serviceman from UNPROFOR, 
causes us deep concern. We consider them unacceptable. 
In this context we again emphasise that adequate assessments must be given to 
the actions of all sides with the application of `uniform standards'. " 
But the circumstances obviously did not demand `uniform' action against both sides. 
The following day, an MFA official described the NATO air strikes on a Bosnian 
Serb tank convoy near Srebrenica as `unjustified': 
These strikes were not necessary. The logic which guided those who decided to 
carry out the air strikes is incomprehensible. It was clear in advance that their 
effect would be the opposite to the expected one. That's how it turned out: 
essentially, two Serb tanks were put out of action and the Serbs got Srebrenica in 
exchange. 36 
33 Ibid.; Silber and Little (1996), pp. 345-349. 
34 `A Cry from the Grave' (27 November 1999). 
35 Russian Federation MFA (11 July 1995). 
361nterfaz (12 July 1995). 
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On his interpretation of events, he is quite right to describe the strikes as `senseless'. 
But his interpretation is flawed; it appears to be based on the notion that a single set of 
air strikes that damaged two tanks which were already entering Srebrenica caused the 
Serbs to capture the town. Apparently, also, the strikes had threatened the lives of 
UNPROFOR servicemen: `In other words, the effect of the demonstration of force was 
absolutely incomparable to the cost of using it. '37 Subsequent events suggest that the 
demonstration of force should have been more, not less, making its effect more 
comparable to the cost. 
Again, Russian officials pointed to the failure to achieve demilitarisation, rather 
than addressing the reasons why the Serb forces were besieging the town in the first 
place. In the Security Council, Vasilii Sidorov condemned the actions of the Bosnian 
Serb army in Srebrenica and expressed Russia's concern at the reports of `flagrant 
violations of the norm of international humanitarian law'. But he concluded: 
The lesson to be learned from events in Srebrenica and Zepa is that we need to 
address directly the concept of safe areas and the modalities for implementing that 
concept. It is important to take steps to determine what kind of safe area is 
acceptable to both sides. The relevant agreements should include an agreement on 
the demilitarisation of all territories. If this had been done earlier, as Russia 
repeatedly proposed, the tragic events in and around Zepa and Srebrenica might 
have been avoided. 38 
This was at best a contorted lesson to learn. The clear lesson was that in a war 
situation, where one side was aiming to gain a particular piece of territory and remove 
the inhabitants, creating a besieged `safe area' could only be a temporary, stop-gap 
measure, and the security of the population within the `safe area' could be guaranteed 
only by providing a credible deterrent based on the deployment of sufficient troops and 
the readiness to use force. Russian diplomats did not address these points, and sought to 
prevent the development of a credible deterrent, all in the name of `objectivity'. Even 
after it was obvious that the Bosnian Serb forces had seized Srebrenica, Russian 
diplomats continued to insist on demilitarisation and reject the use of NATO air power. 
For example, Sidorov told the Security Council on 12 July: 
Russia, like other members of the Security Council condemns the actions of the 
Bosnian Serb army in Srebrenica in violation of Security Council decision on safe 
31 Ibid.. 
38 United Nations Security Council (10 August 1995), pp. 13-15. Zepa also had fallen to the Bosnian Serb 
army on 25 July. 
211 
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina... We concur with the view on the need to restore 
the demilitarised status of the safe area of Srebrenica, which was also violated by 
the other side in the conflict. 
Unquestionably, this task is extremely complex and should be resolved in a 
serious fashion. We must again note that the use of air power is not the road to a 
solution. Nor do we see a solution in the withdrawal of United Nations forces from 
Bosnia or a build-up of pressure by force, which would have serious adverse 
consequences, but rather in ensuring the secure and effective functioning of 
UNPROFOR. 
We note that the draft resolution mandates the Secretary-General to use all 
resources available to him to restore the status as defined by the Agreement of 18 
April 1993 of the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the mandate of 
UNPROFOR. It is clear that this provision precludes the option of using force 
which would exceed the context of the present mandate of a peace-keeping 
operation. 
It is extremely important that any efforts to restore the safe area status not 
violate the impartiality of UNPROFOR and that they be fully consistent with 
present decision-making procedures and rules for conducting operations. We 
reaffirm that United Nations forces neither can be nor should undertake actions 
which would convert them into a party to the conflict. 39 
Sidorov did not explain how the status of `safe area' was to be restored without the use 
of force, nor exactly what action Russia proposed in order to ensure the `secure and 
effective functioning of UNPROFOR'. 
The Russian government presented its position as `objective'; as I shall argue in the 
conclusion, this was misguided in the circumstances and there are also reasons to 
believe that these claims were not entirely in good faith. In contrast, the opposition in 
Russia made little pretence of impartiality. On 12 July, the State Duma passed a 
declaration about `NATO actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina' which stated that the 
Duma 
resolutely condemns the new NATO air bombardments of the Bosnian Serbs in the 
region of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Time and again a situation has 
arisen in which provocations by the forces of the so-called Muslim-Croat 
Federation have not received a response from the side of the West and the United 
39 United Nations Security Council (12 July 1995), pp. 9-10. 
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Nations Organisation, causing answering actions by the Serb side, after which 
followed the one-sided military intervention of NATO forces. 40 
On the same day, the Duma passed on its second reading a resolution on ending Russian 
participation in the international sanctions against the FRY. But at no time did the 
Duma condemn the Srebrenica massacre. This contrasts with its reaction to the Croatian 
offensive in August, which it described as `aggression' leading to the `mass destruction 
of the peaceful population', and in which it demanded that the `genocide' be stopped. 4' 
Much of the reaction in the Russian press to the events in Bosnia was also myopic, 
in its obsession with Western partiality and refusal to recognise or criticise Bosnian 
Serb crimes. For example, Inga Svetlova wrote in Rossiiskaia gazeta that the NATO 
warplanes `light-heartedly dropped several bombs on the Serbs, reportedly damaging 
one tank', which was proof of NATO's `double standards'. She continued: 
One could ... argue that the 
Serbs formally crossed the line of `military decency' 
this time and did indeed encroach on the demilitarised zone. However, the 
immediate pretext for the strike was a report that the Serbs had arrested a group of 
Dutch soldiers, which turned out to be absolutely false. 42 
Even if we disregard the factual inaccuracy, the claim to `objectivity' ultimately masks 
bias, since it demands a deliberate blindness to the reality of the Bosnian Serb intentions 
and the scale of their crimes. While she admitted that the Serbs `do not conceal their 
intention to push further towards another Muslim enclave, Zepa', Svetlova wrote that 
the Bosnian Serb leadership was `reacting to flagrant violations of the status and 
arrangements governing the six demilitarised regions agreed upon with the UN, while 
NATO prefers to close its eyes to the Muslims' violations and abuses but continually 
seeks to punish the Serbs for the slightest infraction'. 43 
Srebrenica was hardly the `slightest' infraction, but many Russian observers 
refused to accept reports of the massacre as anything other than Muslim and Western 
propaganda. For example, in relation to the indictment of Mladic and Karadzic by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in November 1995, even the 
supposedly `liberal' Kommersant" daily cast doubt on the number of victims in 
Srebrenica and commented that 'UN observers who were in Srebrenica when the Serbs 
captured the town noted no instances of mass repression'. 44 
40 Russian Federation State Duma (12 July 1995). 
41 Russian Federation State Duma (12 August 1995). 
42 Svetlova (13 July 1995). 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Smirnov (18 November 1995). 
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The end of the great power concert 
The major Western powers decided after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa that any further 
attacks on the remaining `safe areas' would be met with resolute force. A second 
London Conference took place at the end of July, where the Western powers attempted 
to formulate an effective military response to future Serb attacks but again met Russian 
opposition. Kozyrev boasted that the Russian delegation managed to turn the debate in 
the direction of peace and point it towards the discussion of political approaches; 
attempts to turn the meeting into some kind of `conference for declaring aerial war' and 
to `bind' Russia into a scenario based on force were unsuccessful. 45 Nevertheless, he 
admitted that it had not been possible to draw up a joint final statement. Vladimir 
Abarinov noted the significance of this: `For the first time since it was created, the 
Contact Group was unable to adopt an agreed document. 46 
The Western powers realised that it was now more feasible to use air power 
because there was less chance of reprisals against UNPROFOR after Srebrenica and 
Zepa had fallen and the peace-keepers left. There were still British and Ukrainian troops 
in Gorazde, but they were withdrawn in August before the NATO air strikes began, 47 
and an offer by Russia to provide peace-keepers in Gorazde was rejected. 
48 This did not 
mean that NATO would not respond to an attack on the town, but that it would use air 
power on a large scale, without being restricted by the threat of hostage-taking. 
49 The 
intention clearly was to react to any Bosnian Serb attack on a `safe area' with force, not 
just to defend the `safe area', but to coerce the Bosnian Serbs to accept a peace 
settlement based on the Contact Group plan. The Western powers believed that recent 
events - the fall of Srebrenica and 
Zepa and the re-taking of Krajina by Croatian forces 
- had increased the prospects for peace, since apparently irresolvable problems had in 
effect been `solved' by force. -50 The pattern of occupation was beginning to approximate 
the envisaged map and this process continued with Muslim-Croat gains. 
Hence, on 1 August, British, French, and American generals warned Mladic that 
NATO and the United Nations would meet any further attacks on `safe areas' with 
45 ITAR-TASS (22 July 1995). 
46 Abarinov (25 July 1995). 
47 Sloan (1998), p. 74. 
48 For the offer, see Interfax (26 July 1995); Yeltsin claimed that Russia had reached an agreement with 
Milogevi6 and Nfladid that Bosnian Serb forces would not enter Gorazde and that Russia would send its 
peace-keepers there if absolutely necessary; ITAR-TASS (7 August 1995). 
9 Leurdijk (1996), p. 76. 
50 In contrast, Demurin argued that there was a danger that the situation in Croatia could get out of 
control, and disagreed with the view that the Croatian offensive created a favourable situation for a 
political settlement; Russian Federation MFA (8 August 1995b). 
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`disproportionate' and `overwhelming' force. 51 Russian officials were well aware that 
such action was imminent, and that NATO was merely awaiting a pretext. In an 
interview in early August, Yeltsin remarked on the change in direction: 
The UN peace-keeping forces have a clear-cut mandate to keep the peace. But 
recent decisions - to deploy a rapid reaction force with heavy weapons at its 
disposal, the preparation of plans for massive air strikes, and the switching of the 
`dual key' principle to a technical level - increasingly indicate that the existing 
mandate is being changed. There is no doubt that all these actions fall under a 
mandate - of peace coercion. But any change in the mandate of the peace-keeping 
forces can only be made by a special decision of the UN Security Council. 32 
Attempting to avert such action, Russia increased its diplomatic activity. Even as 
early as June, Moscow had resumed relations with the Bosnian Serbs, with Churkin 
visiting Belgrade and Pale after the hostages were released. The MFA explained that it 
was striving to `make every effort to direct the situation towards a political 
settlement'. 53 On 27 July, Yeltsin sent an outline of the `Russian plan' for a peaceful 
settlement to the leaders of the other Contact Group countries. Unfortunately, the plan 
contained few details and merely repeated Russia's established position: 
commencement of a direct dialogue between the parties, practical implementation of 
proposals by the co-chairmen of the ICFY which envisaged the mutual recognition of 
the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the lifting of a significant proportion of the 
sanctions against the FRY. 54 Beyond this proposal to lift sanctions, Russian diplomats 
presented no clear programme of incentives and disincentives. The root problem with 
Russia's diplomacy was expressed clearly by Pavel Fel'gengauer: `Moscow has neither 
a carrot nor a stick - it is not in a position to back up its diplomatic initiatives with 
55 promises of assistance or with a threat to use military force'. 
The domestic context 
The Russian government was attempting to maintain a compromise position between 
domestic pro-Serb pressure and international demands for action against the Bosnian 
Serbs. This had been possible during the previous year, but was more difficult after the 
recent developments in the conflicts and growing Western impatience to achieve a 
st Sloan (1998), p. 74. 
52 Rossiiskie vesti (10 August 1995). Obviously, Russia would not support such a decision; NATO 
therefore acted without a mandate. 
53 Abarinov (21 June 1995). 
54 Comments by Igor Ivanov, Interfax (27 July 1995). 
55 Fel'gengauer (12 August 1995). 
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peace settlement. The government's balancing act was criticised both by liberals and by 
nationalists in Russia. Liberals attacked Yeltsin and his government for continuing to 
protect the Bosnian Serbs which, as well as being morally objectionable, was not in 
Russia's interests. For example, Pavel Kandel' argued that the creation of a `Greater 
Serbia' and a `Greater Croatia' had been the purpose of the war from the beginning, but 
Russian foreign policy had `reached the point of undisguised support for Serb claims'. 
He pointed out that `support of the Greater Serbian ideal is incompatible with 
international law and with peace in the Balkans', and continued: 
In any case, the Serbs are pursuing their own interests, however misunderstood. 
What is less understandable is why Russia should sacrifice its own interests for the 
Serbs. In 1914, this led to its being drawn into a war for which it was unprepared. 
But then Russia at least had a significant objective - the straits. What does Russia's 
support of Greater Serbian plans offer it today? they talk of an `historical ally'. But 
what benefits can Russia expect to gain from an alliance with an international 
outcast? s6 
lusin and Eggert shared this view that Yeltsin had `unconditionally taken the side 
of the Serbs'. Furthermore, they questioned the possibility of a Russian mediating role: 
`It is impossible to understand how Russia expects to play the role of mediator in the 
future when its leader has not demonstrated even a semblance of objectivity. '57 
Meanwhile, Fel'gengauer argued that Russia's policy in `war-torn ex-Yugoslavia is 
determined first of all by domestic political considerations, as well as by the personal 
ambitions of individual politicians and diplomats'. 58 And Abarinov attacked Russia's 
policy of calling for sanctions to be lifted because of Belgrade's `policy of peace': 
`Milosevic has not moved one step from his positions, and now the linkage with 
recognition of Bosnia has dissolved in the fog of general phrases about the peace-loving 
nature of Belgrade and Moscow. '59 
Realist and nationalist commentators attacked the government from the other 
direction, accusing it of sacrificing Russia's own interests and the interests of the Serbs 
for the sake of Russia's relations with the West; they argued that Russia should lift 
sanctions unilaterally and offer the Serbs military support. For example, Elena 
Gus'kova criticised the government for not halting the move towards NATO force 
during the previous few months: 
56 Kandel' (2-9 July 1995). 
57 Eggert and lusin (12 August 1995). 
58 Fe1'gengauer (12 August 1995). 
59 Abarinov (26 July 1995). 
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Russia silently swallowed the propaganda bait about NATO's new peace-making 
missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and agreed to all of Washington's actions... 
Unfortunately, the Russian President was far from resolute in condemning the 
shift to a forcible solution of Balkan problems-60 
Referring to Yeltsin's attempt to `regain the role of chief peace-maker in the 
blazing Balkans, ' Evgenii Fadeev regretted that `the world does not listen to Russia 
now': 
Let us recall that throughout the bloody conflict in the Balkans, Russia has never 
yet decided on open confrontation with the West over the problems of the Serbs, a 
people with whom Russia is linked by close bonds that go back many centuries. 61 
Obviously, Fadeev believed that Russia should risk open confrontation with the 
West. Other nationalists believed that Russia, like the FRY government, was 
abandoning the Bosnian Serbs because of Western pressure. Such a view became 
common in the nationalist and communist press when NATO embarked on its air 
campaign at the end of August. An extreme example comes from Zavtra (as the 
nationalist newspaper Den' had been renamed): 
At this time of peril for the Serbs, when the German `Luftwaffe' is shelling radar 
installations in Bosnia, when Croatian vultures are bombing columns of Krajina 
refugees, when fat and stupid America is preparing an invasion armada, when 
Milosevic, who considers himself a Serb, is doing nothing, when `Bill's and 
Helmut's friend' Yeltsin is behaving treacherously as usual, and when the 
perfidious Catholics, crafty Jews and the frenzied Muslims are throwing down the 
Orthodox Cross in the Balkans, - one incorruptible and splendid face shines its 
light on Russia and Serbia. Your face, brother Radovan; your face, friend 
Karadzic! 62 
The Sarajevo mortar attack and Operation `Deliberate Force' 
The `pretext' for NATO's air campaign turned out to be not Gorazde, but Sarajevo. On 
28 August 1995, a mortar exploded near the Markale market-place in which the mortar 
had landed in February 1994, this time killing thirty-seven people. Unlike in 1994, the 
UN investigators declared within twenty-four hours that the shell had been fired by the 
Bosnian Serbs. The Russian MFA accepted this conclusion although, after the NATO 
60 Gus'kova (1 September 1995). 
61 Fadeev (12 August 1995). 
62 Zavtra (August 1995). 
217 
air campaign had continued for more than a week, Lavrov demanded more information 
about the investigation; having `accepted the information' of the UN investigation `on 
trust', Russia expected more explanations of the basis of its conclusions, `especially 
since there have been reports in the press putting it into doubt'. 
63 
One such report was by Gus'kova in an article in Krasnaia zvezda, in which she 
expressed strong scepticism about the investigation and its aims, and referred to the 
comment by the [Russian] commander of the UN peace-keeping forces in Sarajevo, 
Aleksandr Demurenko, that, for technical reasons, the likelihood of the shell being fired 
by Serb forces was `one in a million'. 64 Gus'kova concluded that 
[t]here is no doubt that the explosion in the Markale market-place was a planned 
action - planned this time even more thoroughly than in February 1994 - that was 
required as a pretext. Above all, for activating the mechanism of replacing 
UNPROFOR with NATO forces. 65 
Some officials also took up this theme. The Russian ambassador to the FRY, 
Gennadii Shikin, claimed that there had been `no investigation as such' since the UN 
experts `hastened to blame the Bosnian Serbs'. 
66 And Grachev claimed on 14 
September that it was `now clear that the staged blast' was a pretext for the NATO 
campaign and `the blame was hastily placed on the Bosnian Serbs, without any serious 
investigation'. 67 He was influenced, perhaps, by the comments of a Russian Defence 
Ministry officer who had just returned from the Balkans and was reported by ITAR- 
TASS as suggesting that the blast was the handiwork of NATO special services in an 
operation called `Cyclone 2', and that the February 1994 blast was also a NATO plot, 
entitled `Cyclone 1'. 68 
NATO responded to the mortar explosion by launching Operation `Deliberate 
Force', a large-scale air campaign against Bosnian Serb military installations. The 
specific purpose was to re-establish the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Janvier outlined the 
demands of NATO and the UN authorities in a letter to Mladic on 3 September: no 
more attacks on the [remaining] `safe areas', withdrawal to twenty kilometres from 
Sarajevo, freedom of movement for the UN and Non-Governmental Organisations 
63 Russian Federation MFA (8 September 1995). 
64 Gus'kova (1 September 1995); Demurenko's comments are also quoted in Markovie (1996), p. 199. 
65 GUS'kova (1 September 1995). 
66 Interfax (30 August 1995). 
67 ITAR-TASS (14 September 1995). 
68 Platkovskii and Sychov (13 September 1995); the Izvestiia reporters found the report unconvincing, and 
instead accused the Russian intelligence ministries, supported by the Russian leadership, of inventing a 
mythical plot 
218 
(NGOs), and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport. 69 But the broader purpose of the 
operation was to coerce the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, in correlation with 
an American diplomatic offensive. 70 
Russian policy makers might have accepted a limited NATO response to the mortar 
attack in order to re-establish the Sarajevo exclusion zone. For example, Igor' 
Shcherbak, deputy director of the MFA's Department for International Organisations 
and Global Problems, suggested that the Serbs' `barbaric' shelling of civilians in 
Sarajevo was precisely the sort of `scandalous case' in response to which Russia 
considered punitive strikes by NATO to be appropriate. " But Russian diplomats 
certainly rejected any broader purpose. As Lavrov put it, 
Russia 
... condemned the 
barbaric shelling of the Sarajevo market and was the first 
to call for conducting an investigation and punishing those responsible. However, 
we feel that the reaction of the leadership of the UN and NATO forces to that 
action is clearly inappropriate. Above all, it exceeds the bounds of the situations in 
which the Security Council has authorised the use of force - the defence of peace- 
keeping forces, the protection of humanitarian convoys, and the containment of 
military threats to civilians. The Serbs have indeed created such a threat to 
Sarajevo. But instead of neutralising their gun emplacements that they used to shell 
the city, NATO has set about destroying the Serbs' military potential not only 
around Sarajevo, but throughout the entire theatre of military actions. n 
Lavrov told the Security Council that NATO had seriously violated UNSC 
resolutions in five ways: the necessary consultations with Security Council members 
required by UNSCR 844 were not held; air and artillery strikes were disproportionate 
and applied on a wide scale without any decision by the UNSC to alter the principle of 
proportionality; the `dual key' procedure had been abandoned since the UN could not 
halt the use of force if NATO did not agree; media reports suggested that a secret 
`memorandum' had been made between NATO and the UN on the use of force, without 
the Security Council or countries with peace-keeping contingents in Bosnia (especially 
Russia) being informed; and the RRF's participation in attacks on Serb positions 
exceeded the limits of its mandate as defined by UNSCR 998.73 
Once again, these complaints related to the lack of inclusion of Russia in the 
decision making process. Karasin told journalists that Russia had not been informed or 
69 Lewdijk (1996), p. 80. 
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consulted before the NATO strikes began. Indeed, at the meeting of the Contact Group 
on 29 August, there was no serious discussion of the possibility of such actions, and the 
Russian representative gained the impression that all of the representatives saw the need 
to press on with the positive developments towards a peace settlement and not be 
diverted by the Sarajevo incident. 74 More generally, Russia was concerned at the by- 
passing of the UNSC and the implications this had for the international system and 
Russia's position within it. In order to reassert the Security Council's authority, Russia 
demanded a meeting of the UNSC, prepared a resolution demanding an end to the 
campaign (which was supported only by China and Nigeria), and called on the UN 
leadership to use its own authority to stop military actions. 75 
This concern with the procedure for decision making and the scale of the NATO air 
strikes is understandable: the action did abandon the principle of `proportionality' and 
did exceed the existing mandate, and this decision was made by NATO with the support 
of the UN military command in Bosnia. But Russian concern went beyond the 
implications for UN decision-making and the lack of consultation with Russian 
representatives. David Owen writes that `President Yeltsin criticised the NATO 
bombing but Russia was in effect acquiescent; they wanted proper consultation'. 76 This 
again implies that the Russian administration objected to lack of consultation, not the 
bombing campaign itself, which is simply not true. Russian policy makers wanted 
consultation not simply because they wanted to be involved in decision making, but also 
in order to prevent or veto such a campaign by NATO. 
Reasons for Russian opposition to `Deliberate Force' 
Diplomats gave a number of reasons why they opposed operation `Deliberate Force'. 
Firstly, the MFA, pointing out that the bombing continued even after the Serbs had 
accepted the terms of the ultimatum, argued that there was `no logic' to the NATO 
action and that it was purely `punitive', with the aim of defeating the Bosnian Serbs. 77 
Hence, NATO was entering the war on one side, whereas responsibility was borne by 
all sides. 78 
Secondly, Russian diplomats argued that the air campaign would hinder rather than 
promote the political process towards a settlement. An MFA declaration stated that the 
74 Russian Federation MFA (31 August 1995a). 
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only result of the NATO action would be a worsening and deepening of the conflict. 79 
Furthermore, the MFA claimed that the strikes risked damaging the positive changes 
that were taking place in relation to a political settlement, 8° although the only proof that 
it gave of these improvements was that the Bosnian Serbs had agreed, before the strikes 
began, to participate in negotiations as part of a single Yugoslav delegation .81 
In 
addition, Zotov claimed that it was wrong to think that bombing could force the Serbs to 
enter negotiations, echoing an opinion often expressed in the Russian nationalist press: 
The supporters of this `theory' are not familiar with local conditions or with the 
psychology of the Serbs. The greater the toughness towards and the pressure on the 
Bosnian Serbs, the fewer the chances of bringing their actions within the peace 
process and the more stubbornly they will resist. 92 
And Russian diplomats also argued that the one-sidedness of the action would 
encourage the Muslim-Croat Federation to fight on. Consequently, the action did not 
promote peace, 83 but instead provided the `very catalyst' for the other side - the 
Muslim-Croat forces - to embark on an offensive. 
84 
All of this, of course, contrasted with the opinion of Western policy makers, who 
believed that the air strikes would force the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate and accept a plan 
based on the Contact Group map, and also that the Muslim-Croat offensive promoted 
such a settlement because it made the balance of territory closer to that envisaged in the 
map. They were also aware of the danger of the Federation side abandoning the map 
and continuing the offensive, which is one reason why, contrary to Russian claims, the 
strikes, though large scale, were not aimed at destroying the Bosnian Serb army. 85 
Contrary to Owen, Russia did more than `criticise' the NATO campaign: the MFA 
`resolutely condemned' NATO's military actions and demanded that they end. 86 The 
MFA also argued that NATO was more concerned with its own role than with achieving 
a peaceful settlement. As I have already argued, by this stage NATO action `out of area' 
in Bosnia was linked in Russian minds with NATO expansion into Central and Eastern 
Europe in three senses: it was in effect de facto expansion, it gave NATO a new role 
that reinforced its status and put it at the centre of the new European security 
arrangements, and such action might set a precedent for similar action in the former 
79 Russian Federation MFA (5 September 1995). 
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Soviet Union. These three fears were evident in official reactions to Operation 
`Deliberate Force'. At a wide-ranging press conference on 8 September, Yeltsin said 
that what was happening in Bosnia was `only the first sign of what could happen if that 
organisation expanded... NATO is now showing what it is capable of . 97 And he 
warned: `When NATO comes right up to Russia's borders, one can count on there being 
two military blocs'. In a similar vein, the MFA issued a declaration which stated: 88 
one gets the impression that NATO, taking refuge behind statements of its 
attachment to a political solution, is in fact turning the long-suffering land of 
Bosnia into a testing ground for its `new role' in European and international 
affairs. 89 
In an oblique reference to the Partnership for Peace programme, Yeltsin also warned 
that, if the action continued, Russia would have to reconsider its relations with the 
alliance. 90 
Official Russian statements revealed not only this anti-NATO stance, but also an 
increasingly pro-Serb approach which exaggerated the effects of the NATO bombing. 
This was most evident in a government declaration of 12 September: 
Despite numerous protests, the NATO command continues to inflict bomb and 
rocket strikes on Serb positions in Bosnia. As a result of this action, innocent 
civilians are dying, including the most defenceless among them - children. 
While nobody has calculated exactly the number of victims, there is no doubt 
that the tragic list is very long and is growing by the day. It is difficult to determine 
the number of children and young people who, as a consequence of the unjustified 
military actions, are without parents and without shelter. In this way, the survival 
of the present generation of Bosnian Serbs is put in doubt, and it is practically 
threatened with genocide. 
The Russian Government resolutely protests against the harsh, one-sided use 
of the military power of NATO in Bosnia against the Serb population. We cannot 
remain indifferent to the tragic fate of the children of our brother-Slavs. 91 
"' Zuichenko (9 September 1995). 
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The domestic Russian response 
This language was directed not just at the West, but also at a domestic audience. It was 
designed in part to appease the Duma, which reacted much as would be expected to the 
NATO action. On 9 September, the Duma passed a resolution in relation to the 
`barbaric' NATO actions. It called on the President to insist on an immediate meeting of 
the UNSC to discuss the `mass extermination of the Serbs and the responsibility of 
NATO for aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina, causing the mass extermination of 
the civilian population'; to sign the laws on lifting sanctions against the FRY and 
imposing sanctions on Croatia, and consider military-technical co-operation with the 
FRY; to work out a joint position with Ukraine and Belarus and other members of the 
CIS and Balkan states; and to relieve Kozyrev of his duties for `the many mistakes that 
he has made and that have led to the humiliating failure of Russian diplomacy in the 
Balkans and to the discrediting of the Russian Federation, its President and its 
parliament'. 92 
Opposition to the NATO action came from across the political spectrum. Lukin 
regretted that Russia and the US did not act as partners in resolving the Balkan crisis 
because `the US defines what is good for Russia (both in implementing the US plan for 
Bosnia and in deciding on the expansion of NATO) and acts in accordance with its own 
interests'; and he used the familiar argument against NATO action that it would `have a 
negative effect on the Russian democratic process and the natural outcome of the 
elections'. 93 The Duma Speaker, Ivan Rybkin, a member of the Agrarian party, believed 
that the Russian government had to take `all the necessary measures' to stop the 
bombing so that there would be `no more bombing with impunity'. 94 Zhirinovskii 
claimed that a `normal foreign minister' in Moscow would have prevented the NATO 
action; he claimed that he himself would have recalled the Russian ambassadors from 
NATO countries, equipped the Serbs with anti-aircraft systems, and sent Russian 
warships to the Adriatic. 95 Another future presidential candidate, Aleksandr Lebed, 
claimed that 'NATO's true face' had been shown in the Bosnian crisis, arguing that 
NATO was `holding Russia at gunpoint'; Russia was left without allies and without 
friends, and `only a nuclear shield [could] save it from aggression from the West'. 96 The 
chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Konstantin Zatulin, joined the 
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attack on Kozyrev, claiming that, since the Serb side regarded most Russian diplomats 
and Kozyrev `with total distrust', the minister's resignation was needed to `restore the 
confidence of our traditional ally'. 97 
Zatulin was one of a delegation of Duma deputies that travelled to former 
Yugoslavia in order to collect information about the consequences of the NATO air 
strikes for the Serbs in Bosnia and about the `genocide' committed against the Serbs in 
Krajina. The leader of the delegation, Sergei Glotov, said that `the world must learn the 
whole truth about the Yugoslav crisis and not be guided merely by reports in the 
Western press which accuse the Serbs in a biased way of atrocities which they have 
allegedly committed'. 98 After the visit, the deputies held a press conference in which 
they described the UN stance in the Balkans conflicts as an attempt to `create a mono- 
polar structure of the world', and called for immediate Russian military aid to the 
Bosnian Serbs. 99 A second delegation visited Yugoslavia a few days later, this time 
headed by Rybkin; the deputies stressed that their visit, and that of previous delegations, 
symbolised moral support to Yugoslavia, although their primary goal was `to contribute 
to the settlement of the crisis'. Yugoslav parliamentarians said that they appreciated 
highly the `principled and objective position of the State Duma since the outbreak of the 
Yugoslav crisis' and its `huge efforts to end the crisis'. 1°° 
Yet, even in the Duma, opinion was not unanimous. One delegate on this visit 
disassociated himself from the majority's `principled and objective' position: Sergei 
lushenkov, chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, criticised the Duma's one-sided 
approach which, in his opinion, failed to serve Russia's strategic interests but instead 
benefited reactionary generals and the military-industrial complex, as well as nationalist 
and orthodox-communist forces that intended to use anti-Western hysteria in the 
forthcoming election campaign. lushenkov noted that the position of unconditional 
support for the Bosnian Serbs taken by the Duma in relation to Bosnia was fully 
matched in Yugoslavia itself only by the Serbian Radical Party, which was the 
equivalent of the LDPR. IOI This last point was certainly correct; on 22 October, 
Zhirinovskii and the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, Vojislav §eselj, signed in 
Belgrade an agreement on political alliance of the two parties. 102 
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Differing responses within the administration 
The administration unanimously opposed the NATO action. Nevertheless, there were 
some differences between the governmental branches over how to respond. President 
Yeltsin followed his populist instincts and echoed the nationalist rhetoric of the Duma 
and some elements of the press. This was particularly evident in his press conference of 
8 September: 
These bombings are inadmissible. Taking into account Russian-Serbian relations, 
we must respond appropriately to the actions of the Croats and the Croatian [sic] 
Muslims, by helping the Serbs. 
On Thursday [7 September] I signed a decree providing humanitarian aid to 
the Bosnian Serbs, and we are already helping them. The longer things go on, the 
greater the aid. And then we shall see; if such actions continue, it could come to 
something hotter [delo doidet do bolee goriachego]. 103 
This rhetoric was designed in part to assuage criticism from the Duma. So too was 
his attack on the work of the MFA, which was reminiscent of October 1992 when the 
administration's foreign policy had also been subjected to criticism. Yeltsin again 
declared that he was not satisfied with the MFA's performance, and reported that at a 
recent meeting of the MFA collegium he had `stated bluntly what its mistakes and 
shortcomings were and in what way Russia was losing ground in the international arena 
on account of the ministry's performance'. '°4 In his view, responsibility for this lay with 
Kozyrev, who, he said, `hasn't been around lately and is always flying around 
somewhere'. '°5 The following month, it was widely reported that Yeltsin was still 
dissatisfied with the MFA's work and was looking for an appropriate candidate to 
replace Kozyrev. 106 
The Russian Defence Ministry adopted a stance defined mostly by its anti-NATO 
aspect but also reflecting support for the Serbs. The latter was shown by a three-day 
visit to `Republika Srpska' by a delegation from the Defence Ministry, led by the 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Zhurbenko, which went to observe 
the effects of the NATO campaign and the Muslim-Croat offensive. The delegates met 
Mladic and Karadzic, for whom the visit was `a sign of friendship and understanding of 
the Russian people and an expression of their support for the just struggle of the Serbs 
103 Rossiiskie vesti (9 September 1995). 
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in the Serb republic'. 107 The Defence Ministry's anti-NATO attitude was evident in the 
linkage made between the NATO campaign and Russia's relations with the alliance. For 
example, Grachev warned his American counterpart, William Perry, that continued 
NATO action would extend the conflict beyond the Balkans; in these conditions, Russia 
would be compelled to review its approach towards the Partnership for Peace 
programme, and Russia's implementation of a number of international treaties in the 
military field might also be affected by the NATO action in order for Russia to preserve 
its state national security. 108 One practical effect of this division was the postponement 
of joint Russian-American military exercises; as Grachev explained to the press, while a 
war was underway and the Bosnian Serbs were being bombed, `it wouldn't be healthy' 
to hold joint exercises, `the people simply would not understand us'. 109 
As we have seen, the MFA also was categorically opposed to the NATO operation, 
and likewise admitted that Russia might have to end the programme of co-operation 
with NATO if differences over its use of force in Bosnia remained. 10 Nevertheless, the 
MFA avoided siding openly with the Bosnian Serbs, and tried to diminish the impact of 
the crisis on relations with the West. Kozyrev in particular attempted to calm emotions 
in Russia and to prevent an outright split with NATO and the members of the Contact 
Group. In addition to criticising NATO, he launched a counter-attack against his 
domestic opponents; rather than adopt a low profile in the face of attacks from the 
Duma and even the President, he conducted a series of television interviews. On 6 
September, he accused the Duma of attempting to `prove itself in Bosnia instead of 
tackling pressing domestic legislation, and of advocating a foreign policy in which 
Russia would be `tossed between isolation and confrontation'. "' The following day, he 
pointed out that most of the other members of the international community, including 
neutral and developing countries, believed that the NATO air strikes were legitimate, 
and also pointed out that the strikes were a consequence of a request from the UN; 
hence, Russia's voice sounded `rather lonely', yet the Duma expected the administration 
to `enter confrontation with the rest of the world'. Instead, Kozyrev defended a 
pragmatic approach: 
Yes, we are against the NATO operation but we can see reality. We are advocating 
our position but we are not going into confrontation with the whole world around 
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us. And we continue the most important thing, that is, our political efforts to get the 
situation back on peaceful tracks. ' 12 
Kozyrev singled out Vladimir Lukin for criticism, accusing him of having `no 
suggestions apart from criticising the government', which basically `left the road clear' 
for Zhirinovskii. 13 This attack was not merely a reflection of the history of tensions 
between the two men; Kozyrev also felt frustrated that other `reformers' were taking 
such a negative stance, although, as I have argued, it was consistent with their neo- 
realist outlook. This was also shown by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 
(CFDP), a think-tank of state centric academics and politicians, which blamed the 
`failed policies of the present Russian MFA' for the fact that Russia was threatened 
`more than ever' and its position on important international problems simply `spat 
on'. 114 
Kozyrev's policy was the only feasible approach that could allow Russia to 
maintain reasonable relations with the West and still express opposition to the air strikes 
and exert pressure on NATO to halt them. A more pro-Serb policy would, indeed, have 
left Russia in international isolation, with even the FRY now recognising that America 
was the key international player. This pragmatic policy, of course, would never satisfy 
the Duma, for political and ideological reasons. As Abarinov put it: 
No matter how the President tries to soothe the lawmakers, nothing will be enough 
for them. The stakes in this game are too high for them to be satisfied with 
symbolic gestures. Another issue is that on the threshold of elections, the Duma 
will not be satisfied with any measures, even a declaration of war on NATO. 1' 
Behind the populist rhetoric and the increasingly incoherent and erratic comments, 
Yeltsin also recognised that partnership with the West was not worth abandoning for the 
sake of the Bosnian Serbs. Such a move would be neither in Russia's interests nor in his 
own political interests, since he had placed so much emphasis on relations with the 
West during his presidency. After Yeltsin summoned the ministers involved in foreign 
and defence policy to a meeting in Sochi, Kozyrev claimed that he had received a 
mandate from the President, and that Yeltsin's earlier criticism was `in a way an 
expression of confidence' showing that he expected the minister `to make amends'. And 
certainly, if his account of Yeltsin's instructions was accurate, then Yeltsin had in fact 
endorsed Kozyrev's own line: 
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we shall continue our struggle, but the president has given a clear instruction: to act 
within the bounds of international law, not to lapse into confrontation, but to argue 
for our interests through co-operation and partnership with the world around US. 116 
Conciliatory moves 
Consequently, the MFA's more moderate approach prevailed and, as soon as the NATO 
air strikes were suspended after two weeks, Moscow began to make conciliatory 
gestures and more moderate statements aimed at boosting international co-operation and 
Russian involvement in the peace process. For instance, coinciding with a visit to 
Moscow by the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Yeltsin vetoed the Duma 
laws on lifting sanctions. "7 On 13 September, a senior MFA official was reported as 
stating that despite the `complexity of the situation' in Bosnia, Russia's position on the 
`political settlement of the conflict and on the very possibility of such a settlement' was 
basically similar to that of the Western countries. "" Certainly, the major powers still 
favoured a settlement based on a 51: 49 per cent division of the territory, as the Contact 
Group had always proposed. 
Igor' Ivanov made it clear that Russia's sharp criticism of the NATO strikes did not 
mean that it intended to stop its work in the Contact Group, nor that there was `any 
threat' of a split in the group. 119 The same applied to the Security Council; by 22 
September, Moscow was expressing satisfaction with the `spirit of interaction' finally 
developing among the UNSC members after the Security Council had, on Russia's 
initiative, adopted Resolution 1016 which demanded that the Bosnian and Croatian 
government forces end their offensive. ' 20 As I have suggested, this coincided with 
Western diplomatic aims, but the Western governments also supported the resolution 
because they realised that Russia needed to be treated delicately and to be encouraged to 
continue co-operating. 
Hence, as Bovt and Kalashnikova wrote in Kommersant" daily, everything was 
`proceeding as if Boris Yeltsin had never made any harsh statements with 
confrontational overtones about NATO, and NATO had never responded to them with 
perfect equanimity'. 12' Although Yeltsin again attacked NATO's policy in Bosnia and 
in Eastern Europe at the fiftieth anniversary session of the United Nations General 
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Assembly, 122 at the subsequent summit meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin at Hyde 
Park (USA), both presidents were intent on demonstrating that partnership between 
Russia and the West had been preserved. 123 As in Feburary 1994, Russian diplomats, 
while insisting that they had been right to object to NATO's actions, sought to play 
down the differences in the hope of encouraging reconciliation and establishing a 
heightened Russian role. 
This was evident in comments by Sergei Lavrov, interviewed on Itogi news 
programme. He began by stating: 
We are in no doubt that NATO exceeded the powers which it received from the 
Security Council ... and this 
is alarming, not only from the point of view of the 
Bosnian crisis, but it has wider implications for the future. 
But, later in the interview, he denied that Russia had `quarrelled with America': 
I do not think the differences are insurmountable. I am not a champion of calls for 
slamming the door, although very many questions do arise, not only regarding 
Bosnia, but regarding how the partnership is to continue to be built. 
Indeed, this whole episode, if we disregard the purely Bosnian angle, is 
important from the point of view of learning lessons for the future, in that a 
partnership presupposes the absence of surprises, and we reached agreement on 
that long ago. '24 
These comments were almost identical to those made by Kozyrev after the Sarajevo 
crisis the previous year. 
The road to Dayton 
The administration's fear that Russia would be isolated internationally led it to retreat 
from the more anti-Western stance that it had adopted during the NATO air strikes. 
Once again, it tried to demonstrate Russia's importance in the peace-making process 
through the Contact Group, the UNSC, and diplomatic activity in the Balkans, and to re- 
establish the great power co-operative approach. To a certain extent, the United States 
was prepared to make gestures to mollify Russian self-importance; nevertheless, as with 
the NATO air campaign, it was prepared to act unilaterally when necessary. Russia had 
little choice but to accept the results of the American diplomatic offensive led by 
Richard Holbrooke, particularly since the Balkan presidents now recognised that 
'22 Russian Federation MFA (22 October 1995). 
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Holbrooke was leading the negotiations. Russian diplomats continued to stress the 
importance of Russia to the peace process, with increasingly exaggerated claims. 
American diplomats made certain symbolic gestures to allow Russian - and European - 
pride to be assuaged, although they too were not immune from making exaggerated 
claims about their own significance and comments that belittled the efforts of other 
states and negotiators. 
Holbrooke launched his shuttle diplomacy on 15 August, and it was soon 
reinforced by Operation `Deliberate Force'. The first break-through was a Serb 
withdrawal from the Sarajevo exclusion zone which was followed by a suspension of 
NATO air strikes. Negotiations eventually led to a cease-fire agreement, which was due 
to come into effect on 10 October. Russian diplomats claimed primary responsibility for 
both of these achievements; as in February 1994 - but with less legitimacy - they 
claimed that their own diplomacy, rather than the NATO air strikes, had achieved the 
Serb withdrawal. Kozyrev claimed that NATO's decision to suspend the bombing for 
three days was reached as a result of efforts made in Moscow (where Milosevic met 
Yeltsin) and in the region itself, where Igor' Ivanov was also engaged in intensive 
diplomatic activity. 125 Ivanov did not miss the opportunity to elevate his own status; 
speaking in Geneva, he told journalists that the end of the NATO air strikes and the 
Serb withdrawal was achieved `largely thanks to Russian efforts': 
Our trip to Belgrade was mostly aimed at stopping the NATO air strikes. This was 
a part of Russia's efforts in a larger scale at the political level and in diplomacy... 
Richard Holbrooke's mission is a concrete practical result of this work done 
by Russia. This is a practical reply to the sceptical statements that Russia's voice is 
not heeded. "6 
Again, this resembled Churkin's comments the previous February, although the Russian 
role then was less disputable. 
The associated boast that Russian diplomacy was instrumental in creating progress 
in negotiations on a peace plan was even more inflated, given the rival claim of the 
shuttle diplomacy conducted by Holbrooke. According to Kozyrev, speaking on 11 
September, 
the scenario for a political settlement was set out in the president's statement on the 
outcome of his talks with President Milosevic. And everything that has been 
achieved so far - and much has been achieved - has all been achieved due to and, 
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to put it frankly, on the basis of the talks which took place in Moscow. Firstly, 
there was a single delegation led by Milosevic. Secondly, the Contact Group itself, 
which includes the West, has recognised the equality of the rights of the Muslims 
and Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. And thirdly, and I consider this very important, 
the West, not just the Bosnian Serbs, has now recognised the central role of 
Belgrade and the need to lift sanctions. 127 
Russian scepticism of the novelty of Holbrooke's proposed plan was more justified. 
This scepticism was explained by Andrei Stakhov in Segodnia: `As Moscow sees it, the 
popularity of American mediator Richard Holbrooke is largely undeserved: the 
territorial demarcation plan was worked out by the contact group a year ago, and now 
the cunning Americans are claiming the fruits of a common effort as their own. ' 12" This 
was a valid criticism, since the American proposals and the Dayton accords themselves 
were a development of the Contact Group plan. On the other hand, the American 
initiative was significant because it was backed by NATO force and coincided with the 
Muslim-Croat offensive, which gave a strong incentive to the Bosnian Serbs to accept a 
cease-fire and negotiations on the basis of the plan. Russian policy makers refused to 
recognise that the important issue was not the details of the peace plan - on which the 
international community had already agreed - but how to get all of the sides to accept it. 
There were also exaggerated claims by the Russians in relation to the cease-fire. 
Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, met the Russian Prime Minister, Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, in Moscow on 2 October, and requested the renewal of gas supplies as 
`Russia's substantial contribution to the normalisation of life in ... 
Sarajevo, and the 
achievement of a cease-fire on the entire Bosnian territory'. 129 The Bosnian government 
then put the renewal of gas and electricity supplies to Sarajevo as one of the conditions 
for a cease-fire. 130 Chernomyrdin confirmed Russia's readiness to resume supplies, and 
the decision was announced on 6 October by Yeltsin, who described it as a `concrete 
and substantive contribution' to the attainment of a cease-fire. 131 Kozyrev stated on the 
same day: `I cannot conceal my satisfaction that the [cease-fire] agreement was reached 
with Russia's most active, if not decisive, participation'. 132 
A period of wrangling over the conditions of the resumption of supplies then 
followed, which delayed the beginning of the cease-fire. The Russian side had 
127 Russian Public TV (11 September 1995). 
128 Stakhov (22 September 1995). 
129 Interfax/ITAR-TASSEkho Moskvy Radio (2 October 1995). 
130 Holbrooke (1998), pp. 194-6. 
131 Rossiiskaia gazeta (7 October 1995). 
132 ITAR-TASSlInterfax (6 October 1995). 
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previously proclaimed the importance of the gas supplies for the cease-fire; now, a 
senior Russian diplomat condemned attempts to link the cease-fire to Russian gas 
supplies to Sarajevo as `inappropriate and provocative'. 133 Russian diplomats gave a 
number of explanations for the delay: technical problems with filling the pipe and 
increasing the pressure in it; the need to obtain consent from the UN Committee on 
Sanctions and from Ukraine and Hungary (across whose territory the pipe-line passes); 
confusion about who to deal with in Sarajevo; a lack of co-ordination between Russian 
departments; the fact that Gazprom, as a private company, was not under political 
control and therefore depended on an appropriate instruction from Gazprom chiefs that 
initially was not forthcoming; and the fact that the Bosnian delegation arrived in 
Moscow only on the evening of 9 October. 134 The most likely explanation was that 
Gazprom did not want to recommence deliveries until the form of payment was agreed; 
in November, delivery of gas to the FRY for humanitarian purposes was also delayed 
for four days due to problems with the means of payment. 135 
Whichever reason applied, a Russian MFA official declared on 10 October that it 
was `immoral to blame Moscow for the disruption of the cease-fire in Bosnia, which 
was due to begin at 0000 on 10th October. This is like passing the buck. ' 136 Yet Russia 
was happy to accept the buck and take the credit when gas supplies were resumed and 
the cease-fire began. According to Zotov: 
By agreeing to resume gas supplies to Bosnia, Russia played the key role in 
achieving the cease-fire agreement. The political decision on resumption of gas 
supplies to Bosnia was taken before the terms of payment were co-ordinated. This 
is Russia's noticeable contribution to the settlement process. It outweighs what has 
been done by other countries, which boast of their generosity in relation to 
Bosnia. 137 
And, a week later, Kozyrev told an interviewer that the cease-fire had `shown the 
material aspect of Russian diplomacy ... as nothing would 
have come of it without our 
gas ... our gas was of 
decisive importance'. 138 On his part, Holbrooke later seemed 
intent on minimising the Russian role, and the role of other mediators, even making the 
point that his cease-fire agreement with Izetbegovic was reached after Ivanov and Bildt 
'33lnterfax (9 October 1995). 
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had left for other meetings. 139 He described the gas issue as an `unexpected side issue' 
and a `frustrating subplot'. 140 
This retrospective mutual belittlement by Russian policy makers and Richard 
Holbrooke continued during the period up to the Dayton talks. Russia chaired a meeting 
of the Contact Group in Moscow from 16-17 October, which Ivanov described as 
`extremely productive', involving consideration of a `wide-range of problems'. 141 For 
Holbrooke, this meeting took place only because `Moscow wanted its moment in the 
limelight'. 142 His description of the Moscow meeting is equally patronising: `The 
Russians were pleased at their first opportunity to act as host for the Contact Group. But 
the meetings, held at the Foreign Ministry, were confused and shapeless; the Russians, 
not used to running international meetings, had no set agenda. '143 Carl Bildt, on the 
other hand, was impressed by the speed with which they got down to work: `The 
Russians were keen to do business, and so were we'. 144 
Russia also insisted on hosting a preparatory summit meeting of the presidents of 
Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the Dayton talks, primarily to 
boost the government's and President's prestige before the Duma elections. Clinton and 
Talbott, still eager to support Yeltsin, agreed (apparently after Yeltsin had promised 
them that they would restrict it to a `photo op' with Yeltsin), although Holbrooke had 
doubts about the proposal because it would delay the start of Dayton by a day and 
`risked derailing or delaying the negotiating process, notwithstanding the Russian 
pledge to stay away from substance'. 145 As it turned out, somewhat to the Americans' 
relief, Yeltsin suffered a heart attack on 25 October and the meeting was cancelled. 
Dayton 
By the `General Framework Agreement' negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed 
formally in Paris, Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue as a sovereign state within 
its existing internationally recognised borders. It would be composed of two entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska, with a ratio of territory 
of 51: 49 (map 10). Sarajevo was re-unified within the Federation, and Goraade was 
linked to the Federation by a secure land corridor. The final status of Brcko would be 
determined by arbitration; previously with a Muslim majority, it had been taken by the 
139 Holbrooke (1998), p. 195. 
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Serbs during the war and was viewed by them as strategically crucial in securing the 
Posavina corridor between the two parts of Republika Srpska. (Brcko was finally 
apportioned to the Federation several years after Dayton). Forces from both sides would 
withdraw to two kilometres from the `line of separation' between the entities within 
thirty days of the Accords being signed. Elections would take place within a year, with 
refugees able to vote in their pre-war place of residence. All parties were compelled to 
`co-operate fully' with war crimes investigators. 146 
Map 10 The two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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Domestic Russian reactions 
The Duma broadly welcomed the political and territorial arrangements for bringing 
peace, but - like the administration - believed that sanctions should have been lifted 
completely and should not have been linked to the issue of the arms embargo (see 
below). 147 Many commentators were more critical, claiming that the Accords violated 
the vital interests of the Bosnian Serbs by not giving them Brcko, by re-uniting 
1 46 War Report (1995); Dayton, The General Framework Agreement (1995). 
14' Russian Federation State Duma (8 December 1995). 
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Sarajevo, by not lifting the indictments of Mladic and Karadzic, by not lifting sanctions 
permanently, and because Republika Srpska would possess no more than twenty per 
cent of the industrial potential of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also claimed that Russia 
had `betrayed' the Serbs, especially by putting pressure on Milogevic. 148 
But the agreements should be criticised most for rewarding `ethnic cleansing'. Any 
deal based on partition would do this, of course. Yet, the Dayton Agreements were 
worse than the Contact Group plan, most disturbingly by allowing the Bosnian Serbs to 
keep Srebrenica and Zepa. The deficit was made up by allowing the Federation to keep 
Serb areas in north-western Bosnia that it had seized in the recent offensive. 
The other main problem was one of omission, and it was to have dire 
consequences. As Arbatova wrote in 1998, there were other "`sleeping volcanoes" of 
ethnic and territorial problems', of which Kosovo was the most serious: `In this context 
it seems strange that at Dayton a preventative strategy was not worked out in relation to 
centres of potential conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia'. 149 It was not worked 
out because the international mediators preferred to put off making any decision and 
hoped that the problem would go away; 150 in any case, they believed that the pressing 
task was to get peace in Bosnia. Russian diplomats also did not want to set a precedent 
for intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. '5' 
Official Russian reactions 
Russian diplomats highlighted the collective efforts to achieve success at Dayton, rather 
than acknowledging the American leading role. Ivanov, who represented Russia at the 
Dayton talks, suggested that it did not matter which country had played the most 
prominent role, and that this co-operation would have to continue: `neither the European 
powers, nor the USA, can now resolve anything in the former Yugoslavia on its own - 
only together'. 152 And Lavrov told the Security Council: 
The Russian Federation welcomes the initialling in Dayton by the parties to the 
Bosnian conflict of the package of documents on the peace settlement in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. A major step has been taken towards a comprehensive settlement 
of the most tragic conflict to have taken place in post-war Europe. Russia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the European Union, 
gas Vasil'evskii (8 December 1995); Gus'kova (1998a); Stepanova (1996); Volobuev and Tiagunenko 
(1997). 
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acting in concert in the framework of the Contact Group, have done some solid 
work. The United Nations assistance at various stages of the peace process was an 
important factor in achieving progress. '53 
Lavrov's speech demonstrates Russia's positive evaluation of the Dayton accords. 
Russian diplomats were satisfied both with the political arrangements and the territorial 
division. Furthermore, they welcomed a peaceful agreement on Eastern Slavonia, 
especially as the Croatian government had threatened to re-capture the region by force if 
a deal was not reached by 30 November 1995; 154 Russia would also keep its peace- 
keeping battalion stationed there. 155 
Disagreements between Russia and the other members of the Contact Group arose 
not over these political and territorial issues, where there had always been broad 
agreement, but over those areas that had always been a source of discord: sanctions, the 
arms embargo, and military aspects. 
Sanctions and the arms embargo 
Russian diplomats wanted sanctions against the FRY to be suspended when the peace 
conference began, and permanently lifted when an agreement was signed, but the other 
Contact Group members rejected this proposal. 156 Russia believed that the FRY's co- 
operative approach should be rewarded by its normal re-integration into the 
international community: sanctions should be lifted and the FRY should be accepted 
into the OSCE. 157 However, Yeltsin continued to refuse to lift sanctions unilaterally and 
again vetoed the Duma resolution demanding this, on the grounds that a unilateral 
action would violate Russia's commitments under the UN Charter and would be at 
variance with the Russian constitution. 158 The Russian attitude on sanctions was 
summed up by Karasin on 23 November: 
Yesterday, the Security Council adopted a most important, although belated, 
decision, lifting the burden of economic sanctions from Yugoslavia. The 
resolution, coming into force immediately, has opened a wide potential for the re- 
establishment and development of all-round Russian-Yugoslav co-operation. 
It is important that this was done not by unilateral actions, but on the basis of a 
joint Contact Group project accepted unanimously by the Security Council. A new 
153 United Nations Security Council (22 November 1995), pp. 11-13. 
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page has opened in the peace process in the Balkans when, after Dayton, Belgrade 
is considered by all sides not as a `source of evil' but as a reliable partner in efforts 
towards a settlement. The wall of international isolation surrounding the FRY is 
beginning to fall. "9 
Russian-Yugoslav co-operation was spurred by the signing of further economic and 
trade agreements and the adjusting of the texts of the August 1994 and February 1995 
agreements on trade and the supply of natural gas. On 23 November, the MFER 
announced that it was ready to implement these agreements now that sanctions had been 
suspended. 160 Russian politicians believed that Russia should use its connections in 
order to get a foot in the Yugoslav market as quickly as possible since Russia faced 
tough international competition. As Kozyrev remarked, `[n]ow is absolutely the right 
moment to get all our fraternal feelings realised in economic interests, and not to be late 
in doing so, either'. 161 
Although the Russian government accepted the suspension of sanctions on the FRY 
by UNSCR 1022, it would have preferred sanctions on Belgrade and Republika Srpska 
to be lifted completely. 162 Yet, Kozyrev did not consider there to be any essential 
problem. He explained that sanctions 
may be re-imposed only if there is another radical turn towards war, some flare-up 
of the war, or if Belgrade itself ... embarks upon the path of war. This is virtually 
unthinkable, though. 163 
Unfortunately, this optimism was to prove unfounded. Indeed, the confidence that 
Russian policy makers placed in the FRY government was, given its past record, 
unfounded, and the rush to establish the FRY as Russia's Balkan ally was misguided 
and premature. While the status of Kosovo remained unresolved, Russia's approach was 
likely to create major tensions with the Western states in the future. 
The second area of dispute remained the arms embargo. Not unreasonably, Russia 
opposed lifting the embargo as this would lead to re-armament that could destabilise the 
region and create future conflict. As Lavrov told the Security Council in the debate on 
what became UNSCR 1021, 
neither the spirit nor the letter of the text follow the logic of the political process, 
which is aimed at ending military confrontation in the region... We believe that the 
159 Russian Federation MFA (23 November 1995). 
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Balkans should never again pose a threat to international security and stability. 
Therefore, we are in favour not of an arms build-up in the region, but of a 
restriction and reduction of arms. 'T' 
However, the other Contact Group members, especially the United States, wanted 
to lift the embargo - believing that this was necessary to create a balance of forces - and 
this was agreed by the three Balkan presidents at Dayton. Consequently, Russia worked 
to remove what they perceived as discrimination against the Bosnian Serbs and a lack of 
international control over the supply of arms in the initial approach. Russian diplomats 
insisted on an equal approach to all sides in the resolution, the gradual lifting of the 
embargo, and control by the UNSC sanctions committee of the supply of arms. 16' These 
amendments, and the fact that it was `an integral part of the Agreement package 
approved in Dayton' by the three presidents, led Russia, `although unable to associate 
itself with' the draft resolution, to abstain rather than to use its veto in the voting. '66 
Kozyrev also explained that Milogevic had telephoned him and asked Russia not to 
hinder the adoption of the resolution, partly because Yugoslavia also needed weapons, 
and also because acceptance of the resolution was part of the compromise which 
included the resolution on lifting sanctions. 167 
The military aspects 
The most problematic area was the military implementation of the agreement. Western 
states had for some time been discussing the possibility of NATO implementing any 
peace agreement, no doubt partly in order to establish a new peace-keeping role for 
NATO, but also for financial reasons and because of Western dissatisfaction with the 
existing arrangements. After the problems experienced by UNPROFOR, NATO wanted 
the implementation force to have a single chain of command and for there to be no dual- 
key arrangement, so that United Nations diplomats would not be able to veto the use of 
force. This was also because American troops would now be participating on the 
ground, and the US refused to allow its troops to serve under foreign command. 168 
Russia accepted that NATO would have a significant role in the implementation 
force, but insisted on four principles. Firstly, the force must receive a mandate from the 
UNSC in a resolution that would authorise the participating states - and not merely 
" United Nations Security Council (22 November 1995). 
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NATO - to constitute the force. The UNSC would also preserve its ultimate control 
over the force. Secondly, the force must be requested by the parties themselves and 
must not be a `coercive operation'. 169 These principles were intended to ensure that it 
was a peace implementation rather than a peace making force, that it did not involve 
coercion, and was therefore not in effect a NATO `occupation'. Thirdly, Russian troops 
must not serve under NATO military command. 170 Fourthly, all the countries providing 
troops should have equal participation in the planning and management of the operation; 
this would ensure that Russian troops were not serving under NAC political control. '" 
The first two demands were relatively uncontroversial. By signing the Dayton 
accords in Paris, the sides accepted Annex 1a. They agreed thereby to facilitate the 
operations of an Implementation Force (IFOR), which might be established by NATO 
and would `operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control 
of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command', with the 
assistance of other, non-NATO states. 172 In addition, IFOR received its mandate from 
the UNSC in Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, which stated that the Security 
Council: 
13. Notes the invitation of the parties to the international community to send to the 
region for a period of approximately one year a multinational implementation force 
to assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions 
of Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement; 
14. Authorises the Member States acting through or in co-operation with the 
organisation referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a 
multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in 
order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace 
Agreement. 
The resolution thus (rather circuitously) avoided naming NATO, specified that the 
parties had agreed to the formation of the force, and gave the UNSC the responsibility 
to renew the force's mandate after one year, hence ensuring `reliable political control' 
of the operation by the Security Council. 173 Russian demands had therefore been met. 
The terms of Russian participation in the force were more difficult to resolve. 
NATO was keen for Russian troops to be involved as this would prevent Russia feeling 
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that it had been pushed out, and would lay the basis for future co-operation in other 
spheres. But NATO planners did not want Russia to have a significant role. Nor did 
they want to allow the Russian troops independence from NATO control. And they did 
not want to allow Russia to have an equal say in the planning and command of the 
operation. Instead, they wanted NATO to control the operation and Russian troops to be 
subject to NATO control. This was partly a question of prestige and power; but it was 
also a practical issue, since American policy makers in particular perceived the Russians 
as being pro-Serb and also opposed to the use of effective force by NATO; an 
independent Russian role and significant Russian involvement in control of the 
operation might undermine implementation of the agreement. Initially, the Pentagon 
wanted Russia to perform only auxiliary tasks, rather than participating in separating the 
sides and taking up positions within sectors, but it was forced to back down. '74 
Russian military and political representatives proposed various models for the 
operation and for Russia's participation in it. Politically, they wanted the force to be 
controlled by a Special International Council which would answer to the UNSC, would 
be made up of representatives of the contributing countries, and would operate on the 
basis of consensus. 175 This was unacceptable to NATO, since it would give Russia too 
much say and the possibility of a veto. 176 Militarily, Russia wanted a joint NATO- 
Russian operation, which would highlight Russia's role and distinguish it from the 
other, smaller states that would participate alongside NATO. This could operate on the 
basis of a joint command, or a rotating command, or there could be separate zones with 
separate commanders. l" None of these options was acceptable to NATO because they 
would violate the principles of a single chain of command and American command of 
US troops. 178 Furthermore, there would be too few Russian troops - at most, 3,000 - to 
justify such arrangements. Grachev himself admitted that, given Russia's financial 
limitations and military commitments elsewhere, it could not expect to play a similar 
role as the United States which would provide 25,000 troops. 179 This meant that, to a 
certain extent, the United States and NATO were able to define the terms, but both sides 
had to compromise, although NATO's concessions were perhaps more cosmetic and 
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designed to demonstrate acknowledgement of Russia's status rather than the substance 
of its demands. 
Negotiations began as soon as the cease-fire commenced in Bosnia, and were 
conducted by Colonel-General Leontii Shevtsov at NATO's military headquarters 
(SHAPE), by Grachev and his American counter-part, Secretary of Defence William 
Perry, and, on the political side, by Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Afanasevskii and 
Vitalii Churkin (who had been appointed Ambassador to Brussels and Liaison Officer 
with NATO the previous summer). A compromise was achieved for the political 
structure that respected to a certain degree one of Russia's basic demands: Russian 
participation in the planning and control of the operation. A joint council of the NAC 
plus Russia - the `16+1' formula - was created, in which Russia would have an equal 
say on the consensus model, with Churkin serving as the Russian ambassador to 
NATO. 180 However, this only related to decisions affecting the Russian contingent; 
Russia did not have representation on the NAC for decisions relating to the operation as 
a whole. This meant that IFOR was, contrary to Russian aims, a NATO-led operation. 
Militarily, an imaginative, although somewhat contrived, solution was found to the 
problem of maintaining a single command structure while Russian troops did not serve 
under NATO command. NATO had divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into three divisions of 
responsibility: Multinational Division North - MND (N) - was the American sector, 
MIND (SE) was the French sector, and MND (SW) was the British sector (map 11). 
180 Pel'ts (30 November 1995). 
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Map 11 IFOR sectors 
Based on map on NATO/IFOR web-site, Republika Srpska http: ', www. nato. intiifor ifor. htm 
The Russian battalion of 1,600 troops would be deployed in the American sector, 
MND (N). Col-Gen Shevtsov was appointed deputy to General Joulwan in his capacity 
as a United States general rather than in his capacity as SACEUR, in order that - 
nominally at least - the Russian contingent would not be subordinate to NATO. 
Grachev explained that this meant that all orders given to the Russian brigade would 
carry the signatures of both Shevtsov and Joulwan, and that if Shevtsov disagreed with 
an order, he could suspend it or clarify it with Grachev directly. '8' Ultimately, however, 
Shevtsov would not be able to veto a decision by General Joulwan, but the latter agreed 
to consult the Russian general on all matters relating to the Russian brigade, and all 
orders would be conveyed through Shevtsov (figure 1). 182 Perhaps most importantly for 
the success of these arrangements, there was to be liaison at all levels of the operation: 
at SHAPE, where a Russian military mission was opened on 11 November; at the 
intermediate level, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at Vicenza; and at 
MND (N) headquarters in Tuzla. 
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Figure 1 Russian participation in IFOR 
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Certain efforts were made to demonstrate that the Russian contribution was not 
merely symbolic. The Russian brigade was based in the Posavina corridor, which 
Grachev described as the `main and most important region. ' 83 And, although it was not 
in the most controversial part of that region, Brcko, it was in the Sapna thumb, an area 
that had experienced some of the fiercest fighting during the war and had changed hands 
several times. Although the headquarters were in Uglevik, in Republika Srpska, a 
battalion was also based on the Federation side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, in 
order to demonstrate impartiality. Russian troops subsequently helped to establish a 75 
km length of the zone of separation and patrolled both sides of it. During the second 
stage, an additional 1,000 Russian troops would patrol the Brcko region in joint patrols 
with American troops. 
183 Russian Public TV (12 November 1995). 
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Domestic criticism of Russian participation in IFOR 
Many Russian critics attacked the arrangements and, indeed, the very fact of Russian 
participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force. From a liberal perspective, 
Vladimir Nadein interpreted Russia's position in the negotiations as `inflexible', and 
questioned whether such `obviously tangled logic' of the command arrangements was 
really necessary when the national interests of Russia and the US so closely coincided in 
the matter of stopping the Bosnian carnage. 184 Certainly, the idea of Joulwan being 
considered an American general rather than the NATO commander in his dealings with 
Shevtsov was sophistic; it also revealed a curious attitude on the part of Russian 
diplomats, since they allowed Russian troops to serve under a United States, but not a 
NATO, commander. For many Russian commentators, these were humiliating terms 
that would not have been accepted by other major states. As Kondrashov wrote when 
the negotiations were continuing, `the Americans reject a "dual-key" principle because 
they are unwilling to accept a situation in which their soldiers' lives depend on someone 
else's will. What makes our soldiers deserving of less? "85 
Like many other realist critics, Kondrashov viewed the operation as an attempt by 
NATO to enforce peace, and he questioned why Russia should participate at all: 
If Russia were to refuse to `submit to America', and hence to participate in this 
NATO - not UN - operation of `coerced peace', it would, in effect, be leaving the 
Balkan stage. That would strike a blow against the concept of partnership with the 
West, which is basic for Russian diplomacy. 
But does partnership really mean some kind of automatic reaction and the 
acceptance of any terms, including unequal ones? 196 
A similar point was made by Aleksandr Pikaev in Moskovskie novosti, who asked 
whether the Brussels agreements were `a continuation of the compromised policy of 
1992-1993': 
It seems that this time, too, Moscow said "yes" on all the problems that NATO 
considers important... 
The intricate system of political and military control over the operation that 
has been devised leaves Russia with only the right to a voice, to be consulted ... 
the real decision making monopoly remains in Brussels. 
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And just what did Russia get? The opportunity to show its flag once again and 
to confirm its status as an influential power? But influential powers do not put their 
soldiers under the command of military alliances of which they are not members. '87 
Both Pikaev and Kondrashov implied, from a realist perspective, that if Russia 
could not have a more equal or independent role, then it should not be involved. Other 
commentators made a more practical argument for why Russia should not participate: it 
could not afford such participation, especially as it had more vital matters for its troops 
to deal with nearer to home. This was expressed starkly by Vladimir Frolov in 
Nezavisimaia gazeta: 
We are told that participation in world politics is not cheap, especially when one is 
talking about a `normal great power' like Russia. The paramount duty of any 
government in any state is to take care, first of all, of its own citizens and only 
then, if manpower and resources remain, foreign citizens in need of assistance. And 
it is absolutely criminal to send our soldiers to a foreign country for peace-keeping 
... at a time when our own 
home is ablaze with a war that is very similar to the 
Bosnian one, and from where body bags are dispatched punctually every day from 
Chechnya. 188 
The debate about Russia's foreign policy and its role in world and Balkan affairs 
was clearly as alive now as it had been three years previously. As these commentators 
recognised, the government had been faced with a choice between participating in a 
NATO-led force on NATO's terms, or abandoning its `presence' in the Balkans. Why, 
then, contrary to the criticisms, had it chosen the former? The reasons relate directly to 
the orientation of official Russian policy throughout the Balkans conflicts. 
Firstly, policy makers felt that they could not afford for Russia to `abandon' its 
position in the Balkans, a region in which they claimed that Russia continued to have 
strong interests. Russia had to remain involved, even if this was not on the terms that 
they wanted. Secondly, they had always viewed involvement in conflict resolution as 
part of Russia's role as a great power on the global stage, and as part of Russia's role as 
a major European power. The implementation of the Dayton agreement was going to be 
a key period in the international community's involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts, 
and would have a significant impact on the evolving European security structure. 
Russian policy makers wanted Russia to be part of this operation and to have a say in it. 
Thirdly, as we have seen, the issue was closely linked to the broader issue of Russia's 
187 Pikaev (3-10 December 1995). 
188 Frolov (28 November 1995). 
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relations with NATO. If Russia did not participate, then NATO would have pushed 
Russia out of the Balkans at the same time that it was proposing to push Russia out of 
Central and Eastern Europe by accepting new members. The convoluted military 
arrangements, and the political arrangements, were designed to allow Russia to 
participate while preserving its status in relation to NATO. Grachev, for instance, 
claimed that all the Russian requests `were met positively ... our 
forces will participate 
in this operation, but they will not be under NATO'. 189 Preventing a NATO monopoly 
would also allow some balance, since NATO was perceived as being anti-Serb. 
But most important was the argument that Kondrashov and Pikaev attacked: the 
administration's insistence on maintaining co-operative relations with the West. We 
have seen that Yeltsin re-established the idea of partnership at his summit meeting with 
Clinton at Hyde Park in late October. In December, Kozyrev stated that co-operation 
between Russia and NATO, and between Russia and the United States, was gathering 
strength; the US and Russia had both made a contribution to achieving the Bosnia peace 
accords and would be `continuing to co-operate in the spirit of partnership'. 190 The point 
was that Russian participation in IFOR would demonstrate the positive aspects of this 
co-operation if it did indeed establish peace in Bosnia. As one NATO analyst 
recognised, the Yeltsin administration had receded from the `over-zealous' pro-Western 
policy of 1992, but still advocated a 
cautious but pragmatic approach to continued co-operation with the West, 
including NATO. Without a concrete example of how co-operation with NATO 
can also serve Russian interests, the chances for this best-case scenario are 
extremely slim - hence Yeltsin's current gamble with IFOR co-operation. 19' 
Ultimately, Yeltsin had invested too much political capital in co-operation with the 
West to abandon that policy now that an opportunity had arrived to demonstrate the 
benefits. 
Conclusion 
In summer 1995, the Western states, led by America, finally felt compelled to coerce 
the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement, one that was not significantly different from 
the Contact Group plan that had been presented to the parties over a year before. This 
189 Nadein (11 November 1995). 
190 ITAR-TASS (6 December 1995). 
191 Petzold (1995). 
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was achieved only by ignoring Russian objections and by making decisions without 
significant Russian participation. 
Russian policy makers objected to Operation `Deliberate Force' because it was 
launched by NATO and UN military commanders without consulting Russia, and also 
because they opposed the use of force to coerce the sides to accept a peace deal. During 
the NATO air campaign, Russian attacks on the Western policy approached the level of 
rhetoric associated with the Cold War. There was opposition to the air strikes across the 
political spectrum. Yet, despite pressure from the domestic political forces of the 
opposition, the administration refused to provide the Bosnian Serbs with military 
support or to break off relations with the West, either in the Contact Group or more 
generally. The MFA and, ultimately, Yeltsin himself still believed that it was in 
Russia's interests to maintain co-operative relations with the West, and those relations 
should not be sacrificed for the sake of the Bosnian Serbs. Consequently, when the 
combination of the air campaign, the Federation offensive, and American-led diplomacy 
achieved the re-establishment of the Sarajevo exclusion zone and then a cease-fire, 
Russia co-operated with the other Contact Group countries and contributed to the 
achievement of a peace settlement. The rapprochement between Russia and NATO was 
confirmed by the agreement to participate in the NATO-led peace-keeping force, IFOR. 
The events of summer 1995 had shown the inadequacy of Russia's policy towards 
the conflicts. Only by ignoring the Russian position could peace be achieved. In the 
conclusion, I shall discuss the lessons to be learned from these events and analyse the 
implications of the evolution of Russian policy towards the conflicts. 
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Conclusion 
In part II, I analysed the evolution of Russian policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts 
from the initial liberal Westernising approach of the independent Russian Federation to 
a consensual approach based on neo-realist great power concepts. In part III, I showed 
how this new assertiveness led to a crisis in relations with the West which was resolved 
through the formation of a great power concert. The concert served to reduce tensions 
arising between the powers over the conflicts, but was ineffective in resolving the 
conflicts. An end to the Bosnian war was achieved only by rejecting Russia's demands 
and by ignoring its great power status. 
In the conclusion, I shall evaluate the various approaches of Russian policy and 
Russia's contribution to the international mediation efforts, in terms of Russian interests 
and the interests of peace and justice in former Yugoslavia. I will also look at the wider 
implications for the evolving security system, and make some remarks on what the 
future would hold. 
Liberal internationalist policy of 1992 
During most of 1992, Russian policy was close to that of the West. Contrary to some 
claims, Russia was involved in the mediation process, particularly through the United 
Nations Security Council where Russia sponsored or supported all of the resolutions 
passed in connection with the Yugoslav conflicts. Russian diplomats believed that it 
was Russia's duty as a great power to contribute to efforts to end the conflicts and 
achieve a just peace. Unfortunately, their faith in the West as the guardian of human 
rights meant that they were insufficiently critical of the Western policy in some areas, 
particularly the recognition process and also Croatian involvement in the Bosnian 
conflict. This was partly because they did not want Russia to be isolated and wanted to 
prove that Russia was a `reliable partner'; in other words, they `looked up to' the West 
in a manner that many Russians found humiliating. There is also some truth in the 
assertion that this was done in order not to jeopardise economic support for Russia. 
Nevertheless, key Russian policy makers genuinely shared the dominant Western 
interpretation of the Yugoslav conflicts, especially of the Bosnian war. They believed 
that the Bosnian Serbs were the main perpetrators of `ethnic cleansing' and were aiming 
to create an `ethnically pure' mini state through forceful acquisition of territory and the 
eviction or killing of members of other ethnic groups in those regions. And they 
concurred with the Western view that the Bosnian Serbs were supported by the Serbian 
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and Montenegrin authorities who wanted to create a `Greater Serbia'. Kozyrev in 
particular was aware of the political orientation of those in power in Belgrade, Pale, and 
Knin, whose programme was equivalent to that of the `red-brown' forces opposed to the 
government of the newly independent Russian Federation. 
Russian centrist and nationalist critics, in contrast, accused the West of being `anti- 
Serb'. This was partly because they claimed that all of the sides in the conflict were 
morally equivalent, that they all aimed to create `ethnically pure' states. But this was not 
true, at least in 1992. As Pavel Kandel' writes: `Although none of the parties is guiltless 
when it comes to ethnic persecution, only the Serbs have elevated national homogeneity 
to a principle of state policy. " In fact, a large proportion of the population in Bosnia - 
including many Serbs - objected to this principle. Many considered it part of being 
Bosnian, part of their identity, to live in a multi-confessional or multi-ethnic society. 2 
These feelings were destroyed by ethnic nationalists who deliberately fostered hatred 
and fear to erase the memories of inter-ethnic cohabitation. 3 
Views of the Russian opposition 
The attitude of many critics of Russian and Western policy in 1992 reflected three inter- 
related viewpoints. Firstly, there was a sympathy with the ethnic nationalist programme, 
particularly of the Serbs, as Russian nationalists favoured a similar programme in the 
former Soviet Union. 4 Secondly, there was an underlying pro-Serb and anti-Muslim and 
anti-Catholic orientation. This was evident among deputies of the Supreme Soviet and 
among many academics. Even if Serbs were guilty of the majority of crimes in the 
conflict, many Russians believed that they should be supported by Russia anyway, for 
historical, ethnic, and religious reasons. 5 Thirdly, there was a reductive realism: not only 
were all the sides in the conflicts aiming for equivalent goals, but all the outside powers 
were supporting a particular side in order to further their own interests. Russia should 
do the same by supporting the Serbs. 
Even those `reformers' who were supposedly the `democrats' in Moscow displayed 
many of these traits. For Vladimir Lukin, democratisation appears primarily to be a 
means to restore Russia's great power status: 
if we don't show that we are continuing on the path of democratic development, I 
think the result will be an acceleration of the process of expanding NATO... And 
' Kandel' (2-9 July 1995). 
z See Bringa (1993) and Fine and Donia (1994). 
3 Sorabji (1995). 
4 For an example as late as 1997, see Volobuev and Tiagunenko (1997). 
5 See, for example, Gus'kova (1995a), p. 38. 
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this will be followed by an attempt to eject us from regions in which we still have 
some influence. From Yugoslavia, for example, by encouraging and strengthening 
the Muslim state. 6 
Kozyrev was well aware that the state centrists were more radical than their 
comments intended for Western ears would suggest. This is why he chose the 
unorthodox tactic of the mock speech in Stockholm. Nevertheless, by 1994, Kozyrev 
himself had moved towards the kind of policies that he had lampooned at the CSCE 
summit. This was recognised by Lukin, who gave an analysis of divergent views of the 
conflicts without leaving in much doubt his own opinion: 
The international aspect of the Balkan crisis stems from a fundamental difference 
in viewpoints on the events that are occurring. There are two opposite points of 
view. 
The first one holds that international intervention is taking place in Bosnia. 
External forces, supported by `internal villains', are infringing the sovereignty of 
the Bosnian republic. As a subject of international law and a member of the UN, 
the central Bosnian government of Izetbegovic should be supported morally, 
legally and, most importantly, physically. The Serbs' military efforts within 
Bosnian should be repelled as a component part of the external attack on the state 
of Bosnia. 
The second viewpoint holds that from the outset Bosnia has been an inherently 
and organically unviable state created by Tito's communist mafia according to 
Lenin's disastrous formula, and that it is being used to promote very specific 
interests by such diverse forces as the united Germany, the Vatican and a number 
of Muslim `centres of power'. A civil war that is brutal on all sides is being waged 
on this territory, and the real task of the international community is to find optimal 
terms that satisfy the three sides participating in the conflict and living in Bosnia: 
the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats... 
The first viewpoint is held by the American Congress and, until recently, the 
US government, possibly against its own will, and by influential circles in 
Germany... 
The second viewpoint is held by Russian diplomacy, which has nearly come to 
its senses, as well as by France and Britain, which are returning to realism. 7 
The second view, which Lukin supports, became the dominant view in Russian 
policy as he states. Policy after 1992 was based on the supposedly `balanced' position 
6 Karpov (14 March 1995). 
' Lukin (9 December 1994). 
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that all sides were equally to blame, and the (contradictory) notion that Russia had to 
protect its own interests in the Balkans as other powers were doing. 
Great power policy after 1992 
In chapter 3, I failed to find any convincing arguments that Russia has important 
interests in the Balkans. This was recognised by some Russian commentators. 8 
Nevertheless, the view that the Balkan peninsular was a region of significant Russian 
interests became commonplace not just among neo-realist commentators and politicians, 
but also within the government. 
In relation to the Yugoslav conflicts themselves, Russia in fact had fewer direct 
interests than Western European states. Even if the war spread, it would not reach the 
borders of the Russian Federation. Few refugees reached the Russian Federation 
(although Russia offered to take refugees from Serb Krajina in August 1995). Despite 
efforts of the MFER to convince the government otherwise, even the direct economic 
consequences were minimal. 
Nevertheless, after 1992, the government believed that it had interests distinct from 
the West in relation to the conflicts. This was partly because of the change in policy 
thinking. As I argued in chapter 2, the rejection of liberal Westernism spelt the end of 
the notion that Russia necessarily shared interests with the West because of its liberal 
democratic system. Certainly this idea had been simplistic and many of the arguments 
were untenable. Furthermore, Russia's geographical position meant that it had different 
priorities to the West; it was right that Russia should focus more on the `near abroad', 
for example. In these areas, Russian interests might conflict with those of the West, 
particularly in the issues associated with the oil and gas resources in the Caspian. But 
none of this means that Russia necessarily had different interests from the West in 
relation to the Yugoslav conflicts. Unfortunately, the shift from liberal internationalism 
led to the invention of interests where they did not exist, in order to distinguish Russian 
great power interests and to appease domestic opposition. Ironically, this meant that 
policy was still a function of relations with the West instead of being derived from an 
analysis of the conflicts themselves. 
The government was influenced also by the argument that Western powers were 
pursuing their own interests (in a neo-realist sense) in their policy towards the Yugoslav 
conflicts. This was partly a consequence of the way that the EC handled the recognition 
issue. Russia portrayed the Western powers (especially the United States and Germany) 
S For example, Fel'gengauer (12 August 1995). 
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as biased and anti-Serb, while Russia was unbiased and had an independent policy. 
Kozyrev, for example, argued that European governments were `completely submitting 
themselves to the mood of society, and therefore are taking a one-sided, anti-Serb 
position'. Russia, on the other hand, was `taking a balanced position'. 9 
A balanced policy 
I have already quoted Lavrov in chapter 5: `it is impossible in this conflict to determine 
who is right and who is wrong'. This mantra was repeated regularly by Russian policy 
makers after 1992. For example, Kozyrev was satisfied with the fact that President 
Clinton described the conflict as a civil war because, he said, `[i]t is common 
knowledge that in a civil war nobody is right and nobody is wrong'. 10 And Yeltsin used 
this claim to argue that the indictments of Karadzic and Mladic by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia could `hardly be called just': `In a civil war (I 
am using the definition of the Bosnian crisis made by the US President B. Clinton) no 
one can be right and no one can be guilty. ' 11 
But, regardless of whether this was a civil war or whether it was a case of external 
aggression, the Russian argument is incoherent. A `civil war' is a war between two or 
more sides within the boundaries of a state, but there is nothing special about this fact 
that makes moral evaluation invalid. Russian diplomats wanted to make a distinction 
between such a war and an act of aggression by one state against another because, in the 
latter case, the United Nations would have been compelled to act. But aggression by one 
ethnic group against another is not only morally wrong, it is also illegal as a result of 
developments in humanitarian international law after the actions of the Nazi German 
government in the Second World War. 
I have argued that there was no moral equivalence in 1992, and that Russian policy 
makers also believed this. In 1992, they endorsed the London principles which upheld 
the idea of maintaining a multi-ethnic Bosnia and demanded Serb withdrawal from the 
territory that they had seized. The Serbs did not withdraw and the `ethnic cleansing' 
continued. It would seem that responsibility was clear. The Vance-Owen plan was then 
presented to the sides; whatever its weakness, the plan maintained a multi-ethnic, 
unitary Bosnia, and it was endorsed by the Russian administration as the basis for a just 
peace. The Bosnian Serbs again rejected it. 
9 Mlechin (26 November 1994); sec also Kozyrev (1995b), p. 129. 
10lnterfax (3 November 1994). 
11 Rossiiskie vesti (10 August 1995). 
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But the `international community' - including Russia - was not prepared to enforce 
the London principles or the VOPP. Not surprisingly, the trauma of 1992 and the failure 
to gain outside intervention hardened the attitudes of the Bosnian government side and 
made it more nationalist. The government played on the Islamic factor in order to gain 
support from Muslim governments. After the VOPP was abandoned, all sides in the 
conflict as well as the `international community' accepted that a de facto division would 
take place. Each side now wanted to gain a maximum amount of territory in a 
partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina. By default, then, all sides were now in a sense 
equivalent in terms of their aims. 
This suggests that the shift to the dogma of `equal responsibility' by Russian 
diplomats can be explained in part by developments in the conflict itself, although it 
should be emphasised that those developments resulted from the lack of will on the part 
of all the major powers, including Russia, to enforce a just settlement. 
Nevertheless, even after the VOPP was abandoned, the sides were not equivalent in 
terms of the Russians' own principles. 
After the VOPP 
If Bosnia was to be divided, there were two options for international mediators. The first 
was to accept the balance of forces and conclude a peace based on a Serb victory or a 
carve-up between the Serbs and Croats. The second option was to devise a `just' 
division of the territory (whatever that could be). 
The first option was espoused by many centrist Russian politicians. It resulted from 
an amoral realist view that often masked pro-Serb sympathies. For example, 
Ambartsumov claimed in April 1993 that there was `a greater possibility for a peaceful 
settlement than some time ago' because all the sides `especially the Croats and 
Muslims' were `tired of war': `They are prepared, first and foremost, the Croats, for 
direct talks with the Serbs' (in other words, they were prepared to do a deal on a carve 
up). And he added magnanimously: `I think that Serbia ... 
having won the military 
victory, could make some territorial concessions. ' 12 Similarly, Lukin wrote in December 
1994 that Russian diplomats could propose terms for peace that had become realistic for 
Bosnia after the Serb victories around Bihac: 
12 Ostankino TV (26 April 1993b). 
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Two main terms suggest themselves: that the Serbs receive no less than half of the 
country - they now control 73% and have the wind of victory blowing in their sails 
- and that this territory constitutes an integral whole, not unconnected fragments. 
13 
Presented as a neutral approach, this was an application of the principle `might is 
right'. Not only was it morally dubious, but it was untenable once the `international 
community' had become involved. The `international community' intervened from the 
very beginning, and contributed to the outcome of the conflict. Its first action - in 
September 1991 - had been to impose an arms embargo that froze an imbalance of force 
between the republican governments and the Serbs. When Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
recognised as an independent state, the JNA gave its heavy weapons to the Bosnian 
Serbs (or Bosnian Serb members of the JNA retained them). Because of the embargo, 
the Bosnian government was denied the right to self-defence against aggression (which 
the UNSC acknowledged was occurring when it imposed sanctions on the FRY) 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter (Article 51). 
In any case, a settlement based on a Serb victory was unacceptable because of the 
wider implications, since it would set a perverse precedent. This was Kozyrev's own 
view. Speaking in September 1993, he noted the need to resolve issues connected with 
the map then being discussed, pointing out that it was important that `the impression 
that this map consolidates the war gains and the results of ethnic cleansing, no matter 
who carried them out, should not be created'; for Russia, it was `particularly important 
to prevent such a precedent being set as it might lead to Russian-speakers being 
subjected to ethnic cleansing' in the former Soviet Union. 14 
Despite these problems, the first plan after the VOPP - the EU plan - was based 
precisely on the principle `might is right'. It was, in effect, a deal between the Croats 
and the Serbs. Not surprisingly, it was rejected by the Bosnian government. 
The great powers then turned to the second option: to devise what they saw as a 
just or fair division of the territory: approximately 17.5 per cent for the Croats, 33.5 per 
cent for the Muslims, and 49 per cent for the Serbs. This was the basis of the Contact 
Group plan (by then the Muslim-Croat Federation had then been formed and so the ratio 
was 51: 49). 
The division was generous to the Serb side. Kozyrev put it thus: 
Russia believes that, when the territorial issue is decided, the Serb people of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should get 49 per cent of the territory. History has decreed 
13 Lukin (9 December 1994). 
141nterfax (7 September 1993). 
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that, although the Serbs form only around 33 per cent of the Bosnian population, 
they are entitled to claim a large and fair slice of territory. 
And he issued a `clear warning': 
There is another option, leading to war - unwillingness to accept reasonable 
compromises and an intention to hold on to 70 per cent of the territory which has 
ended up in Bosnian Serb hands as a result of the war. If you do opt for war ... we 
must state just as firmly that you will not in that case be able to count on Russia. 
As real friends, we only support fair play. Russia will not support injustice. " 
But the Bosnian Serbs again rejected the deal. 
This shows that it is simply not true that all sides were equally responsible for the 
failure to achieve a just end to the war. Only one side rejected proposed settlements that 
Russian diplomats themselves endorsed. A `balanced' approach was therefore 
incoherent in terms of Russia's own principles. The important distinction here is 
between `neutrality'- not getting involved in the conflict or not having a preference for 
any particular outcome - and `impartiality' - advocating moral principles that were 
impartial with respect to the particular sides (i. e. were not in essence `anti-Serb') but 
might require action against one or more of the sides if they were violating the 
principles. 
In other words, given the nature of the conflict and the divergent aims of the sides, 
it was impossible to be both `neutral' and `impartial'. Yet this is precisely what Russian 
policy makers claimed that Russian policy was supposed to be. The contradiction is 
shown in a comment by the First Secretary of the European Department of the MFA, A. 
S. Botianovskii, writing in early 1996: 
From the very beginning, Russia's political objectives were a just and peaceful 
settlement of the conflict, a balanced stand towards all the opposing parties, and 
equal consideration of their respective interests. 16 
Russia's own policy demanded impartiality but it could not be `balanced' (neutral) with 
equal consideration of the parties' perceived interests (i. e. their aims) once Russia had 
committed itself to a just outcome 
A demonstration of the problem is the way in which, in the name of `balance', 
Russian diplomats criticised UNPROFOR and NATO for not responding to `Muslim' 
'5 ITAR-TASS (14 June 1994). 
16 Botianovskii (1996), p. 129. 
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military offensives in the same way that they responded to Bosnian Serb actions. In 
September 1995, Yeltsin asked: 
why is it that ... the 
Muslims deploy 20,000 men against the Bosnian Serbs - and 
yet there are no sanctions against them, no-one is bombing them, and no questions 
are asked. Why only the Serbs? " 
The answer was, that it was only the Serbs who had refused to accept the peace deals 
endorsed by the `international community'. They held over seventy per cent of the 
territory and would not cede it. The `international community' would not impose a 
settlement. Therefore, the only way for the government to gain what everybody 
recognised as just was to continue fighting, which required mounting offensives. The 
Russian insistence on `balance' meant accepting Serb gains that the Russians 
themselves rejected. 
Russian diplomats even admitted that the Serbs would not cede without strong 
coercion the territory that they had conquered. For example, Alexei Nikiforov - one of 
the MFA's representatives in the Contact Group - believed that the only action that 
would persuade the Serbs to give up territory was a Federation military victory. "' Yet 
the Russian administration refused to endorse an air campaign or the deployment of 
ground troops to aid the Bosnian government, and it did not want to allow the 
government to fight to reclaim the territory to which Russia recognised it had a right. 
However much Russian policy makers tried to hint that stronger measures might be 
taken, they continued to refuse to support the measures that were necessary to enforce a 
settlement. The main problem was that the Russian side - but not only the Russians - 
refused to endorse the means necessary to achieve the aims that they themselves had 
agreed were just and legitimate: first, the application of the London principles, and then 
a reasonable division of the country. 
Sacrifice of ends to means 
In 1992, Kozyrev fluctuated between suggesting that enforcement action might be 
necessary in Bosnia, and warning that force would not solve matters and that political 
methods must be pursued. No doubt, at that time Russian policy makers were genuinely 
concerned about the consequences of intervention, although the repeated 
pronouncements that there should be a peaceful resolution of the crisis were somewhat 
Radio Russia (8 September 1995). 
Ludlow (1995), note 69. 






bizarre given the war raging at the time, as this cartoon in Moskovskie novosti (2-9 July 
1995) illustrates (picture 1). 
Picture 1 'I would intervene, but I'm afraid of 
provoking bloodshed' 
(The cartoon refers to the EU's response to the conflicts, but it could apply equally to 
the Russian MFA, at least while it considered the possibility of intervention. ) 
By 1994, it is hard to believe that the Russian arguments against enforcement 
action were made in good faith. During the NATO air strikes in September 1995, 
Russian diplomats repeatedly claimed that the operation would not contribute towards 
the conclusion of a peace deal. Lavrov, for example, stated: `It is very difficult to follow 
the logic that the increasing use of force will motivate the hostile parties to settle down 
at the peace table'. 19 And Yeltsin proclaimed: 
Bombing has never produced the necessary result and such a conflict cannot be 
resolved by force - otherwise there will be a 100-year war, which would spread to 
other countries in Europe. 20 
19 ITAR-TASS (7 September 1995). 
20 Ibid.. 
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Just over a month later, the sides agreed to a cease-fire and shortly thereafter, the hostile 
parties `settled down at the peace table' in Dayton. 
As many commentators have pointed out, it is an inaccurate and dangerous 
simplification to believe that the NATO air strikes were the key action that led to the 
Dayton agreement; that, in the words of US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, this 
was the beginning of an era of `diplomacy backed by force'. 2' Arbatova writes: 
Western experts and politicians, evaluating the causes of the defeat of the Bosnian 
Serbs, single out the role of the NATO bombardments. All the same, it seems that 
other factors played the decisive role. These were - the simultaneous offensives of 
the government forces of Croatia and Bosnia on two fronts, depriving the Krajina 
and Bosnian Serbs of the possibility to help each other, and, undoubtedly, the 
neutral position of President Milosevic, who did not want to jeopardise the 
prospective change of sanctions regime in relation to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia because of the intractability and ambitions of the Bosnian Serbs. 22 
This is a fair point, although the fact that air strikes were not the sole cause of the 
`defeat' does not mean that they were not a contributing factor (they were probably 
necessary but not sufficient). Mike Bowker gives the same list with the addition of the 
involvement of Washington in negotiations. 23 And Pauline Neville-Jones writes: 
the use of air-power depended on these indispensable conditions: the willingness to 
abandon peacekeepers' impartiality; reinforcing ground troops to make the risk 
acceptable; Belgrade's acquiescence; and reviving the peace process to pre-empt 
further deterioration of the situation on the ground. ' 
Yet, Russian diplomats opposed or were sceptical about every one of these 
developments. Russia sought to prevent any Muslim or Croat offensive. The offensive 
could only work because, by then, both the Croatian and Bosnian forces had 
surreptitiously re-armed; but Russia always opposed lifting the arms embargo and was 
critical of any illegal re-armament. Russia wanted sanctions lifted before any deal was 
signed, but the promise of lifting sanctions after a deal had been reached was the very 
incentive that forced Milosevic to abandon support of the Bosnian Serbs, as Arbatova 
notes. Russian diplomats refused to acknowledge the importance of the American 
diplomatic efforts, presenting them as a continuation of Contact Group diplomacy. They 
abstained on the resolution on the formation of the RRF that reinforced ground troops, 
2t Gankin (1-8 October 1995). 
22 Arbatova (1998b), p. 79. 
23 Bowker (1998), p. 1257. 
24 Neville-Jones (1996-97), p. 48. 
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and rejected any moves to abandon peacekeepers' impartiality. And Russia was 
absolutely opposed to an air campaign. 
Repeatedly, Russian diplomats warned of the possible consequences if the arms 
embargo was lifted or if there was military intervention. The implicit assumption was 
that, in those circumstances, Russia would have supported the Bosnian Serbs; yet, 
nobody explained why Russian policy makers should feel obliged to support them, 
particularly if they recognised that the Bosnian Serbs were the party obstructing a peace 
settlement. But these warnings served two distinct purposes. They were directed partly 
at domestic critics to avert calls for open support of the Serbs, which the government 
did not want. And they were also directed internationally, with the aim of preventing 
any moves towards intervention or lifting the arms embargo. In this case, they were 
used as a tool to prevent action that they did not want anyway. 
Domestic motives for opposition to enforcement measures 
There were some divisions within the administration over these issues. Diplomats most 
closely involved with conflict management in former Yugoslavia were more likely to 
endorse stronger enforcement action, both for a universal settlement and for local 
settlements (in the `safe areas'). This was partly because they were more influenced by 
Western colleagues. It was also because they felt the isolation of their position in 
international fora. And they felt increasingly frustrated, slighted, and used by the 
Bosnian Serbs. This was true of Vitalii Churkin in particular, who called for 
enforcement action after the Goraide episode in April 1994. And the position of Iulii 
Vorontsov, Russia's representative on the Security Council until 1994, was interesting. 
During the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994, despite all the protests against the NATO 
ultimatum in Moscow, Vorontsov said that he would not attempt to stop military action 
by trying to force a UNSC vote, and claimed that Boutros-Ghali was `absolutely right' 
to assert his authority to call for NATO air strikes. 25 Stan Markotich explains this by 
Vorontsov's proximity to the situation at the UN and his realisation that he would not be 
able to persuade the other Security Council members that a new resolution and vote 
were necessary. In addition, `the contrast between Vorontsov's tone and that of officials 
in Moscow can be explained by the difference in the audiences at which their statements 
were directed'. 26 This seemed to be confirmed by US State Department spokesman M. 
25 The New York Times, 11 February 1994, quoted in Markotich (25 February 1994), p. 10. 
26 Markotich (25 February 1994), p. 10. 
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McCurry who pointed out that Russian officials openly speak one thing about Bosnia 
and something else in contacts with the American administration. 27 
It is reasonable to assert that the sacrifice of ends to means was favoured by Yeltsin 
himself (and followed loyally by Kozyrev28). We have seen that he attacked the MFA 
on at least two occasions at a time when it was also being criticised by domestic 
opponents. Yeltsin also refused to endorse any enforcement action after the Gorazde 
events in April 1994. These choices were made primarily for political reasons. Yeltsin 
did not want to allow his position to be threatened by an issue that he did not consider to 
be vital for Russia. Without being as cynical as Milosevic in his use of nationalist 
rhetoric, Yeltsin was a populist who was prepared to make changes in policy and 
dramatic statements to appeal to nationalist sentiments, all the while making sure that he 
did not abandon co-operation with the West. 
Whether such tactics were really necessary is difficult to evaluate. The Communists 
posed the greatest threat to Yeltsin in the December 1995 elections and also in the 
presidential election due in mid 1996, and they adopted a nationalist line and attacked 
the government with this. There was detailed coverage of the Yugoslav conflicts in the 
media, usually with a pro-Serb slant. But Yeltsin probably overestimated the degree to 
which adopting what would be perceived as an `anti-Serb' line would have been an 
electoral liability. The voting public was not sufficiently concerned with the Yugoslav 
conflicts to make them an important issue in elections. 
Perhaps more significant was the fact that Yeltsin needed to garner support from 
state centric and neo-realist politicians, both outside the administration - such as 
Vladimir Lukin - and also within it - such as Evgenii Primakov, who was head of the 
Foreign Intelligence Service but replaced Kozyrev as Foreign Minister in January 1996. 
They were broadly in favour of Yeltsin's domestic policy but demanded a more 
assertive foreign policy. 
The other main reason why Russian policy makers did not want enforcement action 
was the role of NATO. This is the one area where it does make sense to talk of Russian 
interests in former Yugoslavia distinct from Western interests. This was because of the 
significance of the conflicts for the evolution of the European security system after the 
Cold War. 
27 Bilten vesti, 9 February 1993, p. 1, referred to in Gus'kova (1995a), p. 37. 
28 Iusin (21 October 1995). 
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NATO, UNPROFOR, and the use of force 
UNPROFOR began as a peace-keeping operation in Croatia. It then took a primary role 
in ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. In other words, its task was to 
mitigate the effects of the conflict. As Richard Caplan writes, the central problem with 
this approach is that `it does nothing to stop the violence that is the source of suffering it 
is attempting to alleviate'. 29 The absurdity of the mission is shown unwittingly by a 
report on UNPROFOR's operations of 1994 by the UN Secretary-General: 
Several of the newer tasks have placed UNPROFOR in a position of thwarting the 
military objectives of one party and therefore compromising its impartiality, which 
remains the key to its effectiveness in fulfilling its humanitarian responsibilities. 30 
Those `humanitarian responsibilities' resulted from the pursuit of those `military 
objectives', but Boutros-Ghali seemed to think that tackling those objectives would 
jeopardise dealing with the results of them! 
Although humanitarian assistance and protection no doubt saved lives in the 
absence of any other intervention, it was used as a substitute for political and military 
action. 31 In 1993, a choice was made against enforcement of an overall peace 
settlement. However, pressure to act led to the `safe areas' policy. This was designed to 
protect the civilian population of six key areas, all predominantly Muslim, and all under 
siege from Serb forces. It implied drawing the line and saying that these areas would not 
be subject to `ethnic cleansing'. The resolutions in fact allowed for enforcement action 
to protect the `safe areas', but insufficient numbers of troops were provided to protect 
them. Therefore, the UN envisaged the use of air power, which meant NATO. Air 
strikes were carried out against Serb forces when they attacked or shelled the `safe 
areas'. Each time, Russia objected that the UN was guilty of `double standards' because 
strikes were only against the Serbs. But this was not surprising, since it was the Serbs 
that were besieging the areas. 
Russian politicians and commentators were right to highlight the lack of 
condemnation of the Croat offensives in Krajina and Western Slavonia on the part of 
Western governments, particularly the US. This was partly the result of bias, partly a 
feeling that the Serbs in Krajina had by their earlier actions ('ethnic cleansing' and the 
shelling of Vukovar and Dubrovnik) lost the moral right to any support (which is 
understandable but wrong), a sense that it was a case of suppression of an internal 
29 Caplan (1996), p. 36. 
30 Quoted in Weller (1998). 
31 Caplan (1996), p. 37. 
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insurrection, and also a feeling that it would be the quickest and easiest solution. This 
latter point was also perhaps a factor in Srebrenica and Zepa. In other words, Western 
governments preferred to accept the formation of an acceptable map by force rather than 
impose it themselves. In this respect, as I have argued, the Krajina case and Srebrenica 
are the same (although it could be argued that in Krajina, the Croatian government was 
re-establishing control of an area within its recognised borders, whereas in Srebrenica, 
the insurgents seized control from the government). 
The assaults on Krajina and Srebrenica marked the failure of UNPROFOR, 
showing that the `protected areas' were not protected, the `safe areas' not safe. This was 
partly due to a shortage of troops, but also because of weak-willed UN leadership and 
restrictions on the use of force. These were partly a result of Russian demands. Russian 
policy makers would not allow force to be used effectively for the policy of deterrence 
to work, despite having voted for the establishment of the `safe areas'. They explicitly 
refused to support any proposals to simplify the procedure for requests by the UN to 
NATO for air support. 32 
This insistence not just on the cumbersome `dual key' system, but also the 
involvement of the UN Secretary-General and consultations with the permanent 
Security Council members, was in marked contrast to Russia's own approach in 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union. As Pavel Baev writes: 
Perhaps one strong impulse coming from the UNPROFOR experience is that 
against multilateralism as such. While persisting in claims for legitimisation and 
even financial support from the UN and the CSCE, the Russian leadership has the 
clear intention to preserve its freedom of action in peace-making activities. 33 
But it did everything it could to deny such freedom of action not only to NATO but also 
to UNPROFOR and the national contingents within it. 
In order to protect the `safe areas', the use of force by peace-keepers, and also close 
air support, were necessary. Russia sought to restrict this because it would make the 
United Nations seem `partial' and also because of the role of NATO. NATO was the 
obvious organisation to implement air cover, particularly as it was enforcing the no-fly 
zone. No doubt this pleased NATO personnel and American diplomats because it gave 
NATO a new role. But by attempting to restrict UNPROFOR's use of force in the 
limited sense provided for in existing UNSC resolutions - air support to ensure the 
32 Russian Federation MFA (14 April 1994). If anybody doubts the absurdity of the authorisation 
arrangements, they should read Honig and Both (1996), chapter 1. 
33 Baev (1996a), p. 77. 
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protection of peace-keepers, the supply of humanitarian aid, and protection of the `safe 
areas' - Russia undermined UNPROFOR and the Security Council (which had created 
the `safe areas') and thereby promoted NATO. Thus, the result of the policy was 
precisely the opposite of that intended. 
Kozyrev and Yeltsin both expressed their concerns about the implications for the 
United Nations of NATO's air campaign of September 1995. Kozyrev warned the 
Security Council that 
attempts to monopolise the solution of international problems by one state or a 
group of states, to introduce `double standards' on the principle of dividing the 
word into `us' and `them', to count on military alliance rather than strengthening 
the UN, may turn out to be no less dangerous for the integrity of the world and the 
work of the Security Council, than the `Cold War'. 34 
And Yeltsin conveyed the same message at the special fiftieth anniversary session of the 
UN General Assembly: 
A dangerous trend towards belittling the role of the UN and acting in 
circumvention of its charter and the Security Council's collective will has 
emerged... 
Russia is alarmed over situations like that which arose recently in Bosnia when 
the Security Council was sidelined. This was a clear and blatant violation of the 
foundations of the world organisation laid down by its creators. 
It is intolerable for a regional organisation, bypassing the Security Council, to 
take a decision on the massive use of force. 35 
Of course, these points were true, if exaggerated. But Russia's refusal to allow 
effective functioning of UNPROFOR and implementation of Security Council 
resolutions had done more to threaten the work of the Security Council than NATO's 
belated air campaign. Yeltsin continued: `Military force must not intrude where 
diplomacy has not had time to operate'. 36 The point is fair. But one wonders when 
Russia would ever have believed that diplomacy had had sufficient time in Bosnia. 
Contrary to Yeltsin's claim, there was no `collective will' of the Security Council. 
Rather, most states saw the need for action against the Bosnian Serbs, but Russia 
threatened to veto it. Kozyrev himself recognised Russia's isolation: 
34 Russian Federation MFA (26 September 1995). 
35 Russian Federation MFA (22 October 1995). 
36 Ibid.. 
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The political point is that NATO really has shown some haste... On the other hand, 
it must be taken into account that at the UN, our voice is as yet a lone one, that is, 
the majority of members of that organisation - be it the Security Council ... or the 
General Assembly 
... - everywhere the voting, whenever 
it has been held in the 
last few years, has been extremely anti-Serb. 7 
Yugoslavia was one of the places where a more active United Nations role was 
experimented with during the 1990s. Michael Williams shows the implications of its 
failure in a review of Michael Rose's Fighting for Peace: 
There are few who would agree with Michael Rose that UNPROFOR was a 
success. How is success to be judged when UNPROFOR's ultimate tragic 
conclusion was the slaughter in Srebrenica in July 1995 and an effective end to 
peacekeeping as a brave experiment of the 1990s? Today there is no hope of the 
Security Council establishing a peacekeeping mission, at least of the UN itself, 
anywhere in the world. In none of the sixteen existing peace missions is the UN 
central to the resolution of the conflict as it was, or at least tried to be, in 
Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Haiti, El Salvador, and Bosnia in the 
early 1990s... There is little doubt that the ultimate failure of UNPROFOR has 
been a major contributory factor in the decline of UN peacekeeping, now at a level 
where it was in 1990.38 
Russia contributed to the failure of UNPROFOR and thereby undermined the United 
Nations, which it supposedly saw as the keystone of the international system. 
The missed opportunity 
From 1993, one of the main aims of Russian foreign policy was to prevent NATO 
expansion. NATO expansion alienated Russia and made it suspicious of NATO action 
in the Balkans. This was heightened by the declarations of NATO leaders themselves 
who talked of NATO's new role `out of area', its new role in peace-keeping, but linked 
this also to NATO expansion. 39 
The best way to have assuaged Russian suspicions of NATO and to have 
demonstrated a positive example of co-operation would have been to perform a joint 
enforcement action in former Yugoslavia. This needed to be early in order to prevent 
`ethnic cleansing'; when a crisis becomes so acute that intervention is seen as essential, 
37 Russian Public TV (25 September 1995). 
38 Williams (1999), p. 381. 
39 Simi (1998); Gow (1997b). 
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`it puts any satisfactory outcome significantly beyond reach'. 40 In the case of Bosnia, 
preventative action should have occurred before Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised as 
an independent state; the government had requested an international peace-keeping 
force to forestall war, but the request was ignored. 41 When the republic was recognised, 
the government should at least have been given the chance to defend itself (by lifting 
the arms embargo). 42 
Preventative deployment is rare because politicians do not feel pressure to act until 
war has already started. Preventive action did not occur in Bosnia. But when war broke 
out in a horrific manner in April 1992, peace-making action should have been 
authorised. 
At that stage, Russia agreed with the Western powers that the war was caused by 
Serbian aggression, as was shown by the sanctions vote. There were signs that the 
Russian MFA might even have accepted a peace-making mission. Kozyrev, as we have 
seen, gave hints that peace enforcement to ensure human rights might be legitimate in 
some cases and might actually be possible after the end of the Cold War. It would be in 
Russia's interests because it would show that `ethnic cleansing' would not be tolerated, 
which was good for Russian speakers in the `near abroad'. And it could demonstrate a 
positive example of co-operation between Russia and NATO under the authority of the 
UN or the CSCE, which was for Russia the ideal framework for the new European 
security structure. 
Such a possibility appeared to arise in June 1992 when Presidents Bush and Yeltsin 
signed the Washington Charter of Russian-American Partnership and Friendship. The 
Charter included a section that mentioned the creation of `Euro-Atlantic peace-making 
forces' that would include American and Russian contingents. Maksim lusin described 
this as a `sensational declaration': 
We are talking about an event of enormous significance - the creation of an 
instrument for containing regional conflicts that could become a most important 
factor in international life in the near future. 43 
Unfortunately, it did not become a highly important factor in international life. 
There was no political will among the Western powers for a true peace enforcement 
mission. " Even if there had been, the United States preferred to use NATO for any 
40 Caplan (1996), p. 37. 
41 Freedman (1994-95), p. 59. 
'Z Ibid., p. 65. 
43 Iusin (19 June 1992). 
44 According to Lawrence Freedman, the `impending presidential election stanched any willingness on the 
part of the US administration to take risks'; Freedman (1994-95), p. 61. 
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action in Yugoslavia, rather than develop a real partnership with Russia. And Russia 
soon also preferred to have an exclusive role in the former Soviet Union; consequently, 
it was wary of a joint mission with NATO in former Yugoslavia because this might set a 
precedent for NATO involvement in the former Soviet Union. This shows how the shift 
to a neo-realist position in the `near abroad' affected policy to former Yugoslavia. 
June 1992 therefore marks a key turning point both for the fate of Bosnia and also 
for the post-Cold War European security system. I am doubtful that Russia really would 
have agreed to participate in a peace-making operation that would necessarily have 
appeared to be `anti-Serb'. The outcry in the elite at the sanctions vote seems to suggest 
not. Yugoslavia was not considered an important enough issue to risk the domestic 
attack that such actions would have provoked, and the Yeltsin administration could not 
feel politically secure. The Russian military establishment also would have opposed 
such action, and Yeltsin had to be careful not to offend it since he would depend on it in 
any future clash with the `intransigent opposition'. It was hard enough to get the 
General Staff to accept involvement in peace-keeping in Sector East in Croatia, let alone 
peace enforcement in Bosnia. 
But the Western powers should have tried. Had Western politicians been more 
attentive to the needs of Bosnia rather than on building the EU and NATO, and also 
sought a genuine security partnership with Russia, they might have made such a 
proposal. If it had been accepted, it would have been a positive step for Russian- 
Western relations and for Bosnia. And if the Russians had declined to participate, at this 
stage they might well not have vetoed the action as long as they had been consulted. 
Russia's role in conflict mediation 
Western commentators are divided over the degree to which Russia should have been 
involved in conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia. Some suggest that Russia was 
pushed aside in decision making; that the main Russian objection to the NATO 
ultimatum in February 1994, for example, was that it had not been consulted. They 
argue also that Russia was in fact a positive contributor to the mediation process. For 
example, Mike Bowker writes: 
Moscow's role was never as important as that of the USA, or even that of Britain 
or France, but Russia did play a part in bringing the war to an end. Contrary to the 
view of the sceptics, Yugoslavia showed that Moscow was able to play a positive 
role in European security even at times of great domestic crisis. 45 
45 Bowker (1998), p. 1259. 
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But it is actually difficult to find much positive that Russia contributed to 
international mediation in the Yugoslav crises. Its early approach was admirable, 
especially as it marked such a radical departure from [pre-New Political Thinking] 
Soviet diplomacy. Its recognition of Macedonia was a bold and justifiable move. And 
its support of the Vance-Owen peace plan and involvement in the negotiation process 
showed that it was seriously committed to the elaboration of a plan that would go at 
least some way towards preventing the division of Bosnia and victory for the 
nationalists. Churkin in particular was knowledgeable and contributed to the negotiation 
process. 
But, after the failure of the VOPP, Russian diplomats were more of a hindrance 
than an aid. Rather than `playing a part in bringing the war to an end', they contributed 
to its extension. 
Bowker also claims that 
Russia's policy towards Yugoslavia can be criticised for giving succour to the 
aggressors in the conflict. It was a policy based on Realpolitik rather than 
morality... Yet, in the overall context of the international effort, Russia's policies 
were defensible. For Moscow's continued links with Belgrade served a useful 
purpose. No negotiated settlement was possible without Serb compliance... It was 
important ... that the 
Serbs were not isolated and that their interests were 
represented in international fora, such as the UN and the Contact Group. '6 
There is some truth in this, but the issue of relations with the Serb side is problematic. 
Relations with Belgrade 
At the heart of the issue was the relationship between Russian diplomats, the Serbian 
government, and the Bosnian Serbs. In 1992, Russia supported the moderate federal 
leadership of the FRY. After the December elections in Serbia, Russian policy makers 
put pressure on Milosevic, with positive results. Milosevic backed the VOPP and also 
the Contact Group plan. How much this was to due to Russian pressure and how much 
to sanctions is difficult to evaluate, but the limitations of the strategy were demonstrated 
by the Bosnian Serb refusal to accept either of those plans. In other words, neither 
Russia nor Milosevic had sufficient control over the Bosnian Serbs for the tactic to 
succeed in ending the war in Bosnia, although it was worth putting pressure on Belgrade 
anyway. 
46 Ibid., p. 1246. 
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The tactic was also undermined by contradictory signals from Moscow. According 
to the MFA, Russian action both as part of the Contact Group and on a bilateral footing 
was important for seeking acceptance of the Contact Group map, with visits by Grachev 
and Churkin to the region. 47 But they failed to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept. 
This was not surprising if Karadzic's account of his meeting with Grachev is true. 
According to Karadzic, Grachev told him: `You must accept the Plan because if they 
attack you we will have to defend you, which would cause problems for us'; it would 
mean a new political and, possibly, military confrontation in the Balkans, and a 
dangerous stand-off between Russia and the West. Karadzic said that he left the meeting 
confident that the `Russian Army was supporting us. We knew that before, but now it 
was clear that the Russian Army had a sympathetic ear for the Serbs. '48 
After Belgrade broke off relations with Pale, Russia rightly argued for some reward 
for the FRY's stance, but its calls for full lifting of sanctions were premature as the 
pressure needed to be maintained. Russia talked of a `differentiated' approach which 
was quite necessary, but required far more pressure to be exerted on the Bosnian Serbs, 
which Russia was not prepared to accept. In fact, it was clear that Russia would oppose 
any stronger enforcement action. However much they tried to avoid stating this directly 
so that the Bosnian Serbs would not feel that they could act with impunity, that was 
precisely the effect. 
There are other problems. The idea of Russia working closely with the Serbs may 
have seemed useful but it reinforced the notion that Russia would naturally support the 
Serb side. 49 David Owen in particular took this for granted, to the extent that he was 
surprised whenever Russia agreed to something that the Bosnian Serbs and also the 
Krajina Serbs might not accept. 50 In fact, Churkin was unhappy about the idea when the 
Contact Group was formed, which was just after the Gorazde events, and he refused to 
go on the joint Contact Group visit to Bosnia because he would have to meet the 
Bosnian Serb leaders. Nikiforov went instead, but he was also unwilling to serve as their 
`patron'. 51 Nevertheless, we have seen that Yeltsin resisted any move towards a stronger 
line and the severance of relations with the Bosnian Serbs. Only when the FRY 
government announced that it was ending relations did Russia follow. In other words, 
47 ITAR-TASS (26 July 1994). 
48 Silber and Little (1996), p. 341. 
49 For a similar argument, see Woodward (1995), p. 306. 
50 Owen (4 June 1994) and (28 October 1994). 
51 Ludlow (1995). 
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rather than exerting pressure on the FRY, the Russian administration followed 
Milosevic's lead, or at least checked with Milosevic before acting. 52 
The hypothesis that the Serbian authorities were manipulating Russia is particularly 
credible when we look at the diplomacy in 1995. Serbia itself realised, when the US 
became intent on a settlement, where the real power lay. As Abarinov wrote: 
gone are the days when Moscow, by puffing up its cheeks, could act as if it had 
some exclusive influence with Belgrade, as though we were the only ones 
Milosevic would receive and hold serious talks with. When Milosevic needed 
something more than a smokescreen, when things reached the point of political 
bargaining 
... the 
Belgrade leader received the Americans warmly. 53 
Milosevic even went so far as to disparage the quality of Russian aid, much to the 
sa chagrin of Grigorii Karasin who was `unpleasantly surprised'. 
Limits of Russian involvement 
Some commentators believe that the problems with Russian policy meant that Russia 
should not have been involved in conflict management at all. For example, Alexander 
Rahr wrote in reference to 1994: 
Russia tried to play world leader in several conflicts throughout the year... 
However, most of the efforts were poorly planned and proved counterproductive. 
For example, instead of co-operating with the West to solve the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Russia took a pro-Serbian stance and damaged the efficiency of UN 
mediation efforts. Moscow's meddling nonetheless gave it a high profile on the 
international scene. " 
But Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council. Its involvement in the UN 
mediation efforts can hardly be called `meddling'. 
Russia had to be involved in some way, but its involvement was likely to hinder 
efforts to achieve a settlement. The dilemma is well revealed by Holbrooke in his 
inimitable fashion. He writes that if `Moscow secured an active role in the negotiations, 
it could cause a serious problem, given its pro-Serb attitude' . 
56 Consequently, Moscow 
must not have an active role. On the same page he writes: 
52 Churkin apparently checked the Contact Group map with Milogevia before accepting; ibid., and Owen 
(1995b). 
53 Abarinov (8 September 1995). 
54 ITAR-TASS (3 November 1995). According to Holbrooke, Milo§evid was 'scornful of Moscow's 
attempts to pressure or bribe the Serbs with aid - "tons of rotten meat, and crap like that, " he said'; 
Holbrooke (1998), p. 114. 
55 Rahr (15 February 1995), p. 11. 
56 Holbrooke (1998), p. 117. 
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Behind our efforts to include Russia in the Bosnia negotiating process lay a 
fundamental belief on the part of the Clinton Administration that it was essential to 
find the proper place for Russia in Europe's security structure, something it had not 
been part of since 1914.57 
Behind the self-flattery and the contradictions lies a genuine problem. Russia had 
to be involved, particularly as a permanent member of the Security Council. But if it 
was blocking a settlement, it would have to be side-lined. The American solution in 
1995 was to avoid joint negotiations altogether. This applied not only to Russia, but also 
to the European members of the Contact Group. At the beginning of his diplomatic 
offensive, Holbrooke notes, the other members of the Contact Group `were disturbed 
that we planned to negotiate first and consult them later, reversing the previous 
procedure, in which the five nations tried to work out a common position before taking 
it to the parties in the Balkans -a system that was cumbersome and unworkable'. 
S" The 
Americans condescendingly allowed the other powers to have a symbolic role, although 
they apparently called the demands by Italy and Russia to hold a Contact Group meeting 
`conference proliferation', and `complained constantly about it as time-consuming and 
redundant', but they `recognised that these meetings were important for European- 
American unity'. 59 In other words, the other members would have to let the American 
team negotiate a settlement with the parties and then agree to it. This was the `uni-polar' 
world that the Russians feared. But it had the advantage of achieving peace in Bosnia. 
I have shown that from 1993 the Russian aim was to use the conflict to show 
Russia's great power importance, which policy makers believed was in Russia's 
interests. Other powers also put their notion of national interests above the need to find 
a just and early settlement. And this was despite the hopes of a new era in which 
international humanitarian law could be applied universally. The fundamental problem 
is that the United Nations Security Council is a forum in which states pursue their 
national interests. Western policy makers might have felt the need to act, and were 
guided less by notions of traditional interests than their Russian counterparts, but even 
when they did feel obliged to pass resolutions in such cases, they did not follow them 
through. 60 
The situation can only be changed by creating some sort of institution that will act 
more impartially. One possibility is a wider Security Council, perhaps without allowing 
57 Ibid.. 
ss Ibid., p. 84. 
59 Ibid., p. 201. 
60 A similar point is made by Caplan (1996), pp. 32-3. 
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the great powers a veto right. Or the General Assembly might be given more powers. 
There is now a discrepancy between the development of international humanitarian law 
and the status of the institution of ultimate arbitration (the Security Council). For the 
legal aspects, a more impartial body is needed to judge cases in line with international 
humanitarian law. In the recognition process, that body existed: the Badinter 
commission. But Western powers ignored its rulings, and thereby aroused suspicions 
from the very start that they were pursuing their own interests. The creation of a kind of 
`Supreme Court' of legal experts rather than representatives of states might be one 
solution. Finally, chapter VII of the UN charter contains a commitment from member 
states to provide armed forces for enforcement operations, but states do not honour their 
commitments, as was evident in the `safe areas'. The creation of some sort of permanent 
UN peace-making force, paid and organised directly by the United Nations, is worth 
investigating. 61 
In the meantime, Western powers might have to act without Russia, and therefore 
without sanction from the Security Council, for two reasons. Firstly, Western European 
states have been affected more by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia than Russia was, 
particularly through the arrival of refugees, and Western European countries would also 
be affected more if the conflict spread beyond Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. 
Secondly, if Russia acts on the basis of principles that are widely divergent from 
the values of humanitarian international law, those values - and, ultimately, the victims 
of regional conflicts - should not be sacrificed to those Russian principles. Under 
Yeltsin, Russia adopted a policy based on promoting Russia's great power interests. 
This took precedence over the achievement of a just solution. The order of priorities 
was shown in February 1994 when Russian diplomats used the crisis to demonstrate 
Russia's prestige and importance. Churkin later explained his motivation as follows: 
To be honest, when I was working on this problem, the main thing I was trying to 
prevent was a national humiliation for Russia. Not a further escalation in Bosnia - 
although I didn't want that, of course, and I had clear instructions on that score - 
but a humiliation for Russia. After all, given our current low-esteem, if everything 
had been done without us yet again, the consequences could have been graver for 
62 us than for the Bosnians. 
I do not think that the residents of Sarajevo would agree. This approach was at odds 
with moral demands and the demands of international humanitarian law. 
61 Glover (1999), chapter 16. 
62 Molchanovyi (16 March 1994). 
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The need to uphold the principles of humanitarian law and to prevent the spread of 
conflicts may make it imperative for Western states to act without Russian support. But 
if they do act unilaterally, they need to elaborate clearly the reasons for intervention, 
both in terms of humanitarian law and security interests. And they need to apply these 
principles consistently. And, if they use NATO, they should not present it as the corner- 
stone of the new European security structure. 
Again, the important point is to develop impartial means of applying international 
law. The distinction between this law and the attitude prevalent among many Russian 
commentators, academics, and politicians was highlighted by the indictment of Mladic 
and Karadzic. As we have seen, Yeltsin questioned the legitimacy of this act. Karadzic 
and Mladic were almost certainly responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent 
civilians. It is precisely because they are `covered with glory' (as one Russian 
commentator argued in opposing the indictment)63 as a result of perpetrating such 
crimes, that they must be tried in the Hague if international law is to have any validity 
and if the nationalist project is to be defeated. 
Forms of Russian involvement 
The question of the direction of Russia's foreign policy became a subject of intense 
debate towards the end of 1995, when NATO expansion, the future role of Russia in 
Bosnia, the likely replacement of Kozyrev, and the forthcoming elections created the 
impression that a change of approach was necessary. The debate focused in particular 
on Russia's position in the world, and the Yugoslav conflicts and Russian interests in 
the region were considered in this context. 
Some commentators argued that it was in Russia's interests to concentrate on 
domestic re-building. For example, Iurii Borko, deputy director of the Institute of 
Europe (RAN) wrote in September 1995: 
Post-war Soviet diplomacy grew accustomed to operating under conditions of 
weakness. In fact, it always proceeded from exaggerated notions of the country's 
might, which led to a whole series of erroneous strategic decisions. It seems as if 
Russian diplomacy today is trying to compensate for the position of weakness 
through an obsessive effort to prove on a daily basis that Russia remains a `great 
power'. It is difficult to say whether this approach was chosen deliberately or is a 
63 Vasil'evskii (8 December 1995). 
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carry-over from the past, but in practice it looks like a strange mixture of arrogance 
and fuss-making. T` 
Nevertheless, some realist critics believed that precisely because of Russia's 
economic weakness, it was necessary to pursue an assertive foreign policy. For them, 
the Balkans were not just an area of Russian interests, but Russian involvement there 
was a sign of Russia's foreign policy strength and its global great power status. Lukin, 
for example, criticised Kozyrev's foreign policy (when Yeltsin hinted that he was due to 
replace the Foreign Minister in October 1995) thus: `there have been moments in 
history when Russia was weak, but it had a strong foreign policy. In the present period, 
since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia has been weak and has had a weak foreign 
policy. '65 Volobuev and Tiagunenko make a similar point in February 1992: `in other 
times, such as after the civil war, we were much weaker and poorer than we are now, 
but we had no shortage of national pride and independence'. 66 And Aleksei Pushkov 
writes: `Historically, foreign policy activity had always compensated for Russia's 
economic weakness. '67 
Pushkov claimed that there were two alternatives to Kozyrev's foreign policy 
course. The radical one was a complete break with the United States, the creation of a 
military bloc of CIS countries in response to NATO expansion, an emphasis in foreign 
policy and trade on countries such as Iraq and Iran, a military alliance with the Bosnian 
Serbs, and perhaps a strategic alliance with China on an anti-American basis. However, 
this would be dangerous and unworkable because it would require money and resources 
that Russia did not have. The other alternative `can be defined as a line aimed at 
carefully considered self-removal from the ranks of active players in the world', very 
close to that outlined by Borko. For Pushkov, 
[s]uch a policy would unquestionably be preferable for Russia and more acceptable 
for the Western world. However, it underestimates the significance of foreign 
policy activity from the standpoint of the domestic political struggle and seems 
much too passive to engender any kind of serious support within the country. In 
addition, there is a risk that the element of self-limitation that it contains, although 
reasonable, could take the form of the renunciation of Russian participation in any 
6" Borko (10-17 September 1995). 
65 Zhuravlev (20 October 1995). 
66 Volobuev and Tiagunenko (28 February 1992). 
67 Pushkov (16 November 1995). 
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serious games on such important geo-political playing fields as the Balkans or the 
Middle East. 68 
The problem with this debate is that - like the debate in 1992 - it was concerned 
with what areas Russia should be involved in, rather than how it should deal with them. 
Mostly, it was conducted from a neo-realist standpoint. Pushkov makes some pertinent 
points, but he assumes that if Russia is to be involved in the Balkans, then it will be on a 
zero-sum model (he sees this as necessary because the West acted from geo-political 
considerations from 1988 to 1992, driving Russia out of its areas of influence). 
Such analysis presents a very crude and simplistic picture. What exactly is meant 
by Russia's `position in the Balkans'? And what did it mean, as Ziuganov said, that the 
Dayton agreement not only `sidelined' Russia but `kicked it out of the Balkans 
altogether'69? Concentrating on domestic re-building did not have to mean `abandoning' 
Russia's presence in the Balkans. There were strong arguments for Russia to remain 
involved in conflict resolution in the Balkans. For example, Russian involvement in 
post-Dayton Bosnia through IFOR and through the Contact Group would be important 
for its success, in particular so that it would not take the form of NATO `imperialism'. 
But Russian involvement does not have to be on the basis of a realist, zero-sum 
approach. The point is not that Russia needs to be involved in `serious games on 
important geo-political playing fields', but that the supreme arbiter in the international 
system is the United Nations Security Council, on which Russia has a permanent seat. It 
is valid to speak of Russia as a global great power, but this does not mean that it has to 
compete with other great powers in regions of conflict, particularly when it lacks the 
resources to do so. On the contrary, it should co-operate and fulfil its duties as a great 
power. 
Robert Legvold writes: 
In the new foreign policy consensus ... no one bothers to focus on Russia's role in 
influencing for the better the coming international order. The constant 
preoccupation with Russia as a great power has largely become a matter of status 
without responsibility. 70 
But a return to the notion of great power duties as opposed to rights would actually give 
Russia higher prestige, more status. The shift of emphasis arose partly because of the 
perception that Russia was being `sidelined' in mediation efforts in 1992. Yet, this was 
68 Ibid.. 
69 Parrish (12 July 1996), p. 22. 
70 Legvold (1994), p. 271. 
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not true. It was the UN Security Council that passed key resolutions. The UNSC 
established UNPROFOR. Certainly, the EC was the initial mediator, but this was 
abandoned anyway in 1992. The London Conference established Russia's role. It also 
set up the ICFY, which had a permanent negotiator appointed by the United Nations; as 
a member of the UNSC, Russia had a say in the ICFY negotiations. Russia was 
involved in the development of the VOPP and the Contact Group plan. As we have 
seen, Western powers placed great emphasis on Russian involvement. 
It was only in summer 1995 that Russia was sidelined fully. This was because it 
was blocking the means required to achieve a settlement due to diplomats' insistence on 
protecting Russia's perceived interests and preserving an `impartial' policy. In other 
words, Russia was excluded as a result of its neo-realist approach. 
After Dayton 
Most Russian and Western commentators and policy makers believed that Russian 
participation in IFOR would be an important determinant for future Russian relations 
with NATO. For example, Nadia Arbatova wrote: `The future of the NATO-Russia 
partnership is now at stake in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it is successful, the IFOR 
operation will promote this partnership. If it is not, new confrontations will ensue. 71 
Churkin stated: 
Over the next 12 months the attention of practically all the European institutions, 
including NATO, will be focused on Bosnian affairs. As to our relations with the 
North Atlantic bloc, a great deal will depend on whether we will manage to set in 
motion our co-operation with them in Bosnia... n 
Western politicians and military personnel were, of course, entirely confident of the 
success of IFOR and of Russian participation within it. According to Grachev, after he 
had visited NATO headquarters, `several defence ministers think that the viability of 
partnership between Russia and NATO will show itself in the Bosnian conflict'. 73 
Thomas Petzold was sure that this would be a concrete example; he argued that 
`Yeltsin, Grachev and Kozyrev believe NATO is on a road to success in Bosnia via the 
IFOR operations and they wish to get involved; reaping some of the winnings'. 74 
If IFOR had not succeeded in keeping the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then it 
would certainly have had a negative impact on relations between Russia and NATO. 
" Arbatova (1996), p. 416. 
72 Russia TV (5 December 1995). 
73 Russian Public TV (3 December 1995). 
74 Petzold (31 October 1995). 
275 
But its success in bringing peace to Bosnia did not necessarily entail the wider 
partnership that these optimists assumed. Involvement in IFOR did, in fact, bring Russia 
into closer contact with NATO, particularly through its representatives at NATO 
headquarters and at SHAPE, and this laid the basis for the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
of 1997 and the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (which grew out of the 
Russian-NATO liaison in IFOR). But the problems with the Founding Act were similar 
to those with IFOR: the two sides had different views about what it signified. In relation 
to IFOR, this was evident from the start. 
For Russian policy makers, involvement in IFOR would give Russia the 
opportunity to influence NATO. Put simply, NATO would change its attitude through 
contact with Russia. For example, Kozyrev said that co-operation gave Russia 
the opportunity to defend our opinions on other issues as well. It also gives us the 
opportunity to influence NATO's evolution, because by co-operating with us on a 
wide range of issues, NATO will itself change in some way. " 
For NATO policy makers, Russian involvement in IFOR would change the attitude of 
Russian policy makers through contact with NATO. According to Holbrooke, the 
agreement on Russian involvement `not only made possible the Russian role in Bosnia 
but also went a long way to ameliorating Russian antagonism toward NATO 
enlargement'. 76 
Given the fundamentally different conceptions of the role of NATO in the post- 
Cold War world, it was unlikely that involvement in IFOR would make much 
difference. It was the military in particular that would gain experience of co-operation; 
but the percentage of personnel affected would be small, and attitudes of the General 
Staff in Moscow (and of many NATO officers) would not necessarily change. It was 
going to take a good deal more than the IFOR operation to overcome the kind of views 
expressed by Major-General Viktor Gromenkov: 
NATO's muscle-flexing policy, the arbitrary expansion of the bloc's zone of 
responsibility, the policy of its eastward enlargement, are primarily spearheaded 
against Russia. Moreover, NATO, as a result of its intervention in the Balkan 
events, has obtained first-hand experience in conducting offensive operations on 
foreign territory... All this shows that NATO is not our possible partner, but is a 
direct threat to Russia's security. It does not ensure Europe's stability. " 
75 Ekho Moskvy (5 December 1995). 
76 Holbrooke (1998), p. 259. 
77 ITAR-TASS (21 November 1995). 
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Even Colonel-General Shevtsov, who was very positive about the experience of co- 
operation in IFOR at a conference held in Russia in September 1996, said that `practical 
implementation of the decision to enlarge NATO to the East is the main factor that can 
78 considerably undermine our newly formed confidence in each other'. 
This comment underlines what I have argued, that Russia's attitude to the Balkans 
had, since 1992, been determined primarily by considerations of the wider relationship 
with the West and Russia's position in world affairs. Its Balkan policy had tended to be 
a reflection rather than a cause of the wider position. In particular, resistance to NATO 
action in Bosnia came not so much because of opposition to such action per se, although 
this was an element, but because of opposition to NATO's activity in Europe as a 
whole. Furthermore, Russia had based its Yugoslav policy on neo-realist notions of 
Russian interest in the Balkans, distinct from those of the West. This would only be 
strengthened by Kozyrev's successor, Evgenii Primakov. Co-operation might work in 
Bosnia, but that did not mean that there would not be acute differences over policy 
elsewhere in the Balkans, especially as Russia sought to strengthen its links with Serbia. 
At the start of 1996, the new Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, wrote that 
he believed that 
concrete co-operation in Joint Endeavour [IFOR] will show Russian decision- 
makers and the Russian public at large that NATO is sincere in its efforts to forge a 
close relationship with her. In fact it is a cornerstone of Alliance policy in the post- 
Cold War era that security in Europe can only be achieved with, and not by 
isolating, Russia. 79 
This is a direct echo of what Holbrooke claimed to be the Clinton administration's 
belief But Solana, NATO, and the Clinton administration would later face a dilemma 
similar to that which they had faced in 1995. 
When fighting broke out in Kosovo in 1998 between the Kosovo Liberation Army 
and Serb forces, NATO and American policy makers thought that they had learnt the 
lessons of Bosnia, did not want another Rwanda, and again believed that NATO 
credibility was at stake. They believed that `diplomacy backed by force' was the 
answer. Russia again opposed forceful action; not only did Russian diplomats refuse to 
acknowledge this lesson from Bosnia, but they also argued that Kosovo was a 
significantly different case. 
" Russian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (1997), p. 27. 
79 Solana (1996a). 
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When it came to a crisis, co-operation in Joint Endeavour made little difference to 
the Russian belief that NATO was pursuing its own interests in the Balkans and was not 
sincere in its efforts to forge a close relationship with Russia. This was reinforced by the 
actual fact of NATO expansion. On 12 March 1999, three former Warsaw Pact 
members joined NATO. Less than two weeks later, NATO launched air strikes against 
the FRY and Russia broke off all contacts with NATO. 
Co-operation in IFOR had failed to promote Russian-Western partnership because wider 
NATO policy had not changed, nor had Russia's foreign policy thinking. Even before 
the `Primakov era', this had reflected a neo-realist outlook on the part of the dominant 
policy makers in the Yeltsin administration. It was only in 1992 that Kozyrev and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had espoused a liberal, internationalist approach to foreign 
policy. This was based on the expectation of a strategic partnership with the West, on 
the grounds that Russia, as a liberal democratic power, shared similar interests with 
other liberal democracies. It also incorporated the belief that the leading powers had a 
duty to work together in international institutions such as the United Nations and the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in order to achieve a just resolution 
of conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia. Hence, Russian policy makers 
supported action by the international community to resolve the conflicts, and the use of 
such measures of coercion as the imposition of sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. The MFA saw Russia's duty as a great power to support these efforts; 
hence, for example, Russian troops participated in the United Nations' peace-keeping 
mission in Croatia. 
By 1994, the Russian approach had changed to a more assertive course in which it 
was no longer assumed that Russian and Western interests in relation to the conflicts 
would coincide. Instead, policy makers emphasised Russia's status as a major European 
and world power, with significant economic and strategic interests in the Balkans region 
which might differ from those of the West. They sought to establish Russia's great 
power credentials, to show that no crisis with global implications, and no major 
European crisis, could be resolved without Russian participation and without taking 
Russia's interests into account. In relation to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, no 
actions should be taken by other powers contrary to Russia's interests in the Balkans. 
This perception of direct Russian interests in the region was not clearly formulated, but 
the administration sought primarily to prevent military action against the Bosnian Serbs. 
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The shift occurred as a result of a combination of developments in Russia's 
domestic politics and in wider Russian-Western relations. By 1994, disillusionment with 
the West over the level of substantive support for the reform process, and the need of 
the Yeltsin administration to boost its domestic standing particularly after the October 
1993 clash with parliament and the elections of December 1993, meant that less priority 
was placed on partnership with the West and more on achieving domestic consensus. 
Furthermore, strategic issues were creating tensions between Russia and the West, 
particularly the United States. Russia's primary aim was to secure for itself a prominent 
position in an evolved European security structure, and saw NATO as the main threat to 
this. The Yeltsin administration attempted to restrict NATO's role in the conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia for a number of reasons: because it would give the organisation a 
new purpose; it would be de facto NATO expansion; it would exclude Russia from 
international conflict resolution; and NATO was also perceived as being biased against 
the Serbs. 
It was especially the role of NATO and differing views on military action that led 
to divisions between Russia and Western powers - in particular, the United States - in 
February 1994 and summer 1995. Nevertheless, Yeltsin and Kozyrev were never 
prepared to sacrifice wider relations with the West for the sake of the Bosnian Serbs. 
Although they had shifted from the notion of strategic partnership - with its liberal 
internationalist connotations - they still believed that Russian-Western co-operation was 
possible and desirable: for Russia, for the resolution of conflicts, and for the evolving 
security system. 
Hence, whereas in 1992, Russian policy makers emphasised Russia's shared 
interests with Western liberal democracies in relation to the conflicts, by the beginning 
of 1994, perceived divergences of interests had come to play a much greater part in 
Russian policy towards former Yugoslavia. The insistence on Russia's great power 
status, the attempts to delineate specifically Russian interests in the Balkans, and 
domestic considerations, meant that Russian policy makers blocked action by the 
international community that might have averted some of the worst massacres and 
`ethnic cleansing' in the conflicts and might have led to an earlier and more just peace. 
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Sources and bibliography 
Bibliographical note 
Western literature 
The thesis examines one area of Russian foreign policy after the Cold War, 
investigating rival foreign policy approaches and the impact of domestic political 
factors on the formulation of policy. In this context, there are two particularly valuable 
books: Malcolm et al (1996) and Wallander (1996). 
The first provides a detailed analysis of internal factors in foreign policy: 
ideological divisions, institutional competition, electoral politics, and the military. In her 
chapter on `Foreign Policy Thinking', Margot Light identifies three groups in the 
Russian elite on the basis of their foreign policy outlook: `Liberal Westernizers', 
`Pragmatic Nationalists', and `Fundamentalist Nationalists'. These categories 
correspond to the labels `liberal internationalists', `neo-realists/state centrists', and 
`ethnic nationalists' that I have used. Light shows the various stages in the debate 
leading to the formation of a `pragmatic nationalist' consensus by summer 1993, and 
investigates the areas of policy concern that affected this change. Neil Malcolm's 
chapter on `Foreign Policy Making' examines the role of the different foreign policy 
institutions and departments in the formation of foreign policy. Alex Pravda - in the 
chapter on `The Public Politics of Foreign Policy' - looks at the domestic factors 
outside the administration. He links the three foreign policy categories to the three 
major political groupings on domestic issues: radical reformers, centrists, and radical 
conservatives, arguing that there was close linkage between domestic and foreign policy 
outlooks. He examines the impact on foreign policy of political parties, economic 
groups and lobbies, parliament, and public opinion. Finally, Roy Allison examines 
`Military Factors in Foreign Policy', showing the changing influence of the military on 
foreign policy over time and in different policy areas. 
In Wallander (1996), there are particularly useful chapters by Astrid Tuminez on 
`Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy', James 
Richter on `Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity', and Bruce 
Porter on `Russia and Europe After the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and 
Foreign Policies'. Tuminez identifies four kinds of nationalism in post-Soviet Russia: 
`Liberal Nativism' (for example, Solzhenitsyn), `Westernizing Democracy' (Yeltsin, 
Kozyrev, Gaidar), `Statist Nationalism' (Rutskoi, Ambartsumov, Lukin), and `National 
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Patriotism' (Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii). Again, these categories correspond to the ones 
that I have used, with `National Patriotism' being the ideology of the red-brown 
coalition - extreme ethnic nationalism or neo-imperialism - and `Liberal Nativism' 
emphasising the Slav and Orthodox roots of Russian identity. Tuminez argues that 
`Statist Nationalism' has become the dominant elite ideology, as a result of domestic 
politics, promotion of elite interests, and international developments. Richter points out 
that the definition of what constitutes the `nation' affects the conception of `national 
interests', and examines the implications; for example, for ethnic nationalists, the rights 
of ethnic Russians in the `near abroad' are, by definition, part of Russia's national 
interests. Porter looks at the various policy outlooks and domestic political competition 
in the context of practical foreign policy issues for Russia in Europe, such as NATO 
expansion. He concludes with the argument that liberal reforms can only succeed in 
Russia if there is a perception that there is minimal external threat; the West can 
contribute by promoting this perception. Failure to do so could be disastrous: 
If Russia's external environment should again become more threatening, it may 
accelerate the coming to power of anti-Western Eurasianists or, worse, extreme 
nationalists. Such an eventuality could occur, for example, as the result of 
mismanaged Western efforts to extend NATO too rapidly or too aggressively to the 
East. (p. 142) 
Porter is interested in the relationship between foreign policy and domestic reform, 
and this is explored at greater length by Jack Snyder and by Celeste Wallander, who 
look at the relationship between democratisation and foreign policy. While Snyder 
warns that democratisation may lead to a more nationalist foreign policy than existed 
during authoritarian rule, Wallander suggests that Russia's foreign policy may become 
less predictable, since it is dependent on elections, perceptions of public opinion, and 
the relationship with parliament, in contrast to the Soviet period. 
These books illustrate the rival foreign policy conceptions in the debate in 1992, 
and explain the development of a consensus around a centrist, neo-realist position. A 
number of articles also chart this development, particularly in the context of European 
issues: Adomeit (1995); Crow (17 December 1993) and (6 May 1994); Jonson (1994); 
MacFarlane (1993) and (1994); Malcolm (1993, chapter on `New Thinking and After: 
Debate in Moscow about Europe') and (1994); Rahr (29 May 1992) and (15 February 
1995); Simes (1994). 
In addition, a number of edited books contain chapters that explore different 
aspects of Russian foreign policy: Allison and Bluth (1998); Arbatov et al (1999); Black 
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(2000); Clesse and Zhurkin (1997); Dawisha and Dawisha (1995); Galeotti (1995); 
Kanet and Kozhemiakin (1997); Ra'anan and Martin (1996); Shearman (1995). And 
there are some books that provide a cohesive survey of Russian policy in general or 
certain aspects of it, by single or joint authors: Bowker (1996); Buszynski (1996); 
Cooper (1999); Karaganov (1994); Petro and Rubinstein (1997); Rahr and Krause 
(1995); Skak (1996); Taylor, T. (1994); Truscott (1997); Webber (1996a). 
None of these books has a separate chapter on Russian policy towards the 
Yugoslav conflicts; instead, it is discussed (if at all) within the context of Russian 
relations with the West (the United States, Western Europe, and/or NATO), Russian 
attitudes to peace-keeping, Russia and international institutions, or Russian policy 
towards Central and Eastern Europe. This is perhaps surprising given the prominence of 
the Yugoslav issue in the foreign policy debate and the way that the debate over policy 
towards the conflicts revealed the different outlooks of Russian political forces. The 
relative neglect of this issue can be explained in part by the concentration on the `near 
abroad', which was the most important foreign policy issue. It might also be due to the 
complexity of the Yugoslav conflicts with which many Russian specialists are perhaps 
not familiar. 
Some exceptions are: Arbatov et al (1997), which has a chapter by Nadia Arbatova 
entitled `Horror Mirror: Russian Perceptions of the Yugoslav Conflict'; Baranovsky 
(1996), which again includes a chapter by Arbatova ('The Balkans Test for Russia') and 
one by F. Stephen Larrabee ('Russia and the Balkans: Old Themes and New 
Challenges'); Cross and Oborotove (1994), with a chapter entitled `Balkan Triangle: 
Washington, Moscow, and Belgrade' by Robin Remington; and Jonson and Archer 
(1996), including the chapter by Pavel Baev `The Influence of the Balkan Crisis on 
Russia's Peacekeeping in its "Near Abroad"'. 
The other source of chapters on Russia and the Yugoslav conflicts is surveys of the 
conflicts themselves, usually edited volumes: Andrei Edemskii `Russian Prespectives' 
(a good, clear survey of Russian policy until 1994) in Danchev and Halverson (1996); 
Danopoulos and Messas (1997), with a chapter by Igor Zevelev and Sharyl Cross 
entitled `Moscow and the Yugoslav Secession Crisis'; Paul Goble `Dangerous Liaisons: 
Moscow, the Former Yugoslavia, and the West' in Ullman (1996); Pavel Baev `The 
Impact on Relations between Western Europe and Russia', in Jopp (1994); and 
Bianchini and Shoup (1995) contains the chapter "Neopanslavism": Mutuality in the 
Russian-Serbian Relationship' by Il'ja Levin. 
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Lukic and Lynch (1996) includes a chapter on Russian policy based on their article 
(15 October 1993) in RFE/RL Research Report. Unfortunately, the chapter only covers 
until 1993, and over-emphasises the degree of pro-Serb sentiments in the Yeltsin 
administration at that time (see my discussion of the Vance-Owen plan in chapter 5). 
Overall, the book does not live up to its title - Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: 
the Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union - which suggests a direct 
comparison of the break-up of the two states; instead, the issues are dealt with almost in 
isolation, thus providing separate accounts of the break-up of the Soviet Union and of 
the SFRY, neither of which adds much to existing literature on the subject. 
Several books cover the development of the conflicts and international diplomacy 
in relation to them. Silber and Little (1996) provides a detailed, chronological survey, 
complementing the television series The Death of Yugoslavia (1995/6) which is based 
on very useful interviews with most of the leading actors. Glenny (1996) concentrates 
mainly on the outbreak of war in Croatia. Almond (1994) is a passionate attack on Serb 
nationalism and Western appeasement, and also places the conflicts in a historical 
context. Unlike these books, Woodward (1995) offers an account of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia more in terms of sociological and economic rather than political factors; but 
she also investigates international reactions. None of these books has a separate chapter 
on Russian policy, since they focus on the conflicts themselves and Western responses 
(which certainly had more impact on the outcome of the conflicts than did Russian 
policy). Glenny shows an understanding of the balance of domestic factors and concerns 
over NATO in the formulation of Russian policy after 1992 (see, for example, p. 281); 
like Woodward, however, he is perhaps insufficiently critical of Russian policy. This 
cannot be said of Almond, who errs to the other extreme: he sees Russia as embarking 
on a neo-imperialist policy in the former Soviet Union, and a pro-Serb policy in 
Yugoslavia, both of which were condoned by Britain in particular. 
Gow (1997a) is the most thorough investigation of international diplomacy in 
relation to the conflicts, and is a persuasive attack on the lack of will on the part of 
Western policy makers to impose a just settlement, specifically the Vance-Owen plan. 
Chapter 8 places Russian policy in the context of international diplomacy and compares 
Russian and American policy; while it provides a good survey of the various factors 
shaping Russian policy, it perhaps places too much weight on the impact of 
developments in the conflicts and Western diplomacy - in particular the abandonment 
of the Vance-Owen plan by America - and not enough on domestic pressure on 
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Kozyrev and Yeltsin and broader relations between Russia and the West (see my 
discussion of the Vance-Owen plan in chapter 5). 
Finally, there have been some papers or articles covering Russian policy towards 
the conflicts, published in journals: Bowker (1998); Cohen (1994); several useful 
analyses by Crow in RFE/RL Research Report; Lough (1993a); Parrish, (3 November 
1995) and (12 July 1996); Sherr (1996); Sobell (1995). 
Although many of these articles or chapters give useful insights into Russian policy 
- in the context of evolving Russian foreign policy, the domestic debate, relations with 
the West, and Russia's contribution to conflict resolution in Yugoslavia - they are 
necessarily too short to provide a comprehensive analysis of Russian policy which 
examines the relationship between these factors. Most were also written while the 
conflicts were continuing. This meant that, as well as the accounts being incomplete, 
some conclusions drawn were not borne out by subsequent developments. For instance, 
many were written in 1994, after the Sarajevo crisis. The crisis drew attention to 
Russia's role in conflict resolution and the impact of the Yugoslav conflicts on Russian- 
NATO relations, but it led to an over-estimation of Russia's importance in international 
mediation efforts. No detailed analysis of Russian policy over the whole period of the 
Bosnian and Croatian conflicts has yet been published in the West. 
Russian literature 
Nor has any book yet been published in Russia on Russian policy towards the conflicts. 
Interestingly, chapters in collections have tended to be in studies of Russia and the 
Balkans, Mediterranean, or Black Sea regions, showing that many Russian analysts 
view these areas as distinct geo-political regions and place the Yugoslav conflicts in this 
regional context. Hence, Carnegie Moscow Centre (1996) and Iaz'kova et al (1995) 
both contain articles looking at Russian relations with the various Balkan states or 
Balkans issues in general; and Kovalsky (1998) also includes chapters (by Arbatova and 
Benediktov) on Russian policy in the Balkans. 
Again, there have been a number of articles on Russia and the Yugoslav conflicts 
published in journals: Arbatova (1995) and (1998b); Romanenko (1996b), (1997b), 
(1998a); Smirnova (1994); Stepanova (1996); Volkov (1995). Some have appeared in 
Western journals: Baburkin (1996); Gus'kova (1995a); Kandel' (1996a); Romanenko 
(1996a); Sorokin (1993). There are also articles or monographs which provide an 
analysis of the conflicts in a historical context, or in the context of international 
mediation efforts, not focusing on Russian policy specifically: Gus'kova (1998a); 
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Leshchilovskaia (1994); Ponomareva and Dikevich (1996); Romanenko (1997a); 
Ulunian (1999); Utkin (1999); Volkov (1994); Volobuev and Tiagunenko (1997). These 
demonstrate that there is as wide a range of opinions on the causes of the conflicts and 
international reaction to them in Russia as there is in the West. 
Many of these analyses are useful resources for information on Russian policy 
towards the conflicts, the causes and course of the conflicts, and international 
diplomacy. But they also reveal different attitudes within academic circles towards the 
conflicts and Russian policy. Academics were prominent participants in the foreign 
policy debate, and I have discussed the rival outlooks particularly in chapters 3 and 4, as 
well as giving examples elsewhere in the thesis. 
Other sources 
Gus'kova (1993) is an invaluable resource, a collection of documents including official 
statements, parliamentary debates, resolutions, press conferences, appeals, interviews, 
newspaper articles by academics, journalists, and policy makers. Unfortunately, it ends 
in May 1993. Gus'kova (1996a) Jugoslovenska kriza i Rusija: Dokumenti, fakta, 
komentari (1991-1995) (in Serbo-Croat) includes the same kind of documents up to 
May 1995, although there is not much additional material. 
For official statements and press conferences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
Diplomaticheskii vestnik has proved very useful. For Duma resolutions and debates, I 
have used the relevant edition of Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Postanovleniia i drugie 
dokumenty and Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii published by 
Federal'noe Sobranie - parlament Rossiiskoi Federatsii. I have also used a number of 
Russian newspapers from across the political spectrum, both as factual resources and as 
examples of the debate. 
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